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Chapter 1 
A Malthusian Moment  
at Last? 
 
 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1798, Thomas Malthus saw an ever rising population and falling agricultural 
production as people moved to the cities. He examined the causes for these changes and 
concluded that the United Kingdom was on the verge of a demographic catastrophe. It 
seemed inevitable that there would be mass starvation or at least a permanent state of 
abject poverty for the vast majority of its population.1  Malthus argued that increases in 
agricultural productivity could not keep pace with population growth. The availability of 
land, the loss of farmworkers and the reduction of soil quality placed an absolute limit 
to growth on agricultural productivity.2 While he placed no limits on the capacity of the 
earth to continue increasing agricultural production, he argued that population growth 
would always outpace such production. He saw little option but to seek limit population 
growth, but saw no (at the time) morally acceptable means of doing so, except to limit 
welfare transfers to the urban poor. 
The fact that 19th century Europe did not see mass starvation and instead had 
massive increases in agricultural production has been seen as a rebuke to Malthus’ 
thesis.3  The key gap in Malthus’ approach was his inability to predict the role that 
technology would play in increasing agricultural productivity during the industrial 
revolution. He did not fully foresee the effects of the mechanization of farm 
production4, nor the role that colonialism and the expansion of trade would play in 
                                                        
 
1 Malthus, T. R. An essay on the principle of population, (London: J. Johnson, in St. Paul's Churchyard, 
1798.) 
2 Ch. II, Malthus, T. R.  
3 Although as Johnson notes, there were sporadic famines in Ireland and some other western European 
countries, there was no permanent stagnation in living standards. See p2, Johnson, D. Gale, “Population, 
Food and Knowledge” 90 The American Economic Review 1 (2000).  
4 See p2, Johnson, D. Gale, “Population, Food and Knowledge” 90 The American Economic Review 1 
(2000). 
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providing new sources and venues for agricultural production.5 It was a mix of policy 
and the ingenuity of invention driven by necessity that provided an escape from the 
demographic trap that was a consequence of Malthus’ thesis.  Technology saved the 
early industrial revolution from the limits imposed by land availability, and the transition 
to fossil fuels. The resultant new chemical industry created newer, cheaper products, 
better food preservation and a whole host of benefits that increased survivability. 
The heirs of Malthus can be found in the twin 20th century movements to 
address environmental degradation and population growth.6 Largely originating in the 
developed global north, advocates of global limits on population growth saw, in the 
newly independent developing country states, a demographic time bomb.  Here you had 
rapidly developing countries, all of whom were seeking to increase their production and 
consumption of goods to the same or greater rate than those of developed countries. 
This was combined with increased access to welfare transfers, to medical treatments for 
diseases, and to reductions in maternal and child mortality. Much like Malthus, those 
who feared a population bomb argued that the planet could not produce sufficient 
goods to support such a global population, if it continued to grow at the rates foreseen. 
The World Scientists’ Warning to Humanity, issued in 1992 stated: 
The earth is finite. Its ability to absorb wastes and destructive effluent is finite. 
Its ability to provide food and energy is finite. Its ability to provide for growing 
numbers of people is finite. And we are fast approaching many of the earth's 
limits. Current economic practices which damage the environment, in both 
developed and underdeveloped nations, cannot be continued without the risk 
that vital global systems will be damaged beyond repair. Pressures resulting 
from unrestrained population growth put demands on the natural world that 
can overwhelm any efforts to achieve a sustainable future. If we are to halt the 
destruction of our environment, we must accept limits to that growth.7 
 They saw limits on the capacity for agricultural and other goods to increase at 
a sufficient rate that would keep pace with consumption growth. Unlike Malthus, who 
advocated a reduction in welfare transfers, 8  the new Malthusians sought active 
government policies to discourage population growth in the face of the absolute limits 
on the capacity of the planet to produce enough resources to support a global 
                                                        
 
5 Although, as a matter of principle, Malthus saw such expansionism as the inevitable result of shortages 
of food brought on by population increases. See Ch. III.6, Malthus, T. R. An essay on the principle of 
population, (London: J. Johnson, in St. Paul's Churchyard, 1798.) 
6 Union of Concerned Scientists, “World Scientists Warning to Humanity” Union of Concerned Scientists,  
(1992) Available at: http://www.ucsusa.org/about/1992-world-scientists.html (last visited August 15, 
2014) 
7 Union of Concerned Scientists, “World Scientists Warning to Humanity”  
8 Ch. V, Malthus, T. R. An essay on the principle of population, (London: J. Johnson, in St. Paul's Church-
yard, 1798.) 
 3 
 
population that consumed at the level of the comfortable middle classes in the global 
north. Recent data has limited the power of population advocates as it has shown that, 
once a significant level of GDP is reached, population growth appears to stabilize or 
reduce.9  This has been most marked in those countries with low immigration and high 
per capita incomes, such as in Europe and Japan.10 This has been driven by two things: 
the first is a social phenomenon that Malthus took little account of; that the driver for 
large families among poor people was not the easy availability of food but the necessity 
to have many children to ensure that a sufficient number survived to adulthood to 
provide for their parents in their old age. 11   Reductions in child mortality due to 
medicines created a situation where this was no longer necessary. However, large 
families remained the norm in many countries due to the second issue: the inability of 
poor people to access the means of controlling their own fertility.12  The new fertility 
technologies such as the IUD and especially the contraceptive pill have been 
transformative in making it possible for those families assured of being able to ensure 
their children’s survival to have fewer children per family.13  Again, technology provided 
an escape. 
The core concept that has been adopted by advocates of limiting population 
growth from the environmental movement is that of carrying capacity i.e. the ability of 
an ecosystem to sustainably support the network of production, consumption and waste 
of its constituent elements in the long term.  Using this concept, some have argued that 
we may have already overshot the carrying capacity of the earth and have begun to 
consume the resources that would be necessary to sustain future populations. 14  In 
particular the argument is that it is unsustainable for everybody to consume at the level 
of the average European or American consumer without creating some form of 
planetary disaster.15 The argument for carrying capacity goes beyond just the issue of 
consumption. Because the processes of production and consumption have network 
effects and feed back into the ecosystem, the carrying capacity of a system is also 
defined by its ability to absorb and recycle waste.  Overpopulation or more specifically, 
levels of consumption that have the same effect, can therefore result in degradation of 
the ecosystem. Such degradation can lead to disease and starvation events that reduce 
population to a level that will allow the ecosystem to recover.  The new element that 
                                                        
 
9 WRI “Population Growth: Stabilization” in World Resources 1998-1999: Environmental Change and 
Human Health – 1998: A Guide to the Global Environment, A joint publication of the World Resources 
Institute (WRI), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).  
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Daily, G and P Erlich “Population, Sustainability and Earth’s Carrying Capacity” 42 BioScience, 761 
(1992); Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Ecosystems and Human Well-being (Washington DC: 
Synthesis. Island Press, 2005) 
15 See Arrow, K et al. “Are We Consuming Too Much?” 18(3) Journal of Economic Perspectives 147 (2004)  
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environmentalists have brought to the table is the argument that even at relatively stable 
populations, some levels and kinds of production, consumption and waste may be 
irreversible, creating permanent changes in the nature of the ecosystem itself. This 
results not in population crashes but in ecosystem crashes in which the evolutionary and 
adaptive niches of the creatures and plants that make up the ecosystem are destroyed.16 
In such a situation, the ecosystem changes irreversibly to become unsuited or hostile to 
the species that formerly inhabited it.17  With the prospect of irreversible climate change 
we may be encountering the very real possibility of an ecosystem crash for much of 
humanity, a true Malthusian moment. 
The Earth continues to experience record-breaking temperatures caused by 
increased atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse 
gases (GHGs).18 The impacts of this unprecedented warming include: increased floods 
and drought; rising sea levels; the spread of deadly diseases such as malaria and dengue 
fever, and; increasing numbers of violent storms and weather-related catastrophes.19 
Climate change presents a challenge to almost all areas of human economic activity 
because of our reliance on greenhouse gas emitting fossil fuels and fossil fuel products, 
the key driver of global modernization in the 20th century.20  Addressing climate change 
therefore appears to require that we give up the prospect of modernization and presages 
unprecedented changes and limits in our patterns of production and consumption. 
However, it may be that, just as in that post-industrial period when Europe 
made the transition from whale oil to fossil fuels and transformed agricultural 
production, technology may yet save us, or at least buy us time in which to consider our 
options.  Policymakers and citizens21 cling to the possibility that climate change can 
largely be addressed through the rapid dissemination of existing technologies, such as 
energy efficient light bulbs, windmills, solar panels, and the development of new ones 
such as carbon capture and storage, smart grids, and artificial meat. We may not have to 
give up our comfortable lifestyles in the US and Europe, or the promise of lifting 
millions out of poverty, in China and India and the rest of the developing world. 
 
                                                        
 
16 See Millennium   Ecosystem   Assessment Ecosystems   and Human Well-being (Washington DC: 
Synthesis. Island Press, 2005) 
17 See p18, UNEP, Towards a Green Economy: Pathways to Sustainable Development and Poverty 
Eradication, (Nairobi: UNEP, 2011). 
18 See p30, IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to 
the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, 
Pachauri, R.K and Reisinger, A. (eds.)] (Geneva: IPCC, 2007). 
19 See p48, Id. 
20 See Stern, D and C Cleveland, “Energy and Economic Growth” Rensselaer Working Papers in Economics 
0410, March 2004. Available at: http://ideas.repec.org/p/rpi/rpiwpe/0410.html (last visited August 15, 
2014) 
21 See e.g. Leonhardt, D “There’s Still Hope for the Planet” New York Times, July 21, 2012; p193, Stern, N. 
et al. The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007). 
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For that hope to become reality requires a massive effort in the near term to 
ensure distribution of existing technologies, and a significant effort in the longer term to 
invest in R&D and distribution of new innovations.  That effort has to be global and 
can only be accomplished by unprecedented levels of global cooperation. In terms of 
global cooperation, the global community has already accomplished a significant amount.  
194 countries, including the US, are parties to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 22  signed in 1992. 192 countries, not 
including the US, are party to the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC.23  The world has 
agreed to unprecedented levels of cooperation to develop and disseminate technologies 
to mitigate and adapt to climate change.24 
 
The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol were built on a fundamental political 
bargain directly involving technology transfer and cooperation. On one side, during the 
first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, developed 25  countries would take 
primary responsibility for emissions reductions.26 They would move toward low-carbon 
or carbon-free economies, while transferring technology to enable developing countries 
to make progress on carbon efficiency.27  Thus, carbon leakage, i.e., the shifting of 
polluting carbon-inefficient industries from developed to developing28 countries, would 
be avoided, through direct transfers29 and other measures such as emissions trading.30 In 
addition, developed countries would provide financial and technical assistance to 
developing countries to build capacities to adapt to the negative impacts of climate 
change.31 On the other side, the success of the first phase, including the transfer of 
technologies to enable clean development, would then enable developing countries to 
take on emissions reduction obligations. Since 1992, there has been significant growth in 
                                                        
 
22 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), New York, 9 May 1992, in force 
21 March 1994, 1771 United Nations Treaty Series 107 
23 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Kyoto Protocol), 
Kyoto, 10 December 1997, in force 16 February 2005, 2303 United Nations Treaty Series (2004) 148. 
24 Article 4,  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), New York, 9 May 1992, 
in force 21 March 1994, 1771 United Nations Treaty Series 107 
25 This term will be used interchangeably with the term “Annex 1” to refer to those countries listed in 
Annex 1 to the UNFCCC, which has significant overlap with membership of the Organization for Economic  
Cooperation and Development (OECD). This usage is what is common within the context of UNFCCC 
discussions and is common usage in many other international venues.  Where more specificity is required 
this thesis will refer specifically to UNFCCC Annexes, Kyoto Protocol Annexes, or to the specific grouping 
in the regime being discussed. 
26 Article 4 UNFCCC, and Annex I, Kyoto Protocol 
27 Article 4.3 UNFCCC 
28 This term will be used interchangeably with the term “non-Annex 1” to refer to those countries NOT 
listed in Annex 1 to the UNFCCC. This has considerable overlap with the G77plusChina grouping within 
the United Nations General Assembly (as well as other international venues). Where more specificity is 
required this thesis will refer specifically to UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol Annexes, or to the specific 
grouping in the regime being discussed. 
29 Article 4.3 and 4.5 UNFCCC 
30 Article 10 – 12, Kyoto Protocol 
31 Article 4.5 UNFCCC 
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the deployment of renewable energy technology worldwide.32 There have been great 
increases in R&D budgets.33 The world appears to be moving in the right direction. 
 
The problem is that the growth in renewable energy in R&D budgets remains, 
as it has historically, largely confined to developed countries (and, more recently, 
China).34  The vast majority of developing countries appear to have been left out of the 
boom. Developed countries, it is argued, have largely failed to provide effective transfer 
of environmentally sound, climate-related technologies as they are legally obligated to do 
under Article 4 of the UNFCCC.35 The response of developing countries has been two-
fold: a refusal to take on any GHG emissions reduction obligations until progress has 
been made on provision of financial resources and technology, based on Article 4.7 of 
the UNFCCC; 36  and a demand that international rules on intellectual property be 
relaxed, so that they would be free to copy and adapt climate technologies without 
waiting for financial support or permission from developed countries.37 
 
Why did developing countries raise the issue of intellectual property (IP)?  One 
of the great successes of recent international economic law for developed countries was 
the establishment of an agreement that all countries comply with a common, minimum 
set of high intellectual property standards.  The Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property (hereinafter “TRIPS Agreement”) 38  was signed as part of the 
Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 39  and made these 
                                                        
 
32 See p11, IEA “Clean Energy Progress Report: IEA input to the Clean Energy Ministerial” IEA/OECD, June 
2011. 
33 See p30, 36, 39, 54, Id. 
34 See p54, Id.  
35 See e.g. Khor, M. “Climate Change, Technology and Intellectual Property Rights: Context and Recent 
Negotiations” Research Paper 45, South Centre, April 2012. 
36 Article 4.7 UNFCCC states: “The extent to which developing country Parties will effectively implement 
their commitments under the Convention will depend on the effective implementation by developed 
country Parties of their commitments under the Convention related to financial resources and transfer of 
technology and will take fully into account that economic and social development and poverty 
eradication are the first and overriding priorities of the developing country Parties.”  This was reflected in 
the Bali Roadmap, the outcome of the 13th Conference of the Parties and the 3rd Meeting of the Parties 
in December 2007.  Para. 1(b), “Bali Roadmap” Decision 1/CP13 in UNFCCC “Report of the Conference of 
the Parties on its thirteenth session, held in Bali from 3 to 15 December 2007. Addendum. Part Two: 
Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its thirteenth session.” FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1, 14 
March 2008. 
37 UNFCCC “Negotiating Text”  FCCC /AWGLCA/2010/14, 13 August 2010 ; p34, UNFCCC “In-session draft 
texts and notes by the facilitators prepared at the twelfth session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-
term Cooperative Action under the Convention” FCCC/AWGLCA/2010/INF.1, 29 October 2010.  
38 Agreement of Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual property (TRIPS Agreement), Annex 1C to  the 
Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement), Marrakesh, 15 April 
1994, in force 1 January 1995, 1867 United Nations Treaty Series (1995) 4. 
39 Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement), Marrakesh, 15 
April 1994, in force 1 January 1995, 1867 United Nations Treaty Series (1995) 4. 
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standards subject to the dispute settlement system of the WTO. 40   That dispute 
settlement system created an unprecedented ability to enforce the rules on intellectual 
property. Developing countries argue that the TRIPS Agreement unduly restricts their 
ability to take measures to encourage and enable technology transfer.41  
 
What is not clear and has made an appropriate response difficult for the 
international institutions involved is whether this is true as a matter of fact. Does the 
TRIPS Agreement actually proscribe action by developing countries to address IP-
related constraints on technology transfer? If so, in what ways? What can, and should 
the UNFCCC do to respond if there are problems? 
 
The question that I aim to address in this thesis is a contingent one. I do not 
seek to answer the empirical question of whether or not the actual distribution of 
intellectual property rights, as they are today, pose a barrier to technology transfer at the 
global level. While this is a crucial and important question, I argue that it is not the most 
relevant one.  Precisely because the functioning of patent protection is the prerogative 
of national industrial policy, the questions regarding the necessity to act to address the 
role of intellectual property in technology transfer and climate change will arise at the 
national level. This is why I focus on the capacity to act, which is a necessary condition 
for answering the question of whether, in a specific national circumstance, where a 
country finds it is necessary to act, they able to do so.  This is not to say that global 
patterns of existing IP protection are not important context, but the key to the question 
of whether there is necessity to act on intellectual property lies in case by case and sector 
by sector analyses at the national level.  The scale and speed of the need to act is 
determined by each country’s obligations on reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions and its vulnerability to climate change, within the broader context of the 
global set of obligations.  Thus, while all countries must act to address climate change, 
each country, within the limits imposed by the global need, will have to determine which 
sectors, which technologies and which actors are to be addressed to ensure that they can 
mitigate and adapt to climate change. What has to be determined then is, firstly, what 
actions, if any, can countries take to address such problems should they arise; and 
secondly, what actions can and should the UNFCCC take to facilitate such action?   
 
My hypothesis is that if we properly take into account several factors: the 
timing of climate mitigation peaking dates and adaptation impacts; the scope of 
technologies to be addressed; and the scale of money and investment required: that 
developing countries really only have regulatory and market structuring responses 
                                                        
 
40 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), Annex 2 to  the 
Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement), Marrakesh, 15 April 
1994, in force 1 January 1995, 1867 United Nations Treaty Series (1995) 4. 
41 See p6, South Centre “Submission by the South Centre to the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) 
on ways to Promote Enabling Environments and Address Barriers to Technology Development and 
Transfer and the Role of the TEC” South Centre, 2012. 
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available to them to effectively address the climate challenge. Thus, as one of a set of 
market creation and regulating mechanisms, developing countries will have to address 
intellectual property in structuring their technology markets.  I will examine whether, as 
it stands, the TRIPS Agreement provides sufficient flexibility to enable countries to 
structure their climate technology42 markets to ensure maximum diffusion.   
 
Thus for the purposes of this thesis, the key question with respect to 
intellectual property and climate change is whether, in a situation where the 
behaviour of specific intellectual property holders bars, or unduly limits, the 
adoption, adaptation and replication of a specific climate technology in a 
specific domestic sector do UNFCCC member states have the tools necessary to 
address such behaviour or are these blocked, or hindered to an undue extent by 
the TRIPS Agreement?  If so, can and should the UNFCCC take action to enable 
the use of such tools or provide other ways to enable such action?   
 
The question of whether intellectual property poses a barrier is a necessary 
precursor to the question of what kinds of actions the UNFCCC should take. Where the 
TRIPS Agreement can be seen to be a significant barrier to the use of such tools, then 
the UNFCCC may need to take action directed at the norms and standards on 
international intellectual property. Where intellectual property is not seen to be a barrier, 
are there nevertheless actions that the UNFCCC can take to ensure diffusion of IP 
protected technologies at the rate and scope required to meet the climate challenge? 
 
 
II. DEFINING TERMS AND FRAMEWORK 
 
The aim of this thesis is to construct a proper basis for analysis, with clear 
operational definitions for what constitutes technology transfer, what constitutes a 
barrier, and what constitutes necessity to act to address those barriers. In this way it 
aims to go beyond the simplistic framing that focuses on the static question of specific 
examples of IP protected technologies not being transferred and focuses instead on 
targets for action: for timing; for scope; and for geography.  The question of what 
actions the UNFCCC should take on intellectual property has been much discussed in 
the UNFCCC negotiations (see chapter 4), and in the literature (see Chapter 3 for more).  
I contend (in Chapter 3) that a significant problem for all prior research in this area is a 
failure to provide a proper basis for analysis and therefore the mechanisms and 
proposals for addressing the problem have been inappropriate and lacking in scale.  This 
analytical framework, the answer it provides from the analysis of the TRIPS Agreement, 
and the implications that this has for what actions the UNFCCC can and should take 
are the major contribution of this thesis to the state of the art.  To do so I focus closely 
on the terms being used: “barrier”; “necessity”; and “technology transfer”. 
                                                        
 
42 This general term will be used to refer to both technologies for mitigation and for adaptation.  
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II.1 Defining the term “barrier” in the intellectual property and climate change 
context 
The definition of what is a barrier is therefore crucial to this thesis. I do not 
ask whether the existing framework poses an absolute barrier to the flow of 
technologies. While a useful and interesting exercise it is essentially static and does not 
focus on the question of capacity to act. The important issue in defining a barrier is 
understanding the nature of the object being described as a barrier. Here there is a 
crucial distinction that needs to be made with respect to intellectual property subject 
matter i.e. between technological products and technological knowledge. 
 
At the core of the issue of technology transfer is the role of patents. Patents 
can be a positive force, providing incentives for the production and dissemination of 
new knowledge and facilitating licensing which allows the exchange of knowledge to 
occur securely and predictably.   They are a key business tool, allowing entrepreneurs to 
use them as collateral for investors as they raise money, to show investors a future 
business model based on exclusive use (or out-licensing) of the patent.  In established 
enterprises patents can be a way of insuring against the risk of moving into a new 
market sector, or a way of blocking or limiting market entry by competitors into an 
established sector.  Finally, patent owners can engage in actual production of the 
technology themselves, which many do. All of these are legitimate exercises of the rights 
conferred by a patent.  While patents provide the strongest possibility for such business 
strategies, some of the same frameworks can be applied to other forms of intellectual 
property.  It is simply that patents provide the strongest possibility of exclusion and 
precisely because they are aimed at technical fields, implicate a significant share of 
business undertakings either as a tool of ownership or as a determinant of the freedom 
to operate.   
Enterprises that engage in licensing can follow several strategies including43: 
 Licensing without production; this may allow for non-exclusive as well as 
exclusive licensing; generally the plan is either to charge a significant amount 
for a single license and receive royalties from an ongoing concern or license 
multiple times to many actors to maximize returns; 
 Licensing to companies to carry out proof of concept, demonstration and 
possible commercialization; again, the rightholder tends not be the one with 
the capacity to do so or to enter into production; 
                                                        
 
43 Drawn from p6, Lee, B et al. “Who owns our Low Carbon Future: Intellectual Property and Energy 
Technologies” Chatham House, September 2009. 
 10 
 
 Strategic licensing to suppliers and non-competitors to enable production and 
supply chain management upstream and downstream of the main activity of 
production by the rightholder; this is largely vertical to subsidiaries, parent 
companies and other tightly integrated partners such as in joint ventures; 
 Licensing to competitors; this can be used to parcel out markets, so that the 
license is restricted to a product type or a geographical area in which the 
rightholder has no interest and can use the license to commit the licensee to 
not entering the market in which it operates itself. 
While all of these are rational actions by firms, from a public policy and global 
welfare perspective some of these behaviours, in the aggregate, may not be optimal for 
technology innovation and diffusion to address climate change.  Where interests 
converge, companies may also engage in cross-licensing or standardization exercises to 
better enable production for all of them related to core or common technologies that 
they all need to participate in the market. One iteration of this is the patent pool in 
which firms ‘pool’ their patents to license them jointly to non-members but to also 
allow the members free or low cost access to each other’s technologies.  Where the pool 
contains complementary technologies, this can be a vehicle for increasing market 
efficiency but where the patents cover similar areas and functionalities, significant 
problems of monopoly power arise. 44 
The patent system has several built-in safety valves to ensure that appropriate 
patents are given (requiring patent applications to meet basic criteria such as novelty, 
inventive step, industrial applicability) and that others can test and learn from the 
invention (providing research exceptions and requiring disclosure), encouraging follow-
on innovation, and preventing wasteful duplication of efforts. However, patents may 
sometimes have negative effects. For example, patents may (but not always) create a 
type of monopoly control through the exclusive rights they confer on the owners of 
patented technology or knowledge. The existence or use of a patent may reduce 
competition, maintaining high prices for a product above marginal cost of production as 
the patent owner has no incentive to lower the price of the technology, make it more 
competitive or allow others to reproduce or use it.45  
 Patents are well-suited to encouraging innovations, encouraging initial 
disclosure of knowledge but, other than licensing, are not specifically directed at 
increasing diffusion of technologies. In some circumstances, the exclusive rightholder 
has an interest in limiting diffusion of the knowledge so that they can be the sole 
                                                        
 
44 See den Uijl, S et al. “Managing Intellectual Property Using Patent Pools: Lessons from Three 
Generations of Pools in the Optical Disc Industry” 55 California Management Review 31 (2013).  
45 Boldrin, M and Levine, D “The Case Against Patents”, 27 The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3 
(2013)  
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producer of a product for which they can charge a high per unit price.  This ability to 
focus on the high-priced niche market is intrinsic to the patent grant, for products.  
However, diffusion requires broader production and where demand is high, a producer 
who can provide all products at a price accessible by all relevant consumers.  
Intellectual property is a trade-off between present (static efficiency) anti-
competitive costs and the generation of future technologies (dynamic efficiency).  
Governments are constantly assessing the appropriate balance between static and 
dynamic efficiency and use several tools to shift the balance in one direction or another 
depending on specific policy goals and needs at a particular time. The tools that they use 
to do so include: compulsory licensing, working requirements, patent exceptions, patent 
exclusions and the broad application of competition law to restructure markets in 
technological knowledge and technological products. 
In the context of IP interventions to address technology transfer there is a key 
distinction which is sometimes hidden in the broader rhetoric and debate around the 
appropriateness and purpose of actions taken by developing countries. It is crucial for 
the purposes of discussing technology transfer to distinguish between the price of a 
product embodying knowledge/technology and the price of the knowledge/technology 
itself.  Generally, as a function of normal pricing, the price paid for goods will include 
the price paid by the producer/seller for the access to the knowledge/technology.  The 
concerns and goals will be very different depending on whether the primary concern is 
access to the products embodying the knowledge/technology or the 
knowledge/technology itself. 
Where the issue is access to goods there are two levels of concern. The first is 
ensuring the normal flow of goods by making certain that prices of products are not set 
so high that it is too expensive for the relevant economic actors to afford. The second 
level, which applies to climate change the most, is ensuring that prices of products are 
not set so high that they make it too uneconomical to adopt climate technologies. A 
model of the access to goods discussion can be found in the access to medicines debate 
that took place at the WTO, leading up to the adoption of the Doha Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health in 2003.46  In the face of public health crises, 
countries and individuals have had limited funds and an inability to purchase all the 
drugs necessary to meet the needs of their populations.  The results have been avoidable 
deaths and increased costs to society of chronic and untreated diseases.  However, as 
                                                        
 
46 See Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, adopted on 14 November 2001 by the 
Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference, Doha, Qatar (WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2). See also Abbott, F M “Innovation 
and Technology Transfer to Address Climate Change: Lessons  from  the  Global  Debate  on  Intellectual  
Property  and  Public  Health”,  ICTSD’s  Programme  on  IPRs and Sustainable Development, Issue Paper 
No. 24, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Geneva, Switzerland, 2009. 
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Abbott points out, there are crucial differences with respect to climate change.47 For 
example, in the field of renewable energy, there may be range of technological solutions 
to the same problem available, unlike in pharmaceuticals where a particular drug tends 
to lay claim to a whole treatment pathway.48 In contrast, electricity, or more broadly 
energy, is a fungible commodity which can be produced by multiple kinds of 
technologies and ‘sold’ in multiple market paths. 49  In addition, the pharmaceutical 
industry largely maintains control of its innovations rather than out-licensing as is the 
case in many other industries. 50   Finally, for many products related to renewable 
energies, the IP premium may be a small part of the overall cost, although the empirical 
data on this is scarce.  This may be due to simply higher costs of capital involved in 
generating the hardware, but also to more distributed and more frequent licensing due 
to competition between technology holders, keeping the premium lower.  In both cases, 
the importance of maintaining a competitive number of producers in the market is 
crucial for keeping product prices low.   
Where the issue is access to the knowledge there are multiple concerns, 
primarily related to those situations where there is a need to change production 
processes themselves. In such cases, where access to technologies is required to change 
the nature of a production process, some of the most difficult problems to overcome 
are refusals to license, the high cost of licensing, and patent owners maintaining a 
monopoly on the knowledge so as to prevent competition. The final element is 
particularly undesirable as without it, countries or firms can produce competing 
products, thus more efficiently achieving widespread dissemination of the knowledge 
and products. The knowledge about the technology may then be used to adapt it to local 
market conditions.  For a full transition to a low carbon economy, the best available 
existing technologies need to be incorporated into production and consumption 
processes in developing countries.  Achieving low carbon economies in developing 
countries cannot be achieved through sale of products alone into developing country 
markets.  Such an approach would result in the complete absence of developing country 
firms and 100% market share of the domestic economy by developed country firms. 
The only way in which low carbon economies can reasonably be achieved is by 
transforming firms in developing countries rather than pushing them out of business. 
However, as noted, where the concern is to get products into the hands of consumers 
and relevant actors as quickly as possible, decreasing any barriers to imports of any kind 
(including lowering of tariff barriers and allowing parallel importing) then becomes a 
                                                        
 
47 See p3, Abbott, F M “Innovation and Technology Transfer to Address Climate Change: Lessons  from  
the  Global  Debate  on  Intellectual  Property  and  Public  Health”,  ICTSD’s  Programme  on  IPRs and 
Sustainable Development, Issue Paper No. 24, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable 
Development, Geneva, Switzerland, 2009. 
48 See p10, Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
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crucial part of policy, and concerns about protecting local firms may need to move to 
the background. 
All these concerns prompt responses from governments to address supply 
problems.  Actions taken to reduce monopolies and force sharing of knowledge, or to 
enforce lowering of prices of goods, may affect incentives to produce future 
technologies. The extent and effect of that lowering are in dispute but it is clear that at 
least some firms will act as if they believe this to be the case. In addition, the patent is a 
market-based mechanism. Intervention I would argue, then, need only occur when there 
is a market failure – based on the principle that intervention is justified either: 
 where there is insufficient distribution of products embodying a technology in 
the national market to meet demand at a price that is affordable.  This 
justification may be even stronger in a situation of emergency, threats to 
survival, the environment, health, human rights and other fundamental needs 
that economic policies such as intellectual property are designed to achieve; 
 where there is insufficient distribution of knowledge to enable a critical 
number of producers in the market to adopt climate technologies and ensure 
their participation in the market in the face of regulatory or market 
requirements to lower carbon emissions. This implies of course that there are 
national regulatory standards aimed at climate mitigation and adaptation. 
In that sense, the market conditions described are the ones that define the 
“necessity” for a government to act. As Arrow argues, there are significant situations 
where government intervention may be necessary to either create markets (in the case of 
the intellectual property grant) but also to address gaps and failures where the market is 
unlikely to generate certain kinds of public goods or enable certain public welfare 
outcomes because of the aggregate of individual firm decisions. 51  That concept of 
necessity has to underpin any analysis of whether the TRIPS Agreement poses a barrier 
to developing country action in such cases.  This requires us to focus on the ways in 
which the concept of necessity is treated within the TRIPS Agreement and the broader 
corpus of WTO law, to determine the extent to which it limits the conditions under 
which ‘necessity’ is said to exist to a narrower set of market conditions than those 
above. This is why in Chapter 6, I carry out an in depth examination of the treatment of 
“necessity” as a trigger for action.  In addition, then we would also examine not just 
whether such conditions were considered to trigger the necessity to act, but also 
whether the permissible actions allow countries to take the scope of action, within the 
right time frame, in the appropriate territory to address the market condition.  This is 
                                                        
 
51 Arrow, K “Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention’ in The Rate and Direction of 
Economic Activity Economic and Social Factors (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962). 
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what, properly understood, would constitute a barrier to action, within this thesis, and 
constitutes the basis for analysis in Chapter 6 of whether TRIPS poses a barrier.   
Clearly there are interventions beyond the intellectual property sphere that 
could be carried out, and I do not intend to argue that intellectual property may be the 
only or primary barrier. However, it is one of a complex set of interactions that, on the 
whole, present issues for developing countries, and many of them have a basic problem 
at their core: cost of action.  
Most interventions on IP are aimed at the supply-side; how to ensure that 
there are enough products or technologies on offer in the market.  A significant part of 
the technology transfer picture is the demand-side; the creation or expansion of markets 
for products and technologies.  On the demand-side countries can take action to 
increase or expand markets, such as52: 
- Establishing performance standards either on technologies or at sector level 
for energy efficiency or other climate goals; 
- Leveraging government procurement of climate technologies; 
- Establishing Feed-in tariffs for clean and renewable energy; 
- Removing fossil fuel subsidies, for production and consumption; 
- Establishing, credible and predictable legal frameworks for technology related 
transactions, including enforcement of intellectual property rights; 
- Increasing competition in large monopoly or quasi-monopoly  markets, 
especially in energy and infrastructure-related sectors; 
- Increasing market transparencies; 
- Reducing tariffs and taxes on crucial inputs to small and medium enterprises in 
supplier relationships with foreign firms in the low carbon sectors;53 
 
In terms of actions to create market demand for renewable energy for 
example, many developing countries have already taken significant unilateral action to 
put policies in place, (by 2010 over 45, including all emerging economies) including 
renewable energy targets.54  Others have made explicit pledges for GHG reductions by 
2020 within the UNFCCC framework (e.g. Brazil, India, China, Mexico, and South 
Africa).55  To a significant extent, developing countries have signalled to markets that 
                                                        
 
52 See also Chapter 23, p6, Stern, N. et al. The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
53 p33, Maskus, K E “Encouraging International Technology Transfer” ICTSD Issue Paper No. 7, May 2004.  
54 See p226, UNEP, Towards a Green Economy: Pathways to Sustainable Development and Poverty 
Eradication, (Nairobi: UNEP, 2011). Available at: www.unep.org/greeneconomy, (last visited August 15, 
2014) 
55 See Fekete, H. et al “Emerging economies – potentials, pledges and fair shares of greenhouse gas 
reduction” ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH OF THE GERMAN FEDERAL MINISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT, 
NATURE CONSERVATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY Project-no. (FKZ) 3711 41 120, (Umweltbundesamt, 
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they seek to take action and seek funding and investment to do so, even where the full 
range of policy interventions has yet to be implemented. 
 
Developing countries can also take actions to better enable capacity for 
absorption, imitation and adaptation of technology by: 
- Increasing education (both in relevant research based universities and in 
firms);56 
- Reducing brain drain by ensuring opportunities for employment and 
entrepreneurship for trained scientists, technologists and engineers; 
- Increasing subsidies and preferential tax treatment for research and 
development activities in firms and in universities, linked to ensuring 
commercialization of research; 
- Establishing networks of research institutions in specific key sectors and 
directly funding research and development of technologies; 
- Establishing durable physical and soft infrastructure for transport and 
exchange of goods and information; in particular low cost access and 
connection to global information networks is a crucial issue especially for small 
and medium enterprises. 
 
More generally, there are governance issues endemic to some countries that are 
a hindrance to the functioning of markets as a whole requiring that countries ensure: 
- stable, predictable and transparent governance structures for commercial 
activity; 
- stable macroeconomic policy. 
 
However, to the extent that such problems exist and actions are taken, the cost 
of action falls on national budgets and is sometimes passed directly on to consumers 
and taxpayers. 57  In the context of the UNFCCC and the framework for burden-
sharing58, (which this thesis adopts) where such actions are undertaken by developing 
countries, the costs should be financed by developed countries as part of their 
                                                                                                                                   
 
Bonn, April 2013). Available at: http://www.umweltbundesamt.de/publikationen/emerging-economies-
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56 p34, Maskus, K E “Encouraging International Technology Transfer” See also p70, Maskus, K “The Role 
of Intellectual Property Rights in Encouraging Foreign Direct Investment and Technology Transfer” in 
Maskus, K & C Fink (eds.) Intellectual Property and Development: Lessons from Recent Economic Research  
(Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2005). 
57 See p369, Stern, N et al. The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007). 
58 Article 4.7 of the UNFCCC states: The extent to which developing country Parties will effectively 
implement their commitments under the Convention will depend on the effective implementation by 
developed country Parties of their commitments under the Convention related to financial resources and 
transfer of technology and will take fully into account that economic and social development and poverty 
eradication are the first and overriding priorities of the developing country Parties. 
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UNFCCC obligations.   Which brings us to one of the primary issues that drives this 
thesis: it is in the absence of such financial support that developing countries have 
sought to push for greater flexibility to address intellectual property issues that may 
arise.   
To a significant extent, the necessity for a developing country to take action to 
address intellectual property would be alleviated by developed countries providing full 
financial support for developing country actions addressing climate change mitigation 
and adaptation, including local adoption, adaptation and reproductive capacity.  This is 
clearly true for those actions meant at ensuring access to goods, but also true for those 
actions related at addressing the cost of licensing. Where developed countries provide all 
the funds necessary to pay the costs of licensing for technologies, much of the necessity 
to act is absent.  It is the failure to do so by developed countries that has prompted 
developing countries to argue for the necessity to intervene in intellectual property 
markets in a way that imposes no costs on them but on developed country actors.  In 
Chapter 4, I discuss the existing mechanisms, the ways in which they are linked to 
financial support and why they have been and may continue to be unsatisfactory 
mechanisms for addressing technology transfer.  
However, there are limitations to what pure financial support can accomplish 
especially when the primary need is for adoption, adaptation and replication of the 
knowledge/technology.  In those circumstances, it is likely that firms in developing 
countries may run into broader problems such as refusals to license, restrictive licensing 
terms (grant-back conditions, geographic and export restrictions; non-compete clauses), 
non-availability of trade secrets and know-how.  While there may be a market price to 
get around these restrictions, there are significant circumstances in which that market 
price may be prohibitively high and creates such an opportunity cost that it may make 
other actions or the commercial viability of the venture or the firms involved 
questionable.  In addition, there may be structural limitations to licensing, such as the 
tendency for licensees to prefer exclusive licenses that limit the diffusion of technologies 
to one or two firms rather than all relevant actors in the market. 
Where foreign firms engage in foreign direct investment and joint ventures, 
host countries may still see a need to encourage spillovers into their domestic markets, 
beyond subsidiaries, joint ventures or single supplier or purchaser firms. Countries may 
seek to exercise interventions that address these issues as well. 
This discussion above identifies crucial elements to defining a barrier: are there 
market conditions that create a necessity to act at the national level? If so, does the 
TRIPS Agreement address the full scope of that necessity as a trigger for action? Finally, 
does the TRIPS Agreement limit the kinds of action that would address the full scope of 
that necessity in terms of timing, scope of technologies, and geographical scope? 
 
The nature of the climate challenge is precisely one that requires a dynamic 
understanding of what constitutes a barrier.  The operational definition that this thesis 
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will be working with defines an intellectual property barrier as one that prevents 
countries from: 
1. Appropriately defining necessity as: 
a. Affordability - ensuring that prices of products and/or 
know-how are not set so high that it is too expensive for all 
the relevant economic actors to afford.  
b. Adoptability - ensuring that prices of products and/or 
know-how are not set so high that they make it 
commercially unviable for all relevant actors to adopt 
climate technologies. 
c. Adaptability – ensuring sufficient distribution of knowledge 
(information, skills, know-how) to enable a critical number 
of existing producers/service providers in the market to 
adopt, adapt and replicate climate technologies and ensure 
their participation in the market. 
2. Taking actions that:  
a. address the full scope of technologies required by them to 
meet the climate change mitigation and adaptation needs; 
b. at the rate and level of diffusion appropriate to achieving 
those mitigation and adaptation needs; 
c. in the developing countries and regions that most 
effectively meet the climate change need. 
 
In this I take the market barriers approach defined by the OECD and the IEA: 
that a market barrier is one that “slows the rate at which the market for a technology 
expands”.59  It focuses not on an absolute bar, but in the market effect and the dynamic 
rate at which technology diffusion should occur. 
 
II.2 Defining technology transfer 
 In order to avoid confusion it is also necessary to establish an operationally 
appropriate definition of the term “technology transfer”. 60 The first thing to note is that 
we are not addressing technology transfer in the domestic sense, which is the movement 
of research from the development phase into deployment and commercialization.  Here 
I mean international technology transfer, as in the flow of technological goods and 
knowledge across borders. We can consider that transfer happens when technology is 
first transferred from one country to another and is then adopted by public entities or 
private firms, being built into either their means of producing goods and services, or 
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built into the products and services themselves. Despite there being broad agreement as 
to the positive impact technology transfer can have, there is no universally recognized or 
legally enforceable definition as to what technology transfer is or what form it must take.  
 
Within the realm of trade agreements, the closest definition was the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Draft International Code 
of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology which defined it as “the transfer of 
systematic knowledge for the manufacture of a product, for the application of a process 
or for the rendering of a service and does not extend to the transactions involving the 
mere sale or mere lease of goods.”61  The definition is followed by a statement that 
transfer of technology transactions are arrangements between parties involving transfer 
of technology (as defined), particularly in: the assignment of industrial property, the 
provision of know-how and technical expertise, the provision of technological 
knowledge to install and operate equipment and the provision of the contents of 
technical cooperation arrangements. The full definition also includes:62 
 
(a) The assignment, sale and licensing of all forms of industrial property, 
except for trademarks, service marks and trade names when they are not part 
of transfer of technology transactions;  
(b) The provision of know-how and technical expertise in the form of 
feasibility studies, plans, diagrams, models, instructions, guides, formulae, basic 
or detailed engineering designs, specifications and equipment for training, 
services involving technical advisory and managerial personnel, and personnel 
training;  
(c) The provision of technological knowledge necessary for the installation, 
operation and functioning of plant and equipment, and turnkey projects;  
(d) The provision of technological knowledge necessary to acquire, install and 
use machinery, equipment, intermediate goods and/or raw materials which 
have been acquired by purchase, lease or other means;  
(e) The provision of technological contents of industrial and technical 
cooperation arrangements. 
 
The draft code was never adopted. The definition, however, was not one of 
the major bracketed elements of the draft and was not a significant factor in the failure 
                                                        
 
61 Article 1.2, UNCTAD Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology. See p262 
UNCTAD “Compendium of International Arrangements on Transfer of Technology: Selected Instruments - 
Relevant Provisions in Selected International Arrangements Pertaining to Transfer of Technology” 
UNCTAD/ITE/IPC/Misc.5, UNCTAD 2001. Available at: 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs//psiteipcm5.en.pdf 
62 Article 1.3, UNCTAD Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology in UNCTAD, 
See p263 Id. 
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to adopt the code.63  The definition of technology transfer that it generated remains one 
of the first and most influential iterations at a multinational level of what technology 
transfer means. 
 
Even though technology transfer is stated as an objective of the TRIPS 
Agreement,64  and Article 66.2 requires developed country members to put in place 
incentives to encourage their enterprises to carry out technology transfer to LDCs, there 
is no definition of technology transfer in the TRIPS Agreement. Therefore it was hardly 
a surprise when developed country members submitted reports to the WTO’s TRIPS 
Council on their compliance with this obligation 65  that there was not a shared 
understanding of the concept of transfer of technology.66  
 
In the WTO Working Group on Trade and Transfer of Technology 67 
(WGTTT), work on defining technology transfer has not progressed: developing 
countries concerned that too broad a definition would encompass inappropriate 
activities, and developed countries concerned that too narrow a definition would not 
address enabling environments in developing countries and broader capacity building 
activities that were being funded by bilateral and multilateral development assistance.68 
While the WGTTT has largely devolved into a discussion group, it has nevertheless 
produced some useful documents on taxonomies and categories of measures for 
consideration by WTO members. 69   The 2002 background note provided by the 
secretariat usefully identifies 4 stages of technology transfer:70 
 
1) Cross border transfer or acquisition 
2) Learning – acquiring know-how and know-why 
3) Adaptation – fitting the technology to local conditions 
4) Diffusion – the spread of the technology within a country 
 
                                                        
 
63 See p26, Gehl Sampath, P and P Roffe, “Unpacking the International Technology Transfer   Debate:   
Fifty   Years   and   Beyond” ICTSD   Programme   on   Innovation,   Technology   and Intellectual  Property 
Working Paper;  International  Centre  for  Trade  and  Sustainable Development, (2012).  
64 Article 7, TRIPS Agreement 
65 On 19 February 2003, the Council for TRIPS adopted a decision establishing arrangements for the 
submission by developed country Members of annual reports on their implementation of Article 66.2 
and their annual review by the Council for TRIPS. (See "Implementation of article 66.2 of the TRIPS 
Agreement - Decision of the Council for TRIPS of 19 February 2003" - IP/C/28) 
66 Minutes of Meeting of Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights - IP/C/M/55 – 
21 December 2007, par 175 (Brazil) and par 183 (Switzerland) 
67 Established after the Doha WTO Ministerial as part of the Doha Development Round, para. 37, 
Ministerial Declaration, Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session Doha, 9 - 14 November 2001, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 20 November 2001. 
68 Report of The Working Group on Trade and Transfer Of Technology to the General Council, 
WT/WGTTT/5, 14 July 2003. 
69 See e.g. A Taxonomy on Country Experiences on International Technology Transfers: Note by the 
Secretariat, WT/WGTTT/W/3, 11 November 2002. 
70 See p2, Id. 
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For a successful technology transfer to have occurred, all four of these stages 
must be enabled.  For the purposes of climate change especially, diffusion into the rest 
of the economy is paramount.  Combined with an understanding of the channels of 
technology transfer, the target of technology transfer and the content of technology 
transfer, it may be possible to have a sufficiently operationalized definition of 
technology transfer for the purposes of this thesis. 
 
I also draw from the definitions of technology transfer that are found in the 
environmental arena, especially multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) as we are 
specifically concerned with technology transfer as understood in the UNFCCC.  The 
clearest and most well-articulated provisions can be found in Chapter 34 of Agenda 21 
of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.71  The final text that 
was adopted by the parties discussed the transfer of environmentally sound technology, 
and, in Article 34.18, outlines activities that government can take to engage in 
technology transfer including:  
 
(a)  Formulation of policies and programmes for the effective transfer of 
environmentally sound technologies that are publicly owned or in the public 
domain; 
 (b)  Creation of favourable conditions to encourage the private and public 
sectors to innovate, market and use environmentally sound technologies; 
(c)  Examination by Governments and, where appropriate, by relevant 
organizations of existing policies, including subsidies and tax policies, and 
regulations to determine whether they encourage or impede the access to, 
transfer of and introduction of environmentally sound technologies;  
(d)  Addressing, in a framework which fully integrates environment and 
development, barriers to the transfer of privately owned environmentally 
sound technologies and adoption of appropriate general measures to reduce 
such barriers while creating specific incentives, fiscal or otherwise, for the 
transfer of such technologies;  
(e)  In the case of privately owned technologies, the adoption of the following 
measures, in particular for developing countries:  
i. Creation and enhancement by developed countries, as well 
as other countries which might be in a position to do so, of 
appropriate incentives, fiscal or otherwise, to stimulate the transfer of 
environmentally sound technology by companies, in particular to 
developing countries, as integral to sustainable development;  
                                                        
 
71 Agenda 21 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development adopted at United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992. Available at: 
http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/index.php?page=view&nr=23&type=400&menu=35 (last visited 
August 15, 2014) 
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ii. Enhancement of the access to and transfer of patent 
protected environmentally sound technologies, in particular to 
developing countries;  
iii. Purchase of patents and licences on commercial terms for 
their transfer to developing countries on non-commercial terms as 
part of development cooperation for sustainable development, taking 
into account the need to protect intellectual property rights;  
iv. In compliance with and under the specific circumstances 
recognized by the relevant international conventions adhered to by 
States, the undertaking of measures to prevent the abuse of 
intellectual property rights, including rules with respect to their 
acquisition through compulsory licensing, with the provision of 
equitable and adequate compensation;  
v. Provision of financial resources to acquire environmentally 
sound technologies in order to enable in particular developing 
countries to implement measures to promote sustainable 
development that would entail a special or abnormal burden to them;  
vi. Development of mechanisms for the access to and transfer 
of environmentally sound technologies, in particular to developing 
countries, while taking into account development in the process of 
negotiating an international code of conduct on transfer of 
technology, as decided by UNCTAD at its eighth session, held at 
Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, in February 1992. 
(f)  Improvement of the capacity to develop and manage environmentally 
sound technologies  
 
This definition in Agenda 21 has been a guide for the kinds of activities 
expected from developed countries in multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) 
when they bargain to provide technology transfer in exchange for developing country 
participation.  When developing countries point to lack of delivery of technology 
transfer they point to the failure to take the kinds of actions agreed to in Agenda 21. 
 
 In the area of climate change specifically, the International Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) has also suggested a definition in a study on methodological issues in 
technology transfer. 72  However, that definition has not yet been adopted by the 
Conference of the Parties nor the UNFCCC Secretariat and the Expert Group on 
Transfer of Technology.73 The IPCC defined technology transfer as: 
 
                                                        
 
72 Metz et al., “Methodological and Technological Issues in Technology Transfer”, A Special Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, July 2000. Available at: 
http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/sres/tectran/index.htm (last visited August 15, 2014). 
73 See Chapter 2 for an outline of the architecture of the bodies responsible for technology transfer in the 
UNFCCC. 
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a broad set of processes covering the flows of know-how, experience and 
equipment for mitigating and adapting to climate change amongst different 
stakeholders such as governments, private sector entities, financial institutions, 
NGOs and research/education institutions. [...] The broad and inclusive term 
"transfer" encompasses diffusion of technologies and technology co-operation 
across and within countries. It covers technology transfer processes between 
developed countries, developing countries and countries with economies in 
transition, amongst developed countries, amongst developing countries and 
amongst countries with economies in transition. It comprises the process of 
learning to understand, utilise and replicate the technology, including the capacity 
to choose and adapt to local conditions and integrate it with indigenous 
technologies.74 
  
This is a less than useful approach as it fails to draw on Agenda 21 and fails to 
address the specific meaning of the term as used in Article 4 of the UNFCCC outlining 
technology transfer obligations of developed countries.  By being overly inclusive and 
insufficiently specific the IPCC provided little guidance. The Expert Group on 
Technology Transfer (EGTT) working within the mandate provided by the Marrakech 
Accords 75  did not define technology transfer but worked within a framework that 
addressed: 
 
 Technology needs & needs assessments 
 Technology information 
 Enabling environments 
 Capacity building 
 Mechanisms for technology transfer 
 
The compromise reached in the Marrakech Accords means that intellectual 
property is not directly mentioned but may be addressed through the enabling 
environments theme of work which focuses on regulatory actions taken by governments.  
The enabling environments framing however, creates a clear emphasis on technology 
importing country measures, rather than on technology exporting country actions 
 
Building on the UNCTAD Draft Code of Conduct and on Chapter 34 of 
Agenda 21, I propose the following understanding of what constitutes technology 
transfer defining a package: four modes of technology transfer, the balance of which can 
be varied according to the specific needs of the country.  All must take place to ensure 
                                                        
 
74 Metz et al. 
75 UNFCCC “Development and Transfer of technologies” Decision 4/CP.7 in “Report Of The Conference Of 
the Parties on its Seventh Session, held At Marrakesh from 29 October to 10 November 2001: Addendum 
- Part Two:  Action Taken By The Conference Of The Parties” FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1, 21 January 2002. 
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successful technology transfer, diffusion and uptake.  The modes of technology transfer 
are: 
 
 Transfer of Physical Capital and Goods ((outside of the firm or wholly 
owned subsidiary) including, but not limited to: specialized equipment; goods 
embodying or incorporating the relevant technology or idea.  This largely 
entails financing for purchase of such goods.  
 Transfer of Skills and Know How (outside of the firm or wholly owned 
subsidiary) including, but not limited to: licensing or assistance with the 
purchase of proprietary knowledge, provision of technical and manual skills 
training; scientific and academic training; training and technical advice and 
assistance, necessary to maintain, operate, adapt and reproduce a viable system 
or technology. This would include scientific and educational exchanges, 
workshops, field education, funding, training and capacity building all along the 
research chain: - research, development, demonstration, deployment, and 
commercialization. This is largely aimed at ensuring learning – acquisition and 
application of know how leading to an understanding of the principles of why 
the technology works and building the capacity to adapt and replicate it. 
 Transfer of Information and Data ((outside of the firm or wholly owned 
subsidiary), including but not limited to: manuals; designs; blueprints; 
operating instructions; scientific and technical publications and reports.  This 
would include greater access to scientific and technical information, patent 
office publications and data.  This is embodied in the formal documents and 
detail of patent information, licenses, as well as information to learn how to 
operate, adapt and replicate the technology. This is meant to provide a durable 
basis for building on and being able to adapt the technology. 
 Transfer of ability to adapt and improve the technology including, but not 
limited to: no limitations on production and export under licenses for domestic 
use or export to other developing countries; no restrictions on improvement 
and ownership of improvement of the technology; establishment of R&D 
facilities in the country in which the project is placed; creation of joint R&D 
project or projects.   
 
The proposed definition incorporates the vector and the content of technology 
transfer.  It takes into account that there are conditions to be met in developing 
countries but does not require those to be in place before technology transfer activities 
can take place. While proprietary knowledge is part of the kinds of content transferred, 
it forms part of a broader package of measures. Most importantly it ensures that 
technology transfer is something that goes beyond basic hardware sales and servicing, 
and aims at actual transformation of know-how and skills related to production. Implicit 
in this is that such transfer entails spillovers beyond the boundary of the firm to other 
actors. I also include in here the idea that it is not sufficient to simply allow a wholly-
owned subsidiary to exercise the technology where this does not result in learning 
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beyond the boundaries of the firm.  This is an instrumental choice based on what the 
actual goal meant to be achieved is. The shorthand that I will be using in this thesis to 
refer to this framework will be a definition of technology transfer that asks whether it 
enables “localization of technology, leading to adoption, adaptation and 
replication.” 
 
II. 3 Defining Climate Technologies 
Finally, there is a need to discuss exactly what a climate technology is. While 
the scope of technologies will be covered in Chapter 2, it is important here to note that 
there are really two categories of technologies that are discussed. The first is climate 
mitigation technologies and the other is climate adaptation technologies.  Under those 
two categories lie a whole host of potential sub-categories.  There is also some 
disagreement as to whether some technologies may be properly considered to be climate 
technologies e.g. nuclear energy, if they do not also comply with the definition of an 
environmentally sound technology from Article 34.1 of Agenda 21: 
 
 Environmentally sound technologies protect the environment, are 
less polluting, use all resources in a more sustainable manner, recycle more of 
their wastes and products, and handle residual wastes in a more acceptable 
manner than the technologies for which they were substitutes. 
 
In this thesis I adopt a fairly broad definition of what constitutes a climate 
mitigation technology: a technology that contributes to lowering the GHG emissions 
compared to the business as usual technologies for which it is substituted.  
 
For climate adaptation technologies, the issue of definition is much more 
complicated by the link between technologies that enable adaptation and those that 
build capacity to adapt.  In part this is because a significant element of adaptation is 
climate resilience of communities before they are required to respond and adapt to 
climate change, a concept which has broader economy-wide implications.  In Chapter 2, 
I embrace this broad approach as the only way to effectively ensure that technology 
transfer addresses the actual problem and not just the symptoms.  In this I adopt a 
purposive approach to the definition of the technologies by asking which technologies 
would achieve the goals required instead of seeking an internal characteristic shared by 
all the technologies implicated. In doing so, I return to a theme which will recur 
throughout this book: it is important not to underestimate the scale of the problem that 
climate change presents if we are to design solutions that actually work and are not 
simply business as usual. 
 
 
III. THE APPROACH OF THIS THESIS 
 
The definition of a barrier as outlined above then requires us to provide 
information to establish a framework based on three specific targets:  there is a scope 
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target, of which technologies need to be developed and deployed; there is a 
geographic target relating to which countries specific technologies need to be 
deployed; there is a timing target determining the date by which such technologies will 
need to be developed and deployed. In Chapter 2, I rely on several studies and scenarios 
within the IPCC, as well as the UNFCCC (such as Technology Needs Assessments 
(TNA), Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) and national 
communications) to build a picture of three crucial elements: 
1. What is the scope of technologies implicated by the emissions reduction 
and adaptation requirements of the climate challenge? 
2. What are the dates by which these technologies will need to be deployed 
and diffused? 
3. To which countries will such technologies most likely to be required to be 
deployed and diffused? 
 
This framing is crucial to the analysis of whether international intellectual 
property rules pose a barrier to technology transfer, by establishing what the scale of the 
need is.  In my analysis a barrier would exist where the provision or set of standards 
impedes the ability to act with respect to the full scope of technology needs; retards the 
ability or capacity to act to ensure technology transfer by the target dates required; and 
limits the ability to transfer technology into the countries where it is most necessary to 
do so. The issue of geography is particularly important. In chapter 2 and 3 I identify the 
countries and discuss why it may be particularly vital to ensure that the emerging 
economies (China, India and to some extent Brazil and South Africa) are able to address 
IP related problems, particularly as they relate to export markets in other developing 
countries. The basis of this is findings in Chapter 2 regarding the scale and growth of 
emissions in emerging economies, as well as the existing and increasing trade links 
between emerging economies and other developing countries. There may be a need for 
these countries to be major intermediaries for production and distribution of 
technological goods appropriate to developing countries.   
 
In Chapter 3, I evaluate the data and evidence so far on the role that 
intellectual property has played in technology transfer to address climate change 
mitigation and adaptation. This will involve a critical examination of what the available 
patent and other data suggest is the case with respect to the existence and distribution of 
patenting, the exercise of licensing, and the rate of uptake. While these results will not 
be dispositive with respect to the main question in this thesis, this provides important 
context in the discussion as it allows us to identify trends, and lacunae that can feed into 
an assessment, at the global level, of the necessity for the UNFCCC to act.  This 
assessment will work in conjunction with that in Chapter 6, to determine the scope of 
action that the UNFCCC should take, if at all, with respect to intellectual property.  
 
Chapter 4 will be an evaluation of the existing provisions and mechanisms for 
technology transfer in the UNFCCC, and whether they have been, or will be sufficient 
to meet the scope, scale and timing of technology transfer identified as necessary in 
Chapters 2 and 3. In particular, the role of financial support and its relation to 
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technology transfer and intellectual property will be examined. The Chapter will focus 
particularly on the role of the Global Environmental Facility, the Clean Development 
Mechanism, the Technology Executive Committee, and the Climate Technology Centre 
and Network for delivering on the obligations under the UNFCCC.  
 
Chapter 5 will identify a set of IP interventions that have historically been used 
by countries to try to ensure that technology transfer takes place. It will provide the 
baseline for the analysis of whether TRIPS poses a barrier in Chapter 6. In order to 
characterize the kinds of IP interventions that may be required, we need to assess the 
theoretical and empirical frameworks for: how technology transfer and intellectual 
property interact and relate; what evidence there is for the role that intellectual property 
plays in technology transfer; what data there is for the role it plays in the transfer of 
environmentally sound technologies and specifically for climate change.  This will help 
us to identify and characterize the IP interventions that have historically been, and may 
at present be, in use and the kinds of problems at which they have been targeted.   
 
Chapter 6 and 7, which examine the availability of specific IP-related policies, 
form the pivot point of this thesis.  Based on the assessment in these chapters I will 
discuss in Chapter 9, the nature and scope of actions that the UNFCCC can and should 
take to address the scale, scope and timing of the challenge.  In this sense, it is important 
to note that a negative result i.e. a finding that TRIPS does not pose a barrier to the 
availability of many of these measures will be almost as useful as its opposite.  A key 
dispute between developed and developing countries is the nature and extent to which 
the UNFCCC should take action to address intellectual property issues. A 
comprehensively analysed finding that action by the UNFCCC is not necessary would 
be crucial to reframing the negotiating structure of the UNFCCC on technology 
financing and support. However, this is only possible if the debate can be moved 
beyond a static argument pointing to individual examples of failure or success at 
transferring a technology and instead, conducting a proper systemic analysis based on 
the acknowledged targets for scope, scale and timing within the UNFCCC itself. 
 
Thus, in chapter 6, rather than take a compliance approach, which can tend to 
bias analyses towards a purely legalistic approach, I propose an ‘availability’ approach 
which incorporates a legal assessment but also assesses a measure of practical 
implementability along the criteria as developed in Chapters 2 and 3. In this discussion 
on TRIPS, availability has several components. A legal component consisting of 
whether, as a matter of WTO law: 
1) the TRIPS Agreement encompasses room for the triggers for necessity discussed 
above:  Affordability, Adoptability and Adaptability, and;  
2) whether the TRIPS Agreement present a legal bar or limit to the kinds of 
interventions meant to address the triggering conditions.  
 
The practical component examines whether the TRIPS Agreement allows the 
legally available measures to operate within the appropriate time frame, at the right 
scope of technologies, with the appropriate geographical impact.   
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The assessment of the ‘availability’ of particular IP interventions focuses on 
the TRIPS Agreement because that is the primary bone of contention between 
developed and developing countries.76  While many developing countries have agreed to 
higher intellectual property standards in bilateral and regional free trade agreements, 
these obligations do not have the same almost irrevocable character that obligations in 
the TRIPS Agreement have. The TRIPS Agreement was negotiated as part of a package, 
and as such, it is not possible to withdraw from the TRIPS Agreement without losing 
market access in goods, services, and losing resort to rules on sanitary and phyto-
sanitary measures, technical barriers to trade, trade-related investment measures, as well 
as dispute settlement.77  Such a withdrawal would apply to all WTO member states. This 
is in contrast to bilateral and regional free trade agreements which largely affect bilateral 
relationships and the withdrawal from which are of a much less irrevocable nature. The 
effect of such a withdrawal would only be with respect to one country, or just a few 
countries, even though that country may represent a significant part of the export 
market. In general, the intellectual property sections of such agreements are not 
severable from the rest of the agreement,78 but any such withdrawal would still leave the 
existing relationship and obligations under the WTO in place and the losses would not 
be absolute, as in the case of WTO withdrawal. Withdrawal would have far less 
consequences and the threat of withdrawal would provide stronger leverage for 
renegotiations where necessary. Where there is sufficient policy justification there is less 
of a barrier to countries withdrawing from bilateral and regional arrangements.   With 
respect to the TRIPS Agreement, there can be no credible threat of withdrawal by any 
member that would force renegotiation of the terms of the TRIPS Agreement.  The 
impetus for renegotiation will have to be on a different basis, justified by other concerns 
as has been the case in the public health arena.  
 
Much the same can be said of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) that 
countries sign. Where these are seen as a barrier to development, countries are far freer 
to denounce and withdraw than they are with respect to the TRIPS Agreement.   
 
The assessment of the availability of an IP intervention in Chapter 6 will be 
primarily against the legal ‘availability’ of an intervention i.e. does the TRIPS Agreement 
forbid or significantly limit, the use of such an IP intervention?  This is first discussed at 
the level of the general principles and objectives of the agreement before discussing the 
specific provisions on flexibility in the rest of the agreement.  This analysis will be based 
on the interpretation of TRIPS provisions using traditional interpretive rules under the 
                                                        
 
76 See UNFCCC “Negotiating Text”  FCCC /AWGLCA/2010/14, 13 August 2010 ; p34, UNFCCC “In-session 
draft texts and notes by the facilitators prepared at the twelfth session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on 
Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention” FCCC/AWGLCA/2010/INF.1, 29 October 2010.  
77 Article XV.1, Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement), 
Marrakesh, 15 April 1994, in force 1 January 1995, 1867 United Nations Treaty Series (1995) 4. 
78 See Article 23.4 of the United States-Chile Trade Promotion Agreement.  
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WTO and general international law, with reference to direct WTO case law and 
decisions, relevant case law and decisions of other international bodies and national case 
law where pertinent.  In particular, I base my analysis on the rules in the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding and subsequent case law applying them in WTO disputes on 
the determination of jurisdiction, applicable law and the application of Section 3 
(Interpretation of Treaties) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).79 
In particular, Article 31 of the VCLT will be the basis for justifying interpretations of 
TRIPS provisions where I argue that the panels or the appellate body may have been 
mistaken or in error and that a provision may be broader or narrower than WTO case 
law provides for. In this sense, Chapter 6 is not purely descriptive of the law as it has 
been interpreted but seeks to establish a sense of the law as it is, so that policymakers are 
not unduly limited in their understandings of what the actual scope of a provision may 
be. It aims to provide them with a proper basis for risk assessment of whether a dispute 
may be brought against them for the use of a particular intervention. 
 
Understanding that significant weight is given to the assessment of legal 
availability, the other criteria nevertheless provide a novel filter and framework which 
differs from existing analyses of TRIPS that have focused on TRIPS flexibilities with 
respect to health, for example.80  However it is also important to note that there have 
been few comprehensive legal assessments of the TRIPS Agreement with respect to 
technology transfer of climate technologies 81  and none at a the level of detail and 
comprehensiveness of this thesis.  A very useful exegesis of the nature and kind of 
problems in the relationship between intellectual property and innovation for climate 
technology was done by Matthew Rimmer82 but he did not focus on the technology 
transfer dynamic specifically within TRIPS and on the legal relationship between the 
TRIPS and the UNFCCC. To the extent that this thesis succeeds in its aims it may be 
able to provide a more definitive answer to the legal question of the availability of IP 
interventions, while also providing a uniquely climate focused assessment of TRIPS.  
This may provide better guidance on what specific kinds of changes are required, if any, 
and what the scope of such changes should be. The hope is that it will allow other 
researchers to go beyond the question of whether TRIPS poses a barrier and focus their 
                                                        
 
79 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), Vienna, 23 May 1969 in force  27 January 1980,   
1155 United Nations Treaty Series (1987) 331. 
80 See e.g. Correa, C., Integrating Public Health Concerns into Patent Legislation in Developing Countries 
(South Centre: Geneva, 2000) 
81 See e.g. Hutchison, C J ‘Does TRIPS Facilitate or Impede Climate Change Technology Transfer into 
Developing Countries?’ 3 University of Ottawa Law & Technology Journal 517 (2006). Also Consilvio, M 
“The  Role  of Patents  in the International Framework of Clean Technology Transfer: A  Discussion  of 
Barriers and Solutions”  3 Intell. Prop. Brief 10 (2011); Derclaye, E. “Intellectual Property Rights and 
Global Warming”, 12 J. MARSHALL  REV.  INTELL. PROP.  L.  263  (2008). Derclaye, E “Not Only Innovation but 
also Collaboration, Funding, Goodwill and Commitment:  Which Role for Patent Laws in Post-Copenhagen 
Climate Change Action”, 9 J. MARSHALL  REV.  INTELL. PROP.  L.  657  (2010). Sarnoff, J “The Patent System 
and Climate Change” 16  Virginia Journal of Law & Technology  (2011) 
82 Rimmer, M Intellectual Property and Climate Change: Inventing Clean Technologies” (London: Edward 
Elgar, 2011) 
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energies on researching the practical feasibility and design of IP interventions at the 
national level for a post-TRIPS world. 
 
Particularly because this thesis looks at the relationship between two legal 
regimes the issue of whether and how the WTO and the TRIPS regime may incorporate 
or conflict with the climate regime is crucial. The question is, if TRIPS presents a barrier 
to the use of particular IP interventions to address technology transfer for climate 
change, are there broader interpretive mechanisms in the UNFCCC and the WTO that 
may nevertheless enable and provide legal cover for unilateral IP interventions that may 
not be ‘available’ under the TRIPS Agreement, or that lie at the margins of ‘availability’? 
Chapter 7 explores whether the rules of the UNFCCC can be used to expand the 
availability of an intervention, and whether there might be a role for other connecting 
regimes, such as the human rights regime, in expanding that availability.  My approach 
to Chapter 7 remains primarily descriptive, explaining how the interaction of these 
regimes with the WTO may play out in the specific case of technology transfer to 
address climate change. Only in Chapter 8 do I make a normative proposal for how the 
UNFCCC can and should take action to address intellectual property issues. In doing so, 
I will be drawing on the excellent work by the International Law Commission (ILC) on 
the fragmentation of international law.83 Chapter 8 will be a specific application of the 
ILCs’ systemic integration framework for managing interactions between different 
international regimes.  I work from the position that the WTO is situated within the 
broader corpus of international law and is a special application of international law 
rather than a self-contained regime into which no outside regimes can play a part and 
which itself plays no part in other regimes.84 Chapter 8 focuses specifically on the ways 
that the UNFCCC can take action on intellectual property without necessarily raising a 
conflict with the TRIPS regime.  There has been some interesting initial work on this 
issue by Van Asselt, Sindico and Mehling and others who pointed out the relevance of 
the systemic integration concept of the ILC to the UNFCCC.85   In particular, they 
expand the locus of interaction to include decision-making bodies of the regimes and 
not just legal texts and dispute settlement processes. This book takes their point a step 
further and applies it to the specific case of technology transfer for climate change. I 
propose a methodology for how systemic integration may be applied in the specific 
situation of technology transfer for climate change.   
  
                                                        
 
83 Koskenniemi, M et al., ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification 
and Expansion of International Law: Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission’ (13 
April 2006) para 23, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682; ILC, ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Diff iculties Arising 
From the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Report of the Study Group of the 
International Law Commission’ (18 July 2006) UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.702 
84 See p35, Pauwelyn, J Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other 
Rules of International Law. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.) 
85 Van Asselt, H et al., “Global Climate Change and the Fragmentation of International Law” 30 Law and 
Policy 423 (2008). See also Young, M “Climate Change Law and Regime Interaction) 2011 Carbon & 
Climate L. Rev. 147 (2011). 
 30 
 
Finally, in Chapter 9, I propose some actions that the UNFCCC can take that 
avoid conflicts of norms with the TRIPS Agreement and address the problems 
identified by the Chapter 6 and 7 analysis.  
 
IV. THE AUDIENCE 
 
This thesis is a synthetic work, bringing together different legal frameworks in 
international law, looking at the practices and structure of differing international regimes.  
As such, there is a necessity to only include and address the issues of overlap and not 
turn this thesis into an elaboration on the scope and boundaries of each involved 
international legal regime.  However, there are two specific audiences to which this 
thesis is aimed: practitioners and researchers in intellectual property law and policy; 
practitioners and researchers in international environmental law, specifically climate 
change.   
 
This thesis aims to provide sufficient detail on basic background elements to 
satisfy theoreticians on both sides but not so much that the main element of the 
interaction between the two regimes is lost in the details.  In some areas, this has 
required some simplification of complex issues, and in others I have simply left out 
deeper explanations that may divert from the main point in the thesis.  What is left 
should be sufficient to allow the reader to fully engage with issues at the interface of IP 
and environmental law, without necessarily having to be experts in both international 
intellectual property and international environmental law. 
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Chapter 2 –  
The Scope, Timing and 
Geographical  
Targets for Technology Transfer  
of Climate Technologies  
 
 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
  
The aim of this chapter is to identify and elaborate three crucial elements for 
establishing the scope against which options for action, including those related to 
intellectual property, are to be measured. First, there is a scope target, of which 
technologies need to be developed and deployed. Second, there is a timing target, by 
which date such technologies will need to be developed and deployed. Third, there is a 
geographic target relating to which countries specific technologies will need to be 
deployed.  To build a picture of these elements, this chapter will: 
 
1. Draw out technologies identified from several global and regional studies, 
scenarios and datasets, contextualized by the IPCC assessment of global 
and regional emissions trends and climate impacts. Understanding which 
technologies are likely to present the least-cost, highest impact emissions 
reductions and adaptations determines the scope of technologies that will 
need to be addressed. 
2. Draw the outer boundaries of the timing for emissions reductions and 
adaptation, the implied dates for peaking emissions and, the implications 
for technology diffusion based on emission reductions and targets 
outlined in the IPCC and other global assessments, as well as 
commitments already agreed to by UNFCCC parties. 
3. Draw out the specific developing geographical regions and developing 
countries that will need to carry out emissions reductions and adaptations 
and the specific technologies required to do so. This will be drawn 
primarily from an assessment of mitigation scenarios, Technology Needs 
Assessments (TNAs), Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions 
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(NAMAs), and UNFCCC national communications of the relevant 
countries.  
 
For each of these elements, I will address the mitigation and the adaptation 
issues separately.  These elements will be the basis for the analysis of the coverage and 
utility of existing mechanisms in Chapter 4 and, in Chapter 3 the evaluation of the 
existing data on the existence, distribution and transactions relating to patents on the 
technologies identified. 
 
 
Since the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report86 (AR4) there have been significant 
developments in our understanding of what is required to avoid catastrophic climate 
change.  To the extent that this thesis relies on specific data to construct a scenario for 
what action is necessary might be necessary in technology transfer, I rely on the 
standard consensus model of projected pathways in the IPCC combined with the 
acknowledged and agreed consensus statements by UNFCCC parties in the 2011 
Durban Platform at COP 17. However, with respect to mitigation technology I will 
draw on several scenarios that have built on the IPCC’s work including the Energy 
Technology Perspectives (ETP) series from the International Energy Agency.  The 2010 
and 2012 iterations87 present a relatively conservative but nevertheless significant set of 
data on what the baselines are and the necessary shifts in research, development, 
demonstration, deployment and diffusion of climate mitigation technologies that may be 
needed by 2050. 
The political context is also important as a boundary marker. The 
commitments that countries have made to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and address 
adaptation set the baseline for the normative aim in terms of targets, as contrasted to 
more data driven, science based scenarios and assessments. In the Copenhagen Accord 
that was agreed by all countries except Bolivia at the Conference of the Parties to the 
UNFCCC in 2009, parties committed themselves to maintaining the temperature rise 
                                                        
 
86 IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fourth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, Pachauri, R.K 
and Reisinger, A. (eds.)] (Geneva: IPCC, 2007). The relevant portions of the Fifth Assessment Report (in 
particular the report of Working Group III on Mitigation of Climate Change) are being finalized in late 
2014 after the publication of this thesis, but the final drafts appear to build on and support the 
conclusions of the AR4. This thesis will refer only to the AR4 in keeping with its reliance on relatively 
conservative evaluations of future trends. The Fifth Assessment Report remains under considerations 
and its implications continue to be assessed and thus may not present a strong consensus view as yet, 
unlike the AR4. 
87 IEA, Energy Technology Perspectives 2010: Scenarios and Strategies to 2050, (Paris: IEA/OECD, 2010); 
IEA, Energy Technology Perspectives 2012: Pathways to a Clean Energy System (Paris: IEA/OECD 2012). 
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below 2 degrees Celsius relative to pre-industrial levels.88 Annex 1 countries committed 
to 2020 targets for quantified economy wide emissions and non-Annex 1 parties 
committed to take actions to 2020 reduce emissions, consistent with provision of 
financial support and technology transfer.89 In the Cancun Agreements reached at the 
16th Conference of the Parties, UNFCCC parties agreed on the need to reduce GHG 
emissions in line with maintaining global average temperature increase below 2 degrees 
Celsius, and to move towards a lower goal of 1.5 degrees Celsius.90 
 
In addition to these mitigation commitments, there is the ongoing 
commitment that all UN member states have made to reducing poverty91, which will 
require access to energy products and services.  Developing countries must increase 
their energy consumption by a significant factor if this is to be achieved. At present, 
access to electricity is limited to 20% of the global population and approximately 15% 
have only intermittent access.92   Without a transformation in electricity production, 
almost all of that increase in developing countries is likely to come from coal-powered 
electricity generation.  In 2008, developing countries produced over 70% of electricity 
from fossil fuels, with coal at 46%.93 The same issues arise in the core areas of industrial 
and residential heat and heavy and light duty transport.  In transport, emerging economy 
use of motorized vehicles will match that of the OECD within 10 to 20 years.94 The 
question for developing countries is not whether they will decrease their consumption 
of electricity, heat or transport related energy, but whether it will be from cheap, GHG 
emissions intensive sources or from more costly and technologically intensive, 
renewable and efficient sources.  The core of the debate on technology transfer is 
therefore not whether technology will be transferred to developing countries but who 
should bear the cost. The next sections will try to determine the timing, scope and 
specific geographical targets for that transfer. 
 
 
II. THE TIMING TARGET 
 
II.1 Mitigation 
                                                        
 
88 p5, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its fifteenth session, held in Copenhagen from 7 to 19 
December 2009 – Addendum Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its fifteenth 
session, FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (2010).  
89 p6, Id. 
90 Para 4, Decision 1/CP.16, The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group 
on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention, FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (2010). 
91 United Nations Millennium Declaration GA. Res. 55/2, 8 September 2002; Millennium Development 
Goals available at: http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/  
92 p27, Elzinga, D et al. “Advantage Energy: Emerging Economies, Developing Countries and the Private-
Public Sector Interface” International Energy Agency Information Paper, September 2011.  
93 p33, Id. 
94 p40, Id. 
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The IPCC AR4 assessed that to avoid the significant likelihood of irreversible 
climate change that would occur with a mean global temperature increase above 2 – 2.4 
degrees Celsius, a reduction of 50 – 85 % below 2000 levels of greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions is required by 2050.95  Even at the time that the IPCC 4AR came out there 
was reliable data suggesting that GHG emissions were not being reduced at the required 
rate and that the acceleration in climate change suggested that the needed emissions 
reductions were most likely to be at closer to the top of that range at 80% below 2007 
levels.96  
To keep warming well below 2 degrees, and to maintain the possibility of 
stabilizing at the safe level of 1.5 degrees within reach, it may be necessary for global 
emissions to peak by 2015.97 Projections from almost all models from 2007 suggested 
that the Earth was already locked into at least a 1 degree Celsius increase by 2100, based 
on past emissions.98 None of the associated costs of climate change between now and 
2050 are likely to be avoided because of this lock in.99 Based on emissions trends in 
2007, temperatures of between 2 and 5 degrees are likely to be reached by 2060.100 At 
the least, the available projections of necessary reductions suggest that a peak of 
emissions will have to take place between 2015 and 2018, depending on the extent of 
cuts later in the lead up to 2050.101 The harsher the cuts in the lead up to 2050, the less 
the need for an earlier peaking date. The lower the planned cuts, the earlier the required 
peaking date will be. It is not clear whether there is a separate peaking date for 
developing countries, but any such division would imply an even earlier peaking date for 
developed countries. Given that much of the growth in emissions is expected to come 
from developing countries, it makes sense to treat the peaking date as applying to them 
as well, leaving out the political differentiation between Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 
                                                        
 
95 See p67, IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to 
the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, 
Pachauri, R.K and Reisinger, A. (eds.)] (Geneva: IPCC, 2007). The Fifth Assessment Reports Final Draft of 
the Summary for Policymakers of the Working Group III reports suggests a 40 – 70% reduction from a 
2010, rather than a 2000 baseline. See p13, IPCC “Summary for Policymakers” in Climate Change 2014, 
Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Edenhofer, O., R. Pichs-Madruga, Y. Sokona, E. Farahani, S. 
Kadner, K. Seyboth, A. Adler, I. Baum, S. Brunner, P. Eickemeier, B. Kriemann, J. Savolainen, S. Schlömer, 
C. von Stechow, T. Zwickel and J.C. Minx (eds.).] (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United 
Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 2014) 
96 See p61,  IEA, Energy Technology Perspectives 2010: Scenarios and Strategies to 2050, (Paris: 
IEA/OECD, 2010) 
97 See p67, IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to 
the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, 
Pachauri, R.K and Reisinger, A. (eds.)] (Geneva: IPCC, 2007). See also p15, Baer, et al. The Right to 
Development in a Climate Constrained World (Heinrich Böll Foundation, 2007). 
98 p12, Stern, N. et al. The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007). 
99 p156, Id. 
100 p12, Id.  
101 p67, IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report 
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countries, when determining the technology need. This implies immediate action to 
reduce emissions in these countries102, to meet 2020 targets and this will require making 
sure implementation of best available technologies and measures in the technologies 
identified below in the next section. 
 
II.2 Adaptation 
The challenge of adaptation is also quite clear, from sea-level rise to changes in 
the hydrological cycle leading to increased dryness is some areas, and increased wetness 
in others.  There is also a significant chance of shifts in geographical bands in which 
specific diseases and disease vectors proliferate.103The AR4 notes several areas of impact 
relating to climate change that will require some form of adaptive response if warming is 
not kept below 2 degrees above pre-industrial levels.104 
 Ecosystems105 
o A likely 20-30% of plant and animal species at increased risk of 
extinction. 
o For higher temperature increases the majority of plant and animal 
species are likely to face permanent geographical, and climate 
variability shifts in the conditions necessary for survival. 
o Underlying and accompanying these will be increased variability and 
extremes of precipitation, (drought and floods)106 , pests, wildfires, 
and ocean acidification. 
o Extremes of precipitation variability are likely to result in droughts in 
lower to mid-latitudes (sub-Saharan Africa), and floods in higher 
latitudes.107 
                                                        
 
102 See p124, Fekete, H. et al “Emerging economies – potentials, pledges and fair shares of greenhouse 
gas reduction” ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH OF THE GERMAN FEDERAL MINISTRY OF THE 
ENVIRONMENT, NATURE CONSERVATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY Project-no. (FKZ) 3711 41 120, 
(Umweltbundesamt, Bonn, April 2013).  
103 See p48, IPCC 
104 The impacts here are only those that can be expected within the small ranges above 2 degrees, with 
an emphasis on those that are likely to take place at the locked 1 degree increase by 2050. Where 
relevant, impacts projected for temperature increases significantly above that are also included.  The aim 
is to give a sense of the impacts likely to take effect in the period leading to a 2 degree gain by 2100. 
Above the 2 degree temperature range, impacts become even more extreme. 
105 p48, IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the 
Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, 
Pachauri, R.K and Reisinger, A. (eds.)]. (Geneva: IPCC, 2007). 
106 p176, Kundzewicz, Z.W. et al. “Freshwater resources and their Management” in M.L. Parry et al. (Eds.) 
Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the 
Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007).Available at http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-wg2.htm (last visited August 15, 
2014). 
107 p187, Id. 
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o Water quality is likely to suffer, leading to stresses on capture, 
treatment and distribution infrastructure. 108  This is particularly 
concerning as much of the present infrastructure in both developed 
and developing countries has been built on the assumption of stable 
hydrological conditions and does not take into account the increasing 
variability and likely increasing or decreasing trends in volumes, 
depending on the region.109 Even at temperature increases as low as 1 
degree Celsius, water availability will be reduced (affecting almost 50 
million people) for some populations such as those that rely on melt-
water from Andean glaciers which will have largely disappeared.110 
 Food111  
o At lower latitudes, food productivity is projected to decline even at 
temperature increases as low as 1 degree, while demand is set to 
soar.112 Above 2 degrees, significant and sharp declines of between 5-
10% in yields are likely, especially in sub-Saharan Africa.113 This is 
important as this covers the land mass of the majority of developing 
countries. At higher latitudes, there may be some expected increases 
in productivity for increases between 1 – 3 degrees, with projected 
declines for high temperatures.114  Over 70% of the population in 
developing countries lives in areas dependent on agriculture for 
livelihoods.115 This suggests an increase in the gap between developed 
and developing countries with developing countries becoming 
increasingly less able to feed themselves while developed countries 
increase their capacity, leading to a net increase in imports by 
developing countries.116 
o A shift in crop types, plant and harvest dates is also likely, requiring 
new methods and shifts to new crops to adjust the new conditions.117 
                                                        
 
108 p196, Id. 
109 p196, Id. 
110 p57, Stern, N. et al. The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007) 
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112 See p4, UNEP, Towards a Green Economy: Pathways to Sustainable Development and Poverty 
Eradication, (Nairobi: UNEP, 2011).  
113 p57, Stern, N. et al. The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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o These impacts will occur even as, due to projected population growth 
and shifts in demand type, most models suggest that an 80% growth 
(compared to 1999-2001) in crop production will be needed by 2050. 
The same models project a need for 55% growth by 2020.118 These 
imply a 19% increase in rain fed crop-land and a 30% increase in 
irrigated crop-land over those same periods.119 
o There is likely to be a shift in disease and pest bands for crops and 
livestock, increasing potential losses in areas that have little or no 
infrastructure to deal with such outbreaks.120 
o By 2020 in mid to low latitudes, largely in developing countries, and 
especially in sub-Saharan Africa, we are likely to see increases in 
livestock mortality, decreases in maize productivity, and more crop 
failures more generally.121 
 Coasts122 
o A combination of coastal erosion and projected sea level rise is likely 
to put significant pressure on coastal human populations. 
o Many populations in low-lying deltas in Africa and Asia and small 
island states are projected to be subject to increased and more 
intensive flooding. 
o Water quality may decline due to increased salinity of coastal sources. 
 Human health123 
o Health outcomes are due to be affected by increases in: 
 extreme weather events; 
 diarrheal diseases from unsafe water (both due to increase in 
precipitation in some areas and drought in others);124 The 
Stern report projects, at 1 degree increases, 300 000 people 
annually affected by diarrheal diseases, malnutrition and 
malaria.125  
o Shifts in the geographical distribution of several diseases will stress 
health systems and expose new populations to diseases to which 
                                                                                                                                   
 
Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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122 p48, IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the 
Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, 
Pachauri, R.K and Reisinger, A. (eds.)]. (Geneva: IPCC,  2007). 
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124 p395, Confalonieri, U. et al., “Human Health”, in M.L. Parry et al. (Eds.) Climate Change 2007: Impacts, 
Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).  
125 p57, Stern, N. et al. The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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immunities or resistances have not been developed. This includes 
malaria, dengue fever, tick-borne encephalitis, Lyme disease, 
meningococcal meningitis. 126  The Stern report projects that at 2 
degree increases, up to 60 million more people will be exposed to 
malaria in Africa.127 
o Climate change related health outcomes are exacerbated by existing 
lack of health infrastructure and resources.128 
 
What does this imply about the timing of adaptation actions? The first thing to 
note is the lock-in effect of one degree warming by 2100 based on past emissions. These 
will have to be adapted to and the slower the reduction in emissions the quicker the one 
degree threshold will be reached. The faster and more extensive GHG mitigation action 
takes place, the lower the likely cost of action to address adaptation will be.129  Of 
course, the lower and slower the mitigation, the more adaptation that will be needed.130  
However, due to the delay inherent in mitigating GHGs, temperatures are still likely to 
increase well into the middle of the 21st century even if all appropriate mitigation action 
is taken.  The impacts that are already taking place and are projected to take place in the 
period to 2050 will still need to be adapted to.131   This entails increasing adaptive 
capacity in the near term by providing a means of sustainable development to a 
minimum level of per capita GDP to cope with existing climate variability and 
development challenges and then a focus on specific systems and tools to address 
specific climate impacts relevant to a region for the period after that.  The IPCC analysis 
of timing of impacts and mitigation peaking dates suggests that much of the initial work 
for addressing vulnerability and resilience, even under the most optimistic scenarios will 
have to be carried out almost immediately in order to be prepared to respond to impacts 
caused by the inevitable increase of temperatures between 1 and 2 degrees that will 
occur after 2050.132 
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There is also a complex relationship between the impacts of climate change 
and development, in that more severe and frequent weather events can negatively affect 
the very economic growth and development that would make countries less susceptible 
to such climate shocks. The Stern Report notes that natural disasters are a higher 
proportion of GDP losses in developing countries than in developed,133 and have a 
more severe impact on future GDP growth in those countries.  There is an opportunity 
cost when money that could have been spent (by both government and private sector) 
on investment in productive capacity and infrastructure, is instead spent on recovery 
efforts. It may even need to be set aside for future disasters, locking away even more 
funds. The speed at which the frequency of such events will increase is therefore a key 
determinant of how much and how quickly it is necessary to act to get as much GDP 
growth in place as possible in the near term.  The IPCC134 and the AR4 suggests that 
some impacts of climate are already being felt and that by 2025 developing countries will 
begin to feel more severe impacts. Several of these impacts are locked in as a function of 
previous GHG emissions.  This suggests that much of the GDP growth necessary to 
reduce vulnerability and ensure adaptive capacity needs to take place in the period 
leading to 2020 at the latest.   
 
 
III. THE SCOPE OF TECHNOLOGIES 
 
III.1 Mitigation 
There remains some debate about whether the technology mix needed to 
address the scale of the climate challenge can be met with already existing, deployed and 
demonstration-ready technologies or whether new breakthrough technologies will be 
required.   This is a key issue as it will determine the extent to which the balance of 
resources is directed toward research and development versus demonstration, 
deployment and diffusion.  The IPCC Third Assessment Report (2001) argued that 
existing and demonstration-ready technology would be sufficient, however, and the 
Fourth Assessment report confirmed that conclusion with high confidence, from an 
overview of the range of scenarios for stabilization.135 The Stern report suggested that it 
was possible to meet the climate change challenge using existing technologies 136 , 
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although the report does state that achieving stabilization at 450 ppm, which is 
consistent with a 1.5 – 2 degree Celsius goal, is not likely to be achievable with current 
and foreseeable technologies.137  The report foresaw that this would require a peak in 
2010, which has clearly not been met. At the time the report argued that such a scenario 
would require138: 
 Complete decarbonization of the transport sector; 
 Increased and more effective implementation of carbon capture and 
sequestration; 
 A total halt to deforestation.139  
 
Pacala and Sokolow have argued with more confidence that, generally speaking, 
existing technologies would be sufficient. 140   Arguing the contrary, Hoffert et al. 
suggested in 2002 that existing technologies would be insufficient and that new 
breakthroughs would be required.141  As the assessments suggest that faster and greater 
reduction will be needed to meet the challenge of reducing GHG emissions by 80% by 
2050, the arguments of those suggesting that new breakthroughs will be necessary begin 
to seem increasingly persuasive. Taking into account that the necessary reductions 
suggest that a peak of emissions will have to take place between 2015 and 2018142 the 
rapid deployment of existing technologies will be a prerequisite for longer term 
action.143  In the longer term, technological breakthroughs may be required. The next 
sections outline the technologies that may be implicated and try to give a sense of their 
existing development and deployment, where data is available. 
 
The IEA Energy Technology Perspectives 2010 and 2012 (‘ETP 2010’ and 
‘ETP 2012’) provide some more concrete sense of what may be required in terms of 
technology related to energy and to mitigation. While they do not cover technology for 
adaptation, and exclude significant sectors such as agriculture, they nevertheless capture 
and elaborate the necessary scope of action for energy-related emissions, which 
comprise over 84% of global GHG emissions.  The ETPs construct a baseline from 
existing emissions reductions extrapolated to 2050 and then outline scenarios for a 
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technology research, and development pathway to the necessary 80% reductions by 
2050.  While the scenarios they construct (the Blue Map Scenario and the 2 degrees 
scenario(2DS)) rely significantly on controversial technologies such as Carbon Capture 
and Storage, as well as nuclear energy, they provide a useful, if somewhat conservative, 
perspective in helping to understand the scope of technologies to be developed and 
deployed. The scenarios are built on the use of existing or near commercial technology 
available within the scenario period to 2050.144 
 
The Blue Map baseline scenario presumes that no new climate or technology 
policies are put in place in the period leading to 2050.  Thus, under the Baseline scenario, 
energy related emissions are double those of 2007, and almost all of that increase comes 
from outside the OECD.145 The growth is driven in large part by the growth in demand 
for oil and gas from developing countries. 146  While long terms projections can be 
uncertain, the ETP 2010 baseline scenario lies within the range of scenario outcomes for 
2050 outlined by the IPCC AR4, although it remains somewhat on the conservative side.   
The Blue Map scenario is based on a mean temperature increase of 2-2.4 
degrees aiming for a 50% reduction in energy related GHG emissions by 2050 
compared to 2005 levels.147 Under the Blue Map scenario energy-related emissions must 
peak by 2020 and then decline steadily to 2050, if emissions reductions are to be 
achieved with reasonable costs. 148  This is in line with a 2-3 degrees Celsius global 
pathway, but only if other non-energy sectors, such as agriculture, also undertake similar 
if not greater reductions.  If not, the burden of reductions will fall more severely on 
energy-related reductions.  The Baseline and Blue Map scenarios share the same 
assumptions and references related to projections for economic growth and population 
growth. Under the Blue Map scenario, OECD countries must reduce their energy 
related emissions by 30% compared to the Baseline, meaning a 77% reduction 
compared to 2005 levels. Non-OECD countries must reduce their emissions by 24% 
compared to 2005 levels.  In 2050, China will have a 30% reduction compared to 2007 
levels, India a 10% increase, as compared to 81% reduction for the US and 74% 
reduction for OECD Europe.149  
 
Generally, the Blue Map scenario is optimistic about technology research, 
development, demonstration, deployment and diffusion. It is especially optimistic about 
the rapid commercialization, uptake and diffusion of technology.150   However, such 
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optimistic assumptions are necessary to achieving the emissions reductions required to 
reach 50% below 2005 levels by 2050 on which the Blue Map scenario is based. 
 
One clear outcome of the ETP scenarios is that action will be required across a 
broad range of technology sectors, requiring the rapid diffusion and adoption of existing 
technologies, rapid commercialization of demonstrated technologies, rapid and broad 
demonstration of technologies in prototype or feasibility stage and significant creation 
of new technologies through increased research and development.  Looking at the 
sectors implicated, the Blue Map scenario outlines the percentage contribution of 
technology shifts and changes in the following sectors151: 
 End-use fuel efficiency – 24% 
 End-use electricity efficiency – 14% 
 Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) in Power generation – 10% 
 Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) in Industrial Activity – 9% 
 Renewables – 17% 
 Nuclear – 6% 
 Power generation efficiency and fuel switching – 5% 
 Electric vehicles – 7% 
 Fuel cell vehicles – 4% 
 Other end use fuel switching – 3% 
 
The bulk of the contributions in the Blue Map scenario come from: 
- efficiency;152 
- use of renewables; and  
- the application of CCS to power generation and industrial activity.  
 
Emphasizing the sheer scope of technologies involved, the ETP 2010 breaks the 
sectors further down. Including more recent data from ETP 2012, we can see that 
deployment has not kept up with the optimistic assumptions under the Blue Map 
scenarios. For example153: 
 Electricity generation (almost entirely de-carbonised by 2050) 
o CCS – 31% contribution  
 In 2010, no projects had been fully demonstrated and 
applied to power generation. 154  Insufficient investment in 
demonstration projects; for power generation, zero in 
operation in 2010, compared to the 38 projected by ETP 
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2010;155 4 as compared to 52 projected by ETP 2010 in CCS 
in industry;156 
o Nuclear – 19% 
 A well developed and mature technology with low market 
penetration due to policy problems such as waste 
management and disaster risk. Existing plans to build more 
capacity remain well below the levels needed to meet the 2 
degrees scenario.157 
o Wind – 11%  
 A relatively mature technology with increasing market 
penetration. However, to meet the Blue Map scenarios, 
efficiencies would need to be increased as will management 
of connections to the grid. In developing countries, many 
are not yet using wind technologies, although in 2009, China 
was the largest wind market. Existing technology diffusion 
and development is on track to meet that required by the 
Blue Map scenario.158 
 Off-shore wind remains an immature technology, with low 
market penetration, requiring further R&D and 
demonstration.159 
o Solar – Concentrated Solar Power (CSP) – 9% 
 There are three main types: troughs, towers and dishes. 
Trough are the most mature technology; towers are more 
efficient and need further development with many 
promising projects now defunct, and parabolic dishes , 
which are well-suited to decentralized power grids, need 
more R&D. 160  For example, in trough technologies, 
approaches that have been  explored since 2004 include: 
Integrated solar combined cycle systems, combining CSP 
with gas turbine plants; direct steam generation in the 
trough itself;161  
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 This is still a developing technology that needs significant 
investment to move from demonstration to the deployment 
phase. Market penetration is too low and slow; this is 
despite it being selected by the GEF in 2004 for its program 
to support rapid commercialization of near term 
technologies;162  In addition further research is needed on 
issues such as power storage. 163  Nevertheless, because it 
uses largely existing materials such as glass, steel and 
concrete, CSP capacity is more easily installed and ramped 
up within existing industrial frameworks.164 
o Solar – Photovoltaic (PV) – 7% 
 In the 2000-10 period, PV increased by 40% per year, 
although from a relatively low base. This was driven by 
decreasing costs, especially from cheaper Chinese 
manufacturers.  This a relatively mature technology with 
significant global market penetration, although policies will 
need to be put in place to ensure more rapid adoption, 
especially in regions with significant access to direct sunlight 
such as Africa.165 
o Fuel switching coal to gas – 7% 
o Integrated gasification combined  cycle combustion  – 4 % 
 In 2010, there were only 2 operating plants, with increasing 
interest in expanding in countries such as China. However, 
existing efficiencies remain below those necessary to achieve 
the Blue Map scenarios, requiring technological 
improvements and advances to ensure further 
deployment.166 
o Super-critical (SC) and ultra-supercritical coal (USC) – 3% 
 This technology is being increasingly used and applied but 
efficiencies remain below those required to meet the Blue 
Map scenarios. Projected advances in materials will enable 
greater efficiencies in the period leading up to 2030, under 
the Blue Map scenarios. 167  Existing diffusion of SC and 
USC technologies is increasing, but a significant proportion 
of new plant build, especially in China and India, used older, 
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inefficient technologies.168 Approximately 50% of coal-fired 
plants are being built with sub-critical technologies;169 much 
of this is occurring in China, although in 2011 more new 
plants are being built with high efficiency technologies than 
non-efficient. 170  India also contributed to the increase in 
inefficient coal-fired plants with all plants built in 2010 using 
sub-critical technologies. 
o Geothermal – 3% 
 In the early stages of development with significant research 
to be carried out before widespread deployment outside of 
areas such as Iceland. Present development and diffusion is 
falling behind that required by the Blue Map scenarios.171 
o Hydro – 2% 
 Hydrokinetic turbines remain in the early demonstration 
phase:172 
 an otherwise mature, commercialized technology, even for 
micro-hydro applications. 
o Biomass and Waste – 2% 
 Development and diffusion, broadly on track to meet the 
Blue Map scenarios.173 
o Gas efficiency – 2% 
o Biofuels 
 The agricultural-based fuels remain quite mature and are 
part of global value chains and trade; 
 Second generation biofuels remain at the research, 
development and demonstration phase, except for cellulose 
and lignin-based technologies which face a 
commercialization challenge,174 
 Electricity grids and networks 
o Ensuring that all electricity generation can access the grid and 
contribute to emissions reductions is crucial. The Blue Map scenarios 
rely on a smarter grid infrastructure managed by software, maintained 
                                                        
 
168 p16, IEA, “Tracking Clean Energy Progress: Energy Technology Perspectives 2012 excerpt as IEA input 
to the Clean Energy Ministerial” IEA 2012. 
169 p63, IEA, Energy Technology Perspectives 2012: Pathways to a Clean Energy System (Paris: IEA/OECD 
2012). 
170 Id. 
171 p27, IEA, “Tracking Clean Energy Progress: Energy Technology Perspectives 2012 excerpt as IEA input 
to the Clean Energy Ministerial” IEA 2012. 
172 See p212, UNEP, Towards a Green Economy: Pathways to Sustainable Development and Poverty 
Eradication, (Nairobi: UNEP, 2011). 
173 p27, IEA, “Tracking Clean Energy Progress” 
174 See p212, UNEP, Towards a Green Economy: Pathways to Sustainable Development and Poverty 
Eradication, (Nairobi: UNEP, 2011).  
 46 
 
and developed by skilled expertise to ensure the electricity generation 
outcomes.  This is a newly developing technological field that has to 
deal with both legacy infrastructure as well as designing new systems, 
heavily reliant on computer software management systems. Much of 
the work leading up to 2020 will be on research, development and 
demonstration.175  
o There is also a role for micro-grids, connected to community solar 
installations. 
 
This complexity of sectors and technology areas that are covered by energy 
production is also reflected in the ETP 2012, and other IEA analyses of industry, 
buildings (heating, cooling, and appliances) and transport.  These are listed below, 
without their planned contributions to GHG emissions reductions, but as an illustration 
of the scope of technologies that may need to be addressed to achieve the IEA 
scenarios. 
 
1. Industry 
Industrial energy use is largely going to play a role in reductions through 
increased fuel switching (fossil fuel burning to electricity), energy efficiency and 
application of CCS to capture incidental emissions. Progress on energy efficiency is still 
too slow; the diffusion of best available technologies (BATs) has proven difficult due to 
failure to apply energy efficiency and management standards, as well as BATs for pumps, 
electric motors, and boilers, and processes for managing efficiency.  The deployment 
and diffusion need covers technologies such as:  
 Iron and Steel production176 
o Smelting reduction technologies; 
o Top gas recycling furnaces; 
o Highly reactive material additives to lower reducing agents; 
o Molten oxide electrolysis for iron production; 
o Hydrogen smelting; 
o Use of charcoal and waste plastic; 
 Cement177 
o Substitutes for clinker additives; 
o Fuel switching for heat processes; 
 Chemicals and Petrochemicals;178 
o New olefin production methods; 
o Improved catalytic processes; 
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o Novel membrane technologies for separation processes; 
o Bio-based polymers to create new plastics 
 Paper179 
o Advanced water removal systems 
 Aluminium180 
o New inert and wetted cathode technologies; 
o New methods for chemical reduction of kaolin; 
2. Buildings 
Heating and cooling – much of the technology described below is already 
deployed and commercialized but at an insufficient level.181 The areas that need greater 
market penetration include: 
 Modern heat access182 
o Liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) 
o Biogas 
o Natural gas appliances 
o Improved cook stoves (especially for biomass) 
 Renewables for heat183 
o Solar thermal collectors, water heaters and distributors 
 China is the largest market for such heaters, but with only 
3% share of the water heating market.184 
o Advanced biomass cook stoves 
o Biogas digesters, and distribution pipes 
o Geothermal heat 
 Thermal heat efficiency 
o Combined heat and power 
o Advanced building envelope seals and insulation 
o Coke oven gas recovery 
o Power generation from blast furnace gas 
3. Appliances  
Appliances are a significant portion of global electricity end-use.  A significant 
portion of end-use is in electric motors (found in most large appliances, compressors, 
fans, mechanical systems) at about 40% of all global electricity end-use.185 Increased 
efficiency and use of best available technologies have a large GHG emissions reduction 
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potential. 186  Other end-use sectors may also provide significant savings. The 
technologies implicated include: 
 pumps, including for agricultural use; 
 compressors, heat exchangers, insulation (foam and vacuum), heat bridge 
designs and fans for refrigeration and air conditioners; 
 Dishwashers, clothes washers, and clothes dryers; 
 lighting, including solar powered LED lighting operating off-grid; 
 software and hardware, especially for managing active and standby power in 
portable appliances, as well as home televisions, audio, and other information, 
communication and entertainment devices for both residential and office use. 
4. Transport 
Transport is likely to be the hardest area to achieve emissions reductions 
because of the expense of the alternative technologies.187 It represents over 27% of 
world-wide emissions.188 That share is expected to increase as personal transport use 
increases in emerging economies and middle-income countries. The technologies that 
will need to be addressed include: 
 Hydrogen Fuel cells; 
 Plug-in Hybrids and electric vehicles (PHEVs); 
o A key barrier to distribution of these technologies is the price of these 
vehicles, slowing their adoption in developing countries and emerging 
economies.189 The Blue Map scenarios project the majority of sales to 
2030 to be in OECD and China.190 
 Batteries 
o The efficiency and cost of these pose a significant bottleneck for the 
deployment of PHEVs.191 
 Biodiesel and biofuels; 
o The IEA projects that advanced biofuels are unlikely to be 
widespread before 2020, and are unlikely to contribute to peaking in 
the near term, although they will play an important role in the longer 
term substitution of fossil fuels for transport.192 
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o Flex-fuel vehicles are crucial to a transition to non-fossil fuel 
consumption.193 
 Fuel efficiency of petrol or diesel vehicles; 
o The Blue Map Scenario requires at least a 50% increase in fuel 
efficiency by 2030, implying a 3%/year increase on average per 
country. The IEA argues that this is achievable with existing 
technologies but will require strong policy action.194 This presumes 
no significant action to reduce the price of such vehicles.  In terms of 
deployment, this technology is improving but at too slow a rate  
(1.7% as compared to 2.7%)  projected to achieve the 2 degree 
scenario in the ETP 2012; 
The sheer scale of technologies involved is significant, across multiple sectors, 
even when limited to the energy sector and not including agriculture and land use 
change, and not even including the full range of areas that are covered by adaptation 
needs.  
 
The ETPs provide little or no information on the existing relative regional 
distribution of technologies and any regional variations regarding proprietary 
technologies.  Nevertheless, in discussing the scope of action and technologies needed 
for the 2 degree scenarios, the ETP 2012 and 2010 agree on the same principle: that no 
single technology  or small subset of technologies will be sufficient. Policy will have to 
be brought to bear on all the identified technology sectors to achieve the goals.195 Given 
the longer term challenge, the ETP 2012 is clear that existing technologies will be 
insufficient to meet its targets and that R&D will be required to reach an 80% reduction 
target by 2050. This will require immediate and large scale investments in R&D.196 The 
ETP 2012 scenario places an emphasis on providing funding and incentives for the 
generation of new technologies as necessary to achieve its goals, suggesting that dynamic 
efficiency will have to be a crucial part of any policy response in intellectual property 
regulation. The ETP 2012 also places much more emphasis on decentralized power 
generation managed by sophisticated software and hardware interactions. 197  This 
increases significantly the projected role that industries providing controllers, 
environmentally robust switching and control systems, as well as software control and 
management systems will have.  
 
                                                        
 
193 See p404, UNEP, Towards a Green Economy: Pathways to Sustainable Development and Poverty 
Eradication, (Nairobi: UNEP, 2011). 
194 p44, Elzinga D, et al.  
195 p39, IEA, Energy Technology Perspectives 2012: Pathways to a Clean Energy System (Paris: IEA/OECD 
2012). 
196 p56, Id. 
197 p40, id. 
 50 
 
Like the ETP, the Stern report argues that the technology mix will require a 
broad portfolio, and proposes, much the same set of technologies as the IEA: 
 
 Decarbonization of the electricity sector by 2050, including the use of the 
following technologies198: 
o Wind energy 
o Wave and tidal energy (not included in ETPs); 
o Solar PV energy;  
o CCS for electricity generation 
o Nuclear  power; 
o Hydroelectric  power; 
o Bioenergy in other sectors besides transport;  
o Micro-generation (Micro-hydro, micro-solar) (not included in ETPs); 
o Fuel  cells  for transport;  
o Fuel cells for other electric power uses; 
o Hybrid and electric vehicles. 
 
Since no one technology is capable of providing the reductions needed the 
Stern report points out that the development, deployment, diffusion of a broad 
portfolio of technologies is required.199 
 
A valuable addition that the Stern report made is the addition of agriculture to 
the mitigation picture, noting that the contribution of agriculture to emissions was 14% 
in 2000 and 38% of that came from fertilizers. 200  Livestock production, which is 
projected to increase significantly as countries such as China and India consume more 
meat, is the second largest contributor in agriculture due to methane production during 
digestion.201 Technologies needed to address agricultural emissions then include: 
 Less GHG intensive fertilizers; 
 Plant varieties that are less reliant on GHG intensive fertilizers, either because 
they produce higher yields or are more efficient at soil nutrient uptake; 
 Animal variants and breeds less likely to produce methane during digestion; 
 Better management of animal waste, including recycling into biogas and other 
biomass for energy generation; 
 Animal feed less likely to produce methane; 
 
III.2 Adaptation 
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Most of the literature relating to technology transfer to address climate change 
focuses primarily on mitigation. In part this is due to the salience of the issue with 
respect to the major players (emerging economies and developed countries) but also in 
part because mitigation seems much more susceptible to traditional boundary setting.  
In many cases, technology transfer for adaptation is either viewed as inapplicable 
because of how broad the adaptation challenge is, or there is an intuition that 
technology does not really play a part in adaptation responses.202 The AR4 projections 
are based on the assumptions related to increases in climate change and no changes in 
adaptive capacity. In that sense they present baseline scenarios or business as usual 
trajectories.  Changes in adaptive capacity may mitigate some of the impacts, and may 
also make it possible to more usefully adapt to others that are unavoidable even under a 
2 degree scenario.203  In the near term, dealing with adaptation is an economy wide 
challenge involving all the policy levers required for poverty reduction and sustainable 
development but especially focused on increasing the adaptive capacity of the most 
vulnerable.  As the AR4 notes, societies have a long history of adapting to ongoing 
changes in climate and socio-political environments204 , but additional effort will be 
needed to enable adaptation for climate change.  The AR4 notes that adaptation capacity 
is unevenly distributed, both across and within societies and that this is co-extensive 
with uneven distributions of capacity to produce food, provide for health, and to create 
economic surpluses that can be reinvested in hard and soft infrastructure. 205   The 
majority of people in developing countries live in climate vulnerable environments and 
ecosystems.206 Technology and innovative capacity are clearly co-extensive with adaptive 
capacity. 207  Increased technological capacity can decrease vulnerability by enabling 
deployment and use of relevant technologies and enable the development of new 
technologies to address the specific challenges of adapting to climate change impacts.208  
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There are several issues that can be a barrier to effective adaptation.  To the 
extent that access to resources, financial and otherwise, is a key determinant of whether 
a specific adaptation response is adopted 209 , price-determining mechanisms like 
intellectual property may play a significant role as a barrier.  This largely applies in the 
context of existing and available products which are protected by intellectual property 
and for which the producer charges a price significantly above marginal cost of 
production so as to recoup investments over the lifetime of the IP right. Public policy 
interventions at the national level may therefore be required to address the price issue, 
where such prices create a barrier to adoption of necessary and effective technologies. 
 
Climate impacts can clearly impede the development path for developing 
countries. Their vulnerability and lack of adaptive capacity make this clear as is their 
reliance on unsustainable energy production, distribution and consumption technologies.  
Under a business as usual trajectory, likely development impacts include: 
 Falling farm incomes;210 
 Increasing urbanization and energy demand that is unlikely to be met; 
 Decreased health and capacity211 leading to lower productivity.212 
 Opportunity costs 213  as much needed investment in growth is diverted to 
dealing with emergencies and short term structural problems caused by climate 
change. 
 External migration 214 , leading to loss of possibly the most capable and 
productive portions of society, especially in agricultural production from loss 
of land and capital built up by individuals. 
 Internal migration leading to increased societal conflict and, in already 
precarious societies, outbreaks of violence as groups compete for scarce 
resources. 
 
These possible impacts outline the urgency of action on climate change, 
especially in ensuring the technologies necessary to mitigate emissions and adapt to 
climate change as part of broader development policy. 
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However, one of the most important interventions that can be made in these 
developing countries to reduce vulnerability, while laying the groundwork for increasing 
adaptive capacity are ones that increase economic growth as quickly as possible in as 
sustainable and equitable a manner as possible.215  The most basic and most important 
input into economic growth is energy, thus keeping the cost of energy production, 
distribution and consumption as low as possible is crucial to enable such growth in 
developing countries.216 The natural path would be to allow these countries to use the 
cheapest and most available sources of energy to achieve these goals i.e. coal and other 
fossil fuels whose production and consumption is subsidized. However, that will clearly 
lead to more emissions, which will lead to more climate impacts and an even greater 
need for adaptation; a negative feedback loop.  The use of renewable and sustainable 
energy is a fundamental element of addressing adaptation and development in 
developing countries. 217  It may however, entail in many least developed and lower 
middle income countries, off-grid and micro applications of many of these technologies. 
 
As a focus for the areas necessary to reduce such vulnerability, the Stern report 
suggests that the key areas are218: 
 Economic wealth 
 Infrastructure and technology 
 Information knowledge and skills 
 Equity 
 Social capital 
 
Infrastructure, technology, information, knowledge and skills are precisely 
those areas that can be best addressed by ensuring technology transfer.  Developing 
countries are also significantly dependent (up to 64% participation in South Asia and 
sub-Saharan Africa) on agriculture for economic growth and are more sensitive to 
climate variability. 219  A stable and sustainably growing framework for agricultural 
production and distribution is a necessity for reducing vulnerability and enabling 
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adaptive capacity in developing countries.220  Health interventions to deal with chronic 
diseases (both communicable and non-communicable) in developing countries are also a 
necessity to reduce vulnerability and adaptive capacity.221 This implicates general health 
infrastructure, and health management systems, but also the opportunity costs 
associated with prices of medical products, devices and services.  Water also remains a 
significant input for a significant portion of economic activity in developing countries, 
for agricultural and industrial production as well as for household consumption. 222 
Business as usual projections suggest that access to water in 2015 will be extremely 
limited with almost 650 million lacking access to potable water and over 2.5 billion 
lacking water for sanitation.223  Sustainable access to water has a network effect, creating 
a platform on which other interventions can build and can succeed. Increasing the 
efficiency and the capacity of water management systems is a crucial element of the 
economic development framework for developing countries in ensuring adaptive 
capacity.224 
   
In addition to these challenges there may also be insufficient legal and 
commercial frameworks for stable contracting, financial transactions (banking, insurance, 
cross-border transfers), as well as predictable environments for investment. There are 
basic problems of governance endemic in many developing countries, related to lack of 
capacity as well as corruption and insufficient regulatory oversight.225  While many of 
these problems may be susceptible to policy changes in the short term, others, such as 
lack of governance capacity are going to have to be addressed in the longer term.  This 
suggests that urgent near term action should focus on simple interventions that provide 
clear rules and signals to private sector actors to carry out their activities rather than on 
developing country governments to act and intervene.   
 
These failures create barriers to the kind of financial transactions, such as 
licensing, that private sector actors need in order to feel confident, on both sides of a 
transaction.  Clearly access to technology-related products, information, knowledge and 
skills are not a sufficient condition for the achievement of the economic growth that will 
reduce vulnerability and enable adaptive capacity, but it is a necessary condition without 
which such development cannot be achieved.  
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Adaptation presents a complex challenge involving a network of existing 
capacity and vulnerability, with impacts and adaptations to impacts taking place within a 
network of co-factors such as poverty, population shifts and migration patterns, land 
use and land use changes.226  This means that identifying specific technologies that are 
only relevant to adaptation is even harder than for mitigation. In essence, adaptation 
really addresses two core issues: reduction of vulnerability; and increasing capacity to 
adapt.  The overlap with poverty reduction strategies and other core development 
frameworks is significant.  The adaptation challenge is essentially a development 
challenge227 and covers all sectors of technology relevant to ensuring rapid, non-fossil 
fuel dependent economic development. This means not only a continuation of existing 
best practices228 on ensuring transfer of technology but also ramping up and introducing 
policies to speed up the process of development focused on technological 
transformation in an unprecedented manner. 
 
The implications of the framework for adaptation, especially to ensure adaptive 
capacity suggest a far broader range of technologies and economy wide action in 
developing countries that goes beyond simply energy. In addition, the timeframes 
suggest actions must take place almost immediately to have an effect in the period 
leading to 2020 - 25. Any solutions to reduce vulnerability and address adaptive capacity 
for developing countries must ensure access to the best environmentally sustainable 
technologies for: 
 energy production, distribution and consumption; 
 agricultural inputs, including seeds (including flood and drought resilient 
varieties), low emissions fertilizers, and methods and processes; 
 health infrastructure, including medicines, diagnostic  and treatment tools,; 
 water infrastructure for capture, treatment, distribution, and recycling. 
A useful framework for creating resilience and reducing vulnerability in the climate 
change context was provided by UNEP in its Green Economy report.229 The report lays 
out a set of pathways and scenarios for development of a green economy that focus on 
sustainable, non-fossil fuel economic development, within the 2020-2030 timeframe and 
identifies key sectors that would require transformation to enable a green economy.  
The green economy approach focuses on investing in efficiency, preservation, and green 
exploitation of natural resources (Agriculture, Fisheries, Water, Forestry) and a 
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fundamental investment in efficiency, alternative production processes, technological 
innovation and diffusion in the following key sectors: renewable energy, manufacturing, 
waste, buildings, transport, tourism, and cities.  This implicates an extremely broad set 
of sectors, practices, technologies and policies but provides a strategic focus, and 
implementation pathways for economy wide action in the context of addressing the 
adaptation challenge in developing countries.   
Some areas are, however, more clearly susceptible to technological 
interventions and the scope of these can be cabined by an understanding of the 
additional effects and impacts of climate change and variability outlined in the AR4. In 
the following areas we can already begin to see the necessity for the application of 
technological products, processes and know-how, for specific climate-related responses. 
 Renewable Energy 
o Sustainable biomass use – efficient wood burning stoves,  
o Micro-solar, solar household systems (with solar batteries) 
o Micro-hydro 
o Micro-wind 
 Water 
o To address challenges to water quality, changes to treatment 
infrastructure may be needed to deal with higher levels of toxicity and 
microbial and plant growth than systems have initially been planned 
for.230 
o Water desalination technologies, especially for coastal areas with 
significant tidal, estuary and island water systems.231 
o Smart and/or active water metering systems, managed by software to 
providing the ability to shift pricing based on peak demand and peak 
usage periods during the day and the year. 
o Water capture and storage products and processes 
 Rainwater harvesting from roofs into hardened storage 
tanks 
 Direct spring access and protection from contamination 
 sub-surface dams to capture underground streams and run-
off 
 covered, lined and sealed hand-dug wells, to prevent wall 
collapse and contamination 
 tubewells and boreholes 
o Water distribution products and processes 
                                                        
 
230 p196, Kundzewicz, Z.W. et al. “Freshwater resources and their Management” in M.L. Parry et al. (Eds.) 
Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the 
Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007).  
231 Table 3.5, p196, Id. 
 57 
 
 gravity fed schemes to distribute water from higher altitude 
catchment areas 
 disbursement systems such as faucet design, low flow toilets 
o Water treatment and sanitation products and processes 
 filtration processes 
 chemical treatment 
 sewerage systems 
 latrine systems 
o Efficient water use and reclamation technologies 
 Industrial recycling and re-use – iron and steel; paper; 
cement; 
 Food 
o New varieties or adaptations and wider use of existing plant and 
animal varieties may be required in areas where hydrological and 
seasonal variations go beyond those under which existing seed and 
animal germplasm input strategies were developed. Needed 
characteristics include drought resistance, flood resistance, salt-water 
resistance; short harvest cycles, longer harvest cycles; ease of fertilizer 
use232; pest and plant disease resistance;233 
o Agricultural Information and communication technologies – 
including telemetry, soil monitoring – access to local weather 
forecasting on short and long-term cycles, satellite imagery;234 
o Biotechnology and animal and plant breeding will play significant 
roles in adaptation responses, especially where shifts in management 
practices and behaviour are insufficient to achieve the full scale of 
adaptation needed. 235  Genetic markers and alterations related to 
tolerance for lack of water, pest and disease resistance have already 
been identified demonstrated in some crops.236 
o Water storage and efficiency technologies specific to agricultural 
water use;237 
 Human health  
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o One conclusion from the AR4 is that in the human health arena, 
adaptation needs to begin immediately to address vulnerability and 
increase capacity to adapt later to increasing impacts.  Climate change 
may already be responsible for an additional 150,000  deaths  each  
year due to  increased  incidence  of  diarrhoea,  malaria  and  
malnutrition.238 
o The aim must be to enable the immediate uptake of existing health 
interventions in those areas of ongoing high need, largely in 
developing countries.239 
o For climate change specific technologies this includes:  
 Medical products, processes and services related to 
managing health needs during extreme weather events; and 
 Medical products, processes and services related to 
managing health needs during periods of extreme heat (heat 
waves) and extreme cold, especially for vulnerable 
populations such as the elderly and young children. 
o For adaptive capacity more generally this includes: 
 Medical products, processes and services related to 
increasing resistance to vector borne and temperature 
sensitive diseases; 
 Medical products, processes and services related to 
increasing general immune-capacity, e.g. vaccines; 
 Products, processes and services designed to create hygienic 
and sanitary living and working conditions, such as access to 
potable water and sanitary facilities. 
 
Other technologies for adaptation include: 
- early warning systems for disasters (including communications); 
- systems for stockpiling and distributing food, water, and medicines; 
- systems for storing and managing water resources; 
- alternative disaster-appropriate transport systems (e.g., boats); 
- systems for strengthening waste disposal sites against leakage during disasters; 
- disaster mitigation systems, such as flood and sea walls, flood channels; and 
- extreme weather event resistant building materials. 
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It is important to reiterate that technologies for adaptation have significant 
overlap with the general framework of technologies for development.  Attempts to limit 
and cabin the scope of technologies relevant to adaptation therefore generally fail 
because they are based on false premises.  Transformation of the entire energy systems 
of developing countries is a key element of adaptation, as is increasing capacity to adapt.  
This requires a broad approach to technology rather than a narrow one.  While not 
necessarily implicating intellectual property, except in perhaps agriculture and health, the 
role of intellectual property as a tool for enabling development through investment and 
innovation comes much more to the fore.  Adaptation brings the issue into the familiar 
territory of the debate over what role intellectual property plays in the broader 
development of a country, something which is more extensively discussed in Chapter 5. 
IV. THE GEOGRAPHIC TARGET 
The geographic structure of the technology need is somewhat difficult to draw 
from the data in the scenarios studied in this chapter. Some of this information can 
clearly be drawn from the Technology Needs Assessments (TNAs) conducted by many 
developing countries as well as NAMAs and national communications. In the discussion 
below, I begin with those developing countries identified and implicated by their 
mitigation potential, as defined in the various scenarios studies.  This is then overlaid 
with identification of their technology needs from TNAs, NAMAs and national 
communications.  
IV.1 Mitigation 
In terms of the share of GHG emissions, IEA Projections from 2004 
suggested that developing countries would account for 70% of emissions in the period 
2002-2030 and surpass OECD emissions by the early 2020s, with the majority of those 
emissions from China, followed by India.240 A key point is that even if by 2050 OECD 
countries were to reduce their emissions to zero, non-OECD countries would still have 
to significantly reduce their emissions below their 2007 levels.241  This represents an 
immense challenge in the face of the simultaneous challenge these countries will have in 
meeting growing demand for energy as they lift greater portions of their population out 
of extreme or absolute poverty. It identifies China and India as key countries that will 
need to use technology to transform their economies and to reduce emissions.  
 
From a global welfare perspective, deployment and diffusion of technology to 
developing countries may be the cheapest and most effective way of ensuring GHG 
emissions reductions, especially in the 2015 – 2020 period. Some forecasting models 
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conclude that the learning process and speed of adoption and deployment would be 
faster and cheaper in developing countries than in OECD countries, suggesting that 
developing countries should be preferred targets for OECD investments in clean energy 
deployment and diffusion.242  The 2010 World Development Report projects a least cost 
mitigation pathway which would have 65% of mitigation action by 2030 take place in 
developing countries.243   
 
For developing countries, the IEA Blue Map scenario lays out the technology 
sector shifts that will enable reductions commensurate with the projected contributions 
especially for India and China.244 They also identify the following countries for their 
mitigation potential: Brazil, Mexico, and South Africa. In terms of regions, ASEAN as a 
unit is a major contributor in terms of mitigation potentials. In both China and India, 
end-use fuel and electricity efficiency is a large portion of the contribution (38% and 
36% respectively).  CCS forms a significant part of the technology shift for China, 
whereas, for India, renewables play a larger part.  For both countries action is needed 
across all sectors including transport. 
 
A look at the IEA and other scenario models for key selected regions and countries 
(as well as their individual TNAs, National Communications, NAMAs) also may help to 
illustrate the scope of the challenge in those countries where technologies may be most 
needed.  
 ASEAN ( not including China) 
o Power generation – in 2050 Renewables form over 50% of power 
generation (demand grows from just above 500 TWh to almost 
2200TWh), especially hydro and wind. This is compared to less than 
20 percent in 2009.245  
o Industrial energy use – In 2009, less than a third of energy use comes 
from renewables, electricity and other heat sources besides coal, oil 
and gas. By 2050, the model suggests that this will shift to over two 
thirds.246 
o Transport – while LDV transport share triples compared to 2010 
levels (with a more diverse fuel use with over 50% from FCEVs, 
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PHEVs and BEVs) 247 , mass transit contributes the bulk of the 
transport share by 2050, much as in 2010.248 
 
 Brazil249 
o Power generation - Brazil has over 45% of renewables in its total 
energy supply mix in 2010, with hydropower being the most 
significant.250 By 2050, the proportion of wind, solar and biomass will 
have increased to match the increase in demand, along with natural 
gas. Hydropower remains the largest single portion of the mix but 
will hit limits.251 From Brazil’s second National Communication to 
the UNFCCC the needs it identified were:252 
 Efficient coal and gas – SC/USC - IGCC - large and small 
gas turbines; 
 Advanced nuclear; 
 Solar PV; Solar thermal; Concentrated solar power 
 Wind - Control technologies, turbines; 
 Gasification of biomass; 
 Hydrogen fuel cell and hydrogen storage; 
 Gas to liquid, coal to liquid. 
 
o Transport - Brazil has significant experience with the relevant 
technologies for decarbonization of transport including in biofuels 
for transport.253 In 2010 Bus Rapid Transit is over 50% of transport 
share and will remain close to that in 2050 with a significant increase 
in LDVs which will consist largely of flex fuel cars, biofuels, and 
small shares of electric (PHEVs, BEVs).  
 In its Pledge NAMA254, Brazil aims to increase the use of 
biofuels, in which it is already a major market actor.255 The 
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national communication identifies R&D and demonstration 
of second generation biofuels as a need.256 
 It also identified battery technology for transport but also 
for power storage in general. 
o Industry257 
 CCS for industry 
o Grid 
 Smart grids 
o Buildings 
 Energy efficiency for small residential – implying appliances 
 Clean cooking fuels, and stoves 
 Solar heating 
 New environmentally sound design 
o In Agriculture, it plans on new crop and livestock management 
systems.258   
 genetic improvements  for  animals  and  plants to deal with 
new climate conditions and the increase in pest and disease 
incidence.259 
Brazil main mitigation potential lies in reducing deforestation, which 
implicates agriculture and agricultural land-use. Reducing demand for 
land will require better and more efficient use of existing agricultural 
land, increasing its productivity and reducing impact. 
 China260 
o Power generation – by 2050, China reduces it energy related 
emissions by 80% compared with 2009.261 A significant portion of 
that (26%) will be from nuclear, with a similar proportion for 
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renewables, some space for natural gas but with coal plus CCS 
providing a fifth of the portion of the energy mix. 
 IGCC  power  generation;  multi-generation;  converting  
liquid  fuels  from  coal;  coal gasification; 
 New-generation fast breeder reactors; nuclear fusion; 
 Large scale offshore wind power generation;  
 Core  technology  for  solar  thermal  power  generation;  
solar  photovoltaic  power generation;  
 Advanced geothermal power generation;  
 Nitrogen energy and fuel cells;  
 Advanced ocean-energy power generation;  
 Biomass energy;    
 Smart grid and energy storage;  
 Carbon Capture and Storage. 
o Industry – China is the world’s largest producer of cement, crude 
steel, aluminium, paper and board. 262  Adoption of best available 
technologies (BATs) will account for 40% of the reductions in 2050, 
compared to a 4 degree scenario.263 
o Transport – rapid growth of LDVs is envisioned by 2050 but 
accompanied with significant increase in mass transit by 2050. In the 
LDV market, the majority of transport share is in hybrids, PHEVs, 
BEVs and FCEVs, with only a very small proportion of gasoline and 
diesel.264  A very rapid penetration and adoption of advanced new 
vehicle technologies is foreseen under the IEA models. 
 Improved fuel-efficient engines, transmission systems; 
lightweight vehicle construction materials;    
 Advanced low-emission diesel engines;  
 Hybrid power vehicles; high-efficiency electric vehicles. 
o Buildings 
 Lighting, especially LED technology;  
 New building seal materials; advanced ventilation and air 
conditioning systems;  
 District co-generation; geothermal heat pumps 
 Appliances 
 High efficiency electronic devices, especially 
power-semiconductor components;  
 Direct current permanent–magnet brushless 
motors. 
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China’s national communication is quite specific about a basic list of 
technologies it needs in terms of domestic action and industry.  The 
barriers to acquiring such technology are not articulated in the 
communication. 
 India265 
o Power generation – This is the largest contributor to India’s 
emissions reduction in the IEA scenarios.266 As of 2010, India has the 
fifth largest wind capacity globally. Total wind energy will increase to 
6% of the 2050 energy mix from a very low share at present.267 Solar 
power contributes a significant part of emissions saving by 2050 (over 
one fifth of the energy mix).268 
 Coal beneficiation and its impact on efficiency 
improvement/abatement of GHG emission in thermal 
power stations; 
 Validation of the multi stage hydrogenation (MSH) 
technology for converting coal to oil; 
 Abatement of GHG via in situ infusion of fly ash with CO2 
in thermal power plants; 
 CCS- CO2 sequestration in geologic formations with 
enhanced coal bed methane (CBM) recovery; 
 CCS - Geological storage of CO2 in exploration/recovery 
of petroleum gas; 
 developing soft coke technology as the source of rural/semi 
urban domestic energy; 
 CO2 - decomposition through plasma technology; 
 Improvement in solar cell efficiency; 
 All renewables. 
 
o Industry 
 Steel 
 vertical retort direct reduction (VRDR)– 
submerged arc furnace (SAF), electroslag refining 
(ESR) route 
 electric arc furnaces  
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o Buildings 
 Lighting  
o Waste 
 Recovery of methane from landfills and paddy fields 
o Transport – India is expected to have an extremely large increase in 
LDV usage by 2050. The majority of these will be Hybrid, PHEV, 
BEV and FCEV with gasoline only a small percentage. Similarly to 
China, the IEA scenarios envisage rapid market penetration and 
adoption in the post-2020 period.269 
 Fuel switching 
o Agriculture 
 Research, development, and demonstration of low-methane 
emitting feeds; feed additives in mitigating methane 
emission from livestock:  
o India’s emissions need to peak by 2030, (under a 2% scenario), largely 
through rapid deployment of renewables, nuclear and biofuels. Also 
crucial will be deployment of best available technologies to enable 
greater energy use efficiency in industry.270 As with China, the IEA 
ETP 2010 scenario notes that peaking in 2030 is not achievable 
without widespread adoption of CCS in power generation and 
industry.271 
 
 South Africa272 
o Power generation - At present South Africa’s energy mix consists of 
94% coal, without CCS, barely keeping up with growth in demand.273 
At the same time it exports electricity providing more than two-thirds 
of Africa’s electricity needs.274 In 2050, the proportion of power from 
nuclear, solar and coal with CCS will be 75% of the power generation 
mix. 
 Solar power 
 Clean coal – IGCC, SC/USC 
 Wind power 
 CCS 
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o Transport – In 2010, over 50% of road share in South Africa was in 
buses, although these are largely inefficient minibuses.275 Buses are 
expected to maintain that share in 2050 while LDV use doubles.276 
Biofuels and electricity are expected to be almost 50% of the fuel mix 
for transport with fossil fuels providing much of the rest.277 
 Improvement of urban mass-transport systems 
 Fuel-efficiency improvement 
o Industry 
 Boiler improvement 
 Source reduction, recycle, and reuse. 
In addition agriculture will play a significant part in the emissions of 
developing countries and their contribution to mitigation. Simply as a function of 
population, developing countries account for almost 75% of agriculture-related 
emissions.278 For example, Brazil is a lead emitter amongst developing countries in the 
fields of meat and milk production.279 This suggests that agricultural technologies are a 
crucial component of the mitigation technology portfolio for developing countries, as 
urgent as those related to energy and industry-related emissions. 
 
A 2013 study for the German Environment Ministry examines the pledges and 
mitigation potential for emerging economies in the period up to 2020.280 The main aim 
is to examine whether their 2020 pledges may be met, and focuses on cheapest available 
emissions reductions, using existing technologies. As such it measures emissions 
reductions that are significantly lower than those identified in the Scenarios above. This 
excludes technologies not considered available or implementable after that date (such as 
CCS, hydrogen fuel cells), but it provides significant agreement with the ETPs, the Stern 
Report, and IPCC scenarios for mitigation technology needs in emerging economies.  It 
identifies the following technology needs (with different emphases and details) for the 6 
countries reviewed (Brazil, India, China, Mexico, South Africa, South Korea281). 
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278 Annex 7g, Stern, N. et al. The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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280 Fekete, H. et al “Emerging economies – potentials, pledges and fair shares of greenhouse gas 
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Bonn, April 2013).  
281 There was a lack of data on Korea, making it difficult to identify measures that would have mitigation 
potential in South Korea’s 2020 pledge. See p111, Fekete, H. et al. 
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o Energy Supply (Not a significant measure for Brazil) 
 Efficiency of power plants - IGCC, Pressurized Fluidized 
bed compression, circulating fluidized bed combustion (Not 
considered implementable by India before 2020.) 
 Combined heat and power  
 Fuel switch to other fossils - coal to gas (Particularly 
important to India.) 
 Increase of nuclear energy  
 Non-bio renewables – Hydro, Wind, Solar PV,  
o Industry 
 End use efficiency in: iron and steel; other mining; food 
production (Especially for Brazil.) 
 Heat and steam recovery 
 Cement – clinker (The primary area of potential for China) 
 Paper – recycling 
 Use of sustainable biofuels 
 Fuel switch to natural gas and other fossil fuels – non-coal 
waste burning 
o Waste 
 Reduction of emissions from waste (landfill) (Relevant only 
for Mexico and Brazil.) 
o Transport282 
 Modal shifts - Bus Rapid Transport; road freight to rail 
 Efficiency improvements – vehicle and engine design. (Not 
relevant for Brazil.)  
 Fuel switch - Biofuels for transport including flex-fuel 
motors; PHEVs, hydrogen 
o Agriculture, Land use (Not relevant to India, China.) 
 Livestock breeding and management 
 Fertilizer, manure use and management 
o Buildings (Not as relevant for Brazil leading up to 2020.) 
 Appliance efficiency – lighting, end use electronics and 
white goods 
 Refrigeration and air conditioning (pumps, bridge designs, 
etc.) 
 Building envelope efficiency – seals  
 Solar thermal water heating 
 
                                                        
 
282 p42, Fekete, H. et al “Emerging economies – potentials, pledges and fair shares of greenhouse gas 
reduction” ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH OF THE GERMAN FEDERAL MINISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT, 
NATURE CONSERVATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY Project-no. (FKZ) 3711 41 120, (Umweltbundesamt, 
Bonn, April 2013).  
 68 
 
Further evidence of the scope of technologies required by developing countries can be 
gleaned from Technology Needs Assessments, National Communications and NAMAs 
provided by developing countries. This next section relies on the 2009 Synthesis of 
TNAs provided by the UNFCCC secretariat as well as my own examination of specific 
country TNA, National Communications, and NAMAs.  From this data we can see that 
there is considerable overlap with the set of scenarios, and considerable breadth beyond 
renewable technologies. 283  From the review of 70 TNAs and 21 national 
communications in the synthesis paper we find the following mitigation sectors and 
technologies commonly identified284: 
 Efficient fossil fuel power generation (major emphasis for Africa, Asia and 
Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, LDCs, SIDS)285 
o IGCC 
o Efficient combustion technology for traditional coal fired stations 
o Combined heat and Power 
 Renewable Energy (major emphasis for Africa, Asia and Pacific, Latin America 
and the Caribbean, LDCs, SIDS)286 
o Solar PV including micro, off-grid 
o Wind 
 Wind water pumping 
o Biomass 
o Traditional Hydropower; Small and micro-hydro 
o Solar thermal 
o Geothermal 
 Agriculture and Land-use (major emphasis for Africa, Asia and Pacific, Latin 
America and the Caribbean, LDCs, SIDS)287 
o New plant varieties 
o Crop management 
o Forestry management 
o Manure conversion to methane fuel 
o Less GHG intensive animal feed 
 Buildings ,  
o Efficient cook stoves (major emphasis for LDCs)288 – solar cook 
stoves 
o Energy efficient appliances 
o Demand side management software 
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o Building design and materials 
o District heating 
o Efficient Ventilation and heating 
o Lighting 
 Industry – cement, iron and Steel, Aluminium, Chemicals (major emphasis for 
Africa, Asia and Pacific, LDCs, SIDS)289 
o Fuel switching  
o Alternative production processes 
 Dry cement production 
o Energy use efficiency 
 Waste (major emphasis for Africa, Asia and Pacific, LDCs, SIDS)290 
o Waste management technologies – recycling 
o landfill with gas recovery and waste incineration with energy 
utilization 
o processing of solid organic waste 
o solid waste and wastewater recovery and reuse 
o urban sewerage facilities 
 Transport (major emphasis for Asia and Pacific, Latin America and the 
Caribbean, SIDS)291 
o Energy efficient traditional fuel vehicles 
o Modal switch   
o Biofuels 
o PHEVs 
One major element of this analysis is that, as a whole, the needs of LDCs and 
SIDS do not differ in kind from those of other developing countries but only in degree.  
For example, the diffusion need for renewable energy technologies is not only limited to 
the major emerging economies, but is highlighted by LDCs as well.  Getting products, 
as well as increasing domestic capacity in LDCs, is crucial to the long term climate goal, 
despite the relatively low contribution they make to emissions in the present.  More 
interestingly they present a ready export market for mitigation technologies which might 
be appropriately segmented from the developed country market so as to make it 
worthwhile for major developing country firms to provide hardware, and training. 
A major shared emphasis is agriculture, even in major economies, something 
which is also reflected in the adaptation analysis.  This is an area that has seen much less 
attention in mitigation than renewable energy but may be of most importance to 
developing countries.  To the extent that the land-use portion refers to forestry and 
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avoided deforestation, this constitutes a major part of the mitigation potential and 
support need from developing countries. However, addressing deforestation will entail 
reducing the need for agricultural land, and increasing productivity while reducing the 
footprint. 
IV.2 Adaptation 
The geographic regions that are negatively impacted by climate change and thus are in 
need of technologies and development to meet the vulnerability and capacity challenge 
have significant overlap with the majority of developing countries i.e. tropical or sub-
tropical regions with a significant population in marginal ecological niches. In terms of 
regions, the AR4 notes that for: 
 Africa292, by 2020 up to 250 million people are projected to be exposed to 
water stress and its concomitant effects. Crop yields from rain fed agriculture 
could reduce by up to 50%. Some crops could become entirely unsuited for 
production in some areas293; and livestock could suffer from reduced quality of 
rangeland feedstock grasses and scrubland;294 
 Asia295, heavily populated mega-deltas in South East Asia, such as Bangladesh, 
are projected to undergo severe and more frequent flooding.296 This is likely to 
result in an increase in diarrheal and enteric diseases due to decreased water 
quality. Droughts in some areas will also contribute to the disease burden by 
increasing reliance on unsafe water resources.297 
 Latin America298 is projected to lose significant productivity in crucial crops, as 
well as in livestock productivity. Changes in precipitation are likely, and water 
stress will increase due to reduction in glacier size and durability. 
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Key vulnerabilities identified by the AR4 include: 
 Increased risk of extreme weather events, such as droughts, heat waves and 
floods;299 
 Greater risks of climate appear to exist for the low lying latitudes in which the 
majority of the landmass of developing countries is located; 
 
Even if warming were to be kept at the lower range of projections of 2 degrees 
Celsius, the majority of impacts would fall on developing countries.300  
 
 Some evidence of the scope of technologies required by developing countries 
can be gleaned from Technology Needs Assessments, National Communications and 
NAMAs provided by developing countries. This next section relies on the 2009 
Synthesis of TNAs provided by the UNFCCC secretariat as well as my own examination 
of specific country TNAs, and National Communications. From this data we can see 
that there is considerable overlap with the selected scenarios, and considerable breadth 
beyond renewable technologies. 301  From the review of 70 TNAs and 21 national 
communications in the synthesis paper we find the following sectors and technologies 
commonly identified302: 
 
 Agriculture (major emphasis for Africa, Asia and Pacific, Latin America and 
Caribbean, LDCs, SIDS)303, 
o Crop management and Crop breeding, including use of molecular 
techniques for large-scale seed quality innovations and breeding new 
seed varieties;  
o Improved irrigation systems - extension and rehabilitation of existing 
irrigation facilities 
o integrated pest management  
o use of green manure and low GHG fertilizers 
o Livestock breeding – heat and drought tolerance 
o improving the nutritional value of animal feed 
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o developing gene research and technology 
o Food processing 
o development of fast-growing forest species to adapt to new 
conditions  
o establishing early warning systems for forest fires 
 Water (major emphasis for Africa, Latin America and Caribbean, LDCs)304, 
o Efficient water use – recycling 
o Water harvesting 
o Sanitation 
o desalination plants 
o GIS and satellite remote-sensing 
 Health (major emphasis for Africa, Latin America and Caribbean, LDCs)305 
o Water and food borne diseases 
o Heat stress 
o Pest borne diseases – Malaria 
o health alert information systems and disease 
 
 Climate risk and Disaster management (major emphasis for Asia and Pacific, 
Latin America and Caribbean, SIDS306) 
o Early warning systems for floods and tidal waves  
o Seawall and coastal protection technologies  
 Dykes and levees 
 Floodgates, tidal walls 
 Storm surge barriers 
 Water Pumping  and drainage technologies 
o Systematic observation, monitoring and analysis 
 Conventional observations, including use of wind profilers, 
and application of GPS in upper-air meteorological 
observations.  
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 Non-conventional observations, including development of 
satellite remote-sensing instruments and ground-based 
remote sensing technologies.   
 Data analysis and assimilation, including setup of 4D-
VAR 307  data assimilation systems, direct assimilation & 
application of massive satellite data, quick assimilation & 
application of near surface intensive measurements, parallel 
high-efficiency computation of global high-resolution 4D-
VAR data assimilation systems.308  
 Numerical prediction models, including optimized physic-
process parameterization schemes and coordination with 
dynamic models and data assimilation systems.309 
 
The TNAs are somewhat narrower in scope than the scope identified by the 
Green Economy report, or even the broader identification of specific adaptation needs 
in section III.2 above.  Part of this may be the structural bias of the TNAs which have a 
narrower conception of technologies for adaption than is used in this thesis. For 
example, the UNDP TNA handbook sets as a starting point, an assessment of existing 
climate vulnerability rather than addressing resilience.310   While useful this excludes 
climate resilience and the platform and network technologies necessary to enable 
appropriate responses to climate impacts. Nevertheless, it appears that at least the LDCs 
used poverty alleviation as major criteria for technology selection.  One major problem 
for the TNAs is that they rarely provided time horizons, beyond the general framework 
of near term, medium term and longer term technology needs.  While such a 
determination is suggested by the TNA handbook, very few countries engaged in such a 
characterisation of their technology priorities.  In terms of adaptation it is also clear 
from the TNAs that the major emerging economies share many of the same needs as 
the SIDS, LDCs and other developing countries, again this being a matter of degree 
than kind. 
 
 
V. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
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The purpose of this chapter was to elaborate the key criteria against which 
necessity for action would be measured. It identified the portfolio of technologies that 
were broadly implicated (including any data on state of deployment and diffusion), the 
timing of when they would need to be deployed and diffused and most importantly, the 
developing countries and regions to which such technologies are likely to need to be 
deployed and diffused. The next section below restates the key findings in this chapter 
on these three issues.  In the next chapter, we proceed to evaluate what data and trends 
exist on the patent status of these technologies, especially those that developing 
countries will need to be transferred.  
 
V.1. Timescale 
 
The key date is the 2015 – 2018 timeframe for peaking GHG emissions and 
the 2025 date for increasing adaptive capacity.  The scenarios examined suggest that this 
can largely be done with existing technologies, but has to be accomplished within the 
next 3 – 13 years, earlier in that time frame in the case of clean coal technologies.  It 
may be that a significant portion of existing technologies may be in the public domain, 
but regardless of that fact, there is an urgent need to shift the price point to turn these 
technological products and processes more into commodities, at mass market prices.  
This will be the key short term challenge.  In such a scheme, it may be inappropriate to 
rely on the relatively slow-moving process of existing trade and licensing patterns to 
encourage transactions and technology diffusion. It will require deliberate policies to 
encourage diffusion.311 The  ETP 2012 also argues that to achieve its 2 degree scenario, 
no breakthrough technologies are needed and that existing commercialized or near 
commercial technologies are sufficient to achieve the goal, provided the right policy mix 
is in place at both national and global levels.312 
 
In the climate area, it is also important to take into account the lock-in effect 
of not deploying low GHG emissions infrastructure as soon as possible. To ensure that 
the right technologies are in place by 2050, technology deployment may need to start 
immediately, decades ahead of time. 313   There are some suggestions however that 
leading up to the 2050 horizon and beyond, existing technologies will be insufficient to 
meet the challenge of reducing GHG emissions and adaptation.  It will be crucial to 
provide incentives for innovation in a broad portfolio of technologies, especially those 
with significant network and public goods characteristics. While a significant chunk of 
incremental innovation can come from the private sector, the risk premium and 
investment analysis for breakthrough innovation may require significant and 
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coordinated public funding to create many Manhattan project-like research paths in 
multiple sectors.314 Such technologies will include such things as:  
 Nuclear fusion 
 Hydrogen fuel cells 
 Off-grid solar batteries 
 Vehicle Battery storage life in general 
The IEA argues that these are the kinds of technologies that will require 
significant public R&D support, precisely because the benefits for individual private 
actors to invest are too diffuse, while the initial costs are high.315 Intellectual property 
protection will be crucial to ensuring private sector investment in incremental 
innovations, but in breakthrough innovations, which may be significantly public sector 
funded, the risk premium protection that IP provides may not be as necessary. There 
may be no need to go beyond the existing intellectual property system to enable private 
sector innovation for the long term.  Nevertheless, there may be a need to differentiate 
in terms of IP action and time frames between existing technologies, and those to be 
developed in the post-2020 period. 
 
V.2. Scope of technologies 
The analysis on mitigation and adaptation suggests that the scope of 
technologies implicated may be economy wide.  The need to address action across a 
wide portfolio of technologies also argues against attempts to limit the scope of action 
to enable technology transfer only to a few technology sectors. The core finding of this 
chapter is that a broad portfolio of technologies needs to be addressed in each sector316, 
not just best available technologies and not just those that are not IP protected.  
 
 
V.3. Geographical Scope 
From a mitigation perspective, the cheapest and most effective action on 
mitigation can be achieved in developing countries. This argues for focusing energy, 
finance and technology on transforming the high growth economies of Brazil, India, 
China, South Africa into low or zero GHG emissions economies, with at least a peak of 
emissions by 2018.  Developing countries are also the most vulnerable to the earliest 
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impacts of climate change and increasingly so in the period to 2050, suggesting a need 
for rapid technological development in the near term.   
 
The table on the following pages lists the mitigation and adaptation 
technologies identified as necessary to transfer along with the key developing countries 
and regions identified as geographical targets for technology transfer.  What is clear is 
that while countries may have different needs, they differ only in degree of need rather 
than kind of need (except at the margins e.g. small islands states and coastal sea level 
rise).  Clearly some element of the necessity for action at the national level will be 
predicated on the structure of international technology markets, and determined to a 
significant extent by the existence, distribution and exploitation patterns of intellectual 
property.  The next chapter looks at the available evidence regarding the technologies 
identified in this chapter and the implications for the necessity for intellectual property 
action by the UNFCCC. 
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Table 1: Illustrative Table of Technology Needs in Developing Countries 
Data in the table is taken from the analysis in this chapter.  There is some differentiation 
in the grain of the analysis as some scenarios aggregate climate effects and thus 
technology needs at the level of the region. This is especially true for adaptation. 
The technology need was defined as whether the technology was specifically identified 
within a TNA, a Technology Action Plan, a Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action 
(NAMA) plan, or within a relevant scenario exercise, based on existing pledges and 
mitigation pathways reflecting analyses of mitigation potentials for these countries.  
 
Specific Mitigation Technologies 
 
Developing Countries and Regions  
Implicated (in terms of mitigation 
potentials and Technology needs 
articulated) 
Industrial process efficiency (best 
available production technologies in 
the following sectors) 
Africa, Asia and Pacific, LDCs, SIDS 
- Iron and Steel ASEAN, Brazil, China, India, South 
Africa 
- Cement ASEAN, Brazil, China, India, South 
Africa 
- Chemicals and Petrochemicals ASEAN, Brazil, China, India, South 
Africa 
- Paper ASEAN, Brazil, China, India, South 
Africa 
- Aluminium ASEAN, Brazil, China, India, South 
Africa 
- (CCS) in Industrial Processes Brazil, China, India, South Africa 
Renewables Africa, Asia and Pacific, Latin America 
and the Caribbean, LDCs, SIDS; 
ASEAN, , Brazil, China, India, South 
Africa 
- Hydro ASEAN, Brazil, China, India, South 
Africa 
- Wind (Offshore and/or 
Onshore) and Large wind 
power generation units, 
turbines, controllers 
ASEAN, Brazil, China, India, South 
Africa, 
- Solar PV ASEAN, Brazil, China, India, South 
Africa,  
- CSP Solar Brazil, China, India, Mexico, South 
Africa 
- Tidal China, India 
- Geothermal China, India 
- Biomass and waste (including 
landfill) 
Brazil, China, India,  
- Hydrogen Fuel cells, Storage Brazil, China, India,  
Nuclear ASEAN, Brazil, China, India, South 
Africa 
- Pressurized water reactors with 
capacity above 1 000 MW 
China 
Power generation efficiency and fuel 
switching  
Africa, Asia and Pacific, Latin America 
and the Caribbean, LDCs, SIDS 
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- (CCS) in Power generation Brazil, China, India, South Africa 
- coal to natural gas ASEAN, Brazil, China, India, 
- Coal to oil India 
- Integrated gasification 
combined  cycle combustion   
Brazil, China, India, South Africa 
- Pressurized Fluidized bed 
compression, circulating 
fluidized bed combustion 
Brazil, China, India, South Africa 
- Super-critical and ultra-
supercritical coal 
Brazil, China, India, South Africa 
- Coal washing and depressing 
technology 
China, India 
Transport Asia and Pacific, Latin America and the 
Caribbean, SIDS; 
- Plug in Hybrids and Electric 
vehicles, Battery electric 
vehicles, fuel cell vehicles 
ASEAN, Brazil, China, India, South 
Africa 
- Flex – Fuel Vehicles Brazil, China 
- Bus rapid transport ASEAN, Brazil, China, India, South 
Africa 
- Hydrogen Fuel cells Brazil, India, 
- Batteries Brazil,  
- Biodiesel and biofuels (including 
2nd generation biofuels) 
Brazil, India, South Africa 
- Fuel Efficiency of petrol or 
diesel vehicles 
ASEAN, China, India, South Africa 
 Electricity grid – smart and micro 
infrastructure and management 
ASEAN, Brazil, China, India, 
- Flexible AC transmission 
systems; High-voltage 
transmission systems 
China,  
- Monitoring and controlling 
electricity quality, grid 
interconnection and dispatching 
- Electricity dispatching 
automation technology 
ASEAN, China, India 
Buildings  
End-use efficiency and Appliances ASEAN, Brazil, China, India,  
- electric motors Brazil, South Africa 
- pumps, including for 
agricultural use 
ASEAN, Brazil, China, India,  
- lighting including solar powered 
LED lighting operating off-grid; 
Brazil, China, India, South Africa 
- Dishwashers, clothes washers, 
and clothes dryers 
China 
- compressors, heat exchangers, 
insulation (foam and vacuum), 
heat bridge designs and fans for 
refrigeration and air 
conditioners; 
ASEAN, China, India, 
- software and hardware, 
especially for managing active 
and standby power in portable 
appliances 
ASEAN, Brazil, China, India 
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- Modern heat access (cook 
stoves, heating appliances) 
ASEAN, Brazil, China, India, Mexico, 
South Africa 
LDCs 
- Advanced building envelope 
seals and insulation 
ASEAN, Brazil, China, India, South 
Africa 
- Renewables for heat (solar 
thermal) 
Brazil, China, India, South Africa 
- Combined heat and power ASEAN, Brazil, China, India, South 
Africa 
Agriculture Africa, Asia and Pacific, Latin America 
and the Caribbean, LDCs, SIDS;  
ASEAN, Brazil, China, India, South 
Africa 
- Less GHG intensive fertilizer Brazil, India 
- Plant varieties that are less 
reliant on GHG intensive 
fertilizers, either because they 
produce higher yields or are 
more efficient at soil nutrient 
uptake; 
Brazil, India 
- Animal variants and breeds less 
likely to produce methane 
during digestion; 
Brazil 
- Better management of animal 
waste, including recycling into 
biogas and other biomass for 
energy generation; 
Brazil 
- Animal feed less likely to 
produce methane 
Brazil, India 
Waste Africa, Asia and Pacific, LDCs, SIDS 
- Landfill methane capture Brazil, India 
- Waste management 
technologies –recycling 
 
- processing of solid organic 
waste 
 
- solid waste and wastewater 
recovery and reuse 
 
- urban sewerage facilities  
  
Specific Adaptation Technologies Developing Countries Implicated 
Agriculture Africa, Asia and Pacific, Latin America 
and Caribbean, LDCs, SIDS 
- All agricultural inputs, including 
seeds (including flood and 
drought resilient varieties), low 
emissions fertilizers, and 
methods and processes; 
 
- New varieties or adaptations of 
existing plant and animal 
varieties.  
 
- Genetically modified seeds and 
animals 
 
- integrated pest management   
- Food processing and storage  
Energy  
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- All products for energy 
production, distribution and 
consumption; 
 
Health Africa, Latin America and Caribbean, 
LDCs 
- All health infrastructure, 
including medicines, diagnostic  
and treatment tools, methods, 
personnel; 
 
- Medical products, processes and 
services related to increasing 
resistance to vector borne and 
temperature sensitive diseases 
 
- Medical products, processes and 
services related to managing 
health needs during periods of 
extreme heat (heat waves) and 
extreme cold, 
 
- Medical products, processes and 
services related to increasing 
general immune-capacity, e.g. 
vaccines; 
 
- Products, processes and services 
designed to create hygienic and 
sanitary living and working 
conditions, such as access to 
potable water and sanitary 
facilities 
 
Water Africa, Latin America and Caribbean, 
LDCs 
- All water infrastructure for 
capture, treatment, distribution, 
and recycling 
 
-  Water treatment and sanitation 
products and processes to deal 
with higher levels of toxicity and 
microbial and plant growth  
 
- Water desalination technologies 
for coastal areas 
 
- Smart and/or active water 
metering systems 
 
- Water capture and storage 
products and processes 
 
- Efficient water use and 
reclamation technologies 
 
Disaster response Asia and Pacific, Latin America and 
Caribbean, SIDS 
- early warning systems for 
disasters (including 
communications); 
 
- Systematic observation, 
monitoring and analysis 
- Conventional observations, 
including use of wind profilers, 
and application of GPS in 
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upper-air meteorological 
observations.  
- Non-conventional observations, 
including development of 
satellite remote-sensing 
instruments and ground-based 
remote sensing technologies.   
- Data analysis and assimilation 
- systems for stockpiling and 
distributing food, water, and 
medicines; 
 
- systems for storing and 
managing water resources; 
 
- alternative disaster-appropriate 
transport systems (e.g., boats); 
 
- systems for strengthening waste 
disposal sites against leakage 
during disasters; 
 
- disaster mitigation systems, such 
as flood and sea walls, flood 
channels;  
 
- extreme weather event resistant 
building materials. 
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Chapter 3  
Evaluating the existing evidence  
in intellectual property on  
climate technologies 
 
 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
After determining the scope of climate and adaptation technologies to be 
transferred and to which developing countries in chapter 2, this chapter aims to examine 
the data that we have on the extent to which: 
- The relevant technologies are patented, and by whom; 
- The  relevant technologies that are patented are being licensed and on what 
terms; 
- The existing trends in patenting and licensing of the relevant technologies. 
 
This information is important in identifying the targets for action in terms of 
the economic actors to be addressed. However, while this is an important step towards 
examining the role of intellectual property in technology transfer of these technologies, 
it is important to note what studies of this kind do not do: provide a way to answer the 
question of whether, in a situation where the behaviour of specific intellectual property 
holders prevents, or unduly limits, the adoption and use of a specific climate technology 
by all the relevant economic actors in a specific domestic sector, a UNFCCC member 
state has the legal and regulatory tools necessary to address such behaviour, at sufficient 
scale and speed.  
Nevertheless, such information is useful in providing one part of the basis for 
determining whether and how the UNFCCC should take action to address intellectual 
property.  In particular, does the empirical data tell us anything about the pattern of 
ownership, distribution and transactions of climate technology products and knowledge 
that suggests that there may be problems related to: the rate of diffusion of 
technologies; the scope of technologies being transferred; the countries to which 
technologies need to be transferred? Alone this is not enough to come to direct 
conclusions about what action is necessary by the UNFCCC. However, in combination 
with the answer to the question of what interventions developing countries may take to 
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address such problems when they arise (as we do in Chapter 6 and 7), we may be better 
able to determine the nature and scope of action that the UNFCCC should take. 
This chapter conducts a critical literature review that looks at whether we have 
an answer or indications of an answer to the empirical question and Chapter 6 looks at 
the answer to the legal question.  The necessary timing, geography and scope of 
technologies identified in Chapter 2 form the basic framework for analysis in this 
chapter. 
This chapter will analyse and evaluate the methodology of the existing available 
studies, reports and data and the conclusions that they draw along these three vectors: 
1. Do they address the full scope of relevant mitigation and adaptation 
technologies, and do they allow us to draw conclusions about the full 
scope of technologies? 
2. Do they address the issue of the speed at which the relevant technologies 
will need to be deployed and diffused, in particular the 2015-2018 peaking 
date for mitigation and the 2025 date for adaptation? 
3. Do they address the geographic targets, especially the role of the emerging 
economies (including export of technological products and know-how to 
other developing countries)? 
Each study will be assessed on the extent to which it does this, the strength 
and utility of the findings that it makes, and what if any conclusions can be drawn. This 
chapter will present one of the first in-depth critical analyses of these studies on an 
individual and a comparative basis, against the key baselines defined by the climate 
challenge at the UNFCCC. 
It needs to be noted that, to date, there have been no broad systematic surveys 
of actors in developing countries of the IP-related barriers that they face with respect to 
licensing of technologies, let alone of climate technologies.  
There have been very few studies of licensing behaviour of rightholders in the 
climate arena. The majority of studies have focused on static patent landscapes in a 
limited set of technologies. There have been no studies of the pricing of technological 
goods in particular markets as they relate to purchasing power, which may implicate 
access problems relating to embedded IP costs in products, and there have been few 
surveys or studies of pricing and terms of licenses which would also more accurately 
indicate the full extent, if any, of barriers to licensing. There have also been few studies 
of the FDI effects on technology transfer in this arena. The importance of licensing as a 
form of technology transfer can be overstated and it important to put it in the context 
of other vectors of technology transfer.  An understanding of how licensing interacts 
with intellectual property and how and when it can be an alternative to other forms of 
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technology transfer is covered in this first section before moving on to analysis of the 
literature.   
 
 
II. VECTORS FOR TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
 
There are three main vehicles for formal cross-border technology transfer: 
licensing, foreign direct investment (FDI) and trade in goods and services. There are 
other vehicles such as cross-border movement of personnel.317   There exists a tension 
between policies aimed at encouraging foreign companies to export, or establish 
themselves in your market so that needed goods and services can be produced and sold, 
and those aimed at ensuring sufficient spillovers in terms of skills, know-how, 
information and technology to enable domestic producers to move up the value chain 
themselves and perhaps even compete in the same market.  There are various channels 
through which spillovers can occur such as: uncompensated imitation; departure of 
employees to competitors; access to patent data.  There are also spillovers that are best 
described as efficiency savings arising from the effect that FDI can have on the 
behaviour of local suppliers and competitors.318 These include the demonstration effect 
of use of new technologies in providing a competitive advantage, especially those that 
are relatively easily observable; the efficiency (cost or otherwise) of new inputs from the 
FDI actor for downstream producers; the efficiency and learning for suppliers of inputs 
to the FDI actor, provided that the actor uses local suppliers; departure and exchange of 
employees across firms.319   
While these ideas make sense from an economic analysis perspective, it is 
important that we do not take these effects as a given for most forms of FDI. Where 
FDI operates in an enclave and is primarily in export oriented businesses, there is a low 
likelihood of natural spillovers. 320  The proliferation of bilateral investment treaties 
aimed especially at restricting requirements for local content321, or technology transfer322 
                                                        
 
317 p10, Maskus, K E “Encouraging International Technology Transfer” ICTSD Issue Paper No. 7, May 2004. 
Available at: www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/docs/CS_Maskus.pdf (last visited August 15, 2014). 
318 See p14, Saggi, K “International technology transfer to developing countries” Economic Paper 64, 
Commonwealth Secretariat (2004). See also p14, Maskus, K E “Encouraging International Technology 
Transfer” ICTSD Issue Paper No. 7, May 2004.  
319 See p14, Saggi  
320 p68, Maskus, K “The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Encouraging Foreign Direct Investment and 
Technology Transfer” in Maskus, K & C Fink (eds.) Intellectual Property and Development: Lessons from 
Recent Economic Research (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2005). 
321 See e.g. Article V.2.c, Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the 
Republic of South Africa on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, (signed 27 November 1995, 
not yet entered into force).  
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for example, have made it much more difficult for learning by local suppliers to take 
place. This also includes measures that limit regulation of strict non-disclosure and non-
compete agreements with employees, to prevent them taking information, especially 
trade secrets, with them to other employers. This makes it much more difficult to view 
FDI as a vehicle for these kinds of ‘natural’ non-market channels for FDI.  As this 
thesis argues, it is precisely the regulatory structures around FDI and intellectual 
property that may be determinative of whether, how, and how much international 
technology transfer takes place.  It cautions against treating FDI as synonymous with 
technology transfer323 , where the natural effects of FDI are blocked by specifically 
designed regulatory mechanisms or the deliberate behaviour of the investing firm.  In 
addition, there may be a natural bias against such spillovers, given that some economic 
models find that the most profitable or successful affiliates are those that are most 
effective at preventing spillovers of proprietary and non-proprietary knowledge. 324  
While the work by Maskus and others on the role that intellectual property plays in 
enabling FDI has been crucial in identifying channels and levers for the role of 
intellectual property, it has not been particularly useful in disentangling whether the 
kinds of spillovers from that FDI actually occur in the presence of limitations imposed 
by intellectual property and bilateral investment treaties. 
We should also take on board the warning by Barton that the dynamics of 
international technology transfer have shifted significantly since the days of the New 
International Economic Order.325  In particular, whereas the concerns in that period 
involved deeply asymmetric relationships between developed and developing countries 
(both in political power and technical capacity) and between multinational firms and 
developing country firms, the post-WTO landscape is very different.  Barton points to a 
much larger role in the economy for FDI that is export based and is not simply focused 
on access to domestic markets and to a much more dispersed supply chain for many 
products that are internationally traded.326  This shifts the incentives for multinational 
enterprises in terms of how and to whom they provide their technologies. The technical 
and scientific knowledge base in most developing countries has also been transformed, 
reflecting greater capacity for absorption and adaptation, while also providing a possible 
platform for R&D and production for foreign firms seeking competitive advantage for 
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Policy”, Issue Paper No. 18, ICTSD February 2007. 
326 See p1, Barton, J “New Trends in Technology Transfer: Implications for National and International 
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 86 
 
exports to other markets.327 In addition, the distance between developed and developing 
countries, in terms of commercial information and capacity to take part in transactions 
has shrunk, increasing the ability for even small firms to engage in international trade 
and transactions. Domestic firms in developing countries also have a greater integration 
into the global market, and are significantly focused on export markets, meaning that the 
intellectual property standards and rules for market access to developed country markets 
have much more impact on policy decisions to imitate foreign technologies.  Finally, 
public institutions and universities have become greater players on the commercial side 
of technological transactions. This means that an increasingly significant amount of 
technology may be held by so-called non-practicing entities that have no interest in 
production and do not face the same concerns as firms seeking to carry out FDI or 
prevent market entry by other firms.  These ‘public’ non-practising entities may be more 
interested in licensing and in doing so broadly.  
At the very least, this new landscape implies a greater willingness and incentive 
for developed country multinationals to site facilities and use their best technologies in 
developing countries.  It also suggests a disincentive for developing country firms to 
circumvent or imitate foreign technologies without authorization because they may be 
shut out of international markets and, in particular, developed country markets.  The 
increase in domestic technical capacity in developing countries, however, also suggests 
that technological catch up may be sped up, given a sufficient technological base and 
access to technologies at a reasonable price.   
Outside of FDI, the key market based channels are those that relate to joint 
ventures and licensing.328   Joint ventures require sharing of technological products, 
processes and know how, simply to allow the venture to succeed. They work best when 
both partners bring know-how and capital to the table, although these can also include 
specialized access to contracting (in the case of preferential procurement policies) or 
goodwill.  To the extent that the venture is time limited, that there is an exchange of 
information, technology and personnel, the ability of the partners to move on after the 
joint venture is completed and having learned from each other is extremely useful.  Joint 
ventures can be some of the most efficient tools for enabling learning by the domestic 
partners. To the extent that joint ventures between competitors are not the natural 
outcome of market behaviour, some countries have seen fit to condition foreign 
investment or market access in strategic economic sectors on the establishment of joint 
ventures.  China has historically had such requirements, although there remains some 
disagreement as to whether these were successful in terms of enabling technology 
transfer.329  The use of such measures however, may be restricted by the existence of 
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provisions in bilateral investment treaties that specifically prohibit requiring that 
investments take place in the form of joint ventures by requiring national treatment in 
the establishment of investments.330  This means that it is not possible to require that 
foreign investment in a particular sector take place only through joint ventures, without 
also applying that same standard to domestic firms. 
Licensing is the primary mechanism for horizontal and vertical market based 
technology transfer.  It can be an efficient way for rightholders to receive return for 
their investment in researching and developing a technology while ensuring diffusion to 
those who demand it.  However, the technology licensing market suffers from one 
major structural problem that implicates technology transfer.  Licensing, even horizontal 
licensing, tends to be exclusive to one other primary market player. Where the 
technology confers a competitive advantage, e.g. energy efficiency where this is a 
consumer differentiator, the licensee will act to ensure it has exclusive access to the 
detriment of other domestic firms.  This runs counter to what is aimed to be achieved in 
the climate context which is the diffusion of relevant technologies to all the primary 
actors in the relevant market.  Thus our assessment of licensing and the extent to which 
it takes place must look beyond whether a single license is negotiated, and whether or 
not it is horizontal, but also the extent to which such a license provides for spillovers of 
knowledge to the broader market.   
Having provided some background on these mechanisms, the discussion 
below will now examine the existing literature and studies on IP and technology transfer 
in environmental law and climate change. Clearly, to the extent that there is evidence 
that patent distribution and trends, and licensing costs and terms pose no structural 
limitations to addressing the scope, timing and geographical targets above and are not 
likely to do so, there may be less need for urgent action by the UNFCCC on intellectual 
property.  However, where problems are found to exist, it may become even more 
important to ensure that countries have the capacity to act.   
In the realm of technology transfer to address climate change existing studies 
of patents seem to suggest that in the selected technology areas (primarily renewable 
energy for GHG mitigation) there are few patents in developing countries, and if there 
are, they do not pose a barrier because of competitive alternatives.331 Where there has 
                                                                                                                                   
 
1998). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=157614 arguing that FDI and JVs were not a 
significant factor in productivity growth from technology. 
330 See e.g. e.g. Article II.3, Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the 
Republic of South Africa on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, (signed 27 November 1995, 
not yet entered into force).  
331 Barton, J “Intellectual Property and Access to Clean Energy Technologies in Developing Countries: An 
Analysis of Solar Photovoltaic, Biofuel and Wind Technologies” Trade and Sustainable Energy Series, Issue 
Paper No. 2, ICTSD December 2007. See also Copenhagen Economics and the IPR Company “Are IPRs a 
Barrier to the Transfer of Climate Change Technology?” Study Commissioned by European Commission 
DG Trade, January 2009. Available at: 
 88 
 
been an increase in patenting, almost all of that can be attributed to increased patenting 
in the small group of emerging economies, of which China is the most affected.332 The 
next section goes further in depth to assess the existing work in this area, but it is 
important to note a very important caveat - while the distribution of patents worldwide 
in a particular sector is useful to know, it tells us very little about how those patents are 
exercised.  The existence of a patent in a country can be indicative of several things: 
from a willingness to offer for sale and license to a defensive blocking patent aimed at 
excluding competition. This is a weakness long acknowledged in the literature on cross-
country comparisons on innovative activity.333 In combination with data on residence of 
the inventor or applicant, as well as counting patent families rather than individual 
patents, patent counts can tell us when an inventor who resides in one patent 
jurisdiction seeks to patent an invention in another country.  To the extent that the data 
can be considered predictive of whether the patent will actually be granted (which is 
largely true for registration systems but much less so for examination systems which 
may have varying standards for inventive step e.g. the triadic patent families of the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office, the European Patent Office and the 
Japanese Patent Office) then that tells us something about the rate of diffusion of the 
patented technology.   
 However, in terms of technology transfer, defined as transferring, hardware, 
skills, know-how necessary to enable domestic actors to reproduce and adapt the 
technology, such data tells us very little.  The existence of a patent in a country does not 
tell us whether the right to exercise the patent has been assigned or made available to 
one or more domestic actors, whether it has allowed that actor to produce for domestic 
and or export, and whether the technology has diffused into the market.  That 
information can really only be gained from looking at granted patents and information 
regarding assignation or licensing of such patents.  
In addition, the lack of a patent in a country is not necessarily an indicator of 
freedom to use or import the technology.  For example, if all the countries where the 
patented product is manufactured all have patent protection then firms from the 
country that does not have patent protection will have to pay the IP premium included 
in the price of the good in the other markets or the global market, regardless of the fact 
that it is not patented in their domestic market.  Obversely, domestic firms that produce 
the technology will be shut out of the markets of those countries where the technology 
is protected, and will not be able to benefit from the economies of scale that allow for 
providing products to both the national and international market. The key indicator that 
may best determine the nature and scale of IP issues is whether and to what extent 
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licensing takes place and what the terms of such licenses are, including licensing that did 
not take place due to proposed restrictive terms.  
Finally, patent landscaping exercises suffer from a critical problem regarding 
the baseline for comparison. Where the landscape can tell us about the absolute number 
of patents in a sector, it does not tell us about what the percentage of patents are in 
relation to the technological field as a whole.  This is compounded by the ways in which 
technologies are defined in patent landscapes i.e. by looking at the patent classifications 
which may be biased specifically towards patentable subject matter in each field.  Even 
where such a baseline might be established, patents are not of equal value, and while 
there are ways of examining the data to establish the value of a patent by seeing whether 
it has been patented in multiple jurisdictions, that does not really let us know the 
technological role of the patented invention i.e. is it a central technology which is sine 
qua non for participating in the technological market, or are their alternatives, patented 
or otherwise. Thus patent landscapes can allow us to compare absolute number of 
patents between fields, but cannot really provide us a way of measuring patent density as 
compared to non-patented technology in the same field.   
Keeping these issues in mind, I now carry out a critical survey of the empirical 
literature on patents and climate change.  
III. THE EPO/UNEP/ICTSD STUDY334 
 
The study that comes the closest to providing the kind of data needed (as 
discussed above) was carried out by the European Patent Office (EPO) in collaboration 
with UNEP and the International Center for Trade and Sustainable Development 
(ICTSD).335  It consists of a patent landscape (based on a newly constructed set of 
patent classifications for Clean Energy Technologies (CETs), encompassing a much 
wider and deeper data set than the traditional International Patent Classification scheme) 
and a licensing survey. 
III.1 Scope, Timing and Geography 
Its main weakness is that it covers a very small pool of technologies: power 
generation limited to wind, biofuels, solar PV and thermal, CCS, ocean marine power, 
and Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle.336 Nevertheless, the patent classification is 
a true advance in the state of the art, likely to enable better assessments of the full scale 
of patenting of environmentally sustainable technologies.  It finally provides both a tool 
for objectively classifying technologies in patent applications, after an initial self-
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selection by the applicant.  Most impressively however is the fact that the classification 
has worked retroactively to classify older patents in the EPO database, creating an 
unusually rich dataset for future analysis. 
In terms of geography, the licensing survey only surveyed licensors, largely 
based in the OECD. The only developing country respondents were from Brazil and 
South Africa, constituting 4% of the sample.337  The study did not address rates of 
diffusion of the technologies studied and so provided no information on timing. 
III.2 Findings and analysis 
Several things become clear from the landscape: the vast majority of patenting 
takes place in OECD countries with an increasing share in emerging economies.338 
However, there is comparatively little direct ownership of patents by domestic firms in 
China, India and Brazil in the selected sectors.339  On the other hand, the study confirms 
earlier findings by John Barton 340  that the selected sectors do not have highly 
concentrated claimed patent ownership, although ownership is concentrated in OECD 
firms.341   
This would seem to suggest that even where patents existed, there was 
sufficient competition such that licenses would be made available, prices would not be 
too high and terms not overly onerous.   The limitations of the patent landscape make it 
difficult to draw broad conclusions, but one can note that the ability to access foreign 
technology will be a key need even for countries with internal manufacturing and 
learning capacity.  Increasing the speed and scale of market transactions relating to those 
technologies will therefore be crucial to address the climate challenge. Information 
about the nature and scale of the cross-border licensing of relevant technologies is 
crucial and it is here that the licensing survey provides some tantalizing if preliminary 
data.   
The licensing survey looked first at the importance of patents in the firm’s 
activities and secondly at how these related to the firm’s activities, if any, in developing 
countries. Methodologically, the survey suffers from not being able to get information 
on the terms of licenses as well as specific pricing information for specific markets. This 
points to a serious hurdle for empirical studies in this area in the absence of formal 
procedures for surveillance of licensing and/or joint venture contracts.  Precisely 
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because of the post-contract confidentiality of most transactions, it may be necessary for 
countries concerned with addressing technology transfer to not rely on post-transaction 
measures such as competition law but to actively collect and mine the data on terms and 
prices beforehand so as to catch patterns and enforce rules against unacceptable terms.  
The questions used to determine the importance of IP protection also present 
a concern.342  There is little overlap with the criteria and measures used in indexes such 
as those by Park343, making comparability somewhat difficult. However, as this is an 
assessment of perceptions rather than an assessment of objective strength, it may be 
workable even if it does make comparability to other measures of IP strength difficult.  
The three questions relate to 1) membership in an international protection treaty 2) 
ability to enforce, especially civil and criminal penalties 3) ability to gain access to know-
how owned by the other third party.  While the first two are quite general, the third 
question is actually quite specific, addressing itself to the permissible terms of the 
licensing contract (such as grant-back conditions).  The critique is that for the first 
question, it is not clear that there is any awareness of membership of international 
treaties of these countries in many firms and in fact, whether such membership exists 
may pale in signaling power compared to the simple question of whether there are clear 
transparent rules on IP. The concern is that respondents may rate this element low 
when what is really relevant is whether IP protection covers their technology (product 
and patent) for the requisite 20 year term, and provides them with specific rights. If that 
is the case, then it is possible that respondents may actually have responded by placing 
more importance on this issue if asked these specific sub-questions. In particular, a 
useful approach would have focused on protective terms that go beyond the TRIPS 
Agreement, given that this is now the baseline and the main policy question is whether 
providing stronger IP than is required by TRIPS protection will induce changes in 
behaviour and perceptions of industry participants. It would have been useful to ask 
questions related to extension of patent protection to software; restrictions on research 
exceptions and reverse engineering. The findings may have ended up being the same but 
would have been more informative for the climate policy discussion.  
The second question poses the same concerns. At the level of generality, this 
does not really provide key information. What would be good to know would be 
perceptions of what is necessary for enforcement such as; the ability to get injunctions 
and provisional measures in disputes; or speed and access to specialized IP courts. 
Having basic access to civil and criminal courts, may indeed be a basic condition, but 
perhaps because that is a basic condition of doing business in any sector. Somewhat 
narrower questions related to specific IP concerns may have been useful.  The anomaly 
here is the third question which actually does address itself to a specific business 
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concern of licensors or JV participants.  This seems much better designed to extract 
information related to business decisions and levels of IP protection and restrictions. An 
additional question might also have related to enforceability of restrictions on the 
protection of know-how through non-compete clauses for departing employees.  The 
overall concern related to these questions suggests that the survey would have been best 
served by carrying out a preliminary study on what issues in IP protection were of most 
concern to licensors and investors who participate in technology sectors generally, so as 
to test the relevance of these factors to decisions to license into developing countries. 
The first important result from the licensing survey is that, for organizations 
involved in significant patenting in the selected sectors of the study, out-licensing was of 
greater significance for the majority of firms (84%) compared to the group as a whole 
(73%). 344   The importance of out-licensing was especially significant for academic 
institutions and public bodies.  In part this reflects the structure of the business model 
for such entities who carry out fundamental research, usually with public money, and are 
mandated as part of their mission to transfer such technology into the domestic 
business sector. They rarely have production capacity themselves and are not significant 
actors in the manufacture and trade of goods related to the technology they license.    
The study did also ask about other mechanisms such as collaborative R&D and 
joint ventures.345  In terms of licensing and collaborative ventures, almost 60% noted no 
activity in the previous 3 years,346 while 17% stated that they frequently did so.347 This 
data is particularly useful because the question regarding whether licensing or 
collaborative activities took place focused on activities relating to non-majority owned 
subsidiaries348 , thus filtering out vertical technology transfers. The majority of that 
activity took place in China (25%), India (17%), Brazil (12%) and Russia (10%), again in 
line with where the major developing country markets are.  As a rule, renewable energy 
intensive companies in the selected sectors were more likely to use licensing and 
collaborative mechanisms than the sample group as a whole, although there is no 
indication of the extent to which that willingness included licensing to firms in 
developing countries.349 As the report notes, there may be a gap between the willingness 
to license and collaborate and the difficulty of finding and negotiating agreements with 
partners in developing countries.350 In part, this may be because many participants in the 
renewable energy field are not mature businesses with significant international 
experience and the technology market in developing countries tends to be even less 
                                                        
 
344 See p53, Karachalios, K et al. (eds.) “Patents and Clean Energy: Bridging the Gap between Evidence 
and Policy: Final report” UNEP/ EPO / ICTSD 2010. 
345 See p56, Id. 
346 See p58, Id. 
347 Id. 
348 See Licensing Survey Part B. Question, p84, Id. 
349 See p56, Karachalios, K et al. (eds.) “Patents and Clean Energy: Bridging the Gap between Evidence 
and Policy: Final report” UNEP/ EPO / ICTSD 2010. 
350 See p58, Id. 
 93 
 
mature than traditional manufacturing and industrial sectors, all of which is complicated 
by linguistic, legal process, and other factors, including perceptions regarding the 
reliability of intellectual property protection.  Indeed, the survey finds that of the 
concerns that firms had in engaging in licensing and other collaborative activities, 
protection of IP was a basic but not compelling reason to engage. More weight was 
placed on investment climate and market attractiveness.  It would have been useful to 
find out how much importance was attached to IP protection by those companies that 
did not engage in any licensing to developing countries in the previous 3 years in 
comparison to the general sample, and in comparison to those that did engage in such 
licensing.  This would have given some insight into how much of a barrier perceived 
lack of IP protection was to engaging in licensing at all. Instead, the report does the 
opposite, and compares the importance of IP for those that have licensed to developing 
countries in the previous 3 years, to the general sample.351  The report notes that the 
group saw IP protection as more important by 7% over the sample group (89% to 
82%).352  This is a significant variation in the context of the numbers in the study, 
suggesting that something related to the experience of licensing into developing 
countries raises awareness of a need for greater intellectual property protection.  This is 
something that may need to be confirmed with further empirical work, but if true, 
means that the IP related experiences of such licensors have not been entirely positive.  
However, the survey also shows that the group would be more willing than the general 
sample to offer easier monetary terms to firms in developing countries (78% to 70%).353 
The willingness to offer substantially more accommodating pricing was however, limited 
to 5% of the general sample354 suggesting that grant or concessional terms were not an 
option unless the difference is made up by other measures. In addition, the question 
limited itself to monetary terms355 and so provides little guidance as to whether they 
would also provide flexible terms on grant back conditions, geographical scope, sub-
licensing etc. Finally, the group most likely to consider more flexible licensing was 
dominated by academic and public institutions, with multinational enterprises being the 
least willing to do so. Overall, the study concludes that the rate and scale of licensing to 
developing countries in the selected technologies is not significantly different from 
licensing for all technologies into developing countries. 356   This may present a real 
problem in that what is actually needed is for such technologies to be licensed or made 
available at a far higher rate than is the case at present and in comparison to other 
technology sectors. 
III.3 Conclusions to draw from the study 
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One possible conclusion to draw from this study is that academic and public 
institutions are best suited to be channels of flexible licensing to developing countries.  
In addition, if given the opportunity, SMEs who do not at present have any commercial 
relationships in developing countries would be happy to license, even at flexible rates, if 
they could be assured of predictability, transparency and a minimum level of IP 
protection (especially in their home markets).  The only group that may be less 
amenable to doing so are the multinational enterprises who may already participate in 
developing country markets and have interests beyond simple licensing and actually 
engage in production and competition in these markets.  
IV. THE COPENHAGEN ECONOMICS/IPR COMPANY STUDY  
 
This study by Copenhagen Economics was commissioned by the European 
Union. 357  It carries out a patent landscape but without the advantage of the more 
accurate and well developed classification for patent applications and grants developed 
for the ICTSD/UNEP/EPO study. It also poses some methodological problems, ones 
that it has in common with other such patent landscape exercises. It presumes that the 
non-existence of a patent therefore indicates that there are no IP-related problems.358  
As noted above, the fact that no patent exists in the domestic market does not mean 
that the firms in that country that need to purchase technological products and do not 
produce them domestically would not have to pay the IP premium as included in 
products made in countries where the patent was in force.  
IV.1 Scope, Timing, Geography 
The core of the study is limited to a narrow set of technologies in power 
generation (waste, biomass, wind, solar, geothermal, fuel cell, ocean power).359 However, 
the analysis of the abatement cost curve that they use covers about 50 technologies.360  
A closer examination of the data show that for the vast majority of mitigation 
technologies that they identify (using the McKinsey & Co abatement curve361), there is 
no information on whether they are patented in LDCs.362  In fact for all but one of the 
technologies on the negative cost side of the abatement curve, and for a significant 
section of those on the other, the study has no data on the levels of patenting in 
developing countries.  For the area of the curve with positive abatement costs, in the 
selected technology areas, they have coverage of the bare majority of technologies. This 
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means they have no data on: 363  Industry (efficiency); Agriculture/waste; Power 
generation related to CCS, coal-firing, Nuclear; transport related to power trains, hybrids, 
plug-ins, transit; buildings.  It is on this basis that they argue that the majority of 
technologies are not patented in LDCs and developing countries, at least as determined 
by those that would be used under their extraction of an abatement curve for 
developing countries from the McKinsey global abatement curve.  On this basis, that 
claim may be too large to be supported by the nature and quality of the data that they 
were able to gather. On the basis of the technologies that this thesis has identified in 
Chapter 2 as needed by developing countries, it may be especially insufficient as it only 
covers mitigation technologies and only a small fraction of the mitigation technology 
need.  As noted, in Chapter 2, a significant portion of the need in developing countries 
will be in agriculture, industry, and buildings 
The study does indeed address itself to the issue of geography and where the patents are 
distributed.  It does not necessarily consider the role that countries such as China, India 
and Brazil play in providing technology to other developing countries. In terms of 
timing, it does not provide any data or analysis on the rate of diffusion of technologies.  
IV.2 Findings and Analysis 
The study looks at the distribution of the patents and finds that, especially for 
renewables, but also other sectors, the vast majority of patenting in developing countries 
takes place in China, followed far behind by other emerging economies.364 They argue 
that even where a significant portion of abatement technologies are patented in China, 
the cost of accessing IP should not be a barrier because, in the aggregate, the relevant 
technologies (in efficiency and fuels switching in industry, transport, and buildings)  will 
have a negative abatement cost.365 While true in the aggregate, this still does little to 
address what occurs at the level of individual firm decisions that may not be able to 
entirely capture these efficiency gains all to themselves.  More importantly, while cost 
may indeed not be a factor, firms in China and other emerging countries may have 
problems relating to issues such as refusals to license, restrictive licensing terms and 
reach through provisions that deter firms from licensing technologies.  Finally, China 
and other emerging economies may play a role in providing technological products to 
other developing countries and if they are blocked from producing these for export to 
these other countries, it may be impossible to address climate change mitigation and 
adaptation within the necessary time frames. 
The study also finds that while most patented technologies in the sectors 
studied are concentrated in OECD countries, emerging economies, in particular China, 
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accounted for much of the recent growth. In particular, the study notes that an 
increasing share of patents are owned by domestic firms in emerging economies 
(approximately 33%).366 The study does not tell us whether they determine ownership 
by name of inventor or assignee, and whether they analyzed whether the assignee is a 
wholly owned or majority owned subsidiary of a foreign firm. This disaggregation may 
be important as it could prevent erroneous conclusions regarding the actual level of 
control over these patents. 
The largest number of patents is concentrated in the Solar PV area, and over 
92% of technologies in developing countries in the 7 sectors covered by the study are 
owned by Chinese applicants. This means that in all other emerging economies, foreign 
owners may be heavily dominant in patent ownership and that far from being the rule, 
China may present an exception.  The study also notes that, in the sectors covered, there 
appears to be relatively dispersed patent ownership.367 The authors conclude that there 
is less likelihood of high rent extraction due to competing possibilities for access to the 
same or similar technologies.  This indeed may be true, in the absence of anti-
competitive collusive behaviour amongst patent holders. However, given the 
concentration of patents in the hands of foreign rightholders, there may be broader 
structural problems in the market. While concentrated foreign ownership may not 
correlate directly with firm concentration, it does imply that we should not be too 
sanguine about the competitive pressure on rightholders even in sectors that do not 
have high firm concentration.  In particular, licensing costs and licensing terms are not 
subject to normal competitive structural influences.  This is because the price of a 
license is not usually disclosed 368  and so other players in the market have no 
transparency as to what was offered by other players in similar transactions, 
internationally or domestically. This makes assessing whether a particular offer is 
market-based or not difficult and complicates how other offerors may compete on price.  
This makes each negotiation for a license, not a negotiation that takes place in a 
transparent competitive market, but one that takes place somewhat isolated from 
information about the nature and scope of other similar transactions in the market.  
This may make each offeror more likely to seek higher rents than they might otherwise 
seek, and create pressure on potential offerees to take the transaction in front of them 
rather than move on to another offeror and ask for a better deal. 
IV.3 What conclusions may be drawn 
Overall, while providing some insight, the study’s larger conclusions may not 
be sustainable. However, its conclusions on concentrated OECD ownership dovetail 
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with those of other studies. In addition, the finding that China presents the largest 
emerging economy share of patents in the selected sectors is also consistent with other 
findings, as is the finding that the majority of technologies are not patented in LDCs.  A 
newer finding may be the relatively dispersed ownership of patents even amongst 
OECD rightholders. In the absence of data on licensing distribution and terms, it is 
difficult to draw conclusions, but multiple vendors or offerors of similar technologies 
may indeed be likely to increase the tendency to out-license, even for large enterprises 
who are themselves engaged in production in the technology sector.369  This may not 
necessarily mean that restrictive licensing terms may not still be imposed. The data on 
this in the climate technology arena, however, seem to suggest that this tendency to 
license may still be limited to non-producing entities.370 
V. DECHEZLEPRÊTRE ET. AL. STUDY371 
 
A comprehensive patent landscaping study was carried out by Dechezleprêtre 
and colleagues372 (LSE, MINES Paris and the OECD). The study also uses a global 
database developed by the EPO.  The authors study the process of innovation and 
technology transfer by looking at patent counts, weighted for propensity to patent and 
patent breadth.373  The methodology, however, presents some problems, especially for 
the purposes of measuring technology transfer. While not uncommon in the field, their 
assumption that a patent is a reliable indicator of intention to ‘use’ the patent is difficult 
to reconcile with much of actual business practice regarding patenting. Patents can be 
sought for reasons ranging from intent to manufacture products oneself in the market, 
to blocking market entry.374  In either case, little technology transfer occurs if local 
domestic capacity is not enabled.   In this case, they presume that a patent is transferred 
from one country to another when it is patented in a country by an inventor who is 
resident in another.375 They presume intent to ‘use’ to mean to either manufacture or 
license the patent into the market.376   However, in the case of technology transfer, 
where the problems that arise are exactly those such as refusals to license, refusals to 
work, refusals to provide knowledge flows to other actors in the market, such an 
assumption is untenable.  Even if it were a valid measure of market intention by a patent 
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holder, the failure to operationalize a proper definition of technology transfer makes it 
difficult to draw anything but the most indicative conclusions on the nature and scale of 
technology transfer from their data.   
The study also uses patent levels as a proxy for the level of ‘innovative activity’ 
again, failing to account for both the strategic business reasons for patenting, but even 
more crucially, for significant differences not just in patent scope, for which the authors 
control, but in the standards for such things as inventive step. In some countries, 
patents which are captured by the patent system may actually end up in the utility patent 
or design patent system in others.  The EPO data only capture the ‘patent’ data per se, 
and not these others.  However, if controlled for with a measure of the extent to which 
a patent functions as part of a broader patent family, which the authors do, a measure of 
the quality of invention is introduced which shifts the measure of innovation level 
somewhat.  The key issue here is again of proper operational definitions of what 
constitutes innovation. To the extent that the term innovation has a qualitative element 
i.e. a technology that has not been created or used in a particular way before, a patent 
captures only some of that and the range between countries of what constitutes an 
acceptable level of inventive step to qualify for a patent is so large that it may not be the 
most reliable indicator. 
Another problem that the study has is in its use of the residence of the 
inventor on the patent to determine the locus of innovation.377 While they acknowledge 
problems related to collection of data, the greater problem is that the question with 
respect to technology transfer is not necessarily where the innovation is taking place but 
whether the innovation is actually being carried out by a local firm.  The study does not 
measure the extent to which the assignees of the patent are local companies. For the 
purposes of technology transfer measures, it is crucial to know who the actual owners of 
the technology are, something which the authors subsume and do not fully address in 
their measures. 
V.1 Scope, Timing, Geography 
The study covers 13 mitigation technologies: wind, solar, geothermal, marine 
energy, hydropower, biomass, and waste to energy, methane destruction, climate-
friendly cement, thermal insulation in buildings, heating, electric and hybrid vehicles, 
and energy-efficient lighting.378  This presents a broad sub-sample of the technologies 
covered by developing country needs in mitigation.  It remains a narrow slice of the 
broader technology needs, and does not address adaptation. 
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Again, this study is a relatively static landscaping exercise, providing little 
information about future trends in patenting or the rate of diffusion and licensing. In 
terms of geography, the patent landscape covers the major developing countries, but 
does not analyze LDC participation. 
V. 2 Findings and analysis 
The study finds that emerging economies are an increasing centre for 
“innovation” with China coming 4th and Brazil 12th, but after controlling for 
membership in patent families, China drops out of the top 10.379 This may drop even 
more if controlling ownership of patent assignees were measured. 
Nevertheless, the data on concentration of patenting is consistent with that 
found by others; that, in the fields selected, it is almost exclusively concentrated in the 
OECD countries, except for China.380 By the measure of ‘technology transfer” that is 
used, they find that the majority (77%) of transfers occur between OECD countries, 
with 22% occurring from OECD to non-OECD.381 Seventy-five percent of the OECD 
to non-OECD transfers are to China. 382  Non-OECD to non-OECD transfers are 
negligible. 383  The extent of ‘transfers’ to China would be indicative of the lower 
importance of IP protection to intent to transfer, but, it may also be the case that a 
significant amount of this patenting is defensive in nature, to prevent market entry and 
production by Chinese firms, which may leak back out to other markets.  The lack of 
‘transfer’ to other developing countries would also signify that little technology transfer 
is taking place into those economies.  
V.3 What conclusions may be drawn 
 The findings on the rate of patenting into China present some concern. 
Without further data on the reasons why such patenting is taking place, perhaps 
indicated by ownership and control of the patents as well as use, it seems as if there may 
be significant efforts to engage in blocking behaviour in China.  The findings also 
indicate how marginal developing countries are in participating in patenting into other 
countries.  The measure of innovation, while methodologically problematic, suggests 
that at the very least, developing country firms do not have the volume, or even quality 
of patents to engage in equal bargaining with firms from developed countries to engage 
in patent-based research cooperation. 
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VI. JOHN BARTON ICTSD STUDY384 
 
This study by John Barton has been one of the earliest and most cited pieces 
on the topic. In terms of methodology, Barton does not carry out a patent landscape 
and has no direct information relating to patenting or ownership of patents in each 
sector studied.  He examines information on the concentration of the industry and uses 
that to deduce whether or not based on that concentration, if patents did exist, they 
would pose a problem.  Barton presumes that the existence of multiple firms with 
dispersed ownership of patents will make access to licensing easier.385  As also noted, I 
am less sanguine about the existence of competitive licensing markets in the absence of 
transparent information about the prices and terms of previous and ongoing licensing 
contracts. This is especially true where licensing would be desired from actual producing 
entities and not just non-practising entities such as universities and public bodies. 
VI.1 Scope, Timing, and Geography 
The study is limited to three sectors in power generation: Solar PV, Biomass 
and Wind.  Therefore it can only provide an indication of the kinds of patterns that may 
exist but cannot bear the weight of broader conclusions regarding the actual distribution 
of patents in broader power generation sectors, which the author acknowledges.386  
As with others, this study does not address itself to timing or pace of 
technology transfer. In terms of geography, it primarily focuses on Brazil, India and 
China.   
VI.2 Findings and analysis 
The case studies on industry structure and the role of IP are nevertheless very 
useful.  In Solar PV, Barton notes only a moderate amount of industry concentration, 
largely in developed countries with some firms from developing countries.387 He notes 
that the upstream firms in the solar inverter sector are somewhat more concentrated but 
not to the extent that significant rents could be extracted. Nevertheless he concludes 
that because of the large number of firms, some of whom are located in developing 
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countries, there is little likelihood of unreasonable royalties being demanded.388 What is 
more difficult to assess is what the role of restrictive terms might be in the industry. 
In Biomass (largely ethanol), the study shows a much greater degree of 
concentration, dominated by two companies (Monsanto and Archer Daniels 
Midland).389 He notes however that there are many entrants from developing countries 
in the market and points especially to Brazil as having a dynamic and thriving 
competitive capacity. He suggests that since the basic technologies are in the public 
domain, participation is not likely to be blocked by intellectual property except perhaps 
for more recent advanced second generation biofuels (generated from cellulosic 
materials).390 Even where there are such concerns, there may be fungibility between 
different kinds of biofuels such that despite different production processes being 
patented, overall participation in one of the market niches will not be blocked.391  In 
addition, the need for decentralized production and local delivery of biofuels also 
provides an incentive to license more broadly.392 He concludes that the likelihood of 
unreasonable royalties is small, albeit somewhat higher than for Solar PV.  
For Wind, the study finds a higher level of concentration in the global market 
than for the other two sectors examined.393 Barton argues that while the number of 
suppliers ensures access to technological products, entry into the market for production 
of wind technologies will be far more difficult. He notes that there is some evidence of a 
reluctance to license due to fear of creating competitors in developing countries.394  
However, there are significant players from developing countries such as Goldwind 
Science & Technology Co., Ltd (Goldwind) in China, and Suzlon Energy Ltd. (Suzlon) 
in India.395   
VI.3 What conclusions can be drawn? 
Overall, Barton is relatively sanguine about access to technology in all three 
sectors, both for products and for knowledge. He is less optimistic about access to 
technologies for use in developing country firms seeking to participate in international 
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markets and access to developed country markets.396  The case studies presented by 
Barton are suggestive, especially in how they pinpoint significant developing country, 
(specifically India, Brazil and China) participation in all three sectors studied.  The 
existence of capable developing country firms in each sector suggests a real opportunity 
for enabling and transferring technology transfer and development into these economies 
and enabling production for export to other developing countries.  As Barton notes, 
there may be real entry points but concerns about competition in home markets exist 
for many developed country firms. This suggests that some certainty about geographical 
segmentation of markets may be necessary to encourage further licensing in these 
sectors.   
VII. THE CHATHAM HOUSE STUDY397 
 
A report by Chatham House398 on patenting in selected fields confirms some 
of the findings of the Barton study and carries out an initial patent landscaping that 
comes to similar conclusions to the EPO/UNEP/ICTSD study.  The authors use the 
landscaping exercise to try to determine the nature and scope of patent concentration in 
these sectors, going one step beyond the Barton study to actually demonstrate rather 
than infer a relationship between industry concentration and patent concentration.   
VII.1 Scope, Timing and Geography 
The study covers wind, solar PV, concentrated solar power (CSP), biomass-to-
electricity, carbon capture and storage and cleaner coal and it attempts to go beyond the 
traditional IPC classification to capture a finer grained picture of the subsectors and 
links to other technological fields.399   
In timing, the study is one of the few to try to assess the rates of diffusion in 
the sectors. Based on the 2050 timeline, the study assesses the age of the most cited 
patents in patent applications.400   
On geography, the study covers all the important developing country markets 
but suffers because, as they acknowledge, the research methodology’s reliance only on 
electronically accessible patent data meant that access to Indian data was limited.401   
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VII.2 Findings and analysis 
The study finds, as did others, that patenting rates remained sluggish in all six 
fields studied until the 1990s when they began a rapid rise.402  Again, the key patenting 
countries are the OECD (US, Japan, Germany, Denmark and South Korea) with China 
as a major patenting destination larger than Denmark and South Korea. A key insight 
from the study is that an undetermined amount of patenting in some of these countries, 
but especially China and the US because of their size as investment and market 
destinations, may be carried out by subsidiaries of firms from other countries.  In such 
cases, data about the nationality of the inventor is not necessarily helpful and what may 
provide better data is the identity and ownership structure of the assignee of the patent. 
Even those studies, such as the Copenhagen Economics study that find significant 
inventorship by Chinese nationals may not really indicate the extent to which the patent 
is actually under the control of a firm from another country. The Chatham House 
analysis shows that a significant portion of Chinese patents are owned by firms whose 
parent companies are based outside the country.403  
The study finds that all six sectors have relatively concentrated patent 
ownership404 although it does not appear to be significantly correlated with the number 
of patents in the field. The study authors suggest that there does not seem to be a link 
between such concentration and the level of innovation (if number of patents filed per 
sector is used as a proxy).  However, the number of patents is not and should not be 
used as a reliable proxy for ‘level of innovation’ in a sector given the number of 
intervening causes that exist to explain that number.  More reliably, their examination of 
the extent of patent families405 in the sectors studied shows that between 60% – 85% of 
the patents belonged to a patent family, suggesting a high concentration of high-
commercial value, key patents likely to be in the hands of large commercial actors.406 
The study also finds that much of the patent ownership in the sectors studied 
is concentrated (above 50% share) in multinational firms who actually produce in the 
market sector.407  Combined with the concentration of patent families, this suggests a 
stronger likelihood of strategic behaviour aimed at maintaining market share and 
preventing market entry of new competitors and lowers the likelihood of horizontal 
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licensing.  On the other hand, it may make FDI directly into markets more likely with 
the attendant possibility of downstream and upstream effects on suppliers and those 
who use the firm’s products as inputs.  To the extent that these firms are export 
oriented, they may be more likely to ensure that subsidiaries and/or local partners have 
the best technology available.  The analysis by Chatham House emphasizes the 
importance of sectoral analyses for deciding what kinds of interventions may be 
appropriate to increase knowledge spillovers.  However, in the case where the majority 
of patents are owned by national corporations (second highest share overall),408, as in 
the wind sector,409 then even the likelihood of FDI is reduced, as such firms are more 
likely to want to protect existing markets by: preventing the possibility of production 
overseas leaking back into their home markets; competitors competing with them in 
export markets into which they have sales; and they are less likely to engage in FDI. In 
such cases, incentives may have to be created for these firms to either license for local 
production or be required to ‘work’ the patent rather than simply use it as a blocking 
mechanism. The share of patents owned by universities and public institutions is quite 
small suggesting that these may not be the great hope for licensing despite their business 
model and need to license out. In part, some of the issues with their low share of 
ownership of patenting may be related to transfers of patent ownership from the public 
sector into private hands as has been encouraged by policies in developed countries over 
the past two decades. 
The Chatham House study also finds that diffusion of technologies in the 
selected sectors has been worryingly slow (e.g. 20 years for the wind sector) at least 
based on a methodology of assessing the age of the most cited patents in patent 
applications.410  The use of the age of a patent and number of citations in a single 
jurisdiction (the US) leaves a lot to be desired, but it does reflect a broader intuition that 
existing rates of diffusion are insufficient to address climate change, even in the OECD. 
There is some support in other studies for the contention that environmentally sound 
technologies tend to diffuse more slowly, due in part to uncertainty about commercial 
viability in host countries, lack of information about technologies held by providers, and 
lack of information about level and type of technologies needed in host countries.411  
The Chatham House study points to the need for policy interventions in the near term 
to ensure wider dissemination of patent information especially to domestic firms.  
However, the effectiveness of such exercises relies on a proper and full disclosure in the 
patent itself, something which may not always be the case. Patent applicants have a 
strong incentive to disclose only the minimum necessary to be granted a patent, which 
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means much of the information needed to show how the technology actually works may 
not be available. 
VII.3 What can be concluded?   
This study makes clear that ownership firm type matters as it has an impact on 
the kind of activity firms will engage in with respect to the intellectual property they 
own. In particular, the six sectors studied show a high concentration of ownership by 
multinational corporations and a high concentration of high value patents, which is a 
situation that creates incentives for market share maintenance and entry-blocking 
behaviour, although with a significant propensity for export oriented FDI.  It suggests 
that actions taken by developing countries in these sectors may need to focus less on 
licensing and more on encouraging FDI and spillovers from upstream and downstream 
linkages, as well as joint ventures.  The in-depth sectoral analyses of the study point to 
significant variation in ownership structures, concentration and vertical integration, all 
of which implicate different policy tools for countries concerned with technology 
innovation and diffusion in their domestic markets.  This requires countries to make 
sector by sector national market based analyses as to what tools will be appropriate. It 
implies that different sectors will require different tools e.g. those that focus on licensing 
versus those that focus on FDI and joint ventures.  Access to a broad portfolio of 
regulatory tools may therefore be a prerequisite for countries to take action, even within 
the narrow field of these six selected technologies. 
VIII. HASCIC ET AL OECD STUDY (2010)412 
 
A 2010 OECD review and study also attempted to provide some initial data on 
distribution of patents for clean technologies.  It used much the same methodology as 
the Dechezleprêtre et al. Study413, and looked at the rate and location of innovation, as 
well as the rate of diffusion of climate mitigation technologies. It looked at EPO patent 
data over a period of 30 years, (1977- 2007) triggering many of the same concerns and 
limitations addressed above regarding methodologies using patent data. It differs by 
focusing on claimed priorities (those with patent applications in more than one country) 
rather than focusing on triadic patent families, which the authors consider too restrictive 
and likely to miss relevant technologies and actors.414  They also argue that claimed 
priorities address the issue of strategic patenting and allow them to focus on high value 
patents.415 
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VIII.1 Scope, Timing and Geography 
The study covers 7 technology sectors in power generation: Solar (PV and 
Thermal), Wind (on and off-shore), Geothermal, hydropower, marine energy, biofuels, 
fossil fuel (IGCC, CCS). 416  The analysis is global, but encompassing the major 
developing countries and it looks at trends over the past 30 years.  
VIII.2   Findings and Analysis 
One interesting finding that is relatively independent of their methodology but 
that implicates patenting more generally, is that they find that the majority of patents in 
the sectors studied (60%) were only claimed in a single office.417 Either the majority of 
patents in the field are low value patents (as their methodology indicates), or there is an 
attributable difference between the types of firms that engage in multijurisdictional 
patenting versus those that patent in only one. One hypothesis might be that a lot of 
patents are held by small and medium enterprises, or national corporations (as in the 
Chatham House study above) and these are mostly engaged in production of the 
technologies themselves, primarily for the domestic market.  Another could be that this 
reflects the patent quality difference between the offices.418 This could be confirmed by 
looking at the location of the offices where the majority of the single patents applied.  
Appendix B of the study presents some of this information.  The proportion of single 
patents is highest at the Japanese Patent Office followed by the Chinese Patent Office.  
While there is some suggestion that low patent value or quality might be explain the 
Chinese office data, it is much harder to reconcile this with the JPO data, given the 
JPO’s reputation for seeking high patent quality (thus value).419  In comparison, the 
EPO had the lowest percentage of single patents than the US, although both were 
significantly lower than the JPO and the EPO.  This difference is difficult to explain, but 
some comparative caution might be needed as these are percentage measures, and it may 
be that the absolute numbers differ significantly. For example, the EPO has an 
extremely high proportion of duplicate patent applications probably due to the ease with 
which it was possible prior to 2010 to file divisional applications.  
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A key finding is that the rate of patenting in the sectors studied increased 
substantially in the 2000-2010 period, at an annual rate of 20%.420 This is much faster 
than the rate of patenting in general.  Whether this is due to an actual increase in the rate 
of inventions is difficult to conclude from this data, but there is a clear policy effect.421  
In individual sectors, solar PV has seen the fastest growth, whereas fossil fuels have seen 
the slowest. Among the renewable energy technologies, solar thermal has had the 
slowest increase.  The policy effect on patenting appears to differ significantly, but R&D 
seems to have a variable effect depending on the technology sector. What appears to 
have had the most effect is the network of polices, including R&D that have come into 
place in the period from 1990 onwards, but with one major intervening factor: initial 
general innovative capacity (measured by patent count for all fields of activity) seems to 
have the most predictive effect on whether patenting of mitigation technologies would 
increase over time.422 
Looking at market structure, and using patent assignee data, the study finds 
that the highest concentration is in CCS-storage (36% attributable to top 10 firms), with 
solar thermal having the lowest (5% attributable to top 10 firms). Solar PV is at about 
15%, wind at 20% and IGCC at just over 30%.423 Biofuels is relatively low at just under 
10%. The study does not provide a geographic breakdown of the assignees, but a firm 
level examination of CCS and IGCC shows all the top 10 assignees are from the OECD. 
The study does not provide data on the number of assignees in developing countries 
and whether those assignees are wholly owned subsidiaries or whether they are joint 
ventures and downstream or upstream partners. 
Using patent counts to indicate inventive activity, the study finds that activity is 
concentrated in the OECD (Japan, US, Germany and Korea)424 In terms of technology 
fields, the study does some useful disaggregation: in none of the fields do any 
developing countries feature as top five inventor countries.425 
In terms of technology transfer and diffusion the study finds (looking at 
patents applied for in more than one country, other than that of the inventor’s 
residence) that the majority of ‘transfers’ are between developed countries.426 Only one 
developing country (non-OECD), China, features in terms of size of transfers. Broken 
down by technology area, major recipients of patenting transfers in Solar PV are China, 
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Korea and Taiwan, as well as Israel, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa and Morocco.427  
China far outstrips the others, beating out Korea and Taiwan by significant margins.  
There is clearly a correlation to size of market, but more significantly, is there a 
correlation to imitative capacity?  The study does not address this issue and it is difficult 
to draw from the data that they use, but there is at least some research that shows a 
strong link between propensity to patent in a country that is not the inventors first 
resident and the imitative capacity in that country.428 
In terms of participation in research collaboration (measured as co-inventors 
from more than one country), only China features among developing countries and that 
only ranked 5th in Solar PV and 4th in Geothermal.429  It is not clear from the data 
whether the Chinese co-inventors are from Chinese firms or wholly-owned subsidiaries 
of developed country firms but this suggests some, albeit not significant, amount of 
developing country participation in international R&D networks in the studied sectors. 
Finally, the study concludes that the rate of diffusion is insufficient to address 
the climate change technology need especially in developing countries.430 
VIII.3 What can be concluded? 
The data are consistent with other studies that the majority of patents are held 
by firms in the OECD.  The levels of market concentration are not high, again in line 
with some of the findings in Barton, above.  There is evidence of patenting by residents 
in the major developing economies, primarily China, but it remains quite low. In 
comparison, there is significant evidence of patenting by non-residents into the major 
developing country economies, again, primarily in China.  The low participation rate in 
research collaboration suggests that much of this patenting is not reflective of joint 
leaning or joint development activities involving developing countries.  
IX. RESULTS FROM TNAS, NAMAS AND NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS 
 
The most commonly identified barriers in TNAs related to costs, market 
structure and human capacity, with very few directly mentioning intellectual property.431  
However, given that TNAs do not carry out analyses of whether the technologies 
identified as needed are patented and whether there is licensing, this is not surprising.  
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Where a need for capacity building, or for absorption or adoption of technology was 
identified, no TNAs identify the cost of gaining access to such knowledge or the terms 
in which such knowledge would be accessed.  This is partly structural in that TNAs are 
done at the pre-commercial and pre-project identification phase meaning that such 
details are not part of the assessment. In addition, the guidance on how to conduct a 
TNA, embodied in the UNDP Handbook for Carrying Out Technology Needs Assessment for 
Climate Change focuses on intellectual property as a broader policy element in innovation 
policy but does not actually suggest an assessment of the intellectual property and 
licensing structure of the technology sectors or specific technologies identified in the 
TNA.  It simply suggests that intellectual property may be an important element of 
ensuring that investors feel secure transferring technology.432  The TNA process for 
identifying barriers may not really be able to address the issue of intellectual property at 
the level of detail required.  Nevertheless, the concerns with cost and human capacity 
point to a need for building basic knowledge and background on technologies, as well as 
reducing the costs of purchasing hardware, and the costs of learning to operate and 
maintain said hardware.  Many countries also pointed to lack of R&D capacity and 
networks as a crucial barrier that needed to be addressed.433 Included by all was a basic 
concern about lack of technical knowledge and know-how about all the technologies 
identified.434 
 
A key finding from the TNAs may be that in response to the barriers identified, 
most countries pointed to regulatory measures first, followed closely by access to 
investment and funding.  This emphasizes that regulatory structures are seen as key to 
addressing many of the problems in market structure in developing countries and that 
freedom to implement nationally appropriate regulations to enable technology transfer 
may be crucial.  Paramount across all TNAs were market creation and demand-side 
measures as a basis for all other technology transfer action. 
 
The national communications also present similar details and conclusions. 
Interestingly, Brazil’s 2nd national communication does not address intellectual property 
as a policy priority relating to technology transfer, except to note that Brazil (or a 
Brazilian firm) owns patented technology in the hydrogen fuel cell sector.435 
 China’s communication is the most specific and detailed regarding technology 
needs both in mitigation and adaptation.  However, as with other national 
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communications, nothing regarding intellectual property is mentioned in detail, but only 
in general terms as a barrier that developed countries should remove.436 There is no 
detail on the intellectual property issues related to any specific technology or sector, 
except for one: related to protection of plant varieties as a way of stimulating innovation 
in the field.437 India only addresses intellectual property at the general level of policy 
issues the UNFCCC should address.438 South Africa identifies intellectual property as a 
potential cost barrier but only at a general level439 and not an economy-wide barrier.440 
Related barriers cited refer to knowledge and human resource constraints for absorption 
and uptake of technologies. 
 
X. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
What can we conclude from this critical survey and analysis of the existing 
empirical data?   
X.1 Scope of technologies 
The existing studies cover a small proportion of the technologies for 
mitigation and none of those for adaptation.  In particular, efficiency (particularly in 
appliances) and transport are a significant gap whereas this is where much of the 
mitigation abatement from developing countries is expected to come.  There is 
negligible coverage of agricultural emissions mitigation technology. Adaptation 
technology is not covered at all by any of the studies, and this is another key area of 
need for developing countries for which little or no data exists. The table below 
illustrates all the technology areas not covered by the literature. 
Specific Mitigation Technologies 
 
Developing Countries and Regions  
Implicated (in terms of mitigation 
potentials and Technology needs 
articulated) 
Industrial process efficiency (best 
available production technologies in the 
following sectors) 
Africa, Asia and Pacific, LDCs, SIDS 
- Iron and Steel ASEAN, Brazil, China, India, South Africa 
- Chemicals and Petrochemicals ASEAN, Brazil, China, India, South Africa 
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- Paper ASEAN, Brazil, China, India, South Africa 
- Aluminium ASEAN, Brazil, China, India, South Africa 
- (CCS) in Industrial Processes Brazil, China, India, South Africa 
Nuclear ASEAN, Brazil, China, India, South Africa 
- Pressurized water reactors with 
capacity above 1 000 MW 
China 
Power generation efficiency and fuel 
switching  
Africa, Asia and Pacific, Latin America and 
the Caribbean, LDCs, SIDS 
Transport Asia and Pacific, Latin America and the 
Caribbean, SIDS; 
- Flex – Fuel Vehicles Brazil, China 
- Bus rapid transport ASEAN, Brazil, China, India, South Africa 
- Hydrogen Fuel cells Brazil, India, 
- Batteries Brazil,  
- Fuel Efficiency of petrol or 
diesel vehicles 
ASEAN, China, India, South Africa 
 Electricity grid – smart and micro 
infrastructure and management 
ASEAN, Brazil, China, India, 
- Flexible AC transmission 
systems; High-voltage 
transmission systems 
China,  
- Monitoring and controlling 
electricity quality, grid 
interconnection and 
dispatching 
- Electricity dispatching 
automation technology 
ASEAN, China, India 
Buildings  
End-use efficiency and Appliances ASEAN, Brazil, China, India,  
- electric motors Brazil, South Africa 
- pumps, including for 
agricultural use 
ASEAN, Brazil, China, India,  
- Dishwashers, clothes washers, 
and clothes dryers 
China 
- compressors, heat exchangers, 
insulation (foam and vacuum), 
heat bridge designs and fans 
for refrigeration and air 
conditioners; 
ASEAN, China, India, 
- software and hardware, 
especially for managing active 
and standby power in portable 
appliances 
ASEAN, Brazil, China, India 
- Combined heat and power ASEAN, Brazil, China, India, South Africa 
Agriculture Africa, Asia and Pacific, Latin America and 
the Caribbean, LDCs, SIDS;  
ASEAN, Brazil, China, India, South Africa 
- Less GHG intensive fertilizer Brazil, India 
- Plant varieties that are less 
reliant on GHG intensive 
fertilizers, either because they 
produce higher yields or are 
more efficient at soil nutrient 
uptake; 
Brazil, India 
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- Animal variants and breeds less 
likely to produce methane 
during digestion; 
Brazil 
- Better management of animal 
waste, including recycling into 
biogas and other biomass for 
energy generation; 
Brazil 
- Animal feed less likely to 
produce methane 
Brazil, India 
  
Specific Adaptation Technologies Developing Countries Implicated 
Agriculture Africa, Asia and Pacific, Latin America and 
Caribbean, LDCs, SIDS 
- All agricultural inputs, 
including seeds (including 
flood and drought resilient 
varieties), low emissions 
fertilizers, and methods and 
processes; 
 
- New varieties or adaptations of 
existing plant and animal 
varieties.  
 
- Genetically modified seeds and 
animals 
 
- integrated pest management   
- Food processing and storage  
Energy  
- All products for energy 
production, distribution and 
consumption; 
 
Health Africa, Latin America and Caribbean, LDCs 
- All health infrastructure, 
including medicines, diagnostic  
and treatment tools, methods, 
personnel; 
 
- Medical products, processes 
and services related to 
increasing resistance to vector 
borne and temperature 
sensitive diseases 
 
- Medical products, processes 
and services related to 
managing health needs during 
periods of extreme heat (heat 
waves) and extreme cold, 
 
- Medical products, processes 
and services related to 
increasing general immune-
capacity, e.g. vaccines; 
 
- Products, processes and 
services designed to create 
hygienic and sanitary living and 
working conditions, such as 
access to potable water and 
sanitary facilities 
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Water Africa, Latin America and Caribbean, LDCs 
- All water infrastructure for 
capture, treatment, 
distribution, and recycling 
 
-  Water treatment and 
sanitation products and 
processes to deal with higher 
levels of toxicity and microbial 
and plant growth  
 
- Water desalination 
technologies for coastal areas 
 
- Smart and/or active water 
metering systems 
 
- Water capture and storage 
products and processes 
 
- Efficient water use and 
reclamation technologies 
 
Disaster response Asia and Pacific, Latin America and 
Caribbean, SIDS 
- early warning systems for 
disasters (including 
communications); 
 
- Systematic observation, 
monitoring and analysis 
- Conventional observations, 
including use of wind profilers, 
and application of GPS in 
upper-air meteorological 
observations.  
- Non-conventional 
observations, including 
development of satellite 
remote-sensing instruments 
and ground-based remote 
sensing technologies.   
- Data analysis and assimilation 
  
- systems for stockpiling and 
distributing food, water, and 
medicines; 
 
- systems for storing and 
managing water resources; 
 
- alternative disaster-appropriate 
transport systems (e.g., boats); 
 
- systems for strengthening 
waste disposal sites against 
leakage during disasters; 
 
- disaster mitigation systems, 
such as flood and sea walls, 
flood channels;  
 
- extreme weather event 
resistant building materials. 
 
 
X.2 Ownership and distribution of patenting 
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To the extent possible, existing data in the very limited set of sectors show 
concentrated ownership of patents in developed countries, largely OECD.  Of patents 
that exist in developing countries, the vast majority are in China.  In terms of ownership 
by developing countries, China may have the largest ownership but this is still relatively 
small in comparison to OECD rightholders.  
The majority of technologies in the very limited set are likely not patented in 
least developed countries.  They are almost certain to be patented in China, and in the 
main emerging economies of Brazil, India and possibly South Africa.   
X.3. Licensing 
Only very tentative conclusions can be made with respect to licensing but with 
respect to some of the sectors (especially wind and solar), there appears to be some 
evidence of licensing to major developing countries.  However, the licensing appears to 
be from national or smaller companies, not necessarily in possession of best available 
technologies, and not from transnational enterprises with significant production capacity 
of their own.  The vast majority of technology ownership in the limited sectors studied 
in international flows, especially through FDI vectors, is held by large multinational 
corporations who are primary producers of the products that are manufactured based 
on the technology.  These companies are least likely to license but are most likely to 
engage in FDI in attractive markets and even provide best available technologies to 
suppliers and vertically integrated subsidiaries. The levels of ownership by academic and 
public institutions is relatively small and while national corporations and SMEs have a 
significant share, they rarely engage in FDI or licensing but are primarily interested in 
sales. However there does appear to be a significant opportunity to increase licensing by 
national corporations and SMEs provided that they can be assured of preventing leakage 
into their home markets. These companies also present attractive acquisition targets for 
companies from developing countries.  Any intervention has to be able to target the 
correct category of rightholder to achieve its goals. For FDI channels, the tools will 
need to be directed at spillovers, especially from movement of personnel. With respect 
to licensing, any interventions will have to focus on increasing the scale and rate of 
licensing especially from national corporations and SMEs.  
X.4 Conclusion 
Other reviews of the literature have reached some of the same conclusions but 
perhaps differ in their emphasis. A review by Pugatch (2011), of a sub-set of the studies 
addressed here, concludes that, for the most part, based on his review of the studies, 
intellectual property is not a barrier.441  He argues that the focus should be on what are 
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the best ways to use the intellectual property system to enable technology assimilation 
and use by firms in developing countries.442  He also shares the conclusion that the 
existing data are insufficient to come to any strong policy relevant conclusions as to the 
exact role of intellectual property in the transfer of climate technologies.443  The role of 
IP is also obscured somewhat by lack of detail on what constitutes sufficiently effective 
IP protection to encourage technology transfer.  Pugatch points to the fact that Brazil 
and China, despite perceptions of weak IPR protection remain significant destinations 
for FDI and licensing. 444  Most importantly, he emphasizes the increasing role that 
mergers and acquisitions (especially of developed country firms by developing country 
firms) may play in the future, even if much of the activity in developing countries 
remains nationally-based.445  
Khor reviews a smaller sub-set of the studies discussed above and concludes 
more definitively that it shows the significance of the intellectual problem, pointing in 
particular to the Indian case study of LEDS, and hybrid drive trains in the Ockwell 
study446, and to the experience of developing countries under the Montreal Protocol.447   
Both make the error of treating the finding of such studies as dispositive of the 
question of whether a barrier exists.  In the end, it is imperative that capacity to act is 
combined with identification of problems or blockages in the market.  One without the 
other is pointless.  In thinking about the ways in which intellectual property issues arise 
in climate technology markets, it may be useful to examine the experience of other 
MEAs. 
 
 
XI. LESSONS FROM OTHER MEAS AND SUCCESSFUL CASES OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
 
Some further lessons and data can be drawn from the experience of 
implementation of some Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs).  One finding 
from an UNCTAD study is that technology transfer is less problematic, and refusals to 
license or high licensing costs are not a problem where: 1) there is little or no domestic 
production industry that could compete with the company providing technology and/or 
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2) there is a high concentration in the relevant sector, enabling transfers to vertically 
integrated subsidiaries.448  In the first case, there is no actual demand for licensing, while 
there may be a demand for the technological products which may be entirely imported 
and in the second case, production is carried out by local subsidiaries to whom 
technology, even the best available technologies can be transferred without fear of 
significant spill-overs. The experience of Thailand is in contrast with that of India and 
South Korea under the Montreal Protocol. Both of the latter had significant domestic 
industries which sought to shift into the production and use of alternative technologies 
and found difficulties related to refusals to license or unduly restrictive licensing 
terms.449 At least one study by Watal found significant concerns and some reports from 
survey evidence that producers in developing countries such as India, Argentina, Brazil, 
China, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Romania and Venezuela encountered difficulties in 
accessing technologies on grant, or concessional terms (as required by the Montreal 
Protocol), and even on ‘reasonable’ commercial terms.450 The restrictive terms Watal 
identified included: 
 Restrictions on export; 
 Requirements to hand over majority shareholding in their company or joint 
venture. 
 
However, she notes that the concentrated market structure of the Refrigeration 
and Coolants sector may have played a role in the problematic area of the primary CFC 
substitute, HFC134a.451   
Another useful finding is that the existence of efficiency or technology 
standards in developed country markets into which developing country producers 
exported products was a crucial driver of the implementation of an MEA, for a country 
like South Korea.452  These standards create a situation where access to the technologies 
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becomes a necessity if the exporter in the developing country is going to be able to 
participate in the market.  This suggests that failures to license on fair, reasonable and 
non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms should implicate competition law issues in both 
developed and developing countries.  This was the experience of companies in Korea.  
In addition, firms in Korea experienced demands for high prices for licensing, at a level 
which made it economically unviable to license the technology.453  Korean firms also 
experienced restrictive licensing terms. In one year, 1994, a case study found, the 
agreements entered into:454 
 Required Non-assignment or sub-licensing to a third party (8.9% of licenses 
from Japan, 4.8% of licenses from the US); 
 Would only grant on a non-exclusive basis (7.7% of licenses from Japan, 5.4% 
of licenses from the US); 
 Required grant back clauses on improvements (7.7% of licenses from the US, a 
portion of 7.7% of licenses from Japan); 
 Prohibited production for export (4.2% of licenses from Japan); 
 Prohibited production of competing products (1.8% of licenses from Japan). 
 
The data do not address how many licensing contracts were not entered into 
because of such clauses.  However, from the perspective of climate change related 
technology transfer and encouraging spill-overs, non-exclusive grants are preferable to 
exclusive, so that may be less of a problem for policy, even if it presents a problem for 
individual technology licensees. The Korean findings suggest that problematic terms 
consisted of a small but significant portion of licenses granted. Some of these terms 
were found in the same contract so a simple addition would not be accurate but it can 
clearly range from approximately 9% to 20% depending on the distribution of these 
terms.  
The Multilateral Fund of the Montreal Protocol did aim to meet “all 
incremental costs” including paying for patent rights and royalties. 455  The primary 
implementing agency for such issues was UNIDO.  However, the MF did struggle with 
costs related to these issues456 which suggests that for the climate arena, which is orders 
of magnitude larger in terms of the scope of technologies, geographical scope, and 
sharper time limits, the funding needed to pay for such licensing may be prohibitively 
large. 
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XII. THREE TRENDS THAT IMPLICATE THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRUCTURE OF CLIMATE 
TECHNOLOGY MARKETS 
 
XII. 1 Increases in Patenting of Climate Technologies 
Trends in patenting suggest that there may be an increase in problems related 
to patents457 in the period leading up to 2020 and especially in the period from 2020-
2050.  Ownership of climate mitigation technology patents remains largely concentrated 
in OECD countries, primarily Japan, the US and Germany.458 Emerging economies are 
growing their share, increasing, on average, 18% annually between 1998 and 2003 with 
the caveat that a significant amount may be by subsidiaries of foreign firms.459 Overall, 
the rate of patent filing in selected clean energy sectors (power generation using 
renewables) appears to track the overall global increases in patenting.460  The increase in 
patenting is global, suggesting an increase in interest in commercialization and licensing 
of climate mitigation technologies but also that even if patterns of patenting may not at 
present cause concern, increases in patenting, especially in China, India, and Brazil, may 
give rise to such problems. Climate mitigation technology patent ownership remains 
concentrated in the hands of OECD private and public actors and that concentration 
does not seem likely to change significantly given the upward trend in patenting.  The 
EPO/UNEP/ICTSD study found that for the selected technologies, while China 
presented the largest number of patents claimed among emerging economies, only a 
small percentage of ownership was actually in Chinese hands. 461  Limited domestic 
ownership of IP in the selected fields was also found for India and Brazil.462 In China, 
much of the patenting was domestic with a very small number of patents filed first in 
China and then in other countries.463  In contrast, China was the largest destination 
outside the OECD for patents first filed in Japan, the US and Germany.464  This was still 
far below the numbers of patents filed between OECD members, where much of the 
primary activity takes place.465   
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Measures of technology diffusion that look at whether patents are distributed 
across more than one country (as a proxy for intent to use or market the technology in 
that market) appear to show that some technologies are widely diffused (LEDs, CFLs, 
wind power, electric and hybrid vehicles).466 Within that, the diffusion seems largely 
between OECD countries, and increasingly emerging economies.467  Issues of licensing 
costs and access to licensing are likely to become even more important as emerging 
economies expand their use of technologies to reduce their GHG emissions to peak 
between 2015 and 2018.  In addition, while LDCs at present do not have the same 
concerns, that may change with the expiration of their transition period for the 
implementation of the TRIPS Agreement on July 1, 2021.468 Once their legislation is 
TRIPS compliant it will become much easier to patent in those countries, especially if 
they already participate in the Patent Cooperation Treaty system.  In that case, there may 
be a jump in the number of patents filed in least developing countries.  
Specific policies to address climate change may also have an effect on future 
patterns of patenting.  Some governments are beginning to fast-track patents that claim 
‘green benefits’ creating an incentive for reclassification but also perhaps a greater 
number of applications for climate technologies.469 
If governments seek to establish systems for identifying best available 
technologies while at the same time establishing and/or requiring energy efficiency 
standards and targets, energy efficiency will begin to shift from being a tool for 
differentiation in the market, to something that becomes a necessity for participation in 
the market.  Where the best available technologies may be proprietary (patents, trade 
secrets, industrial designs) access to those technologies may become a key part of 
enabling greater efficiency, which may require specific regulations to manage how 
companies whose technologies become standards must treat other market participants. 
Rimmer covers this issue in significant detail470, and examples of this issue can be found 
in both Europe and the US.  This has become a crucial issue in markets such as mobile 
phones, for example. 471  The appropriate regulatory response has been an arena of 
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contestation between private companies, regulators and policymakers regarding what 
licensing obligations can be placed on those whose technologies are designated 
standards or become de facto standards. The issue of fair, reasonable, and non-
discriminatory (FRAND) terms has been raised in the context of the European Union’s 
Competition Commission deliberations on the relationship between competition law 
and standards. The Commission has issued guidance which requires FRAND terms for 
standards that are based on exclusive rights, noting that: 
“Where  participation  in  standard-setting  is  unrestricted  and  the  procedure  
for  adopting  the  standard in  question  is  transparent,  standardization  
agreements  which  contain  no  obligation  to  comply with  the  standard  and  
provide  access  to  the  standard  on  fair,  reasonable  and  non-discriminatory 
terms  will  normally  not  restrict  competition.”472 
As formal standards proliferate as a tool for achieving climate goals, and as 
patenting in the technology areas increases, the importance of managing standard-
setting processes and ensuring access to standards will only grow.  The EU approach 
may provide some policy models for countries going forward, but participation by 
developing countries and their firms in such standard setting processes in developed 
countries will also be crucial. Para 281 of the Guidelines ensures that unrestricted 
participation means participation by all competitors in the market which may leave space 
for firms which sell their products into the EU. The appropriateness and scope of 
measures to address such issues is addressed in more detail in Chapter 6, but it is 
important to note that this is a problem more and more likely to arise in the near future. 
Aside from problems related to technology specific standards there may also 
be problems related to general standards that may nevertheless exclude a market actor 
from the market unless they have access to a specific technology or know how. This is 
especially true for mandatory efficiency standards, such as those which the IEA has 
suggested may be especially effective for dealing with appliance –related emissions.473 In 
such situations, even though technology – neutral, standards exclude from the market 
producers that are unable to comply with the standard.  Access at a reasonable cost to 
efficiency technologies may need to be part of a support system. Voluntary standards do 
not necessarily escape this problem, as it is possible for customer preference and for the 
market to be defined in such a way that less-efficient producers are excluded.  Where 
these standards are unilaterally imposed by developed countries on their domestic 
market, such markets can become closed off to actors in developing and emerging 
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economies imposing the burden of complying with such standards entirely on those 
actors.  The best approach may be to seek out international collaboration on standard 
setting474, especially for products with global or regional markets. However, this is likely 
to run into the dynamic of developing countries demanding access to technologies to 
assist their companies to comply with such standards.   
XII.2 Increases in Public sector Financing of Climate technologies 
As developed countries have argued in the UNFCCC, the majority of 
technologies in developed countries are held by the private sector.  In that context, 
obligations placed on developed country governments to provide technology transfer 
appear to be dead letters, nothing more than hortatory statements.  In the case of purely 
privately funded research and development of products it may indeed be true that 
governments do not have the discretion to deliver those technologies themselves.  
However, this does not mean that there are no policy levers available to them to 
encourage their private enterprises to carry out licensing and transfer of technology. For 
example, Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement places an obligation on developing 
countries to: 
provide incentives  to  enterprises  and  institutions  in  their territories  for  
the  purpose  of  promoting  and encouraging technology transfer to least 
developed country members in order to enable them to create a sound and 
viable technological base. 
Suerie Moon, in her analysis of developed country compliance with this obligation 
pointed to several kinds of measures that would fall directly within the provisions of this 
article such as:475 
1. Financing and loans for purchasing of patents, licenses and products by 
developing country government, institutions and firms; (this could be tied to 
purchasing from home-based firms); 
2. Financing, preferential tax treatment and loan guarantees for FDI, especially 
R&D, in technology-oriented fields, with a preference for FDI that provided 
licensing, transfer of skills and know to local partners and suppliers; 
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3. Providing financing (paid to developed country firms and institutions) for 
individuals from institutions and firms in developing countries to attend 
training, workshops and educational research institutions as well as participate 
in internship programmes in technology sector of relevance to LDCs; 
4. Providing business to business platforms for firms from the developed country 
to conduct business with firms in LDCs; 
5. Providing business risk insurance, including against intellectual property losses 
for firms licensing and investing into LDCs; 
6. Providing preferential access to R&D funds for projects that include 
participation of individual and institutions from developing countries. 
That many developed country WTO members have not implemented many of 
these kinds of incentives476 is a function not of incapacity but of policy choice.  None of 
these options is coercive but does require financial expenditures by the developed 
country.  This may also be due to competitiveness concerns, although it is difficult to 
see how many LDCs could become competitors to these countries in the near term. The 
concerns with respect to competitiveness can also be seen in the pattern of public 
funding for R&D and the ways in which developed countries use the transfer of the 
ownership products of such research to subsidize their private sector and maintain 
competitiveness. 
Many developed countries maintain significant public funding structures for 
R&D.  In absolute numbers, total US public spending was USD 124 billion in 2009. In 
2005 purchasing power parity (PPP) dollars477, the US Federal Government spend was 
114 billion, Japan was 22.4 billion, Germany was 22.1 billion, France was 16.5 billion 
and South Korea was 12.1 billion. In comparison, China’s was 32.9 billion; Brazil was 11 
billion, Mexico was 2.5 billion, Turkey was 2.4 billion, Argentina was 2.3 billion,  and 
Singapore was 2.1 billion. Other than Pakistan at 1.5 billion no other developing country 
features. The data show a very large gap in public R&D spending by governments in 
developed countries as compared to developing. However, China is the second highest 
individual country spender. 
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Many developed countries essentially subsidize their private sector actors by 
allowing them to seek patents for technologies or products developed from publicly – 
funded research and development budgets.478 Given the very large research budget of 
the US this constitutes a significant annual transfer and increases the competitiveness of 
US technology companies by attenuating the risks associated with doing basic and 
demonstration research themselves, while enabling them to focus on the 
commercialization of products.  Simultaneously, however, developed countries have also 
enabled themselves to maintain significant ownership of these publicly funded 
technologies.  For example, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) Patent Cost-Sharing 
agreement with Universities contains a clause that retains co-ownership of the patent 
with the right of the US federal government to:  
An irrevocable, royalty-free, paid-up right to practice and have practiced the 
Patent Rights throughout the world by or on behalf of the Government and 
on behalf of any foreign government or international organization pursuant to 
any existing or future treaty or agreement to which the Government is a 
signatory.479   
A similar clause is inserted into the NIH-lead and Institution lead 
agreements.480  This would enable the NIH to easily make such licenses available to 
firms and actors in developing countries.  This would be especially useful if such 
licensing were made to public or academic institutions in developing countries that 
could cooperate in with industry to further develop and commercialize technologies.   
Problematically, in the licenses that it grants, the NIH has a clause in its 
agreement that “products used or sold in the United States embodying Licensed 
Products or produced through use of Licensed Processes shall be manufactured 
substantially in the United States, unless a written waiver is obtained in advance from  
the NIH.”481  This policy choice deliberately excludes firms from developing countries 
from accessing licenses issued by the NIH for use in their home territories, even where 
the license is for a patent registered in the developing country. Nevertheless the US 
government still retains for itself the right to carry out such licensing on the same terms 
                                                        
 
478 See e.g. the United States Bayh-Dole Act (P.L. 96-517, Patent and Trademark Act Amendments of 
1980), 35 USC § 200 et seq. (2006 and Supp. V 2012). See Abbott, F M “Innovation and Technology 
Transfer to Address Climate Change: Lessons  from  the  Global  Debate  on  Intellectual  Property  and  
Public  Health”,  ICTSD’s  Programme  on  IPRs and Sustainable Development, Issue Paper No. 24, 
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Geneva, Switzerland, 2009. 
479 See NIH, “NIH Cost Sharing Agreement” Available at: http://www.ott.nih.gov/forms-model-
agreements (last visited 15 August 2013). 
480 See NIH “The National Institutes of Health Inter-Institutional Agreement - Institution-Lead” Available 
at: http://www.ott.nih.gov/forms-model-agreements (last visited 15 August 2013). 
481 See Article 5.2 NIH “National Institutes of Health Patent License Agreement – Nonexclusive”, Article 
5.2 NIH “The National Institutes of Health Patent License Agreement – Exclusive” Available at: 
http://www.ott.nih.gov/forms-model-agreements (last visited 15 August 2013). 
 124 
 
as described above in the cost-sharing agreement. 482  This provision is required by 
Section 202(c)(4) of the Bayh-Dole Act.483 
In the issuance of licenses that the government owns itself, the Bayh Dole Act 
authorizes the issuance of exclusive or partially exclusive licenses only to the extent 
required for the public interest or to ensure proper incentives for commercialization.484 
More problematically, it requires that any exclusive licenses issued by the federal 
government impose an obligation to manufacture the products or product from the 
patented process substantially in the US.485  However, this does not extend to non-
exclusive licenses.  To the extent that the US follows the preference for non-exclusive 
licensing embodied in Section 209 of the Bayh-Dole Act then it has the capacity as it 
stands today to make non-exclusive licenses available to firms and actors in developing 
countries on grant or concessional terms.  
In addition, Section 203 of the Bayh-Dole Act retains the right of the US 
government to ‘march-in” and require licensing or sub-licensing to another actor under 
certain conditions. These include: 
- Failure to actually work the patent within a reasonable period of time (section 
203(a)(1)); 
- To address health and safety needs not adequately met by the assignee (section 
203(a)(2)); 
- For public use, not adequately met by assignee (section 203(a)(3)) 
- Failure to agree to substantially manufacture the product in the US (section 
203(a)(4)) 
 
The US has the ability to essentially issue compulsory licenses for the above 
conditions, although it is not clear whether the existence of those conditions is limited 
only to the territory of the US. 
In the EU, the major research funding vehicle for 2009-13 was the 7th EU-
Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development (FP7), whose 
general principle for funding is that all intellectual property generated through the 
funding belongs to the funded participants, including patents applied for as a result of 
                                                        
 
482 Article 5.2 NIH “The National Institutes of Health Patent License Agreement – Exclusive” Available at: 
http://www.ott.nih.gov/forms-model-agreements (last visited 15 August 2013). 
483 35 USC 204 (2006 and Supp. V 2012) 
484 35 USC 209  (2006 and Supp. V 2012) 
485 35 USC 209  (2006 and Supp. V 2012) 
 125 
 
the research.486 The Model Grant Agreement487 between the European Commission and 
grantees has several clauses that elaborate the exact nature of the ownership and the 
obligations with respect to enabling access for third parties.  While grantees are free to 
transfer ownership the Commission may object where such transfer to third countries 
would be deemed to negatively affect European competitiveness (or security interests), 
although there is no requirement of prior notice to the Commission for such 
transfers. 488  This also applies to the granting of exclusive licenses. 489  There is an 
obligation to ‘use’ or work the patented material produced from the project, which 
includes an obligation to seek IP protection such as patents where appropriate. 490 
However, only in the case where an applicant does not seek to protect the material itself 
or offer it to an affiliated entity in a member state will the Commission step in and claim 
ownership.491 In this, the EU is explicitly engaging in a subsidy and intellectual property 
transfer program. However, other than an obligation to use the work, it does not 
obligate licensing or address the contents of licensing except where it concerns the 
relationships between its grantees.  Because of this deliberate contractual choice, neither 
the European Commission nor its member states retain any intellectual property in 
projects funded through these FP7 programmes. It does not appear that there is any 
specific barrier to the EC or its member states retaining such rights, so at least there 
does not appear to be a barrier to amendment of the agreement to doing so for the 
purposes of enabling licenses to developing countries.  However, the EC seems to have 
the opposite attitude by ensuring that the Commission can intervene to stop transfer of 
intellectual property where it considers such transfers may have impacts of EU 
competitiveness.492 
The pattern from the US and the EU makes clear that there remain significant 
amounts of publicly funded intellectual property over which these governments can 
exercise rights.  There is a deliberate and understandable policy choice that has been 
made to use such funds to subsidize their private sectors.  However, it also means that 
they have the legal capacity, and can make a choice, to take action to share that 
technology with firms and institutions in developing countries. While it should be 
acknowledged that the majority of commercialized or near commercialized technologies 
are wholly in the hands of private actors, the role of public funding in transferring 
technologies or providing a basis for commercialized technologies should not be 
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overlooked.  The opportunities for bilateral and multilateral cooperation on access to 
these patents and technologies presents a real opportunity to resolve a significant 
element of the technology transfer debate and it is incumbent upon policymakers in 
both developed and developing countries to provide the right set of incentives to attract 
FDI and licensing and to enable spillovers at a sufficient scale and speed.   
In contrast, many developing country researchers do not engage in patenting493, 
although an increasing number of developing countries are beginning to implement the 
Bayh-Dole model from the US.494 There has been a major increase in patenting in China, 
encouraged and mandated by universities and the state, which has resulted in an 
immense jump in the number of university related patents in China.495 
The issue of whom to license to is wrapped up in the competitiveness 
concerns that drive the public subsidization of patent transfers by developed countries.  
However, as noted in Chapter 3, emerging economies such as China present the 
cheapest cost opportunities for lowering GHG emissions. Lowering their emissions is 
also a necessity if global emissions are to be lowered sufficiently.  Given their growth 
rate the only ways in which climate change can be addressed is if existing technologies 
and near commercialization technologies, both products and processes, are diffused into 
firms in these countries without delay.   
XII.3 The Role of Emerging Economies  
The past two decades have seen increasing growth in the role that middle 
income countries, especially upper middle income countries such as Brazil, India, and 
China play in international technology flows. Data from 2001 shows that upper middle 
income countries presented the highest growth arena for high technology exports from 
the OECD.496 Their share of high technology exports was 18.9% and skills-intensive 
exports was 13.5%.497  Low income countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa have 
shares that are close to 0%; and their shares of global trade in technology exports (for 
skill and technology intensive sectors) may have actually fallen in the period 1970 – 
2001.498 
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Emerging economies are increasingly major players in renewable energy 
technology investments with Brazil, India and China comprising over 90% of the 72 
billion invested in developing countries (just a shade more than that invested in the 
OECD).499  Moreover, a significant part of the climate puzzle relates to a major shift in 
manufacturing from OECD countries to the large emerging economies.500 This means 
that while the majority of consumption of manufactured goods still takes place in the 
OECD countries, emerging economies are increasingly where the negative externalities 
for producing such goods take place.  This has complicated the accounting and the 
understanding of the distribution of the costs and benefits of the most recent phase of 
industrialization.  While the emerging economies have largely engaged in labour 
intensive low cost manufacturing, that is shifting to higher value activity to the extent 
that it is encompassing product design and development. Nevertheless, product and 
process design and development (and its associated intellectual property) remain largely 
in the OECD which implicates the extent to which manufacturing processes in 
developing countries can be redesigned to be more green and sustainable.501 
There is of course some divergence in interests between the large emerging 
economies such as China, Brazil and India and other developing countries. The former 
countries are beginning to compete well on production and dissemination of clean 
technologies, and in some areas, such as wind turbine and solar panel production and 
deployment, may actually be ahead of the US and Europe.   
XI.3.1 The role of emerging economies as research and development and production centers 
A. Brazil 
Brazil has had a longer history of addressing renewable energy than India and 
China. It is a market leader in the implementation of hydropower, and has been 
instrumental in the research, development, demonstration and full blown 
commercialization of biofuels, especially ethanol from sugarcane.502 Brazil has used this 
to move into a significant part of the automobile market with flex-fuel light and heavy 
duty vehicles.503  While its total primary energy supply maintains a large role for oil, and 
is likely to continue due to the discovery and exploitation of new offshore oil504, it has a 
very large penetration of hydropower.505 
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Brazil’s major climate change contribution lies in the deforestation of the 
Amazon basin, the world’s largest land-based carbon sink.  The loss of significant 
portions of the Amazon to biomass use, wood exports and agriculture, contribute 
significantly to GHG emissions, and reduces the capacity to address it.  Avoided 
deforestation therefore remains a significant part of policies and negotiations relating to 
Brazil. 
Brazil does not play a major part in the international trade in other renewable 
technologies and is not a major supplier or provider of such technologies, except 
perhaps in hydropower, and basic ethanol, to other countries. 506  Brazil remains a 
manufacturing powerhouse in South America and is a major regional exporter of 
electrical goods and appliances.507 However, it remains primarily an agricultural exporter 
(basic and processed products), especially as it is the world’s largest meat exporter.508 
It has plans to turn its research program on the application of hydrogen fuel 
cell technology in buses into an opportunity to manufacture such buses for export, 
especially to other developing countries.509 
Brazil places special emphasis on South-South cooperation with a specific 
interest in exporting its technologies to other developing countries.510 This is particularly 
true in the case of first generation biofuels based on sugar to ethanol; and in the area of 
Agriculture.  The potential for Brazil to play a larger part in providing technology and 
exporting products regionally exists but is less likely to ramp up to significant levels in 
the near term. 
 
B. China 
China is now one of the world’s largest consumers of energy,511 and may be 
the largest single emitter of GHG emissions by most measures that do not take 
population into account.512  Its growth has largely been based on coal energy.513 It is 
highly dependent on foreign sources for its supply of oil.514  The demand from China 
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has increased the oil price and has had two major effects: opening up incentives for new 
oil production from previously unprofitable  sources (e.g. tar sands); and making it 
easier for renewable energy to more favourably compare in terms of cost for production 
and consumption.515  While China is one of the largest consumers of fossil fuel based 
energy, it is also increasingly becoming one of the largest producers and consumers of 
renewable energy especially for hydropower, wind and solar PV. 516  Basic industry 
remains one of the largest contributors to China’s energy related emissions, (cement, 
iron and steel and chemicals make up 50% of emissions)517, for which the deployment 
of best available technologies is crucial, if energy efficiencies needed to peak emissions 
by 2020 are to be realized.  China has been able to take advantage of opportunities in 
some sectors such that it is now one of the largest exporters of wind turbine towers, 
solar batteries, and solar concentrators.518  While the majority of technology access has 
occurred through acquisition of licenses, a significant portion has occurred through joint 
ventures (a form of FDI which was highly encouraged and sometimes mandated by 
Chinese regulations), as well as through direct acquisition of firms that held the 
technologies.519 Between 2005 and 2008, Chinese exports of clean technologies rose 
337% while imports rose 56%.520  
China is increasingly becoming a regional and international hub for innovation 
for multinational corporations.  A survey report from Booz and Co. notes that 50% of 
companies in China develop products in China for export to global markets.521 It also 
notes that over 60% over those surveyed planned to increase such development.522 
However, many continue to see IP as a key challenge although not the most important 
one, as talent access and retention are seen as stronger challenges.523 A key finding of 
the report is that the majority of product development taking place in China for export 
is aimed at Asia and developing countries rather than primarily at developed 
countries.524 Another is that Chinese companies have increased their innovative capacity 
and aim to compete on innovation and not just input costs and price.525 China is also 
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increasing its own investment in R&D which was up by 600% between 1998 and 
2008.526 
China has one of the most active markets for coal technologies both for 
domestic use and export.527 The technology to enable such production in China was 
acquired through experience in joint ventures as well as licensing.528  Most of these 
purchases were by large state owned or state affiliated enterprises, rather than SMEs.529 
Chinese success in this sector may be the result of significant state intervention to 
purchase licenses, build capacity, disseminate information, data and know how to all 
actors in the sector.530 Such sector wide cooperation seems to have been a necessary 
condition for successful adoption, adaptation and replication of technologies, driven by 
deliberate government policy and intervention. Licenses were sourced from Hitachi, 
Mitsubishi, Toshiba, Mitsui Babcock, and Alston while joint ventures were carried out 
with Siemens.  The Japanese licensing took place within a broader capacity building 
cooperation between the Japanese and Chinese government creating a collaboration and 
training platform aimed at enabling design and production capacity in Chinese firms.531 
Some findings suggest that patent acquisition or licensing in China faced barriers in part 
because buyers did not feel secure that the first mover competitive advantage of paying 
for a license would be preserved without sufficient patent protection. 532  While the 
preferred mode of absorption of clean coal technology for Chinese enterprises is FDI, 
that apparently conflicted with the strategy of foreign firms’ strategies who focused only 
on product and equipment sales. 533  Chinese policy has worked to ensure greater 
domestic manufacturing of clean coal technologies, for domestic adoption and for 
export.534   One of the most successful externally supported projects for technology 
transfer in China involved industrial boilers.535 The GEF project suggested many lessons 
for technology transfer to China including536: 
 Knowledge transfer to local manufacturers was key; this included intellectual 
property through purchases of licenses; 
 Capacity building to enable absorption of the technology is key to generating 
local interest; 
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 Market creation measures and reduction of market barriers are necessary to 
ensure sustainable demand for the products; 
 Technology transfer of this kind is more likely where there is little risk of 
creating competition that will export the product back to the home market, or 
other existing market of the technology supplier. 
 
In addition, government intervention to promote sector-wide cooperation on R&D, 
demonstration and deployment, including knowledge and cost-sharing is crucial. The 
SC/USC experience also suggests that learning to operate and maintain hardware 
purchased and implemented is a necessary precursor to building capacity to engage in 
adoption, adaptation and replication.537  It seems to also suggest that there needs to 
already exist a capacity to engage in forms of reverse engineering; although this would 
be greatly assisted by active cooperation with the technology provider firm to access 
hard data and information on the technology specifications.538 
China has become the world’s largest manufacturer of thermal power 
equipment including design of super-critical and ultra-supercritical coal technology.539 It 
has begun to export such technology to other developing country markets although this 
still remains at an initial stage.540   China maintains a strong advantage in exporting 
boilers, but lags in steam turbines, and appears to have quality problems associated with 
its export products that may be hindering the scale and scope of its export 
performance.541 It remains a laggard in production of the advanced materials necessary 
for construction of SC/USC technology and has to import it from Japan.542  Once 
Chinese firms can access best available technologies in both sectors, they may be able to 
increase their export performance and lower costs of adoption of SC/USC technologies 
in export markets. 
The Chinese steel sector’s efficiency needs have also exhibited a similar pattern 
to that of the SC/USC sector.543   This is driven by a competitive need to match 
production efficiency in other countries using best available technologies.  The challenge 
was one of absorption and adaptation of such technologies into production processes.  
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The main difference in this case was concerted cooperation with the government of 
Japan that also provided a cooperation platform for its private sector to train and build 
capacity with the sectoral platform participants in China. 544  The joint cooperation 
focused on demonstration and deployment, with participation of firms from both 
countries, and with know-how as a key component. 545   This was followed by a 
localization program in China, creating procurement and tax credit preferences for local 
manufacturing of efficiency technologies. 546  However, as Chinese firms became 
competitors for the domestic Chinese market, Japanese firms withdrew from the 
collaboration547, foreseeing potential competition in other export markets.  The joint 
platform for demonstration and deployment was a crucial learning tool for Chinese 
firms, one that would not have existed were it not for state intervention to encourage 
cooperation in both countries. While Japan did so through state funding and incentives 
and China did so through state mandates, the collaboration proved fruitful for China 
and helped to create a domestic efficiency industry. 
China is also home to what was the most successful solar PV company in the 
developing world, Suntech Power Co.  While its main production subsidiary has recently 
had to declare bankruptcy,548 at its height, it had the largest share of the Chinese Solar 
PV market and also exported a significant amount of its production.  It was a major 
contributor to the price reduction of Solar PV worldwide during the 2001-2010 period, 
making adoption of solar PV cheaper throughout the world. The company was founded 
on existing available technology with some of its own patents, but also grew by 
acquiring other companies such as Japan’s MSK.549 To some extent, it was a contributor 
to what has come to be seen as an oversupply on the global market.550  Nevertheless, 
China continues to have a vibrant market in solar PV with several world class 
manufacturers.551 
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The structure and development of the wind industry differed significantly from 
that of the thermal power sector in SC/USC technology, as Tan et al. note.552 This was 
largely driven by competitive domestic firms seeking domestic market share.  
Government intervention has been aimed at demand creation, and not at encouraging a 
significant export orientation which would require best available technologies.  The 
competition between firms has meant that knowledge sharing and cooperation of R&D, 
demonstration and deployment has not been significant in the sector.553 Lewis notes 
that the Chinese market has several imperfections such as fragmented grid 
connections554 that limit the role of wind and of market oriented supply of electricity.   
However, national policies have created significant demand for wind, even as 
demand for any form of electricity generation also grows.  China uses local content 
requirements paired with a power supply concession. 555   Lewis argues that China’s 
policy of local content, even at 70%, did provide an incentive for foreign firms to locate 
in China, but largely through wholly owned or majority owned subsidiaries.556 There 
appeared to be little licensing to local suppliers or partnerships with Chinese companies. 
On the other hand, the majority of concessions have been given to existing Chinese 
companies such as Goldwind557  one of the more successful wind technology firms in 
the world.  The company serves primarily the Chinese market. Having initially licensed 
some of the key technology needed from REpower, a German company558, Goldwind 
may also have licensed from other European and Japanese firms for other components. 
Its license from REpower, a German company, forbids it from exporting products 
made with the technology.559  However given Goldwind’s focus on the domestic market 
and its natural advantages in access to power supply concessions from the government, 
this strategy may make sense.  By focusing on Chinese market share, Goldwind may be 
planning to create such a dominant market position in China that it becomes an 
indispensable partner for any foreign investors wishing to access the Chinese market.  
The projected demand in growth in China is such that foreign companies may have no 
option but to take whatever entry points into the market that they can.  Goldwind has 
also begun to build a network of local suppliers to which it is transferring its know-how 
and technology. 560   It has also developed significant in-house capacity for R&D, 
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bolstering its local patent position, and increasing its bargaining power.561 It has also 
purchased a majority stake in Vensys (a German firm), giving it access to IP related to 
manufacturing of larger turbines.562 
However, Chinese manufacturers generally do not have access to best available 
technologies and have difficulty with the standard of quality of their smaller turbines 
and do not have the know-how for producing larger turbines.563  Costs of licensing 
appear to be an increasing concern for the government, as well as reluctance to make 
best available technologies available for licensing.564 In part this may be due to demand 
from Chinese firms seeking to out-compete each other in the domestic market.565 
One may conclude from this that, overall, the barriers for Chinese firms do not 
go beyond those of normal commercial entrants and that there appear to be few 
systematic barriers to participation in the market, although perhaps there may be issues 
in relation to access to developed country markets.  China continues to seek to 
participate in greater licensing and innovation in the renewable energy sector. However, 
the lack of access to best available technologies suggests that even where normal 
commercial activity has been moderately successful, China’s full potential cannot be 
harnessed without more intervention to create sector-wide adoption of best available 
technologies, requiring firms to cooperate rather than compete and to engage in 
significant unprecedented knowledge sharing. The importance of export markets in 
pushing firms to adopt best available technologies is also a key lesson from the Chinese 
experience. While foreign FDI into the sector does exist it has done so largely as wholly 
owned subsidiaries, limiting spill-overs. Such FDI has also been focused on meeting 
local demand rather than being export oriented.566 
China’s capacity for large scale manufacturing and its ability to rapidly scale up 
production makes it an indispensable partner for achieving global diffusion of 
technologies world-wide.  China’s role in lowering the costs of solar PV is a case in 
point, even in a situation where the Chinese companies were not holders of the best 
available technologies they have been able to increase production to the point of 
possible oversupply with current market demand.  
C. India 
Like China, India is heavily dependent on fossil fuels for electricity production, 
as well as heating and transport. Its fuel mix is dominated by oil and coal with significant 
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shares from natural gas and nuclear power.567 India has also seen a rapid increase in its 
energy demand, although not on the scale or speed of China. India’s emissions need to 
peak by 2030, (under a 2 degree scenario), largely through rapid deployment of 
renewables, nuclear and biofuels. Also crucial will be deployment of best available 
technologies to enable greater energy use efficiency in industry.568 As with China, the 
IEA ETP 2010 scenario notes that peaking in 2030 is not achievable without 
widespread adoption of CCS in power generation and industry.569  
India has also taken advantage of opportunities to become a significant player 
in clean technologies. One of the best-selling electric vehicle manufacturers in the world 
(by volume) is the Reva Electric Car Company (a Mahindra subsidiary). 570  Indian 
companies have acquired technology through licensing, through joint ventures, as well 
as some direct acquisitions.571 Between 2005 and 2008, Indian exports of renewable 
technology increased 464% while imports increased by 172%.  
India is also the home base of one of the most successful global wind 
technology manufacturers, Suzlon Energy Ltd. Lewis notes that Suzlon has focused on 
acquisition of technology by strategically acquiring whole companies. 572  In part this 
circumvents the established firms, but relies on significant in-house absorptive capacity.  
Suzlon’s export oriented approach also made acquisition of advanced technology and 
access to markets crucial. This meant that Suzlon could not follow an imitation model, 
as its products would have been blocked from access to developed country markets 
where the technologies were protected.  Neither could it rely solely on a licensing model 
since the terms of licenses from any of the established firms would contain limitations 
such as geographic restrictions.  This also necessitated creating significant in-house 
R&D capacity to further develop the technology acquired from smaller second tier 
firms. 573 The firm accessed technology through licenses and then later direct 
acquisition. 574  The firm shifted quickly into R&D and sited facilities in developed 
countries to ensure market access.575  However, India may not have reached its full 
potential in the sector. Lewis points to a paucity of proper reform in India that would 
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allow for independent power producers who would create demand for new 
technologies.576   
A case study by Ockwell et al. (Sussex Energy Group, TERI, Institute for 
Development Studies)577 looked at technology development and diffusion in India of 7 
mitigation technologies: coal gasification, hybrid vehicles; solar PV, Wind, LED lighting; 
biomass; thermal power efficiency.  
In the coal gasification sector, specifically Integrated Gasification Combined 
Cycle (IGCC), adaption to local conditions has been key, as Indian domestic sources of 
coal are higher in impurities than the coals traditionally used for gasification 
technologies.  At the time of the study, there was one major Indian firm, Bharat Heavy 
Electricals Ltd. (BHEL), long established with contractual and licensing arrangements 
with foreign companies such as Siemens and GE.578 Perceptions of barriers in the sector 
focused on high capital costs and access to financing.579 At the time of the study only 5 
demonstration projects had been set up.580 Some of this was due to lack of information 
and testing on how existing technologies would work with the grade of Indian coal.  
Such testing remained to be done at the time of the study, but it was unclear who had 
the resources to carry it out. This suggests that there was little demand or market for 
IGCC in India and what demand there was had been amply met by BHEL.  
Nevertheless concerns were expressed that foreign firms in partnerships retained 
control and secrecy of advanced design elements.581 
In the LED sector, there were no manufacturers in India at the time of the 
study, although there is an importer of components which assembled LEDs for use in 
the domestic market.582 Perceptions were that there is little market for LEDs in India 
and what demand there is can be met by direct importation of completed products. 
There are few skills in the manufacturing side.  The one company that assembled LEDs 
had few connections to foreign firms. The global market is dominated by OECD firms 
and is perceived to be highly patented (especially in process patents) and highly 
litigious.583  There appears to be an assumption that licensing would be difficult for 
Indian firms underlying the perceptions study. 
In Biomass, there are several Indian firms involved in manufacturing biomass 
briquette machines. Most of the firms are exporting these to other countries, including 
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in Africa.584 The basic technology is in the public domain, and Indian manufacturers do 
not engage in much R&D. The study finds some concerns related to Indian 
manufacturers’ reverse-engineering of some European designs, but overall, intellectual 
property is perceived to play a small part in the sector.585 
In the hybrid vehicles sector, the study found two firms working on iterations 
of bus chassis, or three wheeled vehicles.586  All the technology companies owning and 
manufacturing hybrids were based in OECD countries.  The study notes that because 
R&D plays such a large role, patents are a significant determinant of the ability to 
participate in the market, even for actors in developed countries. Ford and Nissan 
licensed from Toyota rather than develop their own technology and Daimler Chrysler 
and BMW cooperated on a research partnership to develop full hybrid technologies. All 
car companies are seeking to enter this technology market as it is perceived as a 
necessity for future participation in the automobile sector.587 IP is clearly perceived as a 
concern as the sector is seen as highly patented and concentrated. The fact that the 
licenses are held by key manufacturers with strong market positions may mean that new 
entrants will find it difficult. However, if sufficient capacity is built up quickly, suppliers 
in developing countries may have a chance to establish themselves, if governments are 
willing to leverage the attractiveness of their markets.  This may be the case with China’s 
requirement that all investments in the automobile sector be carried out in JVs with 
majority Chinese ownership.588 
In thermal combustion efficiency, primarily for electricity production, the 
study finds many government users (electricity producers) who would apply the 
technologies, but a limited number of producers of the technologies (e.g. BHEL.).589 
The basic technology is quite mature and used in India but more efficient designs have 
not been applied in India, primarily because of the capitals costs of refurbishing existing 
plants.590 BHEL has significant experience and perceives no need to rely on foreign 
technology to compete and meet market demand. At least one foreign firm also has a 
presence in India e.g. Alstom (France).591  The focus appears to be on collaborations on 
the development of incremental improvements rather than access to or using foreign 
technologies.592 
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In Phase 2593 of the collaboration which produced the first study, the authors 
expanded the subject area to include Solar PV and revisited some of the subject areas 
covered in the first phase.  As with other studies, solar PV from silicon wafers was seen 
as a mature technology with few barriers to entry, and many producers in India, but new 
materials for thin film PV have proven more complicated. While these are held by a 
concentrated number of firms, there appears to be ease of licensing for Indian firms.594  
This is attributed to the existence of more than enough demand which new entrants can 
meet without reducing market share of incumbents, even in the home markets of the 
OECD firms.  This illustrates the crucial importance of creating strong global markets 
and demand for technologies to remove some of the competitive pressure to maintain 
market share by private sector actors. Nevertheless, differences in firm concentration 
along various parts of the solar PV value chain suggest that expressed concerns about 
blockages for downstream producers may be realized.595 
In hybrid vehicles, the Phase II study identified other Indian actors on hybrids 
such as Tata Motors and Mahindra Motors.  These are engaged in in-house R&D as well 
as acquisition of foreign firms. Patents are concentrated in a few foreign firms but also 
amongst a variety of components.596  Licensing is not occurring from the major players 
but work-arounds and licensing from smaller players is occurring. Concerns were 
expressed that the lack of licensing by major players was limiting technology diffusion597 
and the economies of scale that might result from lowering prices and increasing 
demand for hybrids in comparison to petrol and diesel vehicles.  
The study emphasizes that access to intellectual property protection on its own 
is not seen as a sufficient condition for successful technology transfer of climate 
technologies.598 What it does conclude is that in some sectors such as hybrid vehicles, it 
is a necessary condition. More specifically the need for access to intellectual property 
and the type of intervention needed will differ across sectors depending on industry 
structure, business models and industry vectors for investment in the local economy.599  
The study also emphasizes that the success stories have been ones that focused on the 
generation and growth of local capacity to absorb, adapt and transform technologies, 
and most importantly, to do so both for purposes of participation not just in domestic 
markets but also international markets. 600   Even for a large market such as India, 
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successful domestic clean technology industries need access to and participation in the 
international technology markets.  
It is important however to take on board the argument that Ockwell et al. have 
made in another paper601, that for developing countries, even advanced technologies 
essentially have to be market ready for them to be useful in developing a clean 
technology economic base.  What is needed in developing countries in the period to 
2020 is deployment of technologies that are ‘new to the industry’; and ‘new to the firm’ 
but not necessarily new in terms of inventiveness.602 This places a greater emphasis on 
deployment of existing technologies in developing countries and in pushing these 
already commercial or near commercial technologies down to the level of the firm as 
quickly as possible. 
India is a major hub for pharmaceutical and agrochemicals production and has 
in recent years begun to move from generic industries into major originator R&D.  
Building on its high export performance, especially to developing countries, Indian firms 
have been using that capital to cooperate in R&D, acquire firms, and create joint 
ventures, in order to participate in the lucrative developed country markets for new 
chemical entities and biological medicines.603  This role for India as a crucial supplier of 
affordable medicines has been a large part of the structural debate about how TRIPS 
might limit access to medicines by forcing Indian firms to provide domestic protection 
for pharmaceuticals thus limiting their capacity to produce generics for export to meet 
the need for products in developing countries.604   
D. South Africa 
 South Africa is the main manufacturing powerhouse economy in sub-Saharan 
Africa.  It has significant exports and investment in the rest of Africa, within the general 
regional constraints that much of Africa trades primarily with former colonial powers 
such as France and the United Kingdom. 
South Africa has significant potential capacity for private sector and 
government research and development but is not considered a highly innovative 
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economy. Some measures suggest that it spends less than 1% of GDP on R&D, despite 
several strong research universities.605 South Africa was a leader in the development of 
highly GHG intensive synthetic fuels (coal to liquid) during the apartheid period, which 
has been maintained.606  South Africa also had nuclear capacity and significant expertise 
remains.  However it has significant skills gaps in relevant technology areas, and overall 
in science, technology, engineering and math. 607   It does not have any significant 
research programme on renewable energy and domestic commercial actors are mostly 
implementers rather than producers of the technologies. 
E. Overview 
As part and parcel of their overall growth strategies and economic policies, 
these countries are taking advantage of the attractiveness of their large markets to 
foreign companies. However, they have, for the most part, also put in place strong 
regulatory measures to encourage the diffusion and growth of renewable technologies, 
especially for export markets, including: 
 Ambitious renewable energy production and consumption targets; 
 Renewable energy and efficiency standards and labels; 
 Clean energy tax incentives; 
 Feed in tariffs 
 Joint venture requirements for specific economic sectors; 
 
In China, for example, the vast majority of FDI into China was required to be 
in the form of joint ventures that included specific performance and technology transfer 
requirements or at the very least, no restrictions on the freedom of movement of 
employees of the JV.608  This had a significant impact on China’s ability to move quickly 
up the value chain and move into competing in the international market on higher value 
goods. Brazil, China and India have significant domestic research capacity in both the 
public and private sector.609 
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In addition, all three countries provide intellectual property protection that, for 
the moment, is sufficiently compliant with the TRIPS Agreement and, in comparison to 
the pre-TRIPS era, provides a stable and relatively predictable environment for 
economic transactions to take place in the context of a broader enabling environment 
for investment.  There remain concerns about sovereign risks (policy and macro-
economic) 610  related to sudden shifts in government policy or the extent to which 
government mandates require non-voluntary sharing of technologies, especially in China, 
but that risk appears to be largely mitigated by the broader attractiveness of doing 
business in China.  Nevertheless, such risk perceptions may limit the quality and volume 
of technologies licensed or made available to enterprises in these countries. There is 
some evidence that what is made available under many licensing or joint venture 
agreements in these countries is not best available technology.611 
India and China are already significant players in the global R&D chain, with 
many companies placing significant portions of their global R&D facilities in these 
countries. Already by 2006, General Motors had an R&D presence in China, as did 
Microsoft and BP in India. 612  China, India, Brazil and Russia remain the largest 
recipients of licensing activity from developed countries.613  However, they all remain 
relatively small players in the technology market when measured by royalty receipts. A 
look at royalties in the 2009 - 2012 period shows that among developing countries 
China remains the largest with total charges at USD 1.044 billion compared to Brazil at 
USD 510 million, and India at USD 321 Million.614 China is on a par with Israel but is 
small compared with USD 2.69 billion for Belgium, USD 3.7 billion for Canada, USD 
3.3 billion for Finland, USD 12.4 billion for France, USD 13.8 for Germany, USD 3.4 
Billion for South Korea.   
 
                                                        
 
610 p585, IEA, Energy Technology Perspectives 2010: Scenarios and Strategies to 2050, (Paris: IEA/OECD, 
2010). 
611 Saggi, K “Trade, Foreign Direct Investment, and International Technology Transfer: A Survey” World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2349, May 2000. See also p273, Gechlick, M “Making Transfer of 
Clean Technology Work: Lessons of the Clean Development Mechanism” 11 San Diego International Law 
Journal  227 (2009). 
612  p517, Stern, N. et al. The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007). 
613 See p64, Karachalios, K et al. (eds.) “Patents and Clean Energy: Bridging the Gap between Evidence 
and Policy: Final report” UNEP/ EPO / ICTSD 2010. 
614 World Bank World Development Indicators Available at: data.worldbank.org  
 142 
 
 
Table 3: Selected Royalty receipts for developed and emerging Economies - 2012615 
World Development Indicators IP Charges, receipts (BoP, current US$)
Country Name 2011 2012 2013
Arab World $43,414,575.93 $29,373,311.77
Belgium $2,563,560,261.17 $2,696,785,294.31
Brazil $590,769,562.95 $510,711,775.88
China $743,301,698.00 $1,044,102,041.00
Germany $14,784,193,689.56 $13,870,402,170.39
Spain $1,065,080,142.69 $1,274,602,305.52
European Union $75,410,643,381.96 $70,314,059,914.76
Finland $3,187,717,775.03 $3,315,525,772.67
France $16,127,805,584.34 $12,407,943,394.83
United Kingdom $14,082,476,426.25 $12,462,124,293.18
Greece $69,048,788.65 $82,133,013.96
India $302,615,975.49 $321,445,173.96
Ireland $5,003,354,614.82 $4,996,928,985.12
Israel $1,099,500,000.00 $1,056,500,000.00
Italy $3,970,640,349.05 $4,059,555,009.68
Japan $28,989,252,520.81 $31,892,291,571.95
Korea, Rep. $4,335,600,000.00 $3,435,500,000.00
Mexico $96,535,890.00 $95,626,260.00
Netherlands $5,199,537,295.25 $4,959,690,879.46
Norway $321,690,939.91 $374,389,392.79
New Zealand $334,639,811.81 $310,379,325.95
Poland $268,000,000.00 $229,000,000.00
Portugal $60,821,239.29 $46,675,765.29
Russian Federation $555,800,000.00 $664,200,000.00
Singapore $1,637,016,607.92 $1,648,987,148.75
Sub-Saharan Africa (developing only) $163,843,946.80 $125,872,203.65
United States $120,718,000,000.00 $124,182,000,000.00
South Africa $65,767,203.97 $67,324,145.13
 
India and China may also play a role as developers and adapters of 
technologies that may be better suited to demands in other developing countries.  For 
example, in the area of modern heat access (e.g. switching from low efficiency biomass, 
to efficient gas and solar cookers) rural and peri-urban populations in India and China 
provide ideal testing grounds for development and dissemination of such technologies 
and Indian and Chinese companies can themselves sell and transfer these technologies 
to other developing countries.616  Private sector actors in OECD countries may not be 
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interested in developing such products as there may be no significant domestic demand 
in their own countries, and technological solutions they propose may not be suited to 
deployment in the difficult economic and institutional environments of many 
developing countries. In the electricity sector, another example is the growth in overall 
exports (13% – 45% from 2003 – 2009) from China’s Shanghai Power Corporation of 
super critical technologies for coal powered electricity generation primarily due to 
exports to developing countries.617 
These emerging economies are also the countries in which there may be 
clearest evidence of significant patenting of clean technologies.618  However, they are 
also the most likely developing countries to be able to afford to pay reasonable market 
rates for licensing of technologies, which has been the case for a significant number of 
successful ventures such as Goldwind and Suzlon.619  The problems that they face are 
ones of accessing licenses for existing technologies from potential competitors in 
developed countries. They have to deal with such issues as refusals to license, above 
market rates for technology or restrictive licensing practices, especially for best available 
technologies which present the cutting edge and may be a competitive advantage in 
developed country markets.  They also urgently want to participate in new and 
innovative research on clean technology and generate leading companies that are IP 
holders themselves.   
The means to addressing the issues they face largely lie in using existing tools 
in the international IP system. Compulsory licensing, or the threat of it, may be available 
to address anti-competitive practices such as refusals to license, unreasonable pricing or 
restrictive licenses.  They may be assisted by easier and more transparent licensing 
platforms and markets. In terms of participating in new technologies, these countries 
would be happy to see more joint research and development projects, both co-funded 
and multilaterally funded. Their concerns are reflected by suggestions for: subsidies; 
joint R&D; insurance and loan guarantees for development, diffusion and transfer of 
climate technology; infrastructure for information sharing and licensing platforms, 
global patent pools, access to publicly funded research; as well as full use of TRIPS 
flexibilities.620  In a sense, it is the creation of a transparent and equal playing field for 
licensing of technologies that is their most urgent need as they generally have sufficient 
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domestic production capacity. However, emerging economies are also the most likely to 
have to take on quantified emissions reductions obligations in some form in the new 
post-Kyoto framework and have a fundamental need for access to existing technologies 
to help them make the transition out of technologies in which they have significant sunk 
costs. This means that they are concerned with technology to make existing energy-use 
less GHG intensive such as ‘clean-coal' technologies, and carbon capture and 
sequestration. In that sense, the issues they face bear some similarity to the needs of 
smaller developing countries, in terms of access to existing technologies. 
XI.3.2 The role of emerging economies as export and distribution centers 
 
The least developed countries (LDCs) and other developing countries face a 
calculus that has only some parallels to the access to medicines issue: there is an urgent 
need for access to existing products at low prices that will maintain and increase energy 
access.  In general, these countries have little capacity for production and innovation of 
complex clean technology, nor do they have the funds to purchase goods in the 
quantities necessary.  They are also the ones in least need of mitigation technologies, to 
the extent that they have no GHG emissions reduction obligations and they have 
comparatively low levels of fossil fuel energy consumption. Their mitigation technology 
need is largely related to access to energy provided by existing technology products, and 
the adaptation of low level technologies to local conditions.   
The evidence suggests that most mitigation technologies are not patented or 
otherwise IP protected in these countries.621  However, the countries from which LDCs 
and other developing countries tend to purchase low cost technology products, 
especially China and India, may be increasingly unable to provide these if they are 
unable to access licenses for technologies that allow them to export to other developing 
countries.   
In addition to India and China, countries like Brazil increased renewable 
technology exports, although Brazil had a net increase overall in imports. 622  China, 
Brazil and India tend to be best placed to provide low cost mitigation technologies to 
other developing countries because their companies are better placed and more willing 
to establish production centres and distribution systems in economies that are less 
interesting, or too risky for companies from developed countries. LDCs and other 
developing countries generally have too little purchasing power for most companies in 
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developed economies to establish production centres or distribution networks.  The 
emerging economies can fill that gap but only if they can become production and 
distribution centres themselves and that will need to occur through access to licensing.  
LDCs and other developing countries have an interest in seeing further research and 
development (R&D) and access to patent licensing for emerging economies, but only to 
the extent that the technologies licensed are relevant to their needs.  South – South 
flows of renewable energy technology are at a very low level, the lowest among the four 
south-north vectors of flows.623 However, these have been increasing since 2002 and are 
likely to grow as more developing countries put in place policies that create demand for 
such technologies.  It may be appropriate, for example at a multilateral level to consider 
a way for least developed and developing countries to be able to selectively lower tariffs 
for selected technological products coming from other developing countries without 
having to comply with MFN obligations under the WTO. 
 This need for the emerging economies to provide technological products 
cheaply to other developing countries is even clearer when it comes to technologies for 
adaptation. LDCs and most developing countries are probably the most vulnerable to 
the extreme weather events (droughts and floods) and shifts in disease bands that the 
IPCC Fourth Assessment report has found to be some of the near term effects of 
climate change.624  This implicates in particular areas such as agriculture and health. To 
become more climate-resilient, improving health systems and access to appropriate 
diagnostic and treatment options for diseases such as malaria and dengue fever will be 
crucial.  To deal with droughts and floods, appropriately engineered or hybridized plants 
and plant varieties will be required. Health625 and agriculture626 are both sectors that are 
heavily reliant on intellectual property as a way of organizing investment, production 
and distribution. These technologies are more likely to be IP protected not only in 
emerging economies, but also in a significant number of LDCs and developing countries. 
This would make it more difficult to export products from major emerging economies 
to LDCs and developing countries as licenses are likely only to be granted for domestic 
production and distribution. Where these technologies are patented in LDCs and 
developing countries, importing them becomes even more difficult.  A significant 
portion of LDCs and developing countries may see that the best way to ensure access to 
technologies for adaptation in areas such as health and agriculture is to reduce the 
number of patent protected technologies in all developing countries, including emerging 
economies.  
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Given that emerging economies may be more likely to have distribution 
networks and are more likely to take on the risks of such investment, and given that they 
represent low cost supply markets in many sectors for other developing countries, the 
issue of how the international technology market is structured is crucial. At least one 
recent study has noted that for CDM projects taking place in Brazil, India, China and 
Mexico, a small majority of technology was sourced from non-Annex 1 countries627 with 
India being the top supplier.628 This finding that Brazil, India and Mexico have been 
suppliers of technology in CDM projects points to the potentially useful role of these 
countries in providing low-cost, well-adapted solutions to clean development projects in 
other developing countries, reducing the need for adaptation of developed country 
technology to local conditions. 
In particular, there is a strong interaction between the systems of exhaustion 
that many countries have allowing for parallel importation for goods placed on the 
market in third countries and the levels of IP protection and licensing terms in such 
‘intermediary’ third countries.  The more restrictive the IP protection and licensing 
terms (e.g. geographical limitations) in country A, the less likely it is that parallel 
importation becomes an effective low cost way to purchase goods for country B.  In 
theory, this is not necessarily a bad thing as limiting parallel importation allows a 
rightholder to then pursue a market segmentation approach, allowing them to charge a 
higher price in the country A market and a lower price in the country B market. 
However, where the rightholder has little or no interest in either establishing 
distribution to the country B markets at a volume and price sufficient to meet demand 
in those countries or to establish production in those countries, then forbidding parallel 
importation in Country B only serves to increase their static costs without a benefit in 
FDI or even lower prices.  Nevertheless, there is a case to be made that market 
segmentation should be enabled where it allows for beneficial price advantages for 
developing countries.629 This suggests that developed economies should largely refrain 
from allowing parallel importation of goods that are particularly required in developing 
countries. This may potentially include emerging economies such as China, India and 
Brazil. However, to the extent that supply and/or production is not made available at a 
reasonable price in developing countries, it may be appropriate for developing countries 
as a whole to establish or maintain the ability to parallel import goods. In any case, it is 
likely that one of the tools to ensure that emerging economies can supply other 
developing countries will require some assurances regarding parallel importation and 
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preventing leakage into developed countries.630 Of course, this structure will work only 
if knowledge transfer occurs into emerging economies (for production of technological 
goods), which can then address the access to goods problem in most developing 
countries.  
The actual effect of parallel importation on the ground is quite murky and the 
empirical evidence is quite mixed631 but having a sense of the situation is crucial if the 
right role is to be found for the emerging economies to play as disseminators of climate 
technologies to developing country economies.  Precisely because a system of national 
exhaustion is seen as strengthening intellectual property protection632, most developed 
economies maintain systems of national (or in the case of the EU, regional) exhaustion. 
In their negotiations for bilateral and regional free trade agreements, the IP chapters of 
some of these agreements have explicitly required partners to prevent parallel 
importation, either generally or in specific sectors.633  National exhaustion increases the 
exclusive control over the domestic market that is the aim of a territorial intellectual 
property right.  However, national exhaustion also has cross-border effects. In a system 
with significant international trade in goods, essentially “like products” are treated 
differently at the border creating what may be considered an undue barrier to trade.  
Most developing economies are particularly concerned with abusive pricing practices 
and see parallel importation as a means to restrain such practices and maintain 
downward pressure on prices of technological goods.  This may be crucial in the 
absence of a well-developed regulatory infrastructure to address anti-competitive 
practices.634 As things stand, in the absence of a multilateral agreement on global or 
sectoral exhaustion policies, it is highly unlikely that unilateral adoption of national 
exhaustion will be beneficial or welfare enhancing for developing countries. 
 
XIII. CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has discussed the theory and data on intellectual property and 
technology transfer generally and the application to climate technologies specifically.  It 
is difficult to overstate the methodological difficulties in any empirical work on this 
issue. The myriad problems make for only partial and indicative conclusions from very 
well carried out studies.  The vast majority of studies are limited to a few technological 
fields and do not take into account the broader challenge that adaptation poses, 
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especially to increase adaptive capacity. Nevertheless, policymakers must still make 
decisions on what to do, given the available evidence. On what basis can such a decision 
be made, and how should it be framed?  What message is a policymaker in a developing 
country to take from the existing evidence? As discussed in Chapter 2, the need to act 
quickly is paramount. There is a time limit to how long policymakers can wait for more 
data before taking action.   
Few of these studies takes into account the issue of timeframe which is crucial 
to determining whether and when patents pose a problem. The problem of patents is as 
much about the rate of diffusion as it is about the existence of technology and licensing.  
The rate and scale of licensing must increase by unprecedented amounts if the climate 
technology challenge is to be met. The evidence suggests that the existing pace of 
technology transfer in climate change is likely to have accelerated over the past 20 years, 
but remains insufficient.  This acceleration seems to have largely benefited the emerging 
economies, but primarily China.  There is historical precedent for developing countries 
to take certain kinds of policy actions to take the first steps up the technology value 
chain but changes in global trade mean that exports and access to markets may make 
unauthorized imitation a non-viable pathway. That may nevertheless leave a suite of 
policy levers available to address and enable formal market mechanisms for technology 
transfer.  The evidence suggests that effective intellectual property protection is a 
necessary but insufficient condition for enabling technology transfer. The question 
remains and has yet to be answered as to what constitutes sufficient IP protection to 
encourage formal market mechanisms, but still ensures sufficient spillovers into the 
domestic market to enable quick diffusion and uptake of technologies.  In the final 
analysis, policymakers need to know what suite of tools is legally available to them and if 
that suite of tools is sufficient to enable them to address the climate technology 
challenge. Intellectual property interventions are part of the suite, especially to ensure 
that they can manage behaviours that unduly limit spillovers that should be the outcome 
and are the rationale for FDI, JVs and Licensing.  However, one of the clearest 
outcomes from an examination of the experiences of countries such as China and India 
is that developed country firms are unlikely to make their best available technologies 
available if a country makes active interventions to ensure spillovers, even where the 
country has a legally sufficient intellectual property regime.  The concern about market 
share and competition appears overwhelming.  This is a structural market problem that 
countries may not be able to address by themselves.  If they are to take regulatory action 
at the international level, it may be necessary to build some kind of bargain on 
protection of intellectual property that provides for some extent of market protection 
for developed country firms while allowing developing country firms to engage in levels 
of production and distribution that can meet domestic and international demand within 
the 2015-2025 time frame for addressing climate change mitigation and adaptation.  
However, the UNFCCC was signed at a time when countries had come to a 
significant awareness of the potential issues around technology transfer and intellectual 
property.  There had been experiences in other multilateral environmental agreements 
that provided a background against which technology transfer provisions were created.  
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To a real extent, the need for unilateral measures on intellectual property at the national 
level should have been obviated by the success of the mechanisms for technology 
transfer at the UNFCCC.  Chapter 4 will examine the implementing structures for 
technology transfer in the UNFCCC and examine how and why they may be considered 
to have failed to provide technology transfer, or adequately address the issue of 
intellectual property. 
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Chapter 4  
Evaluating the implementation 
mechanisms 
for technology transfer  
in the UNFCCC 
 
 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the existing mechanisms for 
technology transfer in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC)635 and to assess if and how well they have met the challenge of transferring 
mitigation and adaptation technologies. While these mechanisms cannot be expected to 
bear the entire load of technology transfer required by developing countries, there is 
clearly a role in providing institutional structures, finance and support for policies and 
measures.  More importantly, the UNFCCC provides the basic international framework 
for timing and responsibility for technology-related action.  
The UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol636 are an example of a pattern that has 
become increasingly established in international negotiations on environmental law to 
address commons problems.  In order to persuade developing countries to forgo 
production and consumption pathways now considered harmful to the environment, 
developed countries have offered concessions such as phased in timelines and 
obligations, financial assistance and access to technologies to help them prepare to meet 
their obligations under the agreement. In the case of climate change, developed 
countries took the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions intensive path to development and 
to convince developing countries to forgo such development had to promise significant 
financial support and access to technology.  On one side developed countries would 
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take the first steps to reduce GHG emissions.637 Under the Kyoto Protocol, they would 
move towards low-carbon or carbon-free economies, while, through flexibility 
mechanisms such as the Clean Development Mechanism638, they received credits for 
emissions they helped to reduce in developing countries. These and other mechanisms 
were meant to enable technology transfer to create endogenous capacity in developing 
countries to mitigate and adapt to climate change.639  Thus, carbon leakage, i.e., the 
shifting of polluting carbon-inefficient industries from developed to developing 
countries, would be avoided.   
In addition, developed countries would provide financial and technical 
assistance to developing countries to build capacities to adapt to the negative impacts of 
climate change.  Developed countries would demonstrate to developing countries the 
techniques and policies necessary to achieve GHG emissions reductions while 
maintaining economic growth. Demonstration of this fact, in addition to the 
technologies developed to enable success would ensure that developing countries were 
in a position to act to reduce their emissions.  
A key justification for this two-phase process is the concept of historical 
responsibility. Historical responsibility640 is based on the idea that impacts of climate 
change as they are felt in the present day and near future are due to the cumulative 
historic emissions created by developed countries during their industrialization 
processes and that, under the ‘polluter pays’ principle, they have the responsibility to act 
first and bear the burden of the cost of action.641 As the earth moves closer to the 
period of time when the emissions of emerging and newly developed countries will 
begin to have an impact, the burden of responsibility will begin to be shared more in 
line with their increased contribution and their share of the impacts.  Historical 
responsibility addresses the issue of sequencing as well as the share of the total burden 
of the cost of action.  In both cases, the concept requires that developed countries bear 
the greatest share and the responsibility to act first and most.  Out of this arose the 
principle in the UNFCCC that all states have a common responsibility to act but these 
responsibilities are differentiated in scale and timing by the historical responsibility of 
developed countries who should act first, as embodied by the first commitment period 
(2008 – 2012) for Annex 1 countries under the Kyoto Protocol. 
While these principles have been expressed in the treaty language and in 
quantitative emissions reduction commitments, their implementation has been an arena 
of contestation between developed and developing countries in the UNFCCC. Much of 
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the conflict has centered on the provision of financial support and access to technology. 
At least one state, the United States of America, has consistently objected to this 
framework642 and has refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.  
This conflict finally spilled over during the Bali Conference of the Parties 
(COP) in December 2007, and lay behind the refusal of developing countries to agree to 
negotiations for any new commitment period or new agreement that included 
developing country emissions reduction commitments. 643   The compromise in Bali 
created two working groups, one focused on developed country commitments under the 
Kyoto protocol’s second commitment period (the Ad hoc Working Group on the 
Kyoto Protocol - AWGKP, and the other to discuss further implementation of the 
UNFCCC, under which further action on technology, financial support and developing 
country mitigation action would take place (the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long Term 
Cooperative Action - AWGLCA).644 
Developments at the UNFCCC since Bali are crucial to understanding why 
there is increasing urgency to address the issue of intellectual property (IP) and 
technology transfer to address climate change. The proliferation of bodies and working 
groups is symptomatic of the ongoing conflict over whether intellectual property should 
be on the agenda, in which bodies it should be addressed and how to address it.  An 
understanding of the ways that the UNFCCC may be able to respond to IP and 
technology transfer requires an understanding of the structures and dynamics of the 
processes in place at the UNFCCC to implement technology transfer. 
 
II. BACKGROUND: THE MULTILATERAL FRAMEWORK ON TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
 
From an economic development perspective, international transfer of 
technologies can be a significant factor in promoting growth. In economies with 
significant access to private capital and significant purchasing power, technology is 
developed through market mechanisms, such as intellectual property (IP). Technology is 
owned by private actors and distributed through licensing or purchasing arrangements 
between private actors. However, where technology is held through IP, rightholders are 
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primarily interested in selling their knowledge and technology at a certain price in a 
market with sufficient purchasing power where their technologies are not likely to be 
imitated and where IP enforcements is strong. The weakness in many developing 
countries is threefold: they do not present sufficient markets for private actors to 
develop technologies to serve their needs; where technologies exist and are protected by 
IP, they may not present sufficient markets for rightholders to sell or license their 
technologies; they have, or are perceived as having, low protection and enforcement of 
intellectual property.  In such an environment, the need for technology is not met with 
an appropriate market response. Therefore, other options become necessary, such as the 
creation of domestic mechanisms to require technology sharing and establishing legal 
obligations at the international level to transfer technology from developed to 
developing countries. The history of the debate on intellectual property and technology 
transfer in international policy-making is one of increasing restrictions on the ability to 
apply domestic mechanisms to compel technology sharing, accompanied by expansive 
promises from developed countries to provide technology transfer.   
II.1. Evolution of the Multilateral Framework on Technology Transfer 
As soon as the majority of developing countries became part of the 
international economic system in the 1960’s and 1970s, access to technology to aid in 
economic development was one of their core demands.  The 1970’s saw the peak of the 
effort by developing countries to refashion the global economic order into one that was 
more accommodating to the needs of developing countries.  As a response to the 
dominance of the Bretton Woods Institutions (the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund and the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs) and the investment 
regimes, developing countries proposed a New International Economic Order 
(NIEO)645 based on the UN General Assembly principle of “one state, one vote”, and 
on the historical obligations of developed states (especially former colonial rulers) to 
assist developing countries to develop and industrialize with complete freedom in the 
use of regulatory and policy tools.  Much of the conceptual work under this project was 
carried out at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).   
Technology transfer was a key demand of the NIEO646, and the UNCTAD discussions 
created a pattern of debate that has persisted into the present day.  As John Barton 
notes, this was a concept of technology transfer premised on a foreign direct investment 
model, with a firm from a developed country investing in capital stock and locating in a 
developing country, under which the contract established by the firm restricted the 
transfer of knowledge to local partners, or engaged in restricted licensing practices.647 
The driver for developing countries was that they wished to establish local content, 
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technology transfer and/or performance requirements for these investments such that 
technology would be transferred and that companies would be mandated to share 
knowledge or to lower the cost of accessing such knowledge.  In this context, 
technology transfer discussions became a debate about what actions developing states 
should take and what obligations developed states had, not just to allow developing 
countries to take steps to access technology, but to provide financial and other support 
to access such technologies.  In the realm of intellectual property, developing countries 
sought to provide less extensive protection to technologies created in developed 
countries by excluding certain products from being patented (e.g. pharmaceutical and 
agricultural products) and using regulatory tools such as working requirements that 
meant that patented products actually had to be produced domestically to continue to 
qualify for continued patent protection. 
A major indicator of the end of the NIEO was the failure to come to 
agreement on the UNCTAD International Code of Conduct for Transfer of 
Technology, which would have created common ground on definitions and mechanisms 
that would be acceptable to both developed and developing countries.648  The 1985 
Draft addresses IP licensing practices in Chapter 4 and special treatment for developing 
countries in Chapter 6. Chapter 1 contained definitions which were relatively 
uncontroversial. 649  Chapter 4 proved the most controversial and difficult chapter, 
precisely because it included language on intellectual property and remained largely 
bracketed and under discussion.650  The impasse moved the main focus of discussion to 
other venues where the bargaining power of developed countries ensured that the 
framing of IP and technology transfer issues worked more in their favor.651 
 In the intellectual property arena, an increased focus on intellectual property 
protection from developed country producers saw the increased use of unilateral 
measures such as “Special 301”652 used by the US Trade Representative to list countries 
and threaten them with the withdrawal of preferential trade access if the US unilaterally 
determined that they had not met US standards for IP protection and enforcement.  
The movement towards increased restrictions culminated, temporarily, in 1995 with the 
signing of the TRIPS Agreement as a covered agreement under the WTO and subject to 
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the new Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).653  TRIPS required the vast majority 
of developing countries to provide intellectual property protection for products and 
processes in all technological fields and to redefine working requirements to include 
such things as sale of products in the market. 654   Technology transfer remains an 
objective of the TRIPS Agreement but it only contains a single obligation, in Article 
66.2, for developed country governments to promote incentives for their private actors 
to transfer technologies.  Despite the establishment of a reporting procedure, transfer of 
technology under this provision is widely viewed as inadequate by most observers.655 
Developing countries, however, continued to pursue the aim of technology transfer in 
other fora where they perceived they would have more leverage, including Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements. 
 
II.2. Technology Transfer in Multilateral Environmental Agreements 
As the trade discussions shifted away from the inclusion of technology transfer 
provisions for developing countries in trade and other international economic 
arrangements, technology transfer provisions became pivotal elements of the increasing 
number of Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) that were concluded in the 
period following the 1972 UN Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment.656  
Many of these agreements were aimed at dealing with global problems whose 
causes and effects crossed borders and that could not be addressed through unilateral 
action. In general, these new agreements required that countries either take on costs in 
implementing environmental standards or that that they forgo certain activities or 
products for the common good.  The direct and indirect costs of such agreements, 
especially for decelerating or worsening their economic development prospects have 
always been at the forefront of negotiating concerns for developing countries in these 
fora. While the international environmental system is premised on the concept of 
sustainable development 657  i.e. it is both possible and desirable to have economic 
development that is not environmentally negative and may actually accelerate 
development, the costs of shifting or adjustment have been considered a barrier by 
developing countries to their full participation in MEAs.  MEAs don’t just present the 
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classic collective action problem, however.  An emerging pattern in MEAs was that 
significant global problems such as cross border pollution by power plants creating acid 
rain, and ozone depletion, or deforestation were intimately linked with historical and 
continuing production and consumption patterns by developed countries. Action to 
address these problems required developing countries to forgo production and 
consumption pathways from which developed countries had already benefited.  Such 
patterns continuously raised issues of fairness, justice, equity and historical responsibility, 
issues that may have reached their apotheosis in the climate change negotiations. 
One of the ways that developing countries sought to address the issue of 
adjustment costs and equity, was to gain assurances that they would be assisted 
financially with any adjustment costs, and that they would be provided with the best 
available technologies, at grant or concessional terms, in making the adjustments 
required by the MEA. For example, there is strong evidence that India joined the 
Montreal Protocol658 precisely on the understanding that alternative technologies would 
be made available on grant or concessional terms, and the Multilateral Fund was 
replenished at the time with this precise aim in mind.659 
The demand for technology transfer has remained one of the strongest 
bargaining chips for convincing developing countries to participate in MEAs, but it has 
also remained, except for the notable exception of the Montreal Protocol660, the one 
that has been perceived to be the least fulfilled element of such MEAs. 
Almost all MEAs include some provision on Technology Transfer. These include: 
- United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
o Article 144 on Technology Transfer 
 
- Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 
o Article 10A on Transfer of Technology in conjunction with the 
financial mechanism set up under Article 10. 
 
- Convention on Biological Diversity 
o Article 16 
 
- Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity 
o Article 22 on Capacity-Building 
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- Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents 
o Article 16 on Exchange of Technology 
 
- United Nations Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long Range 
Transboundary Air Pollution on Further Reduction of Sulphur Emissions 
o Article 3 on Exchange of Technology 
 
The extent to which technology is available at ‘reasonable’ cost appears to have 
a strong correlation to how effectively and to what extent developing countries 
implement the aims of an MEA.661 While the principle of incremental costs has become 
increasingly prevalent in determining the exact coverage of costs, it has not always been 
clear whether such a definition covered the costs of patent licensing and or purchases. 
Even in the context of the Montreal Protocol Multilateral Fund, such costs were not 
always covered under the definition, despite there being at least a nominal commitment 
to do so.662 In addition, there may have been impediments related to the limitations the 
Fund placed on such financing by limiting the number of licenses it would pay for per 
technology substitute per country.663 Finally, the Fund would not provide financing for 
R&D efforts to develop indigenously developed alternative technologies, as a substitute 
for licensing, where such licensing costs were perceived as too high.664 
Technology transfer provisions in MEAs vary in their comprehensiveness, and 
it is not the aim of this chapter to analyze or discuss the relative failure and success of 
each agreement with respect to technology transfer.  It suffices to note that, in general, 
developing countries have expressed significant disappointments with the nature, speed, 
and scale of technology transfer that has occurred under almost all of these MEAs. 
Developed country insistence on increased protection of intellectual property has come 
to be seen by many developing countries as either emblematic of this failure, or the key 
reason why technology transfer has not occurred to any significant level. 
It is this pattern of negotiation, adoption and failure to fulfill technology 
transfer provisions that was essentially imported into the climate change negotiations 
and has contributed to the significant frustration expressed by developing countries in 
the UNFCCC negotiations.  This has been exacerbated in the climate negotiations by 
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the sense that, even more than in other environmental arenas, the climate crisis is one 
for which the historical responsibility of developed countries is clearest and most urgent.  
 
III. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN THE UNFCCC 
 
Against the background of this debate and the negotiation of frameworks such 
as the TRIPS Agreement, the UNFCCC was concluded at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit 
to achieve the stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a low 
enough level to prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system.665  The TRIPS Agreement was concluded 3 years later in 1995.  Intellectual 
property issues were relative latecomers in the context of the WTO Agreement and are 
not mentioned in any way in the UNFCCC Agreement itself.  However, since the 
inception of the UNFCCC, technology transfer has been expected to play a significant 
role in achieving the treaty’s objective and this has been built into the structure of the 
agreement. 
III.1. The Legal Basis for Technology Transfer Obligations in the Climate 
Change Regime 
Technology transfer is addressed in Article 4 of the UNFCCC. This provision 
covers a range of issues, including financing, transfer and commitments.  Notably, 
Article 4.7 links the ability of developing country Parties to fulfill their commitments 
under the UNFCCC to the effective implementation of developed country Parties 
fulfilling their commitments, particularly finance and technology transfer. 
The extent to which developing country Parties will effectively 
implement their commitments under the Convention will depend on 
the effective implementation by developed country Parties of their 
commitments under the Convention related to financial resources 
and transfer of technology (my emphasis) and will take fully into 
account that economic and social development and poverty 
eradication are the first and overriding priorities of the developing 
country Parties. 
Further, while the convention provides for the diffusion of technologies 
amongst all Parties, the key provision for transfer of technology from Annex II to 
developing countries is Article 4.5: 
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The developed country Parties and other developed Parties included 
in Annex II shall take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate 
and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, 
environmentally sound technologies and know-how to other Parties, 
particularly developing country Parties, to enable them to implement 
the provisions of the Convention. In this process, the developed 
country Parties shall support the development and enhancement 
of endogenous capacities and technologies of developing 
country Parties. Other Parties and organizations in a position to do 
so may also assist in facilitating the transfer of such technologies. (my 
emphases) 
Article 4.1 addresses the diffusion of technologies amongst all Parties: 
All Parties, taking into account their common but 
differentiated responsibilities and their specific national and 
regional development priorities, objectives and circumstances, 
shall: 
[...] 
 (c) Promote and cooperate in the development, application 
and diffusion, including transfer, of  technologies, practices 
and processes that control, reduce or prevent anthropogenic 
emissions of  greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal 
Protocol in all relevant sectors, including the energy,  transport, 
industry, agriculture, forestry and waste management sectors; 
[...] 
(h) Promote and cooperate in the full, open and prompt exchange of 
relevant scientific, technological, technical, socio-economic and legal 
information related to the climate system and climate change, and to the 
economic and social consequences of various response strategies; 
[...](my emphasis) 
 
Finally, Article 4.3 addresses the financing of technologies: 
The developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in 
Annex II shall provide new and additional financial resources to 
meet the agreed full costs incurred by developing country Parties in 
complying with their obligations under Article 12, paragraph 1. They shall 
also provide such financial resources, including for the transfer of 
technology, needed by the developing countries . . . (my emphasis) 
 
The Kyoto Protocol directly addresses the transfer of technology in Article 10(c), which 
requires all Parties to:  
 160 
 
Cooperate in the promotion of effective modalities for the development, 
application and diffusion of, and take all possible steps to promote, facilitate 
and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, environmentally 
sound technologies, know-how, practices and processes pertinent to climate 
change, in particular to developing countries, including the formulation of 
policies and programmes for the effective transfer of environmentally sound 
technologies that are publicly owned or in the public domain and the creation 
of an enabling environment for the private sector, to promote and enhance the 
transfer of, and access to, environmentally sound technologies. 
 
The Kyoto Protocol also established the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM).666  
The legal framework described above appears to have very clearly chosen a 
specific pathway for implementing the principle of historical responsibility and common 
but differentiated responsibility.  Historical responsibility is primarily about two issues: 
sequencing of GHG reduction actions; and proportion and burden of GHG reductions. 
On sequencing, UNFCCC Article 4.7 directly expresses the underlying principle of 
historical responsibility.  
Article 4.5 outlines the burden sharing between developed and developing 
countries when it comes to technology transfer. The responsibility is on developed 
countries in Annex II to provide technology transfer.  Article 4.3 specifies the exact 
nature of that commitment which is to provide financial resources to cover “the agreed 
full incremental costs of implementing measures that are covered by paragraph 1 of this 
Article and that are agreed between a developing country Party and the international 
entity or entities referred to in Article 11, in accordance with that Article.” While clearly 
establishing that costs of action should be borne by developed countries, but specifically 
only where agreed to between developed and developing countries, the article leaves the 
decision of exactly what should be covered under such costs to a later date. It is less 
clear whether or not the funds envisioned cover such issues as the costs of accessing 
licenses for IP.  What should be covered under the “agreed full incremental costs” 
remains difficult to determine. With respect to “incremental” the difficulty revolves 
around the concept of additionality, i.e. whether all activities should be funded or only 
those activities that would not have otherwise occurred without the funding.  The 
operating definition used by the World Bank’s Global Environment Facility (GEF) is 
one where the GEF funds “additional costs associated with transforming a project with 
national benefits into one with global environmental benefits.[…] GEF grants cover the 
difference or "increment" between a less costly, more polluting option and a costlier, 
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more environmentally friendly option.” 667   The GEF has operated as the primary 
funding mechanism for technology activities, in the absence of any implementing and 
financing mechanism within the UNFCCC itself. Projects have historically had to 
conform to the GEF’s application and project based approach to meeting technology 
needs which are established through the World Bank’s processes rather than as a 
function of the legal obligation set up by the UNFCCC.   To the extent that new 
UNFCCC implementing structures are in place in the post-Kyoto framework, decisions 
such as this may be revisited. 
Nothing in the UNFCCC or the Kyoto Protocol provides an enforcement 
structure for delivery of technology transfer. In particular, while the Kyoto Protocol sets 
up an elaborate procedure for measuring, reporting and verifying when countries have 
met their GHG reductions commitments, with sanctions for failures to achieve targets, 
there is nothing close to comparable for technology transfer obligations.  In fact, there 
are not even any mechanisms for measuring the extent of technology transfer that might 
take place. There has been no agreement on what indicators might be used, although, as 
discussed below, work on indicators by the Expert Group on Technology Transfer 
(EGTT) was completed, but not adopted by the Subsidiary Body on Implementation 
(SBI) or the Conference of the Parties (COP) into the reporting structure of national 
communications.  The reporting structure is primarily limited to national 
communications, but as discussed again below, there has been no agreement on how 
such reporting on technology transfer should take place. There is no system for 
verification of any claimed transfer of technology, another issue that is endemic to all 
the structures within the UNFCCC framework, including the CDM, as will be discussed 
below. 
IV. IMPLEMENTING STRUCTURES FOR TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER WITHIN THE UNFCCC668 
 
While the Conference of the Parties (COP) is the “supreme body of the 
Convention”669 technology transfer is specifically addressed in two subsidiary bodies:  
- the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA), 
which supports the work of the COP on “matters of science, technology, and 
methodology, including guidelines for improving standards of national 
communications and emission inventories”670 ; and  
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- the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI), which supports the COP in 
assessing and reviewing implementation, “for instance by analyzing national 
communications submitted by Parties. It also deals with financial and 
administrative matters.”671 After the Bali Decisions, it also had responsibility 
for monitoring the Expert Group on Technology Transfer (EGTT). 
Other key bodies were also set up and played a significant role in determining the 
content and trajectory of the debate on technology transfer in the UNFCCC and 
through what structures it should be implemented. The next few sections describe these 
bodies and their contributions and evaluates the extent to which they have been 
effective mechanisms for technology transfer. 
IV.1 The Expert Group on Technology Transfer 
Prior to the Cancun Agreements of December 2010, the key UNFCCC body 
for technology transfer was the Expert Group on Technology Transfer (EGTT), 
which was established with “the objective of enhancing the implementation of Article 4, 
paragraph 5, of the convention, including, inter alia, by analyzing and identifying ways to 
facilitating and advance technology transfer activities and making recommendations to 
the Subsidiary Body on Scientific and Technological Advice.” 672   It never had an 
implementation mandate as was made clear by ensuring that it reported to the advisory 
body of the SBSTA rather than the implementation body of the SBI.  Thus, as a 
mechanism for delivering technology transfer the EGTT cannot be considered to have 
played much of a role beyond providing technical assessments and research.   
As part of the Marrakesh Accords, the COP 7 identified five “key themes” for 
meaningful and effective actions to enhance the implementation of Article 4.5 of the 
Convention.  The 5 themes were: 
(i) Technology needs & needs assessments 
(ii) Technology information 
(iii) Enabling environments 
(iv) Capacity building 
(v) Mechanisms for technology transfer 
 
This framework focused on creating conditions in developing countries to 
encourage technology transfer. In terms of implementation the themes were structured 
as below: 
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1. Technology Needs assessment 
a. This meant that developing countries agreed to engage in exercises 
to produce technology needs assessments, so as to identify 
specific technologies that they would seek to have supported 
under the Article 4.1(c), 4.3 and 4.5 framework.  Crucially, 
however, conduct or completion of the TNA was not linked in 
any way to provision of funding for actual delivery of the 
technologies identified. 
2. Technology information  
a. This was aimed at providing further information on technology 
for both developed and developing country actors.  This was 
primarily implemented through TT:CLEAR, an online 
information platform. The secretariat developed TT:CLEAR to 
support the Parties’ efforts to focus on the adoption of 
environmentally friendly technologies. 673   TT:CLEAR is a 
technology information system that includes an inventory of 
environmentally-friendly technologies and projects.674 The use of 
TT:CLEAR is organized under the same key themes that guided 
the work of the EGTT.   
b. While ambitious in scope, it is also evident that TT:CLEAR was 
never anywhere close to operating the way it was envisioned, let 
alone in achieving the goal of enabling technology transfer. 
3. Enabling Environments 
a. This work programme looked at conditions, primarily in 
developing countries, and sought to develop best practices for 
encouraging technology transfer. It is within this context that 
many debates and discussion on intellectual property arose, 
primarily on whether it encouraged or posed a barrier to 
technology transfer.  It was also here that the debate as to where 
action should take place, in developing countries or in developed 
countries, continued. 
4. Capacity Building 
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a. This was primarily addressed through research and policy papers 
discussing best practices.  
5. Mechanisms for technology transfer 
a. This was again addressed primarily through research and policy 
work aimed at discussing best practices. 
In a 2006 report, the EGTT reviewed implementation of technology transfer 
within this framework: 
Technology needs & needs assessments – the EGTT found that many countries had not taken 
the opportunity to conduct TNAs. In 2006, only 23 had been conducted, despite the 
availability of a handbook on how to conduct TNAs.  The report noted that there was 
financing from various sources available for conducting TNAs (the GEF, the UNDP) 
but that once TNAs were  completed there was little information or guidance on how to 
turn the results of TNAs into projects that could be funded by international financial 
institutions or other funders.675  By 2006, it had become clear that TNAs were a useful 
first step but that these remained separated from any commitments to provide finance 
to meet the identified needs.  Project proposals would still need to be made and funds 
sought from various multilateral and bilateral funders, something which seemed to 
suggest that the effort of doing TNAs would not pay off. Funding required multiple 
applications to funders with different application requirements.  The report did not 
evaluate what the success rate of projects constructed from TNAs might be, but the 
EGTT clearly saw a need to create another handbook on how to turn TNAs into 
projects that could be funded. In addition, TNAs were seen to be the responsibility of 
recipient countries and were unconnected to any action by developed countries. The 
project application process also ensured that a donor-recipient relationship was 
maintained despite the fact that Article 4.5 established obligations to be met by 
developed countries. TNAs are considered to have largely failed as vehicles for enabling 
technology transfer.676 
Technology information – on Technology Information, the EGTT noted the development 
and implementation of the TT:CLEAR clearing house hosted by the secretariat.  The 
EGTT positively noted the results of a user survey and also noted moves to integrate 
TT: CLEAR with regional clearing houses and databases.  However, the EGTT noted 
that staffing and resources were inadequate for the database, and that developing 
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country users especially found it difficult to use.677  More generally, TT: CLEAR was 
limited by failures of execution.  It was not until 2009 that it was searchable by 
technologies and went beyond basic data on projects.  As it stands, it is unable to 
function as a tool for connecting technology providers and users, nor for providing a 
platform for managing licensing issues or linking to funding processes. 
Enabling environments– as discussed above, the EGTT noted that there was insufficient 
information on governments’ own actions to assess their progress on the enabling 
environments section. However, the EGTT itself pursued some further work on this, 
producing several technical papers on policies and regulations that could encourage and 
enable technology transfer. On intellectual property rights, a technical paper678 noted: 
Past experience with IPRs and implementing the Montreal Protocol shows that 
where an alternative (non-ozone-depleting substance) exists, is easily accessible, 
commercially viable and not covered by IPRs, the transition has been smooth.  
On the other hand, sectors where the technology or processes are under IPRs 
held by only a few technology suppliers, the experience with technology 
switchover has been negative.679 
The note also pointed to limited and mixed empirical evidence on the role of 
IPRs in either encouraging or limiting technology transfer.680 With respect to the debate, 
the note described opposing viewpoints on the part of developing and developed 
countries. The paper discussed the view of developed countries that there was little role 
for ‘push’ factors as technologies were held in private hands, emphasizing host country 
or ‘pull’ factors. The paper noted a reluctance on the part of developed countries to 
exercise any “leverage” over their private actors.681 
  Under the enabling environments theme the EGTT also worked on an 
informal paper, produced with funding from the US based Climate Technology 
Initiative (CTI) on the role of IPRs and publicly funded technologies. That paper, while 
a useful description of the policy choice made by many countries to subsidize and 
transfer ownership of publicly funded research and development into private hands, 
does not address what policies and measures could be put in place to ensure more 
public access to such technologies.682 
                                                        
 
677 p12, EGTT 2006. 
678 “Technical paper on enabling environments for technology transfer” FCCC/TP/2003/2. 
679 Para 36, Id. 
680 Para 35, Id. 
681 Para 8, Id. 
682 EGTT “Overview of IPR Practices for Publicly-funded Technologies” Informal paper, EGTT 2005. 
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The EGTT also noted many significant barriers in this section of work including:683 
- Insufficient public grants and difficulties faced by developing countries in 
accessing risk capital and flexible loans from international financial institutions 
(IFIs) to support technology transfer projects; 
- Limited private sector investment due to the absence of robust risk shields 
caused by inadequate policy and market framework conditions for the 
development and transfer of technologies; 
The EGTT noted that the enabling environments theme required the most work to 
meet its stated goals.684 
At Bali, in Decision 3/CP.13 para. 1 the parties agreed that the 5 themes (as 
contained in the annex to decision 4/CP.7) “continue to provide a solid basis for 
enhancing the implementation of Art. 4, para. 5 of the Convention.”685 
The EGTT made recommendations to both the SBI and the SBSTA after 
Bali.686 The SBI was tasked with monitoring the work of the EGTT, so as to ensure that 
the EGTT itself did not take up implementation. 
The Bali COP made technology an important element in the discussions 
regarding future long-term cooperative actions to address climate change. Paragraph 
1(d) of the Bali Plan of Action focused on “enhanced action in technology development 
and transfer”. The parties agreed that the work of the Bali Plan of Action was to be 
carried out by the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action 
(AWGLCA) which was meant to complete its work by 2009 in Copenhagen at COP 15.  
EGTT Work Programme 
In the EGTT, work ostensibly progressed on the five themes, especially with 
respect to Technological Needs Assessments (TNAs).  The EGTT was responsible for 
                                                        
 
683 p14, EGTT “Recommendations of the Expert Group on Technology Transfer for enhancing the 
implementation of the framework for meaningful and effective actions to enhance the implementation 
of Article 4, paragraph 5, of the Convention” FCCC/SBSTA/2006/INF.4, UNFCCC 2006. 
684 Id. 
685 “Development and transfer of technologies under the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological 
Advice”, Decision 3/CP.13, UN FCCC, 13th Sess., U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 
686 Para. 1, Id. 
 167 
 
helping to implement TNAs687  by working with non-Annex II countries on writing 
proposals for financial support for technology transfer projects.688  
There was significantly less work with respect to enabling environments, 
capacity-building for technology transfer, and, especially, mechanisms for technology 
transfer. Significant dissatisfaction with its purely advisory role led to the demand for a 
fully-fledged implementation mechanism within the UNFCCC itself. This led to the 
establishment of the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and the Climate 
Technology Centre and Network (CTC&N) under the 2010 Cancun Agreements. The 
establishment of the TEC was accompanied by the termination of the mandate of the 
EGTT.689 
 
 IV.2 The Clean Development Mechanism  
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is one of three flexibility 
mechanisms established by the Kyoto Protocol690  designed as a mechanism to prevent 
carbon leakage and enable Annex 1 countries to meet a portion of their quantitative 
emission reduction obligations by reducing emissions in non-Annex 1 countries.  While 
it is not explicitly a technology transfer vehicle, it has been seen as a vector through 
which market-based technology transfer could occur.691 That hope has not been borne 
out and this is due to both structural design factors as well as the realities of the market 
in emissions reduction credits.   
With respect to technology transfer, the CDM does not and has never had a 
mandate as a mechanism for fulfilling the obligations under article 4.1(c), 4.3 and 4.5. It 
was meant to be additional to those.  It was not a structure that was related to the 
implementation mandate of the SBI and had no formal relationship in terms of policy or 
institutional linkages to the EGTT.  Structurally, the CDM’s aim is not primarily aimed 
at assisting developing countries carry out their obligations under Article 4 of the 
UNFCCC; in fact it was primarily designed as a mechanism to assist developed 
countries meet their obligations on emissions reductions and was an alternative to 
                                                        
 
687 UNFCCC “Terms of reference of the Expert Group on Technology Transfer”, in “Development and 
transfer of technologies under the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice”, Decision 
3/CP.13, UN FCCC, 13th Sess., U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 at Annex II subpara. 3(b). 
688 UNFCCC “Recommendations for enhancing the implementation of the framework for meaningful and 
effective action to enhance the implementation of Article 4, paragraph 5, of the Convention”, in 
“Development and transfer of technologies under the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological 
Advice”, Decision 3/CP.13, UN FCCC, 13th Sess., U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 at Annex 1, subpara. 
17(a).  
689 Section IV.B, Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its sixteenth session, 
FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1. 
690 Article 12, Kyoto Protocol 
691 UNFCCC “The Contribution of the Clean Development Mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol to 
Technology Transfer” UNFCCC 2010. 
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inclusion of developing countries in the Joint Implementation mechanism.692  While 
sustainable development is part of the aim of Article 12(2) of the Kyoto protocol, the 
actual implementation structure of the CDM emphasizes assisting Annex 1 countries in 
meeting their GHG emissions reduction commitments. That means that the 
mechanisms for selection of projects and programmes to be carried out, the decisions 
on when and which activities would be supported largely lie with actors in developed 
countries.  The need for credits would be determined by the extent to which domestic 
reductions in Annex 1 countries were insufficient to meet their commitments under the 
Kyoto Protocol. In terms of design, therefore, the CDM was essentially an FDI vehicle, 
where firms in developed countries would engage in projects in developing countries 
aimed at generating emissions reduction credits, with the limits and strength relating to 
technology transfer that FDI normally has in relation to technology transfer.693 Much of 
the literature points to the conclusion that left to its own devices, the CDM has not 
been an effective tool for meeting sustainable development goals of developing 
countries more broadly,694 although the evidence for some technology transfer may be a 
little stronger. The issue is that unlike much traditional FDI which has a long term 
component, especially for establishment of manufacturing or service centers 695 , the 
project selection structure in the CDM has favoured one-time joint venture type 
structures with specific time limits that would generate credits at the lowest cost within a 
short time horizon of 2 – 4 years.696  This means that the kind of interactive learning 
and repeat play scenarios that theoretically have most the impact on learning by a host 
firm may not be as prevalent in CDM projects.697  In fact, a finding by Doranova 
                                                        
 
692 See p51, Sutter, C “Sustainability Check-Up for CDM projects” Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, Berlin (2003). 
693 See Werksman, J, K Baumert and N Dubash, Will international investment rules obstruct climate 
protection policies?, Climate Notes, World Resources Institute, Washington, April 2001; p19, Cosbey, A et 
al. “Realizing the Development Dividend: Making the CDM Work for Developing Countries - Phase 1 
Report” Pre-Publication version, International Institute for Sustainable Development (2005). Concurring, 
See p6, Doranova, A Technology Transfer and Learning under The Kyoto Regime:  Exploring the 
Technological Impact of CDM Projects In Developing Countries PhD Thesis UNU-Merit, Maastricht 
University. p20, Ellis, J et al. “CDM: Taking stock and looking forward” 35 Energy Policy 15 (2007); p9, 
Niederberger, A and R Saner “Exploring the relationship between FDI flows and CDM potential” 14(1) 
Transnational Corporations 1 (2005) but also cautioning against too simplistic an assumption the CDM 
flows would align with existing FDI flows and patterns.  
694 See e.g. Olsen, K H “The Clean Development Mechanism’s Contribution to Sustainable development: a 
review of the literature” 84 Climatic Change 59 (2007); Sutter, C and J C Parreno “Does the current clean 
development mechanism (CDM) deliver its sustainable development claim? An analysis of officially 
registered CDM projects”. 84 Climatic Change 75 (2007). 
695 See p10, Niederberger, A and R Saner “Exploring the relationship between FDI flows and CDM 
potential” 14(1) Transnational Corporations 1 (2005) citing definition from UNCTAD World Investment  
Report  2003.  FDI Policies  for  Development:    National  and  International  Perspectives  (Geneva: United 
Nations, 2003). 
696 See p23, Cosbey, A  et al. “Realizing the Development Dividend: Making the CDM Work for Developing 
Countries - Phase 1 Report” Pre-Publication version, International Institute for Sustainable Development 
(2005).; p24, Ellis, J et al. “CDM: Taking stock and looking forward” 35 Energy Policy 15 (2007). See also 
p2, Niederberger, A and R Saner “Exploring the relationship between FDI flows and CDM potential” 14(1) 
Transnational Corporations 1 (2005). 
697 See p115, Doranova, A Technology Transfer and Learning under The Kyoto Regime:  Exploring the 
Technological Impact of CDM Projects in Developing Countries PhD Thesis UNU-Merit, Maastricht 
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suggests that even within CDM projects, the intensity of interaction with technology 
providers (including training activities) does not have a significant impact on learning by 
host firms.698  This may be explained by the short time frame and structure of the deals 
constructed under the CDM which may not provide sufficient time for learning and 
building a knowledge base.  In fact, what had the most impact on learning was learning 
by doing, as host firms worked to understand, install and adapt the technology to their 
specific circumstances and internal technological knowledge level and culture.699   
The issue of limited scope and time for projects has been addressed to some 
extent by the adoption of so-called “programmatic” CDM 700 , aimed at allowing 
registration of sector-wide initiatives within which transformative activities can take 
place with ongoing periodic issuance of credits. It allows host parties to create a long-
term climate for investment in a particular sector, and provide a financial structure for 
supporting such investment.  The establishment of a second commitment period from 
2013 – 2020, may have helped to address this uncertainty inherited from the first 
commitment period, but is only going to be effective where a sufficient number of states 
agree to apply the Doha Amendment701 provisionally, while waiting for it to enter into 
force. To date, only 7 countries have deposited their instruments of ratification and 
none have agreed to provisional application. 702  The demand for credits has also 
decreased with the refusal of several major economies (Australia, Canada, Japan, New 
Zealand and the Russian Federation) to participate in the second commitment period, 
creating a potential structural over-supply of credit providers.  
Technology transfer is not a compulsory registration, validation or verification 
requirement for CDM projects and there exists no clear way to measure the extent of 
technology transferred under the CDM.  However, the new second commitment period 
guidelines for application of CDM projects do ask that, in Section A.3 (previously A.4.3) 
of the Project Design Document (PDD), which forms the basis for approval of 
registration and validation of the project, applicants “[d]escribe the technologies and 
measures to be employed and/or implemented by the project activity, including a list of 
                                                                                                                                   
 
University, for a thorough review of the literature on learning by interaction and learning by doing. See 
also p2932, Schneider, M et al. “Understanding the CDM’s contribution to technology transfer” 36 Energy 
Policy 2930 (2008). 
698 See p131-132, Doranova, A. Also potentially explained by the quality of the data collected which did 
not provide for information on the scope, nature and quality of the training. 
699 See p32, Id. 
700 “A voluntary coordinated action by a private or public entity which coordinates and implements any 
policy/measure or stated goal (i.e. incentive schemes and voluntary programmes), which leads to 
anthropogenic GHG emission reductions or net anthropogenic greenhouse gas removals by sinks that are 
additional to any that would occur in the absence of the PoA, via an unlimited number of CDM 
programme activities (CPAs).” CDM Glossary v.6 
701 Doha amendment to the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, signed Doha, 8 December 2012 (not yet in force) 
702 See http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/doha_amendment/items/7362.php (last visited 15 August 2014) 
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the facilities, systems and equipment that will be installed and/or modified by the 
project activity.”703 In addition they are asked to not provide: 
 
 “information that is not essential to understanding the purpose of 
the project activity and how it reduces GHG emissions. Information related to 
equipment, systems and measures that are auxiliary to the main scope of the 
project activity and do not affect directly or indirectly GHG emissions and/or 
mass and energy balances of the processes related to the project activity should 
not be included.”   
 
Applicants are asked to include a description of “how the technologies and 
measures and know-how to be used are transferred to the host Party(ies)” in contrast to 
the older formulation in previous guidelines applicable under the first commitment 
period of “how environmentally safe and sound technology, and know-how to be used, 
is transferred to the host Party(ies).’’  This section is now separate from section A.1 
where parties are asked to “[i]nclude a brief description of how the project activity 
contributes to sustainable development (not more than one page).”   It is not clear 
whether this represents a downgrading of the sustainable development objective of the 
CDM in the PDD or whether it aims to embed the technology transfer requirements 
more tightly into the additionality requirement.  What can clearly be seen is that the 
description of the technology is primarily limited to equipment and in no way addresses 
knowledge transfers or know-how, unlike the previous section A.4.3. On the other 
hand, this requirement of a statement as to the technology used is mandatory, and is 
required for a comparison to a baseline of existing facilities, systems and equipment.  
Any verification or validation should examine the claims on technology used in the 
project (defined as facilities, systems and equipment). We will discuss below whether 
this is actually the case.  There is no data on how the new guidelines and application 
forms are affecting the provision of information in the PDD since the issuance of these 
new guidelines was only effective from February 1, 2013. All the studies discussed below 
address the prior methodology. 
 
As we will see below, the fact that a large number of PDDs have included 
some description of technology transfer is an indication that applicants believe that 
providing such information may make their applications more likely to succeed.  This is 
clearly not due to the CDM validation process which is required before a CDM project 
can be registered/approved. The designated operational entities (DOE) (responsible for 
validation and verification) do not have a mandate and do not examine in any way, the 
claims related to technology transfer that are contained in the PDDs in Section A.3 of 
the new Guidelines and did not in respect of the old standards. There is no requirement 
that the DOE assess the sustainable development or technology transfer claims in the 
                                                        
 
703 Section A.3 Project Design Document, UNFCCC “Guidelines for Completing the Project Design 
Document Form” Annex 8, EB 66 Report. 
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PDD. The only extent to which the sustainable development measures are validated 
requires that704: 
 
- The DOE shall confirm that the [designated national authority] DNA has 
considered whether the proposed CDM project activity assists the host Party 
in achieving sustainable development.  
 
- The DOE shall determine whether the letter of approval by the DNA of the 
host Party confirms the contribution of the proposed CDM project activity to 
the sustainable development of the host Party.  
 
- The DOE shall state whether the host Party’s DNA has confirmed the 
contribution of the project to the sustainable development of the host Party. 
This may be reported together with the DOE’s assessment of the validity of 
the host Party’s approval.  
 
Thus even in the latest version of the CDM Standard for validation and 
verification, there is no real measure or assessment other than confirmation that the 
DNA has made their statement or consideration.  With respect to the claims of 
technology transfer in A.3, there is no validation step but there is a verification step 
which only requires that the DOE:705 
- Determine  whether  the  project  activity  has  been  implemented  and  
operated  as per  the  registered  PDD  or  any  approved  revised  PDD,  and  
that  all  physical features   (technology,   project   equipment,   and   
monitoring   and   metering equipment) of the project are in place; 
 
Verification does NOT address the claims of technology transfer in the existing 
standard for validation and verification. There is some indication that technology 
transfer may be assessed in the additionality criteria related to technology use and 
automatic additionality. In the PDD, where applicants have an option of providing a 
barrier analysis or an investment analysis to show additionality706, guidance from the 
CDM Executive Board707 provides that certain technology elements could form part of 
the barrier analysis, and would be part of the validation and verification process for 
assessing the issuance of credits.  Examples of these technological barrier elements are: 
                                                        
 
704 Section 7.8 “The Clean Development Mechanism Standard for Validation and Verification” Version 
03.0, CDM-EB65-A04-STAN, Available at: http://cdm.unfccc.int/Reference/Standards/accr_stan02.pdf 
(last visited 15 August 2014). 
705 Section 9.4 Id. 
706 Section B.5 Project Design Document, UNFCCC “Guidelines for Completing the Project Design 
Document Form” Annex 8, EB 66 Report. 
707 UNFCCC “Methodological Tool - Combined tool to identify the baseline scenario and demonstrate 
additionality (Version 04.0.0)” Annex 48, EB 66 Report. Available at: 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/methodologies/PAmethodologies/tools/am-tool-02-v4.0.0.pdf/history_view (last 
visited 15 August 2014). 
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1.  Skilled and/or properly trained labor to operate and maintain the technology 
is not available in the applicable geographical area, which leads to an 
unacceptably high risk of equipment disrepair, malfunctioning or other 
underperformance;  
2. Lack of infrastructure for implementation and logistics for maintenance of the 
technology (e.g. natural gas cannot be used because of the lack of a gas 
transmission and distribution network);  
3. Risk of technological failure: the process/technology failure risk in the local 
circumstances is significantly greater than for other technologies that provide 
services or outputs comparable to those of the proposed CDM project activity, 
as demonstrated by relevant scientific literature or technology manufacturer 
information;  
4. The particular technology used in the proposed project activity is not available 
in the applicable geographical area. 
 
While still very much considered part of the hard-headed assessment of 
additionality, the assessment of whether the technology itself is newly introduced to the 
geographic area is a possibility to be validated and verified.  In terms of skills and 
knowledge it largely relates to skills to maintain and operate the technology, but even 
that would be part of the validation process, where the barrier analysis is chosen.  
Parties can carry out a barrier analysis or an investment analysis or both, but only in the 
case of the barrier analysis may it be possible for the technology transfer of equipment 
per se and the minimal amount of training conducted to be subject to validation and 
verification. In terms of validation, the DOE must then determine708: 
- Whether the barriers are real 
- Whether barriers prevent the conclusion of this project but not the 
implementation of baseline alternatives to achieving the project. 
 
  To the extent that the use of such a barrier analysis is voluntary and the use of 
the technology elements is voluntary, it is difficult to argue that technology transfer 
might be assessed through an examination of compliance with the additionality criterion. 
Qualifying for additionality cannot be used as a proxy for technology transfer. 
 
An important to note here is that these requirements in the additionality 
standard are about utilization of technology within the project and require no other 
impact beyond the project.  It is entirely focused on the hardware except where the skills 
and labor to maintain and operate the hardware are relevant.  There is no question of 
capacity to replicate, adapt, use or effect beyond the confines of the project. 
 
                                                        
 
708 Section 72.12.12, UNFCCC, “Clean development mechanism validation and verification standard” 
CDM-EB65-A04-STAN 
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The presence of frequent descriptions of technology transfer in the PDD may 
be due to the other gatekeeping function in the project cycle; the task that is allocated to 
designated national authorities (DNAs) of host countries to state that the project 
contributes to sustainable development of the host country.709  However, the guidance 
for the DNAs provides little or no information on how they are to assess claims of 
technology transfer. In fact, it appears that the construction of these criteria is left 
entirely to the host party. To the extent that the level of technology transfer that would 
be required for such projects may seem to be entirely left to host parties what would 
then seem to be the question is whether countries have actually been doing this and if 
not, why not? TERI carried out a mapping of the criteria that CDM hosts have used.710 
Thirty DNAs were examined. The results suffer from a lack of access to data, especially 
from China, but tentatively, the report concluded that technology transfer was a 
consistent part of most of the criteria used by DNAs, although most requirements 
varied as to definitions and what was considered to contribute to technological 
development.711 Some of the criteria are: 
 
- Use of best available or not-substandard technologies (6 countries) 
- Use of locally appropriate technologies (3 countries) 
- Enabling development of indigenous technology (1 country) 
- Up take and Replication potential (3 countries) 
- Project specific capacity building and training (1 country) 
- Community level capacity building and training (2 countries) 
- Innovation compared to a domestic baseline (1 countries) 
- Transfer of knowledge (2 countries) 
 
Haites 712  outlines some requirements of DNAs, noting that China only 
recommends that a project transfer technology, but does not require it713; India, also is 
non-mandatory. Only Korea’s DNA has a mandatory requirement.714 At least one study 
suggests that Korea has a higher share of technology transfer in its projects than Brazil, 
India or China, but it is unclear whether this is due to the requirement or the fact that 
Korea has a significantly larger share of large-scale projects in its CDM mix, which tend 
to have more claims of technology transfer.715 An update from that study suggests that 
                                                        
 
709 UNFCCC “Clarification on elements of a written approval” UNFCCC-CCNUCC, EB 16, Annex 6, 
paragraph 1. Available at: http://cdm.unfccc.int/EB/016/eb16repan6.pdf (last visited 15 August 2014). 
710 Tewari, R “Mapping  of Criteria set by DNAs to Assess Sustainable development Benefits of CDM 
Projects” CDM Policy Dialogue, TERI (2012) 
711 See p8, Id. 
712 Haites, E et  al., “Technology Transfer by CDM Projects”, 6 Climate Policy 327 (2006).  
713 Wang argues that in fact China’s DNA tends to avoid assessing this requirement. Wang, B “Can CDM 
bring technology transfer to China?—An empirical study of technology transfer in China’s CDM projects” 
38 Energy Policy 2572(2010) 
714 p335, Haites, E et  al., “Technology Transfer by CDM Projects”, 6 Climate Policy 327 (2006). 
715 See Seres, S “Analysis of Technology Transfer in CDM Projects, prepared for UNFCCC Registration & 
Issuance Unit CDM/SDM”, Dec.  2008. 
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Brazil, India and China remain below the average in terms of claimed technology 
transfer while a list of countries including Korea (Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Uzbekistan), remain above 
average for technology transfer claims. The variation among countries relating to DNA 
requirements suggests that this may not be the primary explanatory factor for why these 
countries have higher claimed technology transfer.  However, it may also be that project 
size may not be fully explanatory either given the variation amongst these countries in 
terms of CDM project size.  
 
Other studies suggest that the requirements by DNAs appear to be 
insufficiently stringent to ensure sustainable development and there is significant 
variation in both attention, scope, and stringency.716  It is difficult to avoid the sense that 
the generation of credits is paramount in the DNA assessment, especially where these 
generate income from fees or taxes imposed by the host country.717 Structurally, the 
income generating element appears to dominate above the sustainable development 
considerations as the verification and issuance process only assesses the GHG emissions 
reduction of the project.718  There is also at least some argument that there is an actual 
structural trade-off between the sustainable development objective of the CDM and the 
GHG emissions reduction, given the emphasis on lowest possible cost emissions.719  
 
The studies suggest that, at the least, technology is a consideration for many 
DNAs, but not necessarily a requirement and it is to this that project applicants may be 
responding in including claims of technology transfer in their PDDs.  They may be 
assessing that there is greater likelihood of receiving a letter of approval by including 
such claims, and since it is seemingly costless to do so, there is an incentive to always 
include these where possible. In the absence of additional pro-active policies aimed at 
ensuring spillovers, it is not clear that the DNA gatekeeping function is sufficiently 
strong on its own to encourage technology transfer.  
 
The key explanation for the supposed lack of delivery on sustainable 
development objectives that has been well-documented in the literature is the supply 
and demand structure of the CDM: an over-supply of cheap CDM potential projects 
and a structurally lower demand leading to a race to the bottom. The concern is that 
while DNAs may emphasize sustainability criteria in the letter of approval process, they 
do so within an incentive structure that seeks to ensure rapid approval of such projects 
                                                        
 
716 See e.g. Sutter, C “Sustainability Check-Up for CDM projects” Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, Berlin (2003) 
p22, Cosbey, A  et al. “Realizing the Development Dividend: Making the CDM Work for Developing 
Countries - Phase 1 Report” Pre-Publication version, International Institute forSustainable Development 
(2005). 
717 As suggested by survey data in Cosbey, A et al.  
718 Concurring see p64, Sutter, C (2003). Also van der Gaast, W et al. “Promoting sustainable energy 
technology transfers to developing countries through the CDM” 86 Applied Energy 230 (2009).  
719 See p66, Sutter, C “Sustainability Check-Up for CDM projects” Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, Berlin (2003).  
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and issuance of certified emissions reductions rather than sustainability, and a 
disincentive to look closely at whether the claimed sustainable development benefits 
have ever materialized.720 
 
On the specific issue of whether CDM projects have delivered on technology 
transfer, to date several quantitative analyses have been attempted.721 All but a few of 
them have been unable to address the basic structural flaw at the heart of the CDM, 
which is that there is no internal mechanism to verify whether the claimed technology 
transfer in the PDD has taken place.  Given the gatekeeping function played by the 
DNAs and some evidence that technology benefits are a consideration for receiving 
letters of approval, there may be a systematic bias towards overstatement of technology 
transfer components of PDDs, in the safe knowledge that such claims may never be 
verified.  Unlike Dechezleprêtre et al., I do not conclude that this tendency to overstate 
would be randomly distributed.722 The role of the DNAs suggests that a tendency to 
overstate or over-include technology transfer is more likely to be a persistent structural 
feature of PDDs.   
  The majority of existing analyses measure the technology transfer claims723 
rather than project evaluations and outcomes.  This means that it is difficult to measure 
the contribution of the CDM to technology transfer in any reliable way.  At least one 
study, looking at sustainable development criteria also found it difficult, even within this 
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framework, to provide a meaningful distinction between those claims that used existing 
technology already available in the domestic market or through normal market 
purchases, and new hardware being introduced into the market; as well as technology 
know-how that was already available domestically versus technological know-how being 
introduced into the market.724 
 
Setting aside the methodological problems with relying on PDD data primarily, 
the studies suggest that some technology transfer does take place and that it takes place 
in only about third of projects sampled, a percentage that has stayed relatively stable 
over the group of studies.725 The type of claimed technology transfer has also stayed 
relatively the same.726 However, the frequency of claimed technology transfer in relation 
to emissions reduction has dropped727, something that may be attributable to an increase 
in the number of smaller projects and a drop in the number of larger projects. This is 
consistent with previous findings that existence and level of claimed technology transfer 
is positively correlated with the size of the project.728  This may be due to the fact that 
such large projects generally involve large capital outlays on hardware. In addition, such 
large projects tend to be end-of-pipe solutions 729  requiring one-time installation of 
equipment, and some training on operation and maintenance, including measurement. 
At least one study suggests that there is a significant positive correlation with the 
technological capacity of the country, however, that this is overshadowed by the number 
of similar CDM projects already having taken place.730 While this is interpreted by the 
study’s authors as evidence that the technologies are being diffused more widely into the 
economy rendering the need for further technology transfer less significant in repeated 
experiences in the same technology arena731, it is important to note an equally plausible 
explanation, given that the majority of claimed technology transfer relates to large 
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projects; that this reflects the build-up of capital stock that remains after a project has 
ended. For end-of-pipe solutions, the equipment simply remains installed once the 
project has been concluded and can therefore be moved from one installation to 
another if necessary. It may also reflect the declining availability of such easy low-
hanging fruit for generating emissions reductions so that other less obviously hardware 
reliant sectors play a greater part of the claimed technology transfer.732 This therefore 
does not mean that technology transfer is not needed, it may simply implicate the quality 
of the transfer (greater knowledge and capacity building) rather than the existence of 
transfer.733 
De Coninck et al. suggest that a significant majority of projects involving 
technology transfer, involve not just hardware but knowledge transfer as well, or 
knowledge transfer and capacity building alone. 734  Dechezleprêtre et al. and others 
provide support for this in their findings as well.735 However, the relatively generous 
definition of technology transfer used in this and other studies does not really address 
learning capacity and is overly and structurally biased to hardware purchases and 
imports. 736    All the PDD based empirical studies reflect that the majority of the 
knowledge and capacity building involved training local employees how to operate the 
machinery737, which does not quite reach to the definition used in this thesis: enabling 
the ability to adapt and replicate the technology, or key components thereof.  
A very few studies have attempted to look beyond the PDD data to try and 
determine the nature and scope of technology transfer. Doranova et al. look at a sample 
of host firms in Brazil, India, China and Mexico, and use survey data to look at the 
effects of several independent variables on the main dependent variable - Technological 
Capacity Building – disaggregated into sub-components: four related to operational 
capabilities; three  to  process  improvement  capabilities;  three  to  innovation 
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capabilities.738 Based on the survey data, the study finds that, where technology transfer 
takes place: 
1. Prior technological capacity means that CDM projects build basic 
technology capacity the most, and have the least effect on increasing high 
technological capacity.  This is in line with findings that most CDM 
projects primarily provide minimal training on how to operate and 
maintain hardware. 
2. Higher representation of high skilled engineers in the host firm has a 
positive effect on an increase in intermediate technological capability. 
3. Technological training increases high technology capacity. Lack of 
confidence in the other areas was explained by significant variance in what 
was considered ‘training’ in terms of content, duration etc. 
An earlier study by Doranova provides some details that further support some of 
the conclusions above.739 The questionnaire 740 used in that research allows for some 
drawing out of specific technology transfer issues with key questions such as the extent 
to which (on a 0 - 6 point scale) the CDM project experience improved or built the 
competence of the host firm in: 
1. Basic technological capacity 
a. Preventive maintenance - Revealing possible defects/Maintenance of 
machines/equipment on a regular basis 
b. Process quality control - Systematic independent control of the 
quality of the technological process 
c. Debugging - Removing defects, mistakes, breakages in the equipment 
d. Equipment adjustment - Adjustment of the equipment(s) to the local 
conditions, or to the particular technological lines/system 
2. Intermediate technological capacity 
a. Equipment stretching - Increase the scope of functions or 
productivity of the equipment. 
b. Efficiency - improvement  and cost  saving; Reducing cost, energy 
consumption of the equipment by keeping high  production level  
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c. Process adaptation - Adaptation of the technological process to local  
circumstances/ conditions/ changes 
3. Advanced technological capacity 
a. Basic process design - Engineering design of the technological 
process /technological line, inventions, with possible patenting 
b. Equipment design - Detailed design of the single equipment/ 
machine, inventions, with possible patenting  
c. Development of turnkey project/facility - Detailed design of a 
complete technological facility/ unit/ plant 
 
This presented an ideal survey dataset for revealing not only the extent to which 
host firms report technology was transferred, but establishing the quality of such 
transfer. It also presented an opportunity to assess the role of intellectual property 
generated within the project, although perhaps not the licensing structure.  The study 
also asked some key technology questions relating to: 
- The source (foreign or domestic) of the technology used in the project 
- Whether the technology was already available in the domestic market 
- Whether the technology was considered high technology or best available 
technology 
- What difficulties the firm had in adjusting and applying the technology 
- The type of firm providing the technology (MNE, SME, large, small, domestic 
or foreign) 
- Whether the provider was the parent company or some other relationship to 
the host firm 
- Whether the technology provider was the rightholder or licensor of the 
technology provided 
 
The survey results showed a clear conclusion that technological capability 
improved with experience in CDM projects, but did so most with basic technologies 
and least with advanced. However, the assessment on the 7 point scale for any category 
never went above 3.41, and most stayed below 2.741 To a significant extent, even where 
respondents reported increases in technological capacity, the response indicates that 
both the quality and impact was not very high.742  The short term nature of the projects 
may go some way to explaining the low impact scores, or it may be explained by a 
variable relating to whether the technologies transferred were high or best available 
technologies.  A significant part of the explanation, as Doranova points out, may also be 
related to the absorptive capacity of the host firm. Logically, low absorption capacity 
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explains a significant portion of the lack of impact. In this study, she finds that there is a 
positive relationship between higher prior technological capacity and increased 
technological capacity from CDM project participation but that it is strongest for 
building basic technological capacity and weakest for building advanced technological 
capacity.743 It is unclear what the role of other regulatory factors might be but where 
these are captured in the control variable “POLICY”744, this did not include level of 
intellectual property protection or innovation system policy, making it difficult to tease 
out what effect these may have had on the final outcome.   
 
Nevertheless, she makes some other interesting policy relevant findings. Firstly, 
joint ventures appear to do better on building technological capacity than wholly owned 
foreign subsidiaries which provided the least. Wholly owned domestic firms were in the 
middle between those two groups. 745  Secondly, that there was significant variation 
across technology sectors in terms of use of domestic or foreign technology.746 She 
notes in particular that hydro energy was based almost 80% on domestic technology or 
a mix of domestic and foreign, whereas, wind energy had a larger proportion of foreign 
technology. Other sectors presented too small a sample to come to any conclusions, but 
some of this variation may be due to specific country characteristics in the sample. For 
example, Brazil has a strong hydropower sector of its own747, whereas China and India 
both have strong solar sectors. Curiously, both India and China also have strong wind 
sectors, so the strong representation of foreign technology in wind seems to be related 
to either use in other countries, or use of larger turbine technologies which were not 
within Chinese and Indian market capabilities at the time of the projects.748  Overall, 
there is a trend towards greater use of local technology in CDM projects, driven, she 
concludes, by prior experience and existing capacity in the specific technology area.749  
This predicts that greater experience in CDM projects should result in lower need for 
technology transfer.   
 
More importantly, her finding that Brazil, India and Mexico have been 
suppliers of technology in CDM projects, points to the potentially useful role of these 
countries in providing low-cost, well-adapted solutions to clean development projects in 
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other developing countries, reducing the need for adaptation of developed country 
technology to local conditions.  In the sample, a small majority of technology was 
sourced from non-Annex 1 countries.750  The analysis of this finding cuts in two ways: it 
emphasizes the role that emerging economies can play as technology providers, 
especially of well-adapted technology; but it also implies that the CDM focus on cost-
efficiency means that cheapest technology rather than best available technologies are 
more likely to be diffused under the CDM. More support for this could potentially be 
found in the response to the questionnaire used by Doranova, where she asks about 
whether the technology transferred was considered high or best available technology.751 
The study does not provide any findings related to these specific questions however. 
 
One case study that does look at some of the terms of the transfer, as well as 
the vectors under which it took place, was carried by Hansen in Malaysia, which has a 
mandatory technology transfer requirement in its DNA approval process. 752  In a 
qualitative study, based on interviews with host firms’ project implementers in Malaysia 
he looked at three main modes of technology transfer: 
1. Technology provider partnership arrangements; 
2. Technology implementation by Annex 1 country company subsidiary 
3. Non-Annex 1 country company manufacturing technology under a license, 
royalty or fee agreement 
 
From a final dataset of 13 firms, primarily in the biomass sector he finds that753: 
- There are examples of all the vectors in place, within the CDM projects 
- Most of the projects were based on pre-existing commercial activities or 
subsidiary relationships. Only one was a purpose built joint venture in order to 
participate in the CDM. 
- In those cases where transfer of hardware took place it was under 
circumstances, deliberately aimed at reducing exposure of end-users and to 
limit their capacity to understand and potentially disseminate knowledge about 
the hardware. This was true for all except the purpose built joint venture. 
- Except for the joint venture, knowledge transfer was limited to maintenance 
and operation of the hardware. 
 
Hansen concludes that the quality of technology transfer was low and that the 
DNA approval process placed little emphasis on technology transfer despite what could 
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initially be construed as a stringent standard.754  Hansen’s findings that CDM tends to 
rely on pre-existing commercial relationships is supported by other studies as well in the 
case of wind power in India and China.755 They also note that India and China are both 
the largest hosts and providers of technologies in CDM wind power projects, although 
primarily to their domestic markets.756  Much of the activity in non-India, non-China, 
wind CDM technology transfer constitutes arms-length equipment purchases 757 
supporting Hansen’s finding that Annex 1 firms largely engage in sales and minimal 
training in order to enable operation and maintenance. They find joint ventures to be 
the least used mechanism, and there is a significant amount of activity (almost 20%) by 
subsidiaries.758 Lema and Lema also support Hansen’s finding that mechanisms in CDM 
projects encompass a variety of vectors beyond FDI and equipment import, although in 
their study, only China has a CDM project due to licensing.759 This is notable as the 
definitions of technology transfer employed by these studies may fail to include licensing 
as a vector because of their focus on hardware and associated know-how. Where there is 
domestic capacity for production a license would allow such local production but 
involve no equipment transfer.760  In addition, where such licensing involved further 
know-how transfer associated with the license this may not be captured within the 
PDDs as studied.  Lema and Lema conclude that CDM does not build capacity but that 
it is existing technological capacity that enables CDM activity and the ability to engage in 
local production761, provided that there are partners available willing to engage in other, 
higher quality modes of activity such as joint ventures, licensing or domestic production.  
This suggests that the role of direct equipment transfer may drop out precipitously with 
increased technological capability, meaning that the main vector of CDM transfer is no 
longer relevant to countries that have proven through the CDM that there is a viable 
domestic market for the technology. 
 
Another approach to measuring technology transfer was taken by Haščič and 
Johnstone in a specific study of the role of the CDM in the wind power sector.762 They 
looked at patent data as a proxy for technology transfer, in particular looking at patents 
where an inventor resident in one country seeks patents in the host country.  As they 
acknowledge (and as discussed in Chapter 3), there are problems with using this as a 
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proxy for technology transfer, and although they suggest that propensity to patent will 
be attenuated by the cost of applying for patents763, they are not really able to examine 
to whom patents are transferred and the use to which they are put. At most therefore, 
their data can tell us something about intent to participate in the host market in some 
fashion, but not the manner of such participation. Nevertheless, there are some 
interesting outcomes relating to their hypothesis that CDM activities affect the level and 
rate of transfer, measured by cross-country patent counts from Annex 1 to non-Annex 
countries in the wind sector.764  
Their findings suggest that the direct effect of CDM has a statistically 
significant, positive, but relatively small effect (compared to absorptive capacity) on 
technology transfer in the wind sector as measured by increased contemporaneous 
propensity to patent into the host state.765  In terms of specific countries, the effect for 
China was consistently positive and for India, consistently negative.766 In addition, there 
was a significant, negative relationship between the stock of CDM projects and 
technology transfer, as measured by increased patenting propensity by inventors outside 
the home state.767   The results are only indicative and suggest that some effect on 
contemporaneous patenting may exist due to CDM participation, but it is difficult to 
conceive of the mechanism or vector along which such an effect would take place.  
Considering the determinants of propensity to patent across borders, there may be a 
regulatory effect in that existence of CDM creates a stronger impression that there is 
indeed a market for the technology and therefore a technology holder would be 
interested in participating in the market in some fashion.  However, there is also clearly 
a confounding variable in that such an interest would consider the imitative capacity of 
the country in the decision of whether to patent.  That may remain a stronger driver of 
whether a patent is sought in relation to the technology sector especially to prevent 
strong imitators from taking over the entire domestic market, or from exporting to 
other countries.  This may explain to some extent the difference between India and 
China observed in the study. As noted in Chapter 3, China presents a significant danger 
of competition in the wind sector, as Goldwind dominates the domestic market and has 
little interest in export for the moment. However, India also is a strong competitor in 
the wind sector, but its market may be more open and present less risk of imitation due 
to the significant export orientation of the main wind firm, Suzlon, which while it may 
be capable of imitation may not be willing to engage in imitation to the same extent 
given the need to ensure it can export its products back to OECD countries.  However, 
in the absence of further research and data, especially data that goes beyond the patent 
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count, it is very difficult to tease out the mechanism and role of different variables in 
this study. 
A specific China study by Wang (also a PDD based study) found that technology 
transfer in Chinese projects involved both hardware and know-how, but only the basic 
level related to operation and maintenance of the hardware, in line with most findings.768 
Overall, other than Hansen and Doranova, none of the studies provide information 
from the PDDs on the terms of the technology transfer (concessional, grant or 
otherwise in line with CBDR) that is claimed to take place.769  Additionally, only one 
study (Hansen, and only tangentially) addresses itself to the issue of intellectual property 
in terms of: the role it may play in the CDM transfer process; the number of protected 
technologies involved; whether any licenses are made available in the context of the 
project and on what terms. This is clearly an arena for further research.  In fairness, the 
CDM provides little purchase for making findings related to this and details of deal 
structure, intellectual property involved and licensing are not readily available, even in 
the context of survey data.  This has forced authors to use proxies in many 
circumstances that may not be reflective of the actual underlying nature and scope of 
activity under the CDM. 
The lack of real data on the sustainable development (including technology 
transfer) outcomes of the CDM770 has led to several proposals to make the delivery of 
sustainable development more effective. Most have revolved around assisting DNAs in 
developing appropriate mechanisms771, while others have suggested adding an additional 
layer of international standards to be met in addition to the DNA assessment.772 All the 
studies emphasize the need for an independent validation, monitoring and verification 
of claimed sustainable development and technology transfer claims in PDDs.773  To the 
extent that this would focus energies on actual implementation of claimed technology 
transfer this would be a significant step beyond the existing state of affairs. However, 
what this would bring to the fore would be the capacity to examine the actual 
determinants of technology transfer in the CDM. The role of such things as absorptive 
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capacity 774  (in the case of Dechezleprêtre et. al., captured by the variable 
TECH_CAPABILITY), or level of intellectual property protection may therefore be 
made more clear and used to better inform policy.  In the case of China, one study 
applying Dechezleprêtre et als. methodology argues that much of the low levels of 
technology transfer in the data for China can be explained by the country dummy 
CHINA (modified and more detailed for this case), embodying characteristics related to 
China’s rules on joint venture and limited foreign ownership requirements, levels of 
intellectual property protection; local content requirements.775 However, it is precisely 
on these kinds of regulatory interventions that a measurement of learning would be 
most useful at capturing the nature and scale of technology transfer beyond the binary 
measure of whether technology transfer was claimed or not in the PDD. This is not to 
say that the ‘intent’ to transfer technology that appears to exist in most PDDs should 
not be a valuable data point, but absent any other data it cannot be reliable evidence of 
actual attempts to do so, except perhaps in the very limited sense of whether hardware 
intended to be used was actually used. 
The potential of the CDM to function as a vehicle for technology transfer 
remains strong but there is significant concern that it has not done so, and it is difficult 
to find reliable data on whether it has done so. In the end it leaves us in the same 
position that we were in before: given some structure for encouraging and enabling FDI, 
how should states act to ensure sufficient spillovers from such investment in terms of 
technology transfer? The CDM has been successful at addressing a major FDI problem 
for ESTs and that is by creating a platform on which actors can exchange and share 
information about existing and completed opportunities, as well as potential partners 
who have already succeeded.776  It is a very useful platform for encouraging certain 
kinds of transactions and lowering the perceived low commercial viability of some 
projects777, despite the prevalence of low cost end of pipe technology solutions in its 
early phases. 
The CDM offers a crucial leverage point in the DNA process but it also may 
be susceptible to other regulatory actions, such as joint venture requirements, use of 
domestic technology, where a domestic substitute exists, 778  rules on mobility of 
personnel, or rules on intellectual property developed during the joint venture. In 
particular, as with the Chinese experience in SC/USC boiler technology (discussed in 
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Chapter 3), programmatic CDM may provide a knowledge-sharing and regulatory 
platform for localization and ensuring spillovers at a sectoral level that project based 
CDM has largely been incapable of doing. The availability of these actions remains both 
a legal question and a practical one given the market demand structure of the CDM. It 
may be appropriate to consider a methodology for crediting projects and programmes 
that even where they may not directly result in reductions may nevertheless generate 
credits for high quality transferring of technologies that sees the best available 
technologies provided to enable production, or integration into productive processes – 
ensuring capacity to replicate, adapt and diffuse into the broader economy.  
Finally, the CDM empirical studies suggest one key factor as fundamental in 
enabling or encouraging technology transfer and that is pre-existing technological 
capacity.  The studies suggest that such capacity is both an outcome and an enabler of 
technology transfer activities, but also that these are not the primary consideration of 
market driven structures such as the CDM and that in some circumstances there may be 
a real tension between the enablement of absorptive capacity and the achievement of 
low-cost efficient emissions reductions through market structures.  The importance of 
providing a market-based structure that provides an incentive for private actors to 
engage in such building of absorptive capacity and to do so by engaging in repeat, 
intensive learning and interactive activity related to technologies is crucial.779  Chapter 9 
outlines a proposal aimed at addressing this issue with respect to technologies more 
generally and to intellectual property protected technologies more specifically.  
In the end, it is difficult to conclude that the CDM has been an effective 
technology transfer mechanism.  The basic structure of the mechanism suggests that, 
absent any other policy lever, it is unlikely to ever be able to encourage the kind of high 
quality technology transfer involving more than equipment and minimal training on 
operation and maintenance of the equipment.  It also has a structural incentive in the 
low demand for credits and the large oversupply of potential providers which may 
discourage host parties from imposing any regulatory requirements, something which 
has put pressure on the stringency of even the basic additionality requirement.  Without 
further reform, especially to ensure income based incentives to engage in high quality 
technology transfer, it is unlikely that the CDM can function as a reliable technology 
transfer vehicle under the UNFCCC.   
 
IV.3 The Global Environment Facility (GEF) 
                                                        
 
779 See de Sepibus, J “Reforming the Clean Development Mechanism to accelerate Technology Transfer” 
Working Paper No 2009/42, NCCR Trade Regulation, Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research, 
November 2009. 
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Until the establishment of the Green Climate Fund in the 2010 Cancun 
Agreements, the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) functioned as the primary 
financial mechanism for the UNFCCC.  The GEF has operated as the primary funding 
mechanism for technology activities, in the absence of any implementing mechanism 
within the UNFCCC itself. It has done so through both general funds and specific 
funds such as: The climate change mitigation programme of the GEF Trust Fund; The 
Poznan strategic programme on technology transfer.780  
 
The Poznan Strategic Programme provides funding for781: 
 Technology needs assessments (TNAs); 
 Implementing technology transfer pilot projects; 
 Disseminating GEF experience and examples of successfully demonstrated 
ESTs. 
For the long-term implementation of the strategic programme, the GEF also has 
programs for:  
 Support for climate technology centers and a climate technology network; 
 Piloting priority technology projects to foster innovation and investments; 
 Public-private partnerships for technology transfer; 
 Technology needs assessments; 
The GEF was aimed at providing funds to developing countries to help them 
meet their obligations under Article 4 of the UNFCCC.   The GEF provides only 
incremental cost funding in the form of grants but in most cases requires co-financing. 
Major concerns about the GEF revolve around the strategic focus and the 
structure of project financing.  While separate from the World Bank (which functions as 
a trustee and provides administrative services), the GEF essentially functions as a donor 
agency, whose mandate is delivery of financial support to project applications from 
developing countries that have met specific criteria.  This is in contrast to the structure 
of the UNFCCC which views financial support for technology transfer and other action 
by developing countries as 'obligations' to which developing countries are entitled rather 
than as aid, which is at the discretion of the donor.  This has meant that rather than 
receiving direct access to funds for described plans of actions and programs, developing 
countries have had to “apply” for funding which is granted at the discretion of the 
responsible bodies appointed by the GEF Council which is controlled by donors, due to 
                                                        
 
780 Established at the COP 14 in Decision 2/CP.14) 
781 See p5, GEF “Implementing the Poznan Strategic and Long-Term Programs on Technology Transfer” 
Global Environment Facility, November 2012. 
 188 
 
the weighting given to financial contributions. The GEF uses levels of co-financing as 
part of project approval criteria782 which also falls short of the “full” costs principle of 
the UNFCCC. Primarily, this has placed the burden of change and implementation of 
technology transfer on developing countries, especially to put in place 'enabling 
environments'. Nothing in the program addresses the regulatory structures and barriers 
that may exist in developed countries, which is the primary complaint of developing 
countries about being able to access technologies that are protected by intellectual 
property.  A look at the financing criteria of the GEF provides no information about 
whether payment for intellectual property licenses is covered by their definition of 
“agreed incremental costs”.  The operational guidelines for determining incremental 
costs783 do not address whether such costs may or should be covered. A December 
2009 note on IPR issues in GEF funding784 also does not address whether GEF funds 
access to licenses as part of its “full agreed incremental costs”. The note focuses 
primarily on those situations where GEF funding results in the creation of IPRs and 
what policies exist for GEF to retain access and use of such IPRs. The note by the 
secretariat emphasizes that IPR issues are best handled through contractual 
arrangements but does not elaborate.785  
A short examination of projects under the Special Climate Change Fund show 
that licensing of technology is envisioned under at least one project786, although it is 
unclear whether GEF funding is being used to cover licensing costs, or whether such 
costs are covered by co-financing. In a 2011 approved Jordan project, the co-finance for 
the IPR appears to be coming from the technology rightholder, DuPont.787 
The success of the GEF in enabling technology transfer is difficult to assess. 
In the 2010-2014 period it raised 2.5 billion in pledged funds for its activities.788  
Some research suggest that it has been most successful at transferring mature 
hardware technologies, but less so at enabling demonstration-ready technologies into 
                                                        
 
782 GEF “Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the Incremental Cost Principle” GEF/C.31/12, 
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784GEF “Note on Issues related to Intellectual Property Rights” GEF/C.13/Inf.14, December 1, 2009 (first 
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788 GEF “Implementing the Poznan Strategic and Long-Term Programs on Technology Transfer” Global 
Environment Facility, November 2012. 
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commercial activity.789  The experience relating to the China Industrial Boiler project 
may be illustrative. Mallet et al. note that convincing leading technology holders to 
participate in building capacity and knowledge for the production of boilers was very 
difficult and finding a willing licensing partner took 6 years, and even then, the licensor 
was a second tier firm with less experience in the market.790 Ockwell et al. note that, 
over time, the GEF has de-emphasized direct technology transfer as a goal and focused 
increasingly on market creation projects, precisely because of the difficulty of finding 
private sector actors willing to build capacity and knowledge related to their 
technology.791 
The GEF also has the problem of scale. Its funding for climate change is 
relatively small in absolute terms, limiting it largely to pilot projects, rather than 
functioning as a full scale transfer mechanism.792  It has had to be strategic about where 
and when to fund to have the most impact, but has not functioned as a major funder or 
enabler. There are concerns about the length of the application process especially for 
leveraging private sector involvement. 793   It has broad sectoral coverage, both in 
mitigation and adaptation but the majority of projects are in mitigation and tilted 
towards energy efficiency. 794  It also has good geographic focus, exclusively on 
developing countries with a large portion of funded projects in China.795 
 
IV.4. Non-UNFCCC Multilateral and Bilateral delivery under Article 4.1(c), 4.3 
and 4.5, National Communications and the Role of Nationally Appropriate 
Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) and National Adaptation Plans of Action (NAPAs). 
In the absence of any formal UNFCCC mechanism for implementation of the 
technology transfer provisions in the Convention, much of the weight was left to 
bilateral delivery and reports by Annex 1 countries, channeling their activities through 
bilateral Official Development Assistance (ODA), and through supporting international 
financial institutions (IFIs) such as the regional development banks.   
                                                        
 
789 p13, Lefevre, N “Deploying Climate –friendly Technologies through Collaboration with Developing 
Countries” International Energy Agency, Information Paper, November 2005.  
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791 See p33, Ockwell, D et al. “Enhancing Developing Country Access to Eco-Innovation: The Case of 
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792 See p346, de Coninck et al. “International technology-oriented agreements to address climate 
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IV.4.1. The Clean Technology Fund 
A major venue for multilateral support came from the World Bank and 
associated regional banks through the donor supported Climate Investment Funds796, 
the specific technology related sub-part being: 
- The Clean Technology Fund – aimed at middle income countries for R&D, 
demonstration, deployment of technologies in renewable energy, transport and 
energy efficiency 
- The Scaling Up Renewable Energy in low Income countries Programme – 
aimed at market creation and support measures for renewable energy in LDCs 
The main method of the CIFs was to use co-financing to leverage private 
sector co-investment in large sectoral programmes. Funding comes from pledges from 
donors and is separate from any UNFCCC mechanism. 797  Countries report their 
contributions to the CIFs through their regular national communications to the 
UNFCCC and as part of their finance pledges under the Copenhagen Accord. 798 
Planned as interim measures while a UNFCCC financing mechanism was negotiated and 
established, the CIFs had a specific sunset clause that they would cease operations once 
an effective UNFCCC mechanism was functioning.799   The main aim of the sunset 
clause was to address concerns of developing countries that such funds would divert 
funds from the planned Green Climate Fund within the UNFCCC and that the 
governance structure of the CIFs, which gave prominence and weight to donor 
countries should not be the permanent basis for climate funding.800 
How successful have these programmes at meeting their technology transfer 
aims? The first thing to note is that the mandate of the CIFs but of the CTF specifically, 
was to demonstrate the feasibility and success of specific methods for carrying out 
technology transfer, so that lessons learned could be transferred into the UNFCCC 
financial mechanism when it was finally agreed.801 A fair assessment cannot be aimed at 
whether it provided sufficient volume of technologies or financing but whether it 
showcased and demonstrated what worked and what did not.  They were never intended 
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797 See Climate Investment Fund “About the Climate Investment Funds” 
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as major avenues for achieving technology transfer. So the true measure is whether the 
CTF provided useful lessons going forward for achieving technology transfer, including 
on timing, scope of technologies, and geographical scope. 
The programmes have been subject to independent evaluation and so some details 
can be found there.  The first test is to see what kind of activities were covered by its 
funding, including localization of technology, allowing for adoption, adaptation and 
replication. The structure of the financing avoids the ‘incremental cost’ cost principle 
that has so bedeviled funding under the GEF, and simply focused on providing, in its 
grant financing, the “additional costs” of investment necessary to make investment 
viable. The co-financing, concessional loans and other instruments are not dependent 
on any additional cost assessment but based simply on the project or programme 
meeting the criteria of the funding institution. The majority of funding is through 
concessional loans, and may not fully reflect the full costs principle in Article 4.802 To a 
significant extent, the funding remains subject to the different standards of each 
participating regional development bank for qualifying for such projects.803 Nevertheless, 
the CTF does establish investment criteria as the basis on which participating banks and 
countries can access the funds. There are two sets - public sector804 , and; private 
sector.805 The public sector criteria look at 5 key issues:806 
- Potential for GHG Emissions Savings  
- Cost-effectiveness  
- Demonstration Potential at Scale  
- Development Impact  
- Implementation Potential  
- Additional Costs and Risk Premium 
 
There is a list of examples of activities to be covered in a set of technology 
sectors, at the level of aims to be achieved, e.g. Modal shift to low carbon transportation, 
but no details on the means of implementation.807  There appears to be no limitation on 
the use of funds to conduct technology localization, or access to licensing and know-
how. The CTF seems to have modelled an exemplary additional cost methodology that 
does not exclude using funds for such activities, including for knowledge development 
                                                        
 
802 See p3, Ballesteros, A et al. “Power, Responsibility and Accountability: Re-Thinking the Legitimacy of  
Institutions for Climate Finance” World Resources Institute, WRI Working Paper December 2009.  
803 See para. 12, Climate Investment Funds “Governance Framework for The Clean Technology Fund” 
Adopted November 2008 and amended December 2011.  
804 Climate Investment Funds “Clean Technology Fund Investment Criteria for Public Sector Operations” 
February 9, 2009.  
805 Climate Investment Funds “CTF Private Sector Operations Guidelines” October 24, 2012 
806 See p3, Climate Investment Funds “Clean Technology Fund Investment Criteria for Public Sector 
Operations”  
807 See para. 6, Climate Investment Funds “Clean Technology Fund Investment Criteria for Public Sector 
Operations”  
 192 
 
platforms.  Where internal costs are higher than would make a project commercially 
viable, then the CTF would provide a grant to cover the additional cost or risk premium 
to enable the commercial viability.808  This should therefore cover those circumstances 
where cost of licensing might have made adoption of a technology non-viable.  
The private sector funding criteria are much the same as those for the public 
sector with some additions. The main aim of this kind of funding is to mitigate the risk 
of being first mover into a new technology, and to provide real market demonstration of 
the viability of a technology, taking care of the risk premium that commercial lending 
may not be willing to take on.809 As these are the kinds of requests that are most likely 
to address the commercial cost of knowledge access, the ways in which the CTF funds 
knowledge access and sharing is crucial.  The CTF rules on this are quite clear. They 
require information on and will fund projects that do the following: 
“include initiatives aimed at reducing information barriers or other non-
financial barriers to market transformation. These activities may include 
capacity building for private sector entities, particularly small- and medium-
sized enterprises, and knowledge products aimed at sharing information 
among private sector entities, public sector organisations and public-private 
sector entities, including financial intermediaries, as well as between and among 
the MDBs, and other relevant development partners.”810 
The CTF model seems an ideal vehicle for financing localization activities 
enabling adoption, adaptation and replication – where such licensing and know how is 
available at commercial or near commercial costs.  Thus one of the tests for evaluating 
the CTF is the extent to which it provided funding for such activities. 
  By focusing on middle income countries, the CTF already at least addresses to 
a significant extent the geographic need. In terms of scope of technologies covered, the 
CTF covers all the relevant activities in relevant sectors for mitigation: Efficient fossil 
fuel power generation, renewable energy, Industry, buildings, transport, and agriculture. 
There are no a priori sector or technology limitations.811  In terms of timing, the CTF is 
only an interim body and so its work aims to be completed by the time the 2015 
agreement and the GCF are operational and so also is within the timing structure for 
moving technologies. Of course, it cannot be expected to operate at scale, given its 
mandate.  In the reports provided by the MDBs to the CTF on their activities, the 
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nature of specific activities funded is difficult to ascertain.  The indicators used are at 
too high a level to examine the issue of technology transferred per se. The monitoring 
and evaluation framework focuses primarily on812: 
- Indicator 1: Tons of GHG reduced or avoided (in tons of CO 2  equivalent);   
- Indicator 2: Volume of direct finance leveraged through CTF funding (in US$  
- millions);   
- Indicator 3: Installed capacity (MW) as a result of CTF interventions;   
- Indicator 4: Number of additional passengers using low-carbon transport as a  
- result of CTF; and  
- Indicator 5: Annual energy savings as a result of CTF interventions (GWh). 
 
There is no measure here of the capacity built among the local producers for 
adaptation, or replication of the technology. While the independent report normally 
should have provided some ways to evaluate the technology transfer success of the CTF 
it is limited to these core indicators, as well as operational matters. In terms of lessons to 
be learned from the CTF, the independent interim evaluation report points to several 
key issues: 
- Replicability of projects, especially the private sector ones, is difficult to assess 
and may be a structural problem for the CTF given that at best, its particular 
funding support may be difficult to replicate in the private lending market 
without some fundamental shifting in actual risk profile for the investment.813 
- Very few CTF funds are directed at the policy and regulatory environment; 
making the sustainability and the transformational element of the funds less 
sure.814 
- The CTF has no formal technical quality review of CTF proposals, other than 
comments from provider countries.  There is no technical expert review 
process.815 
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- There is a large gap between endorsed projects and those that have had funds 
disbursed. Less than 10% of CIF endorsed projects have reached disbursement 
stage.816 This is a concern especially for the implementation of private sector 
projects.  
The experience of the CTF suggests the need for long term financing mechanisms 
to substitute to a significant extent the lack of appetite for risk of private sector actors, 
beyond the initial few projects to a point where there is a critical mass.  It also points to 
the need to carry out regulatory and policy measures to restructure the market in favor 
of adoption of technologies in ways that spread or amortize the costs and risks in 
technology adoption and purchasing, while putting in place stronger demand side 
measures to increase potential return on investment.   
A better sense of what the CTF has accomplished regarding technology 
transfer could be drawn from the content of the approved project applications, but 
there is significant variation in the project documents and, for private sector projects, a 
lot of material may be inaccessible. For example, the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development does not provide details for such projects beyond project 
summaries.817  The Country Investment Plans provide insufficient detail as to whether 
they plan to engage in localization, adaption and replication, although all clearly drive at 
adoption.  The details of how they plan to achieve adoption are not available at the level 
of the country investment plans.  The specific project plans under each country’s 
investment plans are not available on the CIF or the website of the responsible MDB in 
any reliable manner.  Comparison or even determining the extent of such activities does 
not seem possible at this point.  This issue of transparency is something that has been 
remarked upon by commentators. 818   To the extent that such information is not 
available, it makes it difficult, other than at the macro level of CTF contributions, and 
the reports of the independent evaluation, to verify the contribution to technology 
transfer made by the CTF. In particular, the failure to include extent of capacity built, 
extent of ability to adapt and replicate and building up of commercial producers or 
implementers of the technology in the core indicators is a problem.  It replicates to a 
significant extent the broader problem of measurable, reportable and verifiable 
technology transfer that has historically dogged technology support in the UNFCCC. 
IV.4.2 Measuring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) of Financial and Technological 
Support 
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Initially, the only ways in which financial and technological support activities 
could be measured was through assessing individual National Communications, the 
primary manner in which delivery on Article 4 obligations was measured under the 
Convention.  Due to significant concerns about the additionality of activities and 
funding reported, developed and developing countries worked towards new methods 
for meeting these obligations, embodied in Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions 
(NAMAs)819  and National Adaptation Plans of Action  (NAPAs) to which funding and 
activities would be directed.  This section describes some of the concerns that drive this 
debate and the structures that it led to, and why despite this there remains significant 
unhappiness with NAMAs and NAPAs as delivery mechanisms for technology transfer. 
As with critiques of the GEF, these revolve primarily around the sense that developing 
countries had that sufficient funding of any initiatives that they wished to undertake, 
whether it be from the GEF, through NAPAs and NAMAs, would never be 
forthcoming, driving them to seek out unilateral options for implementing their 
obligations. 
A key transition in the discussions on technology transfer was the report on 
technology transfer by the Secretariat examining the nature and scope of technology 
transfer as reported in national communications of Annex II Parties.820  In the report, it 
noted that because reporting guidelines were so vague, national communications varied 
as to detail, interpretation, format, and comprehensiveness.821  Four out of 21 reports 
studied did not report on technology transfer at all.822 The definition adopted by the 
secretariat was quite broad, encompassing private sector activity where reported, and 
any funding to a multilateral fund that may have been used for technology transfer. This 
included contributions to the GEF, as well a bilateral official development assistance 
(ODA). Of what was reported, the majority addressed hardware transfers (although on 
what terms is unclear).  Some support for multilateral R&D was reported primarily 
through support to the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research 
(CGIAR). 
This report was the beginning of serious concerns on the part of developing 
countries that implementation of technology transfer obligations would not occur in a 
sufficient and timely manner.  In particular, the concern was that parties seemed to be 
reporting on existing and ongoing funding and activities rather than those that were 
additional to regular ODA and multilateral contributions.  The conclusion they drew 
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was that developed countries did not aim to provide ‘additional’ support to that already 
being provided and that instead, climate support for technology would come from 
diversion of other funding or relabeling of existing support. The lead countries in 
expressing such concerns were China and Russia.823  The response from the US and the 
EU focused on overcoming some of the technical barriers to providing information and 
emphasized the role that the private sector played, noting the limited role that 
government can play in providing technology transfer when technologies are primarily 
held by private sector actors.824 
 It was at the 4th COP that developed countries began to emphasize the issue 
of the lack of enabling environments as a barrier to technology transfer.  Focusing on 
private sector delivery, they argued that developing countries needed to ensure proper 
regulatory environments to create demand for technologies, and that they needed to 
ensure intellectual property protection and enforcement to ensure that companies felt 
comfortable licensing technology.825  This was part of a broader re-framing of the issue 
by the main developed countries, US, Australia, Japan, Canada (and sometimes the EU) 
to focus on market mechanisms, mitigation technologies, and on the flexibility 
mechanisms such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).   
The establishment of the EGTT at COP 6 in 2000 only served to shift the 
debate from one forum to another and may actually have served to delay further action 
on technology transfer.  The work of the SBSTA from this point on tends to focus on 
examining the reports of the EGTT, which met in closed session.  The establishment of 
the EGTT, which did not report to the SBI, also meant that technology transfer fell off 
the agenda of the SBI (with its implementation mandate) over time, as all technology 
transfer issues were deferred to the ‘technical’ body of the EGTT.  The process 
appeared stuck in a cycle of approval or disapproval of the EGTT work program 
without actually addressing the substantive issues that the EGTT’s work raised. 
In 2006, the EGTT produced an assessment of the progress and effectiveness 
in the implementation of the technology transfer framework, and identification of gaps 
and barriers and suggestions for ways and means to better facilitate and advance its 
implementation. 826   One key result of the 2006 analysis was that that there was 
insufficient data from governments to determine what measures and policies they had 
taken to fulfil their commitments on technology transfer.827  This is despite the fact that 
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at the very first COP, the Parties were urged to include in their national communication 
measures taken to deliver on technology transfer commitments.828 
Relevant work by the EGTT during the post-Bali period looked at creating a 
set of performance indicators to try and create a standardized methodology for 
countries to report on their implementation of obligations. All Parties supported the 
development of performance indicators so as to measure the effectiveness of technology 
transfer as it related to the work of the EGTT. 829  Developed countries suggested 
indicators measuring the degree of IP protection, 830   and developing countries 
emphasized technology sharing.831   The Post-Bali review of the technology transfer 
provisions focused on Article 4, paragraph 1(c) and 5, of the Convention.   
Approved in 2008 832 , a draft report was produced in 2009.833  Parties also 
continued to express their views on the areas of focus of the review.834 The review itself 
was produced in 2010835 and made several key points.  
With respect to legal and regulatory frameworks the review notes that enabling 
environments are key to successful technology transfer. Developing countries need to 
do more and need financial help in designing and implementing innovative institutional 
and regulatory systems.836 However, the review appeared to focus almost exclusively on 
regulatory measures taken by developing countries and had little to say about enabling 
environments and ‘push’ actions in developed countries. Some of this was addressed in 
the focus area on cooperation with the private sector. The review noted that there has 
historically been insufficient public funding to leverage private sector participation.  
On intellectual property the review stated that “enhancing the business 
environment through better use of IPRs will be important for promoting the sustainable 
development of technologies by technology innovators in developing countries.”837 This 
assessment also reflects a focus on regulatory and policy environments in developing 
countries rather than developed.  
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836 p11, FCCC/SBI/2010/INF.4 
837 p16, Id. 
 198 
 
Finally, on R&D cooperation the review noted the gap between perceived 
funding needs and actual needs ranging in the billions.838 The review also noted that the 
majority of such funding was taking place in developed countries with little transfer of 
funds to developing countries.839   
Once completed, the AWGLCA took note of the review but took no further 
action regarding the uses to which the performance indicators used in the review should 
be applied.  Despite significant work, this set of indicators was not built into the 
standard for national communications by parties. 
However, on the broader mitigation track, elements of technology came to be 
associated with the broader push to have all countries, but especially emerging 
economies, take on some kinds of pledge mitigation actions. 840   These were finally 
embodied in the NAMAs841, which, where supported by developed countries, bilaterally 
or through the Green Climate Fund, would form the basis for measuring, reporting and 
verifying actions by countries and for provision of and verifying financial and 
technological support.842   NAMAs were intended to be the basis on which support 
would be directed to developing countries, to try and fill the information gap between 
the supply side (where are funds from developed countries to flow to) and the demand 
side (where do developed countries, need or want such funds to flow). They would also 
be a mechanism for recognition of action by developing countries. The exact status and 
role of NAMAs continues to be the subject of negotiation but a registry was created for 
countries wishing for support for their specific mitigation actions under the NAMAs. 
However, there is at present, no mechanism for directly applying for and receiving 
support based on the registry, and it remains at the discretion of funders to determine 
which NAMAs they will fund. The registry only serves a matching function for the 
moment and does not function as a funding mechanism or allow direct access to funds. 
It provides no broader verification function, although there are plans for those 
supported to report emissions reductions and claimed sustainable development benefits 
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under the NAMA, although such reporting may occur on a bilateral basis between the 
funder and the funded.843 
Even where the NAMAs may end up fulfilling their general function of finally 
ensuring direct access to funds for mitigation actions, this thesis has previously pointed 
out that these may best serve to address a subset of the technology transfer problematic: 
access to products; access to know-how and licensing, where the costs are reasonable 
and commercially-based844; but only under existing market conditions.  They would do 
nothing to address how to restructure the market to increase the rate of technology 
diffusion, the scope of technologies to be diffused, and the ability of emerging 
economies to serve as diffusion centers to other developing countries.  NAMAs as they 
stand suffer from much the same limitation that the CDM and TNAs do: they rely on 
the same mechanism of financial support, whose failure (related to lack of measurable, 
reportable and verifiable action845) was the very impetus for developing countries to 
seek unilateral options in the first place.846 As a response, NAMAs fail to address the full 
scope of the challenge of market restructuring and to address the needs of developing 
countries to deal with refusals to deal in licenses, access know-how, and increase 
spillovers into their markets.  Nevertheless, it is clear that beyond new institutional 
mechanisms, developing countries have not been satisfied and will not be satisfied until, 
at the very least, support for NAMAs is direct, predictable, measurable, verifiable, and 
allows them to fund activities that localize knowledge and technology i.e. allows firms in 
developing countries to adopt, adapt, replicate technologies. At present, it appears that 
implementation of the NAMAs requires an additional application process for funding 
from other funding institutions at the bilateral or multilateral level such as the GEF847, 
replicating the same pattern that led to the failure of TNAs as technology transfer 
mechanisms.  The lack of minimum standards for GHG reduction and or sustainable 
development in NAMAs makes it unclear on what basis direct access to funding of 
NAMAs will occur.  In the absence of guarantees that such standards will indeed meet 
the development needs of developing countries and will fund such things as access to 
licensing and know-how, it is difficult to see developing countries agreeing to some kind 
of minimum qualification standard for supported NAMAs.   
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There remains significant uncertainty as to whether the GCF will have a 
specific technology window for funding or whether technology funding will be covered 
as a cross-cutting issue under the adaptation, mitigation and capacity building windows.  
This would require thinking differently about how to MRV support for technology 
actions especially where technology actions are in-kind or non-monetary.  This may still 
require a separate process, which may be housed within the Technology Executive 
Committee (TEC), although for the moment, the Technology Executive Committee 
does not appear to have MRV within its mandate. 
 The extent of public funding available however, may not be anything close to 
what is actually required to address the full scope of action need to develop, deploy, and 
diffuse technologies. Looking at the mitigation scenarios, the IEA projects that from 
2010 – 2020, over USD 2.3 trillion annually will need to be invested, the majority of 
which will be private flows.848 The share of developing countries is USD 1.3 trillion 
annually, of which China represents USD 500 billion.  In contrast to the scale of the 
projected need, total investment flows in 2010 and 2011, were USD 247 billion and 260 
billion respectively. 
Within the climate negotiations, developed countries in Copenhagen at COP 15 
committed to provide USD 100 billion annually by 2020 in investment (from a wide 
variety of sources, including public funds).849 A significant portion is meant to flow 
through the Green Climate Fund (GCF), which implies direct cash or other instruments 
under the control of the fund, rather than financial instruments operating outside of the 
remit of the GCF. The IEA estimates that climate mitigation related flows from 
developed to developing countries amount to somewhere between USD 70 and USD 
199 billion a year.850 The majority of this is private flows (USD 37 – 72 billion), and the 
public funds (through bilateral and multilateral mechanisms) amount to a potential 
maximum of USD 43 billion.  Olbrisch et al. review the range of estimates for 
incremental investment in the literature noting significant variations for 2030 projections 
for annual financing needs in developing countries: from USD 177 billion to USD 565 
billion per annum.851 They do not provide estimates of the portion that would be from 
private flows, but their estimate of current funding suggests that private flows are the 
largest proportion of funding amounting to at least USD 65 billion per year. 
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 In terms of direct support, it is unlikely that existing and future public funds 
will suffice to meet the need in developing countries852 and, as the IEA notes, they will 
have to also mobilize a significant amount of finance domestically.853  This is all before 
funding for adaptation is taken into account, which under the GCF should take up half 
of the planned disbursements. To some extent, the burden on the GCF is mitigated by 
China agreeing that it would not access Green Climate Funds.854 In part this may be 
because China foresees little trouble in drawing FDI into its market.  The IEA and 
others have difficulty finding an argument that investment flows for climate will differ in 
any significant way from existing patterns of investment into developing countries.855 
The prescriptions for providing a proper enabling environment replicate the same tried 
and true axioms of: 
- reducing regulatory uncertainty; 
- Enabling policies for competitive, open markets and greening infrastructure 
investment 
- Sound investment policies; market-based and regulatory policies to “put a price 
on carbon” and correct for environmental externalities;  
- removing barriers and disincentives and incentivize for innovation and 
investment 
- Financial policies and instruments to attract private sector participation; 
 
but applying these specifically to climate change sectors.  Other than a broader faith 
that these interventions will work, there is no little analysis of how these 
recommendations will shift the risk and investment calculus in economies that are not 
already attractive investment destinations (for domestic, but primarily foreign capital) as 
a broader matter. 
While attractive regulatory and market environments are clearly necessary 
conditions, they may not be sufficient to mobilize foreign investment at the scale 
required in markets that simply do not present a sufficient rate of return and may 
present, even at their best, more risk than the potential worth of returns.  The policy 
prescription here essentially tells developing countries to transform their economies as a 
necessary condition for being able to transform their economies, without any of the 
necessary financial and technological support for doing so. These policy transformations 
are meant to substitute for financial support, and, hopefully, make it possible for private 
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sector money to flow. How that presents a different, new or additional solution to the 
broader development challenge is not explained. In order to develop, developing 
countries must therefore ‘develop’ and where they do so, this will obviate the need for 
significant public money and support. 
In the end, the vast majority of financing and transfer will have to come from 
private sector action.  Developed countries hope that the financial shortfall will 
somehow be made up by private sector actors, as long as markets are created and 
regulatory incentives are put in place.  However, where there is insufficient public 
finance to provide support to developing country actors and firms in accessing 
technology hardware and knowledge, a reliance on private finance leaves the additional 
costs of accessing knowledge in the hands of developing country firms and institutions. 
The only way therefore for developing countries to respond is to take regulatory action 
to restructure the market in knowledge and knowledge products so that the costs of 
action are borne by developed country actors, which leads us back to the government 
interventions aimed at regulating prices of products, and regulations aimed at regulating 
prices for accessing knowledge. This is why intellectual property intervention continues 
to be a major structural issue at the core of the climate change negotiations: there is not 
enough money, even were there political will, to provide all the financial support that 
developing countries need to take action to address climate change mitigation and action. 
The recommendation for how developing countries need to transform their 
economies to become more open to investment, have better more predictable legal 
structures, be more open to trade, provide more room for the private sector, reflects the 
long running and ongoing debate on the ways in which developing countries should best 
ensure their broader economic development.856  To a significant extent, these are exactly 
the same policy prescriptions that have been given to developing countries by 
multilateral financing and development institutions for much of the past 3 decades.  It is 
an ongoing debate about which economic model is best suited to ensure development 
and reflects the broader development challenge for developing countries. In that sense, 
it is only realistic to realize that climate change is indeed congruent with the broader 
development challenge. The paucity of direct public funding for climate change 
essentially throws developing countries back into the broader set of policy choices 
regarding how best to ensure economic development more broadly. In the technology 
arena, this therefore involves asking what are the best ways for countries to ensure that 
they can move up the technology value chain857 , what tools have been historically 
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successful for other countries, and are those tools available to developing countries 
today? This then is the structural reason why intellectual property became and remains 
such an important issue. As the primary international treaty regulating the international 
technology market and interventions that states may make, has TRIPS limited the tools 
once available to countries to enable them to move up the technological value chain and 
develop their economies?  In Chapter 5, I address the role that intellectual property 
plays in economic development, the role it plays in encouraging or limiting technology 
transfer, and the measures that countries have historically used to move up the 
technological value chain. 
IV.5 Conclusions 
The implementing structures for technology transfer in the UNFCCC have 
generally been unsatisfactory for developing countries, in particular because there was 
no specific implementation mandate and methodology.  The funding that has been 
made through these structures has also been generally unsatisfactory, and may continue 
to be so.  This explains to a significant extent why part of the struggle at the UNFCCC 
has been about formal structures and mechanisms and has not focused on the actual 
content of and vectors for technology transfer. However, the persistence of the issue of 
intellectual property in the UNFCCC is not just a political issue but a reflection of the 
basic structure of institutional and financial gaps in the UNFCCC. The next section 
discusses the evolution of the new framework on technology transfer and the role of 
intellectual property in the negotiations for that framework. 
 
V. DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER FRAMEWORK AND THE ROLE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AT THE UNFCCC 
 
This section aims to describe the process by which the present structures (the 
Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Centre & Network) on 
technology transfer were agreed and the role that the debate on intellectual property 
played in their design.  
From the beginning of the UNFCCC, China has been one of the primary 
countries pushing for effective implementation of technology transfer commitments.  In 
the first meeting of the SBSTA in September 1995, China identified a need for 
renewable energy technologies, and the need for the identification of adaptation 
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technologies.858  Access to technologies protected by intellectual property was raised 
almost immediately as a concern by the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS).859  As 
noted above, discussions moved quickly to a debate on how and when implementation 
should take place and how the UNFCCC should take action.  As the debate wore on, 
intellectual property became a larger and larger part of the debate as developing 
countries came to believe that they were going to have to take unilateral action to 
achieve technology transfer.  The technology transfer debate became particularly acute 
by the time of the Bali Conference.  By the time of Bali the discussion had divided into 
two parts: new institutions to replace the EGTT; and proposals for intellectual property. 
The disagreement on the role of the EGTT continued into the next meeting of 
the SBSTA and into the Bali COP.  Despite a significant push from the G77 plus China, 
no new financing or implementing mechanism was established at Bali.860  Negotiations 
on technology transfer were a major stumbling block at Bali and were among the last 
issues to be resolved.861   
The issue of intellectual property (IP), and the possibility that it may be a 
barrier to technology transfer, continued to be a significant part of the debate at Bali and 
in the post-Bali period.862  Under the theme of “Enabling environments for technology 
transfer”, the Parties at Bali recommended that all Parties “avoid trade and intellectual 
property rights policies, or lack thereof, restricting transfer of technology.”863  Common 
ground on the interpretation of this recommendation, however, was not forthcoming.   
The discussions on IP as it relates to technology transfer accelerated when the 
AWGLCA began meeting in 2008.  In Bonn, Parties put forward different views on 
how IP could be best addressed within the framework on technology transfer.864 Some 
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Parties also suggested that a working group be established to “review the barriers in 
trade policies and agreements, including the lack of a special intellectual property rights 
(IPRs) regime for climate-friendly technologies and inappropriate use of trade-related 
financing policies of multilateral financial institutions, with special consideration being 
given to supporting positive sustainable development aims”865  which did not occur. 
In 2008 a key development was a proposal from the G77 plus China for a 
comprehensive technology transfer mechanism under the Convention, submitted on the 
last day of the August 2008 meeting in Accra, Ghana.866  It made two key proposals: a 
centralized implementation body within the UNFCCC with sub-bodies responsible: for 
creating implementation strategies, providing technical expertise, measuring and 
verifying technology financing and transfer; and a Multilateral Climate Technology Fund 
under the UNFCCC.  This was a distillation of previous proposals along with some 
more detail on Technology Action Plans and what activities would be covered under the 
fund.  The proposal made no mention of intellectual property.  Over the course of 
negotiations in 2008 and in 2009 leading up to Cancun in 2010, the G77 text was further 
elaborated and included into the formal negotiating text. At COP 15 in Copenhagen in 
2009, states reached no agreements on draft decisions on technology transfer that were 
put forward by the AWGLCA. 867  That decision contained bracketed language on 
intellectual property in paragraph 6(f) on purchasing of licenses and other IP issues868, 
paragraph 10(j), on the mandate of the technology mechanism to address IP issues; and 
a whole section on intellectual property based on the G77 and Bolivia proposals. The 
COP decided to forward the draft decision into the AWGLCA in 2010 for further 
negotiations resulting in the text that was put forward in August 2010 in preparation for 
the October 2010 Tianjin meeting, and which was further elaborated in that meeting and 
forwarded to the Conference of the Parties (COP) in Cancun.   
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The 2010 AWGLCA negotiating text 869  reflects the importance of IP to 
developing countries, both substantively and as a bargaining chip. The main text on IP 
stated two options: 
[Intellectual Property Rights  
13.  
Option 1:   
No reference to Intellectual Property Rights in the text  
 
Option 2:   
Decides that: 
Any  international  agreement  on  intellectual  property  shall  not  be  
interpreted  or implemented  in  a  manner  that  limits  or  prevents  any  Party  
from  taking  any  measures  to address  adaptation  or  mitigation  of  climate  
change,  in  particular  the  development  and enhancement  of  endogenous  
capacities  and  technologies  of  developing  countries  and transfer of, and 
access to, environmentally sound technologies and know-how;  
 
Specific and urgent measures shall be taken and mechanisms developed to 
remove barriers to the development and transfer of technologies arising from 
intellectual property rights protection, in particular:  
 
(a) Creation  of  a  Global  Technology  Intellectual  Property  Rights  Pool  for 
Climate Change that promotes and ensures access to intellectual property 
protected technologies and the associated know-how to developing countries 
on non-exclusive royalty-free terms;   
 
(b)  Take  steps  to  ensure  sharing  of  publicly  funded  technologies  and  
related know-how,  including by  making  the  technologies  and  know-how  
available  in  the public   domain   in   a   manner   that   promotes   transfer   
of   and/or   access   to environmentally  sound  technology  and  know-how  
to  developing  countries  on royalty-free terms;  
 
Parties  shall  take  all  necessary  steps  in  all  relevant  forums  to  exclude  
from Intellectual Property Rights protection, and revoke any  such existing 
intellectual property right protection in developing countries and least 
developed countries on environmentally sound  technologies  to  adapt  to  and  
mitigate  climate  change,  including  those  developed through  funding  by  
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governments  or  international  agencies  and  those  involving  use  of genetic 
resources that are used for adaptation and mitigation of climate change;  
 
Developing countries have the right to make use of the full flexibilities 
contained in the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
agreement, including compulsory licensing;  
 
The  Technology  Executive  Committee  shall  recommend  to  the  
Conference  of  the Parties international actions to support the removal of 
barriers to technology development and transfer, including those arising from 
intellectual property rights.]; 
 
The text reflects a fundamental tension between the developed countries, 
especially the US, EU and Japan, on one hand, and developing countries, largely in the 
G77 plus China grouping on the other.  The developed countries generally supported 
Option 1, that there should be no negotiation of IP issues in the UNFCCC and that 
there is no need to, given what they believe to be the lack of any empirical evidence that 
IP poses a problem for the majority of developing countries.870  Developing countries, 
particularly within the G77 plus China grouping, supported Option 2 believing that to 
ensure transfer and access to climate technologies, the international IP system must be 
re-interpreted, reformed or fundamentally altered. The text in option 2 reflects that 
range of opinion from the mainstream elements of paragraph 2 (patent pools, access to 
publicly funded technologies) to the more radical proposals for patent exclusions in the 
third paragraph. 
There is clearly some sense in which the lack of trust around IP issues between 
developed countries and developing countries that has been embodied in the history of 
discussions UNFCCC created an impasse. The sense of necessary good faith to begin 
having negotiations about the issue was and continues, to be, lacking.  However, that 
good faith was more apparent on the institutional track. 
The Cancun Agreements flowing from the 16th Conference of the Parties 
established a Green Climate Fund as an operating entity of the Convention871  and 
developed countries committed to providing 100 billion US dollars per year by 2020 to 
meet the mitigation and adaptation needs of developing countries. 872  The Cancun 
Agreements also decided on the establishment of a Technology Mechanism consisting 
of a Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and a Climate Technology Centre and 
Network (CTC&N), a development with its roots in the G77 proposal from Accra in 
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2008. The TEC is mandated to recommend “actions to address the barriers to 
technology development and transfer in order to enable enhanced action on mitigation 
and adaptation” but makes no mention of intellectual property.873  The post-Cancun 
negotiations saw the issue of intellectual property fall off the table and the focus of 
discussions move to the organization and institutional linkages for the Technology 
Mechanism.  At the sessions of the AWGLCA held in April 2011 in Bangkok and in 
Bonn in June 2011, the negotiating text from Tianjin remained the official one with no 
alterations on the language on intellectual property.874 However, by the end of the third 
and fourth part of the resumed 14th session of the AWGLCA in October 2011 in 
Panama, and in December in Durban, the document put forward by the Chair as a draft 
decision of the AWGLCA to the COP875, on his own authority, did not contain any 
language relating to intellectual property and focused almost exclusively on issues 
relating to the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Centre 
and Network. This appears to have occurred due to the inability of the AWGLCA to 
forward an official decision to the COP, largely due to the objections of Bolivia.876 The 
language on Intellectual property was relegated to an in-session conference paper877, 
with language stating: 
Intellectual property issues in relation to technology 
66.  Consistent with the principles of the Convention and to enable meaningful 
mitigation and adaptation actions in developing countries, the flexibilities of 
the international regime of intellectual property as articulated by the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights may be 
used to the fullest extent by developing country Parties to address adaptation 
or mitigation of climate change, in order to enable them to create a sound and 
viable technological base; accordingly, consistent with the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, each Party retains its 
right to grant compulsory licences and the freedom to determine the grounds 
upon which such licences are granted; specific and urgent measures shall be 
taken by developed country Parties to enhance the development and transfer 
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outcome to be presented to the Conference of the Parties for adoption at its seventeenth session - Note 
by the Chair, FCCC/AWGLCA/2011/CRP.39 (2011).  
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of technologies at different stages of the technology cycle covered by 
intellectual property rights to developing country Parties; 
67.  The removal of all obstacles, including intellectual property rights and 
patents on climate-related technologies to ensure the transfer of technology to 
developing countries. 
This paper serves only as a reference for the decision made in Durban but 
does not appear to serve as a negotiating text for the post-Durban period.878 
The status of the 2010 AWGLCA negotiating text which contained language 
on intellectual property remains unclear, especially in light of the agreements in Durban. 
It is still nominally on the table but when the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban 
Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) replaced the AWGLCA at the end of 2012,879 
unfinished agenda items, such as intellectual property, did not explicitly make their way 
onto the agenda of the ADP. 
The details of what the Technology Mechanism should do were further 
elaborated at COP 17 in Durban. The terms of reference for the CTC&N were outlined 
and a process established for selection of the CTC&N host.880 The Green Climate Fund 
was launched, but nothing was mentioned in terms of whether or not it would fund 
direct purchase of patents or licensing thereof. However, the Fund is mandated to 
provide financial support for technology development and transfer (defined as 
technology research, development, demonstration, deployment and diffusion) including 
especially for carbon capture and storage.881  This is limited to the full and agreed 
“incremental costs’. It remains to be seen what definition of incremental costs will be 
applied by the GCF in its operation and whether it will use the definitions developed 
under the Montreal Protocol, by the Clean Technology Fund or that used by the GEF.   
                                                        
 
878 p2, Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the 
Convention to be presented to the Conference of the Parties for adoption at its seventeenth session - 
Draft conclusions proposed by the Chair, FCCC/AWGLCA/2011/L.4 (2011).  
879 para. 1, Decision 1/CP.17, Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for 
Enhanced Action, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its seventeenth session, held in Durban 
from 28 November to11 December 2011 – Addendum Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the 
Parties at its seventeenth session, FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 (2012).  
880 paras. 133, 136, Decision 2/CP.17, Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term 
Cooperative Action under the Convention, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its seventeenth 
session, held in Durban from 28 November to11 December 2011 – Addendum Part Two: Action taken by 
the Conference of the Parties at its seventeenth session, FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 (2012).  
881 Para 135, Annex to Decision 3/CP.17, Launching the Green Climate Fund, in Report of the Conference 
of the Parties on its seventeenth session, held in Durban from 28 November to11 December 2011 – 
Addendum Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its seventeenth session, 
FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 (2012).  
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Most importantly the modalities for the Technology Executive Committee 
were further elaborated at Durban.  The TEC may make policy recommendations to the 
COP to address barriers to technology development and transfer. 882  The text and 
language on intellectual property has dropped off the table and no longer appears as 
part of any decision or negotiating text in the post-Cancun period. However, intellectual 
property has been taken up in the TEC as part of the enabling environment framework 
and included in a series of thematic dialogues.883 In the discussion on the agenda for the 
ADP, several countries argued that intellectual property needs to be a part of the 
negotiations.884  However, intellectual property has yet to reappear on the ADP agenda 
as of writing. 
More activity has taken place on the TEC and CTC&N. A host for the 
CTC&N was chosen at COP 18: a consortium led by UNEP.885 The Advisory Board of 
the TM was established and began operating although modalities for interaction with the 
TEC and the CTC&N remain ambiguous.  The CTC&N is the main structure in the 
UNFCCC for assisting developing countries with technology transfer.  However, it is 
important to note that the mandate of both institutions remains facilitative and that they 
have no mandate to actually take an active role in transactions or direct funding of 
technology transfer.  The CTC&N can carry out significant advisory work on policies 
and measures for developing countries to adopt, as well as assist in constructing projects 
and programmes, and in setting up collaborations. However, funding for all these plans, 
policies and measures will still have to be sought from either the Green Climate Fund 
directly or other financial sources and it remains unclear at this stage whether the 
CTC&N views itself as being in a position to assist countries in constructing 
applications for funding of programs and projects it has helped countries design. The 3 
year work programme for the CTC&N approved by the Advisory Board in September 
2013886, appears to be primarily focused on information activities and advisory services 
on a traditional technical assistance model.  It is funded through donor funds rather 
than any regular, predictable source. It receives no funds from the GCF for its 
                                                        
 
882 Para 6(a), Annex to Decision 4/CP.17, Technology Executive Committee – modalities and procedures, 
in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its seventeenth session, held in Durban from 28 November 
to11 December 2011 – Addendum Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its 
seventeenth session, FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 (2012).  
883 UNFCCC “Thematic Dialogue on Enabling Environments” Technology Executive Committee, Bangkok, 
Thailand, from 6-8 September 2012. 
884 See p6, Earth Negotiations Bulletin “Summary of the Bangkok Climate Talks: 30 August – 5 September 
2012” Vol. 12 No. 555, 8 September 2012. 
885 (http://www.unep.org/climatechange/CTC&N/) (last visited 15 August 2014). 
886 UNFCCC “Draft Programme of Work: Climate Technology Centre and Network” September 2013. 
Available at: 
http://www.unep.org/climatechange/CTC&N/Portals/50212/Documents/PDF/CTC&N%20Program
me%20of%20Work.pdf (last visited 15 August 2014). 
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operations and provides no direct funds to developing countries to implement their 
projects and programmes. There appear to be no plans at this stage to assist developing 
countries in applying for funds for implementation from the GCF or other funders. It 
does not provide any facilitative mechanisms such as platforms for matching sellers and 
buyers, no platforms for licensing or exchange.  In addition, to the extent that the 
CTC&N is providing policy advice on issues such as how to encourage innovation and 
transfer into climate technologies, it is unclear on what empirical or ideological basis 
they would be doing so.  Despite the hard-won effort to establish an implementation 
mechanism within the UNFCCC for technology transfer, the existing programme of 
work of the Technology Mechanism remains mired in information and advisory 
activities with no direct link to funding for activities identified and planned by 
developing countries.  What the CTC&N will deliver is knowledge and information and 
assistance in formulating policies and measures but none in implementing them. This is 
both something built into the structure of the CTC&N but also an indication of how 
cautiously it is approaching the boundaries of its mandate.  However, the CTC&N 
presents a real opportunity and platform for action on technology transfer and in 
Chapter 9, I outline some of the ways in which it may be able to improve on prior 
mechanisms to address their weaknesses. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
It is this pattern of experiences related to three core issues: lack of financing 
for existing mechanisms; structural deficits in mechanisms such as the CDM, and a lack 
of implementation mechanisms within the UNFCCC that has prompted developing 
countries to pursue the option of unilateral measures.  To a significant extent, were 
developed countries to provide all the funding necessary for developing countries to 
access and purchase hardware and knowledge, and be able to adopt and adapt the 
technologies, there would be somewhat less to discuss in the realm of intellectual 
property.  However, it is precisely because developing countries have sought to exercise 
some kind of unilateral measures that the issue of whether the UNFCCC should address 
intellectual property has arisen. There are two main issues: claims by developed 
countries that they can do little to influence the behaviour of technology holders in their 
countries; developing country claims that intellectual property holders are unable or 
unwilling to transfer best available and/or appropriate technologies.  This is what has 
raised the salience of the intellectual property to issue to such a level that it remains one 
of the most contentious elements in negotiations and may serve as a barrier to 
persuading developing countries to take on emissions reduction obligations.  
While there is little likelihood that positions on intellectual property will shift 
significantly in the near term, contributions from empirical and legal analyses may help 
to clarify discussions.  It is more important, now more than ever, to have a clearer sense, 
not just of the actual distribution and future distribution of patents and trade secrets, 
but perhaps more importantly, what legal room may actually exist for parties to take 
action, if and when they recognize that intellectual property problems arise. Where a 
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proper legal analysis shows that there does actually exist sufficient ability and room for 
member states to take action to address IP-related barriers, commensurate with 
UNFCCC principles of historical responsibility and common but differentiated 
responsibilities, the need for action at the UNFCCC and other venues would be 
obviated.  Were the opposite to be found, then there would be significant justification 
for some action to be taken at the UNFCCC and for a new approach to the relationship 
between the UNFCCCC and other IP-related regimes. In the next Chapter, I identify 
the intellectual property interventions that countries may wish to take as a basis for the 
barrier analysis in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 5 
Identifying the Range  
of Intellectual Property  
Policy Interventions  
 
 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to create a list of the types of interventions 
relating to intellectual property that countries have taken, and are taking, to ensure 
technology transfer.  These measures will each be examined for their availability under 
the TRIPS Agreement in Chapter 6.  As this exercise proceeds, it is important to note 
that the aim of the examination is to determine the policy space available to countries to 
address intellectual property issues if and when they arise.  Chapter 3 of this thesis 
addressed the data on the extent to which patent and licensing problems exist and 
pointed to several structural reasons why there is indeed such a likelihood, even in the 
absence of solid empirical data one way or the other.  Information on both the empirical 
and the capacity questions is necessary to determine the necessity and the scale of 
UNFCCC action to address intellectual property. 
The debate on the relationship between intellectual property and technology 
transfer beyond the confines of climate technologies is both long-running and freighted 
with ideological baggage.  It has also generally been conducted in the context of political 
fights such as the North – South struggle over proper policies to ensure economic 
development.  This has tended to drown out the few areas of consensus and agreement 
as to the mechanisms and the data on the determinants of technology transfer and the 
role of intellectual property.  However, the paucity of data and certainty on how well 
intellectual property works as a mechanism for generating innovation, for enabling 
cross-border exchange in technology, and for contributing to development has also 
made it difficult to build a coherent picture of the appropriate set of policies that 
countries should follow to ensure economic development through technology 
development and diffusion.  This chapter will not attempt to answer that question in 
full, but will review the existing literature to point to areas of consensus that are relevant 
to technology transfer of climate technologies, areas where there is little consensus, and 
try to extract from the existing empirical work, the set of interventions that have been 
used to encourage technology transfer and move up the technology value chain.  
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The first part of this chapter will outline some of the discussion about the role 
that intellectual property plays in technology transfer.  It will introduce some of the 
basic concepts and discuss some of the tools used to structure markets in technology 
products and knowledge. This will be followed by an examination of the historical 
experience of other economies in moving up the technology value chain.   Out of this, I 
will identify the types of measures that have historically been used to encourage or 
regulate technology transfer spillovers and use as a basis for analysis in Chapter 6. 
 
II. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY BEYOND THE BORDER 
 
In the case of climate change, we are primarily concerned with patents, as the 
primary form of IP that implicates technology transfer. At the core, patents are designed 
as an incentive system to encourage the production and dissemination of new 
knowledge and information. The primary incentive is to encourage the translation of 
research into technological products, and to have the methods of producing those 
products, and the products themselves diffused. The traditional and consensus 
explanation is that, to do so, it has proven necessary to provide limited periods of 
exclusivity to inventors so that, rather than keep their inventions secret, they are willing 
to produce and share them through commercial activities such as sales and licensing.887   
Intellectual property is a solution to the problem of the production of public 
goods.  The aim is to provide sufficient incentive for private sector actors to invest in 
the generation of new knowledge and products, but to ensure that there is sufficient 
spill-over of knowledge during the life-time of the protection provided and beyond.888  
This is the classic structure underlying the patent system which provides the strongest 
potential for exclusivity.  Of the existing forms of intellectual property protection, they 
are designed to provide the least amount of knowledge spillovers during their lifetime.  
However, because of the strength of the exclusivity provided by patents, they may 
sometimes have negative effects. For example, patents can create a type of monopoly 
control through the exclusive rights they confer on the owners of patented technology 
or knowledge. In this sense they may reduce competition, maintaining high prices for a 
product above marginal cost of production as the patent owner has little incentive to 
lower the price of the technology or make it more competitive. In addition, they can 
impose an absolute barrier to entry into both the technology and product market by 
refusing to allow potential competitors access to the technology.  At this basic level, 
intellectual property policy is a trade-off between present (static) anti-competitive costs 
and the generation of future technologies (dynamic cost).   
                                                        
 
887 See p9, Maskus, K & J Reichman (eds.) International Public Goods and Transfer of Technology under a 
Globalized Intellectual Property Regime, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
888 See p8, Id. 
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Achieving a balance between static and dynamic efficiency is complex enough 
in a purely domestic market. The problem in a global market is that there may be very 
large international spill-overs.889  In a system with low international trade in products 
and services, such spill-overs pose little problem as they will tend to equalize over time.  
If all countries provide protection for their own citizens but no protection for non-
citizens, all countries will benefit from spill-overs from other countries, and innovators 
can simply block products from other countries at the border.  However, in a system 
with a significant amount of international trade (both bilateral and multilateral), the 
ability to gain protection in multiple markets becomes increasingly important. In a 
system where there are asymmetries in innovative capacity and thus the number and 
distribution of rightholders, there is an incentive for countries that are net importers of 
knowledge and technologies to provide little or no protection for rightholders from 
other countries.890  Countries that are net exporters have a strong incentive to seek 
protection in other countries and, at the very least, to be treated at the same level as 
nationals. This principle of national treatment is a fundamental element of international 
treaties on intellectual property.891  It requires national level policies on spillovers that 
treat both domestic and foreign rightholders equally, but does not require that all 
countries have the same policies on how and when to take action to increase or reduce 
the level of spillovers into their domestic market.  Of course, existing asymmetries in 
innovative capacity suggest that those countries that are net importers may have policies 
more focused on ensuring greater spill-overs as most of the rightholders in their 
economies will be foreign rightholders in many cases.  This may be the strategy that was 
followed by so-called ‘imitator’ economies such as Japan and South Korea in the pre-
WTO era, and now China in the post-WTO era.  
Net exporter countries have an incentive to seek not just national treatment, 
but intellectual property protection on a par with that provided to firms in their home 
markets, especially with respect to policies that increase spillovers and enable faster 
learning by potential competitors. This dynamic between net exporter countries and net 
importer countries results in actions taken by some countries that reduce or negatively 
affect the scope and exercise of intellectual property rights, as part of a broader 
industrial policy framework.  These actions can be targeted at specific technologies and 
sectors, or can sometimes be economy-wide. They can be targeted at products, or can 
be targeted at the knowledge itself.  
 
                                                        
 
889 See p9, Maskus, K & J Reichman (eds.) International Public Goods and Transfer of Technology under a 
Globalized Intellectual Property Regime, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
890 See p284, Maskus, K E and J H. Reichman, "The Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods and the 
Privatization of Global Public Goods" 7 Journal of International Economic Law 279 (2004). 
891 See e.g. Article 2 of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property; Article 3 of the 
TRIPS Agreement. 
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III. MARKET FAILURES IN INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
INTERVENTIONS 
  
Interventions aimed at ensuring technology transfer rely on two things; a 
particular understanding of the ways in which markets can fail to provide technology 
transfer; the specific vectors through which technology transfer occurs.  On the first, 
there is a normative element that presumes that where the market is functioning, 
interventions cannot be justified. There is also an empirical element in determining 
when such market failures occur.  On the second, the vectors for technology transfer 
are largely defined in formal market-based ways, but in a competitive market there are 
also many informal ways that may not be remunerated.   
 
Maskus points to two categories of market failures associated with 
international technology transfer: ones that are built into the structure of technology 
markets, and those that are the result of factors such as policy and differential factor 
endowments e.g. absorptive capacity or purchasing power. 892   He argues that 
interventions need only occur where there are market failures.893 In this regard, this 
thesis agrees that the trigger for action is indeed market failure.  Where I differ is in 
what constitutes a market failure.  Whereas Maskus may prefer an approach that focuses 
on whether certain procedural frameworks exist to enable markets to operate, I argue 
that the focus should be on outcomes defined by supply and demand: is there sufficient 
supply at the level of the market in technology or knowledge, at a price that will enable 
the majority of participants in the market to adopt technologies to meet the demand in 
the product market for goods and services that are reliant on such technologies? In 
addition, while much of Maskus’ argument addresses vertical spillovers (up and down 
the supply chain)894, a key element of what is needed for the climate change challenge is 
an increase in horizontal spill-overs to firms that are not in wholly-owned subsidiary, 
supplier or purchaser relationships to the rightholder and may actually be competitors.  
In analysing market failures, I would focus as much on the lack of horizontal spillovers 
as on vertical spillovers.895  Market failures then fall into two categories: those that are 
inherent in the structure of the market; those that the market is not capable of 
addressing (such as horizontal spillovers to more than a single firm). Problems inherent 
to the market in technologies that affect the scale of private transactions and spillovers 
include896:  
- information asymmetries between technology licensors (who are fully 
cognizant of technology characteristics) and potential licensees (who may 
                                                        
 
892 p15, Maskus, K E “Encouraging International Technology Transfer” ICTSD Issue Paper No. 7, May 2004.  
893 Id. 
894 Id.  
895 See p20, Saggi, K “International technology transfer to developing countries” Economic Paper 64, 
Commonwealth Secretariat (2004). Agreeing that the key issues is horizontal spillovers.  
896 p16, Maskus, K E “Encouraging International Technology Transfer” ICTSD Issue Paper No. 7, May 2004.  
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not have sufficient information to fully evaluate the usefulness of the 
technology);  
- information asymmetries between technology licensors and licensees as to 
the nature and scope of the market into which the technology is being 
licensed making it difficult for licensors to assess the market potential, and 
thus market value and appropriate price of the license; 
- tendencies for technology holders to try to increase the natural (rather 
than just regulatory) excludability of the technology by masking the full 
nature and scope of the technology897: this can occur even where strong 
IP protection exists, through selective disclosure in patent applications, or 
maintenance of key process elements as trade secrets; this impedes normal 
modes of reverse engineering and imitation in a competitive market 
- tendencies to exercise market power to capture elements of product and 
technology markets upstream and downstream from the technology 
market in which the patent is held. 
The structure of private markets can impede access to public goods in areas 
such as climate change, public health and food security.  In such cases problems with 
intellectual property manifest as: 
- Tendencies for technology licensees to insist on exclusive licenses; 
- Tendencies for licensors to insist on transferring only to wholly-owned 
subsidiaries or majority controlled joint ventures; 
- Anticompetitive behaviour that includes: 
o Restrictive licensing terms on geographical scope; 
o Restrictive licensing terms on exports; 
o Engaging in tied sales; 
o Attempt to capture upstream and downstream markets; 
o Requiring licensees who further develop the technology to grant 
ownership or, no-cost exclusive or non-exclusive licenses on 
those newly developed technologies. These are called grant-back 
provisions; 
o Engaging in collusion; e.g. certain kinds of patent pools; 
o Predatory pricing and other behaviour aimed at pushing out local 
market actors; 
o Refusals to license. 
 
                                                        
 
897 p15, Id. 
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These market failures all require interventions from regulators to ensure access 
to technologies, but such interventions need to be targeted. The mechanism by which 
the problems are manifested is crucial. The vector for technology transfer determines 
the scope, applicability and effectiveness of the policy intervention that a country may 
wish to take.  The following section will discuss the role of intellectual property and 
identify the set of regulatory tools that have historically been used by countries to try 
and encourage spillovers and technology transfer. 
 
IV. THE ROLE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN THE VECTORS FOR INTERNATIONAL 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
 
The broader issue of determinants of FDI is only relevant to this discussion 
where we accept that FDI serves as an accurate proxy for measuring international 
technology transfer. This may not be a safe assumption and especially in the context of 
regulatory structures explicitly aimed at restricting technology spillovers related to FDI, 
it may actually be erroneous. Caution should be exercised in evaluating studies and data 
using FDI as a proxy for technology transfer.  However, in the context of examining the 
role that intellectual property protection plays, there may nevertheless be useful 
elements in that broader discussion of the determinants of international technology 
transfer. An additional caveat, addressed in Chapter 1, is that a distinction needs to be 
made between transfers of technological goods and transfers of knowledge.  While these 
both contribute to technological and economic development, for our purposes the 
larger and more important part is transfer of knowledge if the aim is to enable firms in 
all sectors to shift their production processes.  This division is not always clear in the 
studies on determinants of technology transfer, resulting in the conflation of transfers of 
goods with transfer of knowledge. Nevertheless, some lessons can be drawn from the 
literature: 
- Increased trade in technological goods can lead to spillovers in learning as 
well as enabling reverse engineering.898 However, this requires a significant 
learning capacity in firms and existing investment in R&D.899  There is 
evidence from models and some empirical work that higher IP protection 
on average increases trade, but there is no noticeable impact on trade in 
high technology goods.900 Ivus points to a possible reversal of causation 
                                                        
 
898 p17, Maskus, K E “Encouraging International Technology Transfer” ICTSD Issue Paper No. 7, May 2004.  
899 p33, Id. 
900 p35, Fink, C and C Primo Braga, “How Stronger protection of Intellectual Property Rights affects 
Trade” in Maskus, K & C Fink (eds.) Intellectual Property and Development: Lessons from Recent Economic 
Research (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2005). See also Ivus, O, “Do Stronger Intellectual Property 
Rights Raise High-Tech Exports to the Developing World?” No 2008-27, Working Papers, Department of 
Economics, University of Calgary. Available at: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:clg:wpaper:2008-27 
(last visited 15 August 2014). 
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suggesting that opening up to trade leads to higher intellectual property 
protection rather than the other way around.901 This may be especially true 
for the pre-TRIPS period, but less likely for the post-TRIPS period. 
However even in the post-TRIPS period, causation may be difficult to pull 
out as signatories to the TRIPS Agreement simultaneously opened up 
their trade with other countries due to the single undertaking of the 
broader WTO Agreement. 
- As discussed above, given the appropriate regulatory environment, FDI 
may also generate significant spillovers, both through formal mechanisms 
(licensing and actual transfer to vertically integrated subsidiaries) and 
informal mechanisms. 902  The evidence from literature is mixed, 903  but 
leans to at least a positive effect for those countries with significant 
learning capacity in firms and ongoing investment in R&D. This is 
especially true for vertical spillovers rather than horizontal for which the 
evidence is far more mixed.904  However, increasing IPR protection does 
not seem to be linked to significant short term increases in FDI.905 
- Licensing can be a significant channel for technology transfer, provided 
there is sufficient absorptive capacity and capital in the licensee and 
surrounding firms.906  However, the more the licensor is concerned that 
proprietary knowledge may leak, the less likely they are to engage in arms-
length transactions and the more likely they are to license only to wholly 
owned subsidiaries or to joint venture structures over which they have 
significant control.907 They may either refuse to license into the market or 
only license older technologies.  Of course, the level of intellectual 
property protection also plays a role in a licensor’s assessment of likely 
leakage of proprietary technologies. Theoretically, increased patent 
protection should make arm’s length licensing to unaffiliated firms more 
likely.908 
                                                        
 
901 See p3, Ivus, O. 
902 p8, Fink, C and K Maskus “Why we study Intellectual Property Rights and what we have learned” in 
Maskus, K & C Fink (eds.) Intellectual Property and Development: Lessons from Recent Economic Research 
(Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2005). 
903 p18, Maskus, K E “Encouraging International Technology Transfer” ICTSD Issue Paper No. 7, May 2004.  
904 Id. 
905 p8, Fink, C and K Maskus “Why we study Intellectual Property Rights and what we have learned”  
906 p20, Maskus, K E “Encouraging International Technology Transfer”  
907 Id. 
908 p114, Yang, G and K Maskus “Intellectual Property Rights and Licensing: an Econometric Investigation” 
in Maskus, K & C Fink (eds.) Intellectual Property and Development: Lessons from Recent Economic 
Research (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2005). See also Saggi, K “International technology transfer to 
developing countries” Economic Paper 64, Commonwealth Secretariat (2004). 
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- Intellectual property provides a way to reduce the uncertainty and 
transaction costs associated with sharing of knowledge across borders and 
allows both providers and recipients to have secure predictable 
information about the nature and costs of the technology which is the 
subject of the exchange.909  Intellectual property also enables the capture 
of a larger proportion of the spill-overs that would otherwise occur into 
an economy due to licensing, FDI, or trade, allowing and encouraging a 
firm to engage in transactions into an economy.910  Of course, where the 
aim of policies is to maximize such spill-overs, there is a conflict between 
the desires of the foreign firm and those of the industrial policy of the 
domestic government.   This suggests the importance of appropriate 
regulatory structures to manage and encourage spillovers and to prevent 
anticompetitive behaviour.911 
The evidence for whether higher intellectual property protection increases the 
likelihood of technology transfer remains unclear.912 At best, what can be said is that, 
where intellectual property is initially low and protection and enforcement increased, 
there is evidence that increased FDI takes place, especially in middle-income 
countries.913  These findings do not seem to be replicated for low income countries, 
probably in large part due to the fact that they present largely uninteresting markets for 
rightholders, except for perhaps in the realm of pharmaceuticals and agriculture.  
However, as Maskus points out, there are also studies that have found little or no 
correlation between levels of patent protection and inward FDI even for upper middle 
income countries.914 There does however appear to be a positive link between levels of 
IP protection and the complexity and level of technology involved in FDI or licensing: 
low levels of IP protection limit the transfer of high or best available technology.915  For 
countries at a low level on the technology value chain, still moving from imitation to 
innovation, this may not necessarily be a bad thing as the learning basis for building 
innovative capacity will need to be built on earlier more mature technologies before 
adoption of newer, more complex ones. 
                                                        
 
909 p14, Maskus, K “Differentiated Intellectual Property Regimes for Environmental and Climate 
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911 p69, Maskus, K “The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Encouraging Foreign Direct Investment and 
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The studies and data do not tell us a significant amount about the quality of 
that FDI, i.e. whether it results in best available technologies being transferred, the rate 
and scale of spill-overs, and whether the transfers are vertical (into directly owned 
subsidiaries) into joint ventures or horizontal (into independent entities). The evidence 
suggests that it is the certainty of contract enforcement and IP enforcement rather than 
the strength of IP protection that seems to be determinative of decisions to engage in 
technology related market transactions.916 
The data on FDI and capital goods doesn’t tell us whether such transfers were 
to vertically integrated subsidiaries or joint ventures or to genuine third parties, and what 
the scope and speed of such transfers were, but the implication is clear. Reforms that, at 
the very least, ensure compliance with the TRIPS Agreement provide an incentive to 
outside companies to carry out FDI and sell capital and other technological goods, as 
well as license, into middle income countries.  This may also encourage a shift from FDI 
to licensing, although it is not clear whether this increases arm’s length transactions.917  
The data also shows however that there is little or no positive effect for lower income or 
least developing countries, suggesting, that while intellectual property is a factor, it acts 
in conjunction with other market factors such as: purchasing power; market size; and 
domestic absorptive capacity.918 If intellectual property protection was a key driver of 
FDI, then those countries that increased their intellectual property protection the most 
between 1990 and 1995 (largely sub-Saharan Africa) would have seen the largest relative 
increase in FDI share, which was not the case. In fact the region saw a significant drop 
in the share of FDI919, losing out especially to countries like China, India and Brazil. In 
addition, as Ivus points out, many developing countries, former colonies of Britain and 
France, already had relatively high protection of intellectual property due to their 
colonial legacy.  She notes that, by the Ginarte-Park index920, this group increased their 
level of protection by 17% between 1960 and 1990.921 It was only in the period after 
1990 that they were outpaced by developed and emerging economies in their level of 
protection. 
The key is reliable, predictable enforcement rather than IP standards per se.  
Nevertheless, the level of intellectual property protection is a major factor in decisions 
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relating to location of R&D facilities. 922   In specific sectors with low imitation 
thresholds, such as chemicals and pharmaceuticals, levels of IP also influenced FDI 
decisions, although these determined whether the nature of the FDI was to a direct and 
wholly owned subsidiary or to an affiliate or joint venture, rather than deterring FDI as 
a whole.923 
Looking at licensing, the empirical studies on licensing are few and far between 
and suffer from lack of access to licensing contracts.  The empirical case for a link 
between patent strength and licensing is mixed at best.924 A proxy for licensing that is 
often used is volumes and flows of royalties and other licensing fees.  Problematically, it 
is difficult to determine whether increases in such fees reflect actual increases in the 
number of transactions or simply reflect the growth in market power, and thus pricing 
power, that higher intellectual property standards and enforcement provide. 925  
Nevertheless, the existing studies suggest a strong positive relationship between the level 
of intellectual property protection and levels of royalty flows.926  This however, appears 
to hold true only where the initial levels of IPR protection were already relatively 
strong.927 At least one study found that the effect was strongest regarding licensing to 
non-affiliates.928 Another, focusing specifically on the 1995 – 2005 post-TRIPS period 
found a positive relationship between outward royalty flows and levels of intellectual 
property protection.929 
There is also some evidence that stronger patent rights do shift activity from 
FDI towards licensing, although much of that takes place towards local affiliates rather 
than horizontally, and is largely limited to countries with significant imitative capacity.930 
Data from a 2006 study done for the World Bank suggests that where countries do 
indeed strengthen patent rights, there appears to be a corresponding increase in 
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licensing contracts by US firms to developing country firms.931  This is in line with 
evidence suggesting a negative relationship between the level of imitative capacity and 
the willingness to license into a country.932 There are also findings that suggest that, at 
least with respect to middle-income countries, strengthening patent protection increases 
the likelihood of licensing from developed countries.933 The evidence for such a role in 
lower middle income and poorer countries appears to be zero.  However, it is important 
to reiterate that none of these studies are able to determine whether royalty increases are 
a result of the exercise of market power conferred by higher patent protection or are 
evidence of an actual increase in licensing contracts as such.  Even where such an 
increase in licensing contracts is found to occur, we have no information on the terms 
of such contracts which may inhibit spillovers beyond the licensee. 
Higher patent protection may lead to an increase in the number of patents 
registered in a country, and where these are published and fully disclosed they form a 
significant part of the learning environment. There is some evidence that such increases 
in patent registrations and publications lead to greater technology absorption in those 
countries where it takes place.934 This suggests that the disclosure function of the patent 
system is a key policy lever for enabling technology transfer.  However, the studies do 
not take account of the higher costs and reduced spillovers for imitation that result from 
higher patent protection making it difficult to generalize an appropriate cost-benefit 
analysis.935  
These findings also do not examine the consequences of that licensing, which 
is how rapidly after such licensing does the technology licensed diffuse into the local 
economy, at what rate do spill-overs occur and other questions that are key to 
addressing the climate change challenge.  While intellectual property protection and 
patent protection specifically, is well-suited to encouraging cross-border licensing to one 
or two firms in an economy, the more pertinent issue is that intellectual property 
protection simultaneously inhibits the kinds of domestic spill-overs that are required in 
order to properly address climate change.936   What this suggests is that the wrong 
question is being asked. Rather than asking whether licensing into the local economy 
occurs, the more pertinent question will be whether providing greater intellectual 
property protection that inhibits spill-overs does anything more than enable licensing to 
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one firm?  For our purposes, the key is to find that balance point between providing 
sufficient IP protection to provide certainty for transactions to take place, but not so 
much as to inhibit spillovers that occur through imitation, reverse engineering, 
adaptation, and inter-firm personnel movement.  What policies are capable of achieving 
that balance? If that balance is not possible it may be more useful for countries to seek 
to access technologies outside of the IP licensing and FDI model.  Where firms are 
willing to license to multiple actors the issue may be relatively easily answered, but 
where licensing occurs in only a limited fashion, then the problem remains. Even where 
there is willingness to license, any regulatory response will need to address the issue of 
information asymmetries between licensors and licensees that can impede the existence 
and number of transactions. 
More difficult to address is whether, across all these studies, a consistent 
concept of weak (low) or strong (high) levels of intellectual property protection is used, 
enabling consistent comparability.  This has been somewhat addressed by the 
construction and use of indices of patent strength, such as that constructed by Ginarte-
Park.937  This has been the basis for much of Maskus’ analytical work and has proven a 
useful tool.  However, indices such as these can only provide operational definitions, 
and, from a legal perspective, may not allow us to assess whether or not actions to make 
compulsory licensing easier, to require greater patent disclosure, or broader exceptions 
to patent rights would fall into the scope of ‘weaker’ or a ‘weakening’ of intellectual  
property rights.  The Ginarte-Park938 index gives particular weight to membership in 
international agreements but perhaps a truer measure is that of whether such obligations 
are actually implemented in national law.  For much of the pre-TRIPS era, membership 
in the Berne Convention or the Paris Convention was not a reliable indicator of whether 
a country actually had implementing legislation (where the legal system was dualist), and 
whether that implementing legislation was compliant with its obligations under the 
treaty.  Such a factor can be a misleading indicator of the level of protection provided.  
It may also create overlapping confusion when one looks at the actual content of 
national legislation, double counting specific types of provisions that also are required in 
the international treaties themselves. This may overstate the level of patent strength.  In 
looking at the national legislation, another problem of most indices, but the Ginarte-
Park one specifically, is that it focuses on the laws as written 939  and does not 
characterize how they may actually work as expressed in implementing regulations and 
case law. A key example here is the exclusion of software from patenting that can be 
found in the European Patent Convention Article 52(2)(c).  While this appears to be an 
absolute bar, Article 52(3) only excludes such subject matter to the extent that an 
application refers to the subject matter “as such”. This is a crucial proviso because this 
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has led to the practice within the European Patent Office of patents on software being 
allowed provided that one can show that it has a “further technical effect.” This is 
embodied in the Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office940 which 
justifies this by referencing the case law of the Technical Board of Appeals in cases such 
as T1173/97 (Computer Program product) of 1 July 1998.941  This case law has meant 
that a significant amount of software has been patented in the EPC member countries, 
despite what appears to be an absolute ban in Article 52((2)(c).  The strength of the 
patent law of those countries may be understated by the index. Additionally, the Ginarte 
and Park index primarily focuses on TRIPS and TRIPS-plus provisions looking 
particularly at patent terms, subject matter coverage, and a small sample of restrictions 
(working requirements, compulsory licenses), and the extension of patent protection to 
product patents.  While useful, it is clear that the level of strongest protection lies 
beyond the TRIPS Agreement.  What would be useful would be approaches to the 
index that compare, not the strength of patent protection but whether there are 
significant differences between those countries that are TRIPS-compliant with respect 
to the Index and those that provide protection beyond the TRIPS Agreement.  To the 
extent that this would provide a better assessment of the policy options in a post-TRIPS 
environment, no studies have addressed this. 
The evidence that lower levels of IP protection reduce or impede technology 
transfer remains empirically weak and there remains significant debate on the issue.942 
This is in part due to the fact that, where imitative capacity exists, firms may benefit 
from low cost or free access to producing certain technologies, while being able to 
export to other markets where IP protection for the technology is also low or non-
existent.  This can generate and contribute to development of further innovative 
capacity perhaps even to the point that an internal demand for higher protection is 
required as domestic firms become more innovative and less imitative.  The experience 
of other developmental economies that are now considered emerging or developed may 
help to shed some light on the policy mix that has historically been successful at moving 
countries up the value chain. 
V. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER INTERVENTIONS BY NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZING COUNTRIES: A HISTORICAL 
SURVEY  
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In terms of the existence and usefulness of certain policies, some lessons may 
be drawn from the historical practices of some emerging and now industrial economies’ 
industrial policies in the pre-TRIPS era such as Japan, China, South Korea, Taiwan, and 
Singapore. Generally, there is little evidence that many countries moved up the 
technology value chain with an initially high set of intellectually property standards.943  
There is little dispute that the absorption and development of technology played a 
crucial part in the growth of Japan and the newly industrializing economies of South-
East Asia.944 
A study by Khan for the UK Commission on Intellectual Property Rights also 
finds that many now developed countries also used varied mixes of low and high 
intellectual property protection to move up the technology value chain.945 In Britain, 
product patents on chemicals were excluded until 1949 (because of competitiveness 
concerns regarding Germany) and a compensatory liability regime was in place until 
1977 to ensure licenses for agricultural and pharmaceutical products.946 The early French 
system, which had an influence on many others, had a patent of importation, allowing 
patenting of foreign patents already granted elsewhere. 947  It also had a working 
requirement, which was understood as the industrial use or production of the patented 
product or process in the domestic economy. Importation was not sufficient to meet the 
requirement.948. The influential German patent system also used several policy levers to 
ensure technology transfer, such as: product patent exclusions for food, chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals; pre-grant publication of patents; setting up a utility/petty patent 
system; and working requirements. 949  In all these countries, including the US, 
compulsory licenses were a key tool that countries maintained the option of using.  The 
early US system restricted patents to citizens only, before shifting to a system of 
discriminatory fees and finally to one of national treatment.950 The early Japanese system 
emulated the German system closely with a system of utility models, working 
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requirements and exclusion of product patents on food, chemicals and pharmaceuticals 
(until 1975). 951 
Maskus also points to analyses of Japan’s post-war industrialization that 
suggest, not that Japan had low levels of intellectual property protection per se, but that 
Japan had very specific policies in place targeted at innovation in small and medium 
domestic enterprises, while at the same time aimed at ensuring significant diffusion of 
foreign technology into the domestic market.952 He argues that this shows that Japan 
had a complex but deliberate approach to regulating technology flows including: 
- a strong focus on utility models for domestic innovators; 
- limiting each patent to a single claim (until 1988)953; 
- requiring extensive and early pre-grant publication of patent applications; 
- an active pre-grant opposition system; 
- active surveillance by regulatory bodies of terms in licensing contracts; 
- a working requirement with a three year latency period;954 
 
Japan presents a model of strong government led programs aimed at moving 
up the technology value chain through deliberate market structuring innovation and 
diffusion strategies.955 Ajemian notes the active scrutiny that the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry engaged in by setting up a system of approval and surveillance for all 
technology projects in Japan, including ordering revision of terms it viewed as too 
onerous.956 The success of Japan, partly due to preferential access to the US market, led 
to a significant mistrust and caution by US technology holders. They became much 
more aware of the dangers of creating competitors in other countries by engaging in 
overly permissive out-licensing.957 
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Kumar notes that over the history of the utility model system in Japan, the 
majority of grants (up to over 99%, in some studies) were to Japanese applicants. 958 
Maskus also notes that much of the strengthening of patent protection that took place 
in Japan between 1988 and 1993 appears to have largely been driven by foreign firms, 
pressure from the US and a small but significant group of domestic innovator firms.959  
There was no concomitant growth in Japanese R&D that could explain the shift in 
levels and scope of patent protection.   
Maskus also points to the Korean experience as one where, because of the 
small market size, and lack of threatening industries, many technologies were available in 
the public domain in South Korea well into the 1970’s and early ‘80s.960  This was used 
by the increasingly concentrated and government assisted industries to build 
technological capacity first for domestic markets and then for foreign markets where 
possible.  Korea maintained relatively low levels of protection and encouraged firms to 
imitate, and adapt technologies. It excluded product patent protection for food, 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals (until 1987)961 and has a utility model system that has 
historically granted over 90% of models to nationals.962 As Korea shifted from labour 
intensive production and up the value chain, the necessity to access more technology 
and the development of large concentrated export oriented conglomerates (the so-called 
‘chaebols’), Korean firms ran into difficulties exporting into US and European markets. 
In addition, due to their capacity to imitate and innovate, they had become competitors 
to many firms in developed countries, increasing the reluctance of foreign firms to 
partner or license without firmer assurance that proprietary knowledge would not be 
misappropriated or leaked.  Korea also strengthened its patent and IP system between 
1988 and 1993, in part due to threats of trade sanctions.963 In the case of Korea, there 
was a rapid increase in investment in R&D and related productivity following the 
strengthening of the IP system964, potentially related to the large export orientation of 
the chaebols.   Kim et al. also point to the example of Korea, as well as empirical work 
that they carried out to argue that a utility model system is more appropriate for 
developing countries in contrast to developed countries where patents play a stronger 
role in generating economic development.965 Thus they build basic capability before they 
move onto more complex research.  These countries, along with Taiwan did not 
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increase their levels of protection until the late 1980s and early 1990s as they moved into 
more advanced research and development activity and into foreign export markets. 
Japan and South Korea are examples of successful shifts up the value chain by 
countries that appear to have used lower levels of intellectual property protection, 
combined with deliberate and sustained use of policy levers and regulations related to 
patent registration and licensing to enable domestic entry into technology markets, while 
also expanding technology spillovers from foreign firms and rightholders.966  That this 
was inevitably followed by a later period of increased levels of IP protection as a mix of 
the natural growth of an innovative constituency (and the need for export markets) as 
well as clear pressure from developed countries such as the US concerned with the 
competitive disadvantage such policies created for their firms.  This suggests a 
successful strategy for moving up the innovative ladder for lower and middle income 
countries with imitative and absorptive capacity.  Maskus also argues that this pattern 
can be found in countries such as China, Brazil, Mexico, Malaysia and India. 967  
However, much of the activity described above took place before the TRIPS Agreement 
came into force.  There are clearly concerns that TRIPS may pose a significant barrier to 
entry for countries wishing to enter or move up the technological value chain in a 
similar fashion.968   
The case of India’s pharmaceutical industry is also sometimes cited to provide 
support for the premise that lower levels of intellectual property may be necessary for 
the initial steps up the technological value chain.  The Indian Patent Act of 1970, 
specifically aimed at creating and growing a domestic chemicals industry, excluded 
pharmaceuticals (as wells as chemicals and food products) from product patent 
protection. 969  They also reduced the term of process patents in crucial sectors 
(medicines, food) to 7 years. There is significant evidence, in terms of numbers to 
suggest that this was a crucial element of India’s successful creation of a generic 
pharmaceutical industry.970  However, it is important to note that there was an existing 
industry that to some extent demanded these changes.971 Indian firms engaged in active 
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and concerted imitation of new chemical entities almost as soon as they were patented 
in other countries. 972  India became a major supplier of generic medicines to other 
developing countries. There is some evidence that a crucial element of the development 
of India’s pharmaceutical industry was the policy that excluded product patent 
protection for pharmaceuticals and agricultural technologies, allowing the development 
of an imitator/generic industry.973 This success was dependent on a strong skills base, 
low costs of production, minimal additional R&D costs, as well as strong domestic 
markets for cheap products.974  The pharmaceutical experience was not translated as 
successfully into other parts of India’s economy. Kumar argues that these other sectors 
suffered from not having as easy access to knowledge and information as the 
pharmaceutical and chemical sector did through product patent exclusions and other 
policies.975 
China is sometimes treated as a special case in the legal and economic literature. 
The sheer and unique size of the market, combined with the rapid shift from a wholly 
communist driven economy to a state-oligarchic capitalist model has made it difficult to 
draw lessons from its experience for other developing countries. Nevertheless, in 
comparability, it may provide a useful historical comparison to other large newcomer 
states such as the United States in the 19th century.  Much of the shift in economic 
structures and policy in China happened between 1985 and 1995.  This occurred in a 
period during which China was not a member of the WTO and did not have any TRIPS 
obligations.  In particular, between 1990 and 1995, China’s flows of inward FDI 
increased ten-fold. 976  More importantly it was the largest destination for FDI to 
developing countries by a factor of 5.977 China did not become a WTO member until 
2001. This is not to say that China did not strengthen its intellectual property protection 
between 1987 and 1995, or between 1995 and its accession in 2001.  Looking at the 
Ginarte-Park Index 2008978, the average for China between 1960 and 1990 was 1.33, in 
1995 it was 2.12 (Mean: 2.58), in 2000 it was 3.09 (Mean 3.05) and in 2006 it was 4.08 
(Mean: 3.34).   
In 1995, comparatively speaking, it had higher protection than Brazil (1.48), 
Egypt (1.73) and India (1.23). It had lower protection than Argentina (2.73), Chile (3.91), 
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South Korea (3.89), Mexico (3.14), Nigeria (2.86), South Africa (3.39), Taiwan (3.17), 
and Turkey (2.65). 
By 2000, in comparison, it had stronger protection than Egypt (1.86), India 
(2.27), and Nigeria (2.86). It had lower protection than Argentina (3.98), Brazil (3.59), 
Chile (4.28), South Korea (4.13), Mexico (3.68), South Africa (4.25), Taiwan (3.29), and 
Turkey (4.01). 
In 1995 China’s levels of protection were below the mean and in 2000, despite 
the fact that most countries would have had to change their legislation to comply with 
TRIPS, China’s level of protection was just above the mean. By 2006 it was well above 
the mean.  
China’s reputation as a frequent and widespread infringer of intellectual 
property rights arises in part due to deliberate polices that it has historically engaged in 
to ensure spillovers and technology transfer.979  This reputation does not appear to have 
deterred market entry of FDI and trade, although there is evidence of many foreign 
firms being reluctant to engage in arm’s length licensing and to use best available 
technologies in China.980  While there was clearly some increase in the level of China’s 
IP protection policies between 1990 and 2000 (before its accession to the WTO) this did 
not apparently alter the strong perceptions of foreign actors of the high risks of 
intellectual property misappropriation in China.981 In particular this may be due to the 
perceived difficulties in enforcement, even where the law is technically sufficient.982  
Whether and to what extent the TRIPS Agreement limits the ability to move 
up the value chain is both an empirical and a legal question.  The first is to determine 
whether the policy levers that were used by these countries remain sufficiently available 
under the TRIPS Agreement.  If not, are their nevertheless alternatives that may achieve 
much the same ends such as, an increase in the formal market mechanisms for 
technology transfer?  For the moment, there are no studies that point to either a positive 
or negative effect on growth from being TRIPS compliant, although as noted above, 
there appear to be FDI effects. As Maskus points out, some of the concerns about the 
negative effects on access to technology may be addressed by noting that patenting 
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tends not to occur in low-income and lower middle income countries983 , except in 
specific sectors such as health and agriculture, primarily due to their lack of imitative 
capacity and small market size.  In addition, even where technologies may be patented 
there may be several alternatives on the market, ameliorating the pricing power that a 
patent holder would have.  Nevertheless, it is difficult to draw any conclusions for 
whether the effects on welfare (or sustainable development) are positive or negative984, 
except perhaps in very specific circumstances in specific sectors. Theoretically, at least, 
the economic literature points to significant short term static costs to the increase of 
intellectual property protection985, leading to an increased outflow of royalties and fees.  
There are of course dynamic effects, but in an open economy, it is not clear whether 
those effects would be of a scale to off-set the static costs.986 In specific sectors such as 
health, there is some mixed evidence that there may be an increase in the static costs, 
without necessarily being accompanied by a lowering of the dynamic costs of patent 
protection. 987  The example of India suggests that increased patent protection for 
pharmaceuticals did not drive increased innovation in medicines relevant to the majority 
of the Indian population but resulted in an increased focus on medicines and diseases 
with markets in developed countries. 988  This suggests few dynamic benefits from 
increased patent protection. On the other hand, the WHO Commission on Intellectual 
Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health found that, in the period to 2006, prices 
for anti-retroviral medicines were lowered dramatically.989 The Commission attributed 
this to increased generic competition, the TRIPS transition period and pressure on 
pharmaceutical companies from NGO’s and other actors. However, it should be noted 
that increased use of price differentiation and agreements preventing parallel trade may 
also have played a significant part in the lowering of prices. As Fink and Maskus990 point 
out, until more data on the demand and price elasticities for technologies and 
technological products is available, modeling the impact of higher intellectual property 
in developing countries will be difficult, if not unreliable. 
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One final conceptual note relates to the way in which “higher” intellectual 
property is perceived.  As noted earlier in this chapter, firms from high intellectual 
property protecting countries will always believe themselves at a disadvantage in 
countries that do not provide the same level of intellectual property protection as their 
home state.  The built-in structural incentive is that they will always seek to have those 
other countries harmonize with the level of protection that is available in their domestic 
market.  As such, assessment of what is an appropriate level of intellectual property or 
what is a high enough level of intellectual property should not be based on the 
perception, real or otherwise, of such firms that there is insufficient protection of 
intellectual property in foreign markets.  A case in point is the US use of the Special 301 
Report991 which is a mechanism for the US to place countries on watch lists for failing 
to sufficiently protect intellectual property.  It uses the lever of removal of preferential 
trade access as a tool for encouraging countries to meet the concerns expressed by US 
industry through this process. Countries that have appeared on the 2013 Report 992 
include: Canada, Finland, Greece, Israel, Italy, and Mexico. In 2012, the list also 
included Norway. These are countries not usually considered to be failing to provide 
adequate intellectual property protection as a general matter.  All major developing 
countries, (Brazil, China, India,) except South Africa, have been on the list for much of 
its post-TRIPS existence, although no sub-Saharan African countries have appeared on 
the list in the past two years. We should approach with caution statements that suggest 
that increasing the levels of intellectual property protection will be satisfactory to foreign 
firms and will make them more likely to invest.  As with most regulatory incentives 
there is a point at which the cost of the incentive may have diminishing returns on 
shifting the behaviour and perception of the subject of the incentive.   This is especially 
true when the issue of intellectual property is a proxy for concerns about 
competitiveness. In such cases, the goal is not merely protection of intellectual property 
but protection of the existing market share against new entrants with strong imitative 
capacity.  In the climate arena, it is precisely the creation of competitors or new market 
entrants that we are aiming for, and thus the balance between protection of rightholders 
and ensuring spill-overs, formal and informal, is crucial. 
In considering measures to address the role of intellectual property in 
technology transfer, some of the theoretical, empirical and historical evidence discussed 
points to several key lessons.  
First, the ability to duplicate/imitate/adapt technologies has been crucial to 
technological learning that enables moving up the value chain, at least as an initial step. 
The use of policies such as product patent exclusions, utility models993, narrow patent 
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claims and pre-grant publications have clearly contributed to such learning, where such 
capacity existed in domestic firms. There is clearly an appropriate level of intellectual 
property for some countries that lies at the minimum or lower than that of TRIPS and 
which may be better off emphasizing alternative or lower levels of protection. 
Second, given the varied situations of countries, this suggests that a one size 
fits all approach of harmonized intellectual property protection may not be the best 
approach to ensuring development.994  The variation and ambiguity of the existing data 
on the role of intellectual property protection in FDI, licensing and in moving up the 
value chain, suggests that the best approach for developing countries (and in fact all 
countries) is to seek to directly fit the levels and scope of intellectual property protection 
with specific policy goals in specific sectors.  What it also suggests is that while 
minimum intellectual property standards play a key role in international trade and flows 
of technology, even more important is ensuring sufficient policy space for countries to 
design intellectual property policies that will best enable them to move up the value 
chain.  This may involve following the example of countries like Japan, Korea and Japan, 
in some circumstances, or that of the historical experience of the UK in others. Factors 
such as the size of the domestic market, the dependence on imports, and the 
dependence on exports will all play a key role in determining the nature and scope of 
these policies.  The goal of addressing climate change mitigation and adaptation will 
therefore be determinative of many countries’ policies for much of the rest of 21st 
century. While this has significant overlap with the broader development challenge, 
there may also be more urgent need for ensuring technology diffusion in many sectors 
that may require prioritizing static efficiency over dynamic efficiency.  In other sectors, 
the balance may shift in the other direction.  The circumstances of each country will be 
different even in the context of a shared global challenge, placing even more emphasis 
on ensuring sufficient policy space to allow countries to take measures that increase 
technology development and diffusion in their domestic markets. 
Third, the most effective system of technology transfer is one that encourages 
the broadest participation in the innovation system, in particular focusing on small and 
medium enterprises who both may wish to gain protection but also need sufficient room 
to innovate around and have relatively low-cost access.  This implicates the use of utility 
models with low fees, and the use of compensatory liability approaches rather than ones 
focused on the pure right to exclude. 
Finally, the historical evidence implicates a broad portfolio of actions that 
countries appear to have used to successfully move up the technology value chain.  This 
echoes the general consensus that a portfolio approach is fundamental to addressing 
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climate change mitigation, as no single policy is likely to have the necessary impact 
within the given time frame and that different emphases and patterns of policies will be 
required for different countries due to different factor endowments and positions in 
international trade. 
 
 
 
 
VI. CONSTRUCTING A LIST OF THE TYPES OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER INTERVENTIONS 
 
The kinds of IP interventions that are sometimes proposed to address the 
production and access to goods problem include:  
1. Compulsory licenses 
These are licenses which are normally issued by the government, 
without the consent of the right holder, to another economic actor to use the 
patent. The logic is that by doing so, the government ensures downward price 
pressure by creating competition at the level of the product in the consumer 
market, or allows more production to ensure that all the demand in the market 
is met, where the patent holder has insufficient production capacity themselves 
and either is not willing to license or to license at a reasonable price to others 
in the market. These can therefore be aimed at addressing short term supply 
concerns or price spikes, or to address longer term structural weakness in 
pricing and supply.  However, compulsory licenses are also used to address 
anti-competitive behaviour or to address competition concerns relating to large 
mergers between competitors.  In this case, the concern is not the end-
consumer market per se but the potential for creating undue market power 
that will negatively and unduly affect market entry or market participation. In 
such cases, to correct such behaviour, a firm is required to license to a 
competitor on an ongoing basis. This fully exposes the two sides of 
compulsory licenses: those mechanisms aimed at ensuring that patents actually 
serve public welfare during the life of the patent and intervene for specific 
policy reasons; those that aim at ensuring the proper functioning of the 
technology and product market, reinforcing the patent system.  
2. Patent exclusions  
These entail excluding from patentability certain technology sectors 
deemed to be necessary and crucial to achieving specific public policy goals 
such as health or food security. Under the Paris Convention, such exclusions 
were considered to be well within the margin of discretion that a state had to 
manage its industrial property policy, in sectors crucial to their development 
and the public interest.  As noted earlier, many countries prohibited product 
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patents in pharmaceuticals, chemicals and agricultural technologies, so as to 
allow the same products to be produced by novel and inventive processes, 
allowing for competition on the product market, ensuring the existence and 
development of a domestic industry and ensuring sufficient price competition 
to provide access to such products for their citizens.  This is in addition to the 
subject matter exclusions that countries also provide related to certain 
technologies that are considered outside the appropriate subject matter such as 
computer programs, business methods, plants and animals. In most cases these 
are exclusions where the products are not considered to be “inventions’ within 
the meaning of the domestic law.  
3. Parallel imports,  
This involves allowing the import of goods produced and legally 
placed on the market in another country, or because the technology is not 
patent protected. This is possible where a producer of patented goods sells 
them (or allows an authorized distributor to do so) at a different price in 
different national markets 995  and the country has a policy of international 
exhaustion, where a patent right to control the sale of goods is exhausted after 
the first sale anywhere in the world.  In that case, a product can then be 
imported from that other country, even where the product may still be 
protected in the importing country with respect to all the other patents rights. 
In such a case, the right of importation only extends to products placed on the 
market in other countries without some form of authorization from the patent 
holder.   
Addressing the access to goods problem is somewhat different from that of 
access to the technologies.  The reason a differentiation needs to be made is a 
distinction between immediate action and longer term sustainable action.  In an 
emergency, the priority is the production of more goods at a cheaper price in as short a 
period of time as possible. Thus access to the goods is a priority, and concerns regarding 
the generation of future technologies fade into the background. In the climate change 
arena, this is most applicable to climate change adaptation, especially to address climate 
vulnerabilities in food security and health. 
However, if the concern is for long term sustainable action, access to the 
knowledge or technology also needs to be ensured.  This requires a more complex 
policy response, one that measures the gains from enforcing, or otherwise providing 
better technology transfer, versus reducing the levels of exclusive rights available to 
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innovators. This is most relevant to the situation of mitigation technologies, where the 
goal is to ensure sufficient dissemination to enable appropriate action in the near term 
(in many cases, significant reductions will need to take place by 2020); while ensuring 
sufficient incentives to create a knowledge market in climate technologies that will serve 
to sustain GHG emissions reductions through 2050 and beyond.  This means that, for 
those countries with sufficient manufacturing and absorptive capacity, levels of IP 
protection that provide a strong enough market signal to outside companies to ensure 
voluntary licensing and FDI are a vital part of the policy mix.996 However, there is a 
point beyond which the level of protection may provide diminishing returns and it is 
necessary for each country to find the optimal balance for itself and its specific market.  
Of note is that empirical data suggests that, in comparison to other technology sectors, 
patents do not play a large role in providing incentives for research and development for 
environmentally sustainable technologies, although they may play a greater role in 
determining targets for outward flows of FDI and licensing for middle income 
countries.997 However, there is a point beyond which patents and other IP protection 
may inhibit the kinds of positive technology spillovers which are the public policy aim 
of measures to encourage technology transfer in the first place. 
An added complication in the arena of climate technologies is that there may be 
significant elements of technologies that are maintained as trade secrets which fall 
outside the realm of patents as an incentive system and form part of a broader system of 
protection against unfair competition.  Access to such trade secrets, or undisclosed 
information, may be necessary to ensure effective availability and transfer of knowledge. 
Tools appropriate to addressing patent failures, such as compulsory licenses, may not 
necessarily address accompanying trade secrets.998 
Interventions aimed at ensuring access to knowledge and technology include 
those described above as well as the following: 
1. Working requirements 
Under such a requirement, a right holder is required to ‘work’, usually meaning 
to produce, manufacture (and sell) the patented product, use the patented 
process in the domestic market in order to continue to receive patent 
protection. Failure to do so may result in revocation or the issuance of a 
compulsory license. Under Article 5(A) of the Paris Convention, working 
clearly did not include importation. In fact, exercising the patent purely on the 
basis of importation was considered grounds for action, and Article 5(A)(1) 
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was aimed at ensuring that, at the least, forfeiture of the patent was not one of 
the measures used.  Working requirements were regulated in Article 5(A)(4), 
putting a waiting period of 4 years from filing or 3 years from grant, and 
allowing for a patent holder to justify such failure, and limiting the terms of 
compulsory licenses to address non-working to non-exclusive, and non-
transferable ones.  This concern with importation shows that the requirement 
was not really addressed at ensuring access to goods but to the ‘use’ of the 
patent locally.  The main aim is to encourage FDI or licensing by the patent 
holder, either through subsidiaries or joint ventures, out of which will come 
the suite of formal and informal spillovers with respect to the technology.  
Without such local practice, it can become much more difficult for local actors 
to benefit from the demonstration, downstream and upstream learning effects 
that can be natural outcomes of FDI.  Where the FDI is not the preferred 
mode, then licensing to local actors so that they can manufacture the product 
or use the process is an alternative way of meeting the requirement.  
Traditionally, what has not been held to meet the requirement is simple 
importation of the finished patented product or of products produced by a 
patented process, something about which the Paris Convention was very clear 
in Article 5A. In terms of the patent social contract, the working requirement 
aims to ensure that in exchange for the patent right, which is territorial, the 
benefit of the use and application of that patent accrues to the state in which it 
is granted.  Simple disclosure is the formal mechanism, but the informal 
spillover effect of the patent grant does not operate without the network 
effects of having a producer or user of the patent locally.  In this sense it is not 
discriminatory but places foreign patent holders on the same level as national 
patent holders rather than privileging them with the ability to exercise their 
rights without the responsibility of actual participation in the national market.   
2. Exceptions to patent rights 
These allow third parties to engage in and use the patent for stated 
public policy purposes without being considered to have infringed the patent 
e.g. a research exception or an exception for educational institutions.  
Such exceptions can be categorized into three groups: those that 
select out a specific kind of actor who can exercise some or all of the activities 
usually excluded by the patent holder; those that select out a specific act or 
subset of acts that can be carried out with respect to the patented product or 
process by anybody, under certain conditions; those that  select out a specific 
sector or sub-sector in which third parties may carry out activities in relation to 
the patent that they would not be able to do in other sectors. Many exceptions 
tend to be a mix of these, with specific actors carrying activities in a specific 
sector for example.  The Paris Convention does not provide any limitations on 
the purposes or the scope of such exceptions, nor, in fact, does it prescribe a 
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minimum set of rights that must be provided. The exceptions that may be 
relevant in the technology transfer and climate change arena include: 
 Research/experimental use exception – this may be for non-
commercial or commercial purposes. It is also partly built 
into the patent system for disclosure in that other actors 
must be able to experiment with the patent to test if you 
have truly achieved what you claim to have achieved. This 
allows them to seek a license, innovate around the patent, or 
seek a new inventive solution of their own to the problem 
that the patent solves.  Reverse engineering can usually take 
place under the cover of this exception, although in some 
countries it is limited to non-commercial actors or for non-
commercial purposes. 
 Production of use for purposes of regulatory review – the 
patent can be used to meet the requirement for market entry 
established by a regulator. In the case of pharmaceuticals, 
this may be to meet safety and efficacy standards. A generic 
producer can produce the patented product during its 
lifetime on order to obtain marketing approval and enter the 
market as soon as the patent expires.  This is one of two 
exceptions that has been actually tested under dispute 
settlement at TRIPS.999 
 Stockpiling production for market entry once the patent 
expires 
3. Patent exclusions, especially for products;  
4. Patent revocations; 
5. Patent of importation; 
These are no longer that common. In the early period of international 
patent law making, these enabled domestic rightholders to lay claim to patents 
that had been patented elsewhere and increased the speed at which technology 
was imported from other countries.  The need to do this was slowly eroded by 
the growth of global trade, the international patenting system and more 
widespread publication of patent applications.  Their use was also modulated 
by new approaches to the concept of novelty and international rules on the 
priority date from which a patent could be considered novel.  Under the Paris 
Convention’s Article 4, a rightholder had a patent priority date of 12 months 
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from the date of first application in any convention country. This allowed 
them to supersede any patent application in any country during that period.  
After that period, another person could indeed patent that product in the 
country where the patent holder had declined to patent.  This required that the 
country operate a standard of novelty that examined whether the patent was 
not ‘known’ in the territory 1000  in contrast to the present system in most 
countries that the patent was not known anywhere in the world.   
 
6. Compulsory licenses;  including the licensing  of know-how and trade secrets; 
7. Licenses of right or compensatory liability regimes; 
 These are provisions that remove the ability of the rightholder to refuse to 
license but require the user or second-comer innovator to nevertheless 
compensate the rightholder through a negotiated price, a set price, or one 
set by a regulator. 1001 
8. Technology transfer and other performance requirements to qualify for 
establishing foreign direct investment presence;   
9. The application of competition law to address,  
 Required non-assignment or sub-licensing to a third party;  
 Required grant back clauses on improvements;  
 Prohibited production for export; 
 Prohibited production of competing products; 
10. Setting requirements for, or imposing, fair reasonable and non-discriminatory 
terms for licensing of patents that are used in standards or are considered a 
necessity for participation in the market; 
11. Regular, consistent and detailed monitoring of licensing terms in licensing 
contracts to guard against anti-competitive clauses. This may require a pre-
approval and registration process; 
12. Limiting or reducing patent terms, as a whole or in specific sectors; at the 
moment the standard minimum term is at least 20 years under the TRIPS 
Agreement. 
13. Higher fees for applications and renewals for foreign patent applicant firms; 
higher fees for large firms; 
14. Requiring full disclosure of the patent and the best mode known at the time of 
patenting including all know-how required to practise it; 
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15. Requiring early and significant pre-grant publication of patent application, 
coupled with a process for dissemination to local firms; 
16. Instituting formal dissemination mechanisms, beyond publications such as 
quarterly sectoral meetings.  
17. Setting up a patent examination rather than registration system to better 
control the standards and quality of patent granted; - Shifting from patent 
registration to examination while creating and maintaining strong utility model 
registration system; This may involve setting higher inventive step and novelty 
standards; 
18. Limiting  the scope and number of allowable claims per patent; 
19. Strong pre-grant and post-grant opposition procedures; 
20. Allowing reverse engineering, especially of software: even for commercial 
purposes; 
21. Limiting restrictions on the movement and employment of employees once 
they have left the firm, such as non-compete clauses; 
22. Requiring that publicly funded research, where IP rights are allowed to be held 
by the funded organization, be made available via non-exclusive licensing, for a 
flat fee or for free; 
23. Providing specific loans and capital for mergers with and acquisitions 
(shareholdings or outright purchases) of foreign companies with significant 
patent portfolios of relevance to climate change with the express purpose of 
transferring technology, know-how to the acquiring company. 
 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
In considering these unilateral IP interventions developing countries are 
required to comply with the existing international framework for the protection of 
intellectual property, the TRIPS Agreement.  It is precisely the issue of whether such 
interventions are available and in conformity with the TRIPS Agreement that drives 
developing country critiques of the international system and the argument for amending 
or restructuring the international IP framework. The conformity of these options with 
the requirements of the TRIPS Agreement will be examined in Chapter 6  
The discussion above points to an important framework for the chapters that 
follow: markets can be very efficient tools for generation and dissemination of 
technology, but they can also fail.  The key is that they can fail in relatively predictable 
ways, some of which are natural outcomes of the system we have chosen to provide 
incentives.  Actions can be taken within the system to ameliorate or mitigate such 
market failures or problems, relating to supply, demand or market structure.  The tools 
and solutions discussed above and in the following chapters remain largely within the 
realm of the existing system of incentives and course correction for generating and 
disseminating technologies.  In that framing, the role of government is to provide a 
nudge or restructure market behaviour using the intended tools of exceptions, 
limitations and competition law.  
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Chapter 6 
Interpreting TRIPS  
and the limits on 
unilateral action 
 
 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
  
The purpose of this chapter is to serve as a pivot point leading up to the 
conclusion of whether the UNFCCC should take action on intellectual property issues 
and if so, what kind of action should it take.  In Chapter 3 we look at one portion of the 
empirical case, the global distribution of patents and find that there may not be 
sufficient data on which to make a decision but that there are indeed indications of 
structural problems. However, the chapter also concludes that information on the actual 
national market conditions is a fundamental part of the determining necessity to act.  In 
chapter 3, we examine the effectiveness of existing mechanisms for technology transfer 
in the UNFCCC, and suggest why their failure indicates a need to address intellectual 
property at the UNFCCC.  In this chapter we look at the crucial third element, the 
contingent question; whether, in a situation where the behaviour of specific 
intellectual property holders bars or unduly limits, the adoption, adaptation and 
replication of a specific climate technology in a specific domestic sector do 
UNFCCC member states have the tools necessary to address such behaviour or 
are these blocked, or hindered to an undue extent by the TRIPS Agreement? 
 In order to make that determination it is crucial to determine the nature and 
scope of the barrier that TRIPS may pose for developing countries to take unilateral 
action to ensure technology transfer. As noted in Chapter 4, the need for unilateral 
action is driven by developing countries’ argument that insufficient funding and support 
are forthcoming from developed countries at the scale, scope and timing (outlined in 
Chapter 2) necessary for them to meet the climate challenge.  This leaves them little 
option but to seek other regulatory options, a major one being making intellectual 
property interventions, the set of which are identified in Chapter 5. To answer the 
question of whether TRIPS poses a barrier, it is important to reiterate what this thesis 
understands as the definition of a barrier: restriction that limits developing countries 
from: 
1. Appropriately defining necessity as: 
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a. Affordability - ensuring that prices of products are not set 
so high that it is too expensive for all the relevant economic 
actors to afford.  
b. Adoptability - ensuring that prices of products and or 
know-how are not set so high that they make it 
commercially unviable for all relevant actors to adopt 
‘climate-friendly’ technologies. 
c. Adaptability – ensuring sufficient distribution of knowledge 
(information, skills, know-how) to enable a critical number 
of existing producers/service providers in the market to 
adopt, adapt and replicate climate technologies and ensure 
their participation in the market. 
2. Taking actions that:  
a. address the full scope of technologies required by them to 
meet the climate change mitigation and adaptation needs; 
b. at the rate and level of diffusion appropriate to achieving 
those mitigation and adaptation needs; 
c. in the developing countries and regions that most 
effectively meet the climate change need. 
 
To answer this question I begin with a broad examination of the key condition 
for application of flexibilities in the WTO Agreement: the concept of “necessity”. I 
examine this in light of the broader WTO jurisprudence and in light of specific TRIPS-
related cases.   In the second part I examine the flexibilities within the TRIPS 
Agreement itself that address the measures identified in Chapter 5, such as working 
requirements, research exceptions, patent exclusions, and compulsory licenses.  Each 
section will first describe the legal rules governing the measure, and the case law 
interpreting it and then it will outline the possibilities for implementing such measures 
for climate change under the rule. I conclude  each section with an assessment of its 
overall availability. 
The Chapter concludes by looking at the full set of measures identified in 
Chapter 5 and whether, under TRIPS, they are a) legally available b) whether they are 
practically available in terms of the scale and scope of action needed, with special 
reference to emerging economies. 
This analysis will be based on the interpretation of TRIPS provisions using 
traditional interpretive rules under the WTO and general international law, with 
reference to direct WTO case law and decisions, relevant case law and decisions of other 
international bodies and national case law where pertinent.  In particular, I base my 
analysis on the rules in the Dispute Settlement Understanding and subsequent case law 
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applying them in WTO disputes on the determination of jurisdiction, applicable law and 
the application of Section 3 (Interpretation of Treaties) of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties.1002  In particular, Article 31 of the VCLT will be the basis for 
justifying interpretations of TRIPS provisions where I argue that the panels or the 
Appellate Body may have been mistaken or in error and that a provision may be broader 
or narrower than WTO case law provides for. In this sense, this chapter is not purely 
descriptive of the law as it has been interpreted but seeks to establish a sense of the law 
as it is, so that policymakers are not unduly limited in their understandings of what the 
actual scope of a provision may be and provide them with a proper basis for risk 
assessment of whether a dispute may be brought against them for the use of a particular 
intervention.  Nevertheless, I take a conservative approach and attempt to stay largely 
within the existing practice and substance of the WTO Appellate Body, even where I 
may criticize the approach and outcomes. 
 
II. MEETING THE STANDARD OF NECESSITY IN THE WTO AND TRIPS1003 
 
 An examination of whether TRIPS poses a barrier to actions to address climate 
change rests in large part on the approach of the WTO interpretive bodies to the 
broader relationship between the WTO trade regime and the environmental regime and 
the acts considered ‘necessary’ to protect the environment, 
There have been no WTO disputes regarding how actions to address 
environmental concerns should be treated under TRIPS Agreement, although there 
have been significant developments such as the Doha Declaration on Public Health, as 
well as ongoing negotiations under the Doha Round which may provide some indicia. 
However, the broader WTO jurisprudence on exceptions may have a strong influence 
on the interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement. The General Exceptions clause under 
the GATS, for example, has been interpreted in ways similar to those under Article XX 
of the GATT 1947 and the jurisprudence on the ‘necessity’ test in that article may be 
particularly useful in this context.1004  The necessity test can also be found in other 
WTO Agreements including the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures1005 
(SPS Agreement), in Articles 2.1 and 5.6; the Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
                                                        
 
1002 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), Vienna, 23 May 1969 in force  27 January 1980,   
1155 United Nations Treaty Series (1987) 331. 
1003 An earlier version of this chapter was published as Shabalala, D "Challenges for Technology Transfer 
in the Climate Change Arena: What Interactions with the TRIPS Agreement?” in D Prevost and G van 
Calster Research Handbook on Environment, Health and the WTO (London: Edward Elgar 2013.)  
1004 p77, Bernasconi-Osterwalder, N et al., Environment and Trade: A Guide To WTO Jurisprudence 
(London: Earthscan, 2006). 
1005 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Annex 1A to the Marrakesh 
Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement), Marrakesh, 15 April 1994, in 
force 1 January 1995, 1867 United Nations Treaty Series (1995) 4. 
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Trade1006  (TBT Agreement) in Article 2.2; and the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services1007 (GATS) in Article 14. In TRIPS, the necessity test is found in Article 8.1 
where it states:  
Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt 
measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote 
the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and 
technological development, provided that such measures are consistent with 
the provisions of this Agreement (emphasis added). 
 The concept of necessity governs the rules on when states may justify 
otherwise WTO inconsistent actions.  These are usually for a specific purpose and the 
case law evolved and been elaborated to outline when a measure can be considered 
‘necessary’ in light of the purpose it is claimed.   
 
II.1. The Necessity test in the broader WTO jurisprudence 
Within the GATT, the Article XX exceptions are generally the last stop in a 
series of analytical steps looking at like products and discrimination.  It is in the context 
of these exceptions that the public policy aim of a measure is directly addressed.  In this 
context, the question is whether the panel or the Appellate Body will seek to defer to 
the public policy principles embodied by these exceptions, or whether it will take a 
narrow approach that tries to limit their applicability.  In the context of environmental 
measures there is a long history relating in particular to Article XX(b) which allows for 
measures “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health”. 
The ‘necessity’ requirement of Article XX(b), is at the core of how the WTO 
relates to regulations to protect human, animal and plant life and health.  The exact 
scope of this requirement remains unclear, although it has been addressed by several 
WTO panels and the Appellate Body.1008  Initial decisions suggested that a measure 
would qualify only if there were no other available GATT-consistent measures.1009  
Otherwise the least-inconsistent and reasonably available measure would have to be 
                                                        
 
1006 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Annex 1A to the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the 
World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement), Marrakesh, 15 April 1994, in force 1 January 1995, 1867 
United Nations Treaty Series (1995) 4. 
1007 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Annex 1B to the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the 
World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement), Marrakesh, 15 April 1994, in force 1 January 1995, 1867 
United Nations Treaty Series (1995) 4. 
1008 p149, Bernasconi-Osterwalder, N et al., Environment and Trade: A Guide to WTO Jurisprudence 
(London: Earthscan, 2006). 
1009 Para. 5.26, GATT Panel Report, United States Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, L/6439, adopted 7 
November 1989, BISD 36S/345 (US – Section 337 Tariff Act) 
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applied.1010  Further cases also suggested that necessity did not imply that the measure 
should be indispensable, but should make a contribution to achieving its policy objective.  
In other words, the measure does not need to be sufficient, in and of itself, to meet the 
policy goal. 1011  A three factor balancing test was established that took into 
consideration:1012 
i. the contribution made by the (non-indispensable) measure to  the  legitimate 
objective;  
ii. the  importance  of  the  common  interests  or  values protected; and  
iii. the impact of the measure on trade. 
This was a balancing test and outcomes shifted depending on the weight of 
each element in a case.  The higher the common interests or values protected, the 
stronger the necessity.1013 The greater the contribution to the legitimate objective, the 
easier it was to meet necessity. On the other hand, the more trade restrictive the 
measure the less likely it was to pass the necessity test.  Whether an alternative less trade 
restrictive measure was “reasonably available” was measured against whether it would 
accomplish the same goal to the same extent.  The domestic costs of the alternatives 
could also be taken into account.1014 
In July 2011, a panel report applied these standards, especially for Article 
XX(b) in China – Raw Materials.1015 Brought primarily by the US and Europe, the case 
challenged China’s export restrictions (duties and quotas) on primary products and raw 
materials such as bauxite, coke, fluorspar, magnesium,  manganese, silicon metal and 
zinc, and the re-use of scraps from primary production of these raw materials. 
In considering the argument relating to export duties, under which, in any case, 
the panel found that China could not invoke Article XX to defend measures in violation 
of its accession protocol, there are some significant clarifications of how the standard of 
necessity would be applied.  I primarily address the Article XX(b) analysis of the panel 
with respect to China’s export duties and quotas on coke and silicon carbide, and 
looking broadly at primary product exports (EPRs). The Chinese argument on XX(b) 
related to the necessity of  using duties and quotas to create a preference for recycling of 
                                                        
 
1010 Id. 
1011 Para. 161, Appellate Body Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen 
Beef, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, adopted 10 January 2001, DSR 2001:I, 5 (Korea – Various 
Measures on Beef) 
1012 p149, Bernasconi-Osterwalder, N et al. (2006) 
1013 See e.g. Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-
Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001, DSR 2001:VII, 3243 (EC-Asbestos) 
1014 p149, Bernasconi-Osterwalder, N et al. (2006) 
1015 Panel Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, WT/DS394/R 
and Corr.1/WT/DS395/R and Corr.1/WT/DS398/R and Corr.1, circulated to WTO Members 5 July 2011. 
(China – Raw Materials) 
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scrap rather than primary extraction and production of raw materials.1016  The panel 
notes China’s citation of the Appellate Body interpretation in Brazil-Retreaded Tyres1017 in 
support of its contention that a measure should ‘(i) bring about a material contribution 
to the achievement of its objective; and, (ii) be apt  to  produce  a  material  contribution  
to  the  objective  pursued,  even  if  the  contribution  is  not "immediately  
observable."’ 1018   China argued that while the materiality of a contribution can be 
examined by a panel, this cannot extend to an assessment of whether the right level of 
protection was chosen, again citing the Appellate Body in Brazil-Retreaded Tyres.1019 In 
general the panel did not go beyond the bounds of interpretation set up in Brazil-
Retreaded Tyres. In its examination of the evidence the panel suggests that the measures 
must, in their formulation or justification, state the environmental justification. 
Otherwise this may be evidence of post-hoc justifications for the measures.1020 They 
appear to require more than just general relationships to environmental policy but 
specific and internally consistent justifications such that the measure is clear as to what 
its policy goal is.  This begins to almost suggest a ‘primarily’ aimed at test such as that in 
XX(g). We note that the panel cites the inclusion of other aims in China’s supporting 
documents such as ‘energy, transport, the economy and economic development’ to 
suggest that the primary aim is not environmental.1021 The panel seems to require that an 
explicit link must be made between the specific measure and environmental protection 
and that such measures cannot concurrently have other goals beyond the 
environmental.1022 The panel creates a standard that requires not only a statement of 
environmental purpose but how the measure will achieve the goals to be explicitly stated 
in the legislation or the law.1023 Such a measure must then also be carried out in the 
context of a specific and comprehensive framework for protecting the environment and 
not be deduced from an accumulation of the multiplicity of related measures and 
goals.1024 The member must show how it contributes, but apparently this must be done 
in the legislation or rule establishing the measure itself.   
 
In addressing the issue of least trade-restrictive measures, the panel examines 
the availability of alternative measures, and notes that since China argued that it had 
already taken the measures proposed by the complainant, it had negated any argument 
that they are not ‘reasonably available’.  The panel also finds that China’s evidence of the 
implementation of such measures is weak, and concludes that these have not been 
exhausted to such an extent that they are not sufficient alternatives to export duties and 
                                                        
 
1016 para 7.471, Id. 
1017 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WT/DS332/AB/R, 
adopted 17 December 2007, DSR 2007:IV, 1527 (Brazil – Retreaded Tyres). 
1018 para 7.475, Panel Reports, China – Raw Materials 
1019 para 7.479, Id.  
1020 para 7.501, Id. 
1021 para 7.505, Id. 
1022 Id. 
1023 para 7.507, Id. 
1024 para 7.510, Id. 
 249 
 
quotas.1025 In essence, the panel requires that the alternative measure be fully utilized 
and exhausted before it will accept that they are not reasonably available and effective in 
materially contributing to the desired outcome, requiring the ‘necessity’ of export 
restrictions. The panel’s evaluation concludes that while these measures appear to be 
reasonably available, China has not actually shown that it is implementing many of these 
measures and that there is therefore sufficient room for action to achieve its goals by 
implementing such actions rather than by using export restrictions.  
 
One cannot escape the conclusion that while the standards established by the 
Appellate body appear to leave some room in XX(b) for application of environmental 
measures that may restrict trade, the panel’s evidentiary standard is so high that it is less 
likely that such measures would survive. Of particular concern in the argument by the 
panel that alternative measures that have been applied must be used to their full capacity 
before a trade restrictive measure will be found to be justified, rather than focusing on 
the ability to make a material contribution, in concert with other measures.  Clearly, 
export restrictions are viewed by the panel as one step short of the most restrictive kind 
of action that could have been taken i.e. a ban on trade, but the panel’s analysis also 
suggests that the burden for meeting the Article XX(b) standard is quite high, requiring 
not just specific legislation but (i) implementation of the legislation in a way that 
specifically address the individual measures at hand; (ii) within a broader environmental 
regulatory framework, that states exactly how those measure fit into the broader 
framework; (iii) with a clear showing that other WTO-consistent measures have been 
exhausted, before the claimed measure is adopted.  In its appeal 1026, China did not 
address the issue of Article XX(b) and thus the panel’s analysis stands for the moment 
as the most recent application of the Appellate Body’s articulation of the necessity test 
under the GATT 1994. 
 
The necessity test also raises its head in other WTO Agreements including the 
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement), in Articles 2.1 
and 5.6; the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) in Article 2.2; 
and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) in Article 14. While there 
some differences, such as the burden of proof under the SPS Agreement, these 
Agreements also require, to varying extents, that the least trade restrictive option be 
taken, where no alternative consistent measure can be found, rather than lay down a 
standard that focuses on the most effective environmental outcome.   
                                                        
 
1025 para 7.569- 7.570, Panel Reports, China – Raw Materials,  
1026 Appellate Body Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, 
WT/DS394/AB and Corr.1/WT/DS395/AB and Corr.1/WT/DS398/AB and Corr.1, circulated to WTO 
Members 30 January 2012. (China – Raw Materials) 
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In September 2011 a panel report addressed the necessity issue in the TBT 
Agreement in US – Tuna II (Mexico).1027  The case was the third iteration of a long-
running dispute between Mexico and the US regarding its “Dolphin-Safe” tuna labelling 
scheme. In this case, the new issue related to the fact that a regional agreement (AIDPC) 
had established a dolphin-safe certification scheme for the Eastern Tropical Pacific 
Ocean (ETP) region, which allowed for flexibility in national implementation, but 
provided a specific definition of “dolphin-safe”, referring to mortality and injury of 
dolphins, unlike the US definition which refers primarily to the mode of fishing i.e. 
chase and encirclement of dolphins.  The regional agreement allows flexibility in 
implementation of the procedures under the agreement especially to address where the 
national law of the state may conflict with the standard established by the agreement.1028 
Mexico argued that the US standard is inconsistent with Article 2.2 because “its  
objective  is  not  legitimate  or,  in  the  alternative,  it  is  more  trade-restrictive  than  
necessary (emphasis added)  to  fulfil  a  legitimate  objective  taking  account  of  the  
risks  non-fulfilment would create.”1029 Article 2.2 defines legitimate objectives as those 
aimed at addressing “national security requirements; the prevention of deceptive 
practices; protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the 
environment”.   However, unlike Article XX(b) of the GATT which is an exception to 
positive obligations and functions as a defence, the panel characterizes Article 2.2 of the 
TBT agreement as a positive obligation laying the burden on the complainant to show 
that the requirements of the article have not been met.  This is a crucial difference in 
how necessity is measured because the burden of evidence and showing failure to 
comply lies with the complainant.   
The panel adopts a two-step approach: first to determine whether the 
measures pursue a legitimate objective and then whether the measure is more trade-
restrictive than necessary to achieve that objective.1030 In determining ‘necessity’, the 
panel notes that some degree of trade-restrictiveness is clearly envisioned by Article 2.2 
and that the necessity therefore is measured against possible alternative measures that 
would be less-trade restrictive.1031 Unlike GATT Article XX(b), the panel argues that 
necessity in TBT Article 2.2 is measured primarily against trade restrictiveness rather 
than against the necessity for the achievement of the objective.1032 The panel finds more 
support in footnote three to Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement, which also focuses on 
measuring necessity against the availability of less-restrictive trade measures. In that case, 
footnote 3 requires the measure not just to be less-trade restrictive but significantly less 
                                                        
 
1027 Panel Report, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and 
Tuna Products, WT/DS381/R, adopted 13 June 2012, as modified by Appellate Body Report 
WT/DS381/AB/R  (US – Tuna II (Mexico)) 
1028 para 2.41, US – Tuna II (Mexico)  
1029 para 4.55, Id.  
1030 para 7.388, Id. 
1031 para 7.458, Id. 
1032 para 7.460, Id. 
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trade restrictive, which the panel uses as dispositive.1033 The trade-restrictiveness analysis 
is modified by a consideration that any less-restrictive measure must not pose a greater 
risk of non-fulfilment of the legitimate objective.1034  The panel’s standard therefore 
involves a deep examination of exactly how the measure functions, so as to determine 
whether it actually functions to achieve the legitimate objective in the way claimed. This 
then allows the panel to compare it to the complainant’s proposed alternative(s). The 
issue was therefore whether allowing Mexico to use the regional agreement standard 
would accomplish the same level of protection in terms of the dolphin populations 
aimed at by the US measures. 1035   In assessing the comparability of the measures, 
regarding consumer information in achieving the actual level of protection achieved by 
the challenged measure, the panel found that the use in conjunction of the standards in 
the regional agreement with those of the US would indeed be less trade restrictive. The 
panel found that the use of such standards was reasonably available and that the 
standards are equally capable of meeting the actual level of protection provided by the 
challenged measures, at least as far as the consumer information objective is 
concerned. 1036  With respect to the objective of protecting animal health and the 
environment, the panel also finds that the US measures are only truly effective in the 
ETP fisheries region and cannot be considered to actually extend protection of dolphins 
outside of the region. The issue is therefore whether allowing Mexico to use the regional 
agreement standard would accomplish the same level of protection in terms of the 
dolphin populations aimed at by the US measures.1037  The panel finds that it does and 
thus the US measure was not consistent with its obligations under the TBT 
Agreement.1038 
 
The US – Tuna II (Mexico) panel takes the approach that these are positive 
obligations in which the burden lies with the complainant.  In addition, the primary 
assessment lies in the trade-restrictiveness of the measure in relation to other methods. 
However, the panel only requires that the alternative be less trade restrictive while still 
enabling the achievement of the legitimate objective at the level chosen by the 
respondent.  This is supposedly in contrast to GATT XX(b) analyses which are meant 
to measure necessity against the capacity to contribute materially to the aim of 
protecting human, animal or plant life or health. However, the 2011 China-Raw Materials 
panel report suggests that even in such cases, the trade-restrictiveness of the measure is 
the primary measure of necessity even where there is a showing that the challenged 
measure contributes or is apt to contribute to the achievement of the objective. 
 
                                                        
 
1033 para 7.464, Id. 
1034 Id. 
1035 para 7.612, US – Tuna II (Mexico) 
1036 Id., para 7.577-578 
1037 para 7.612, US – Tuna II (Mexico)  
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The Appellate Body reversed the approach taken by the panel on the necessity 
issue and reversed its findings when applying the three factor test it established in this 
case.1039  In particular, the Appellate body argued that trade-restrictiveness should not 
have been treated as dispositive but that there should be a balancing test between the 
three factors, making it possible for the other two to outweigh the trade-restrictiveness 
of the measures.  In particular, the Appellate Body notes that the ‘alternative measure’ 
proposed must be at least as equally able to achieve the objective aimed for by the 
measure, and pose no greater risk of non-fulfillment of the objective, in order for the 
challenged measure to be found inconsistent. 1040  In this case, the Appellate Body 
pointed to the lack of equivalence between the alternative measures proposed by 
Mexico in order to achieve these aims.1041 
The Appellate body restated and re-applied the three factor test which took 
into account:1042 
(i) the degree of contribution made by the measure  to the legitimate 
objective at issue;  
(ii) the trade-restrictiveness of the measure; and  
(iii) the nature of the risks  at  issue  and  the  gravity  of  consequences  
that  would  arise  from  non-fulfilment  of  the  objective(s) 
pursued by the Member through the measure. 
 
The key lesson from this case is the placing of the burden of showing trade 
restrictiveness on the challenger; the need to show that alternative measures would 
achieve an equivalent outcome in pursuit of a legitimate aim under the TBT; that a 
balancing test does not require that ALL three factors be met but that the degree of 
each factor in the balance matters and that even where one or two are in the negative, 
that may still be balanced by a positive in the others. The broad approach in Brazil 
Retreaded Tyres remains in force in terms of how much the measure should contribute: 
We recognize that certain complex public health or environmental 
problems may be tackled only with a comprehensive policy comprising a 
multiplicity of interacting measures. In the short-term, it may prove difficult to 
isolate the contribution to public health or environmental objectives of one 
specific measure from those attributable to the other measures that are part of 
the same comprehensive policy. Moreover, the results obtained from certain 
actions--for instance, measures adopted in order to attenuate  global  warming  
                                                        
 
1039 para 331, Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing 
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and  climate  change  ...--can  only  be  evaluated  with  the  benefit  of  time. 
1043 
This “necessity” jurisprudence in the GATT XX(b), and TBT Article 2.2 cases 
points to a key conclusion : there is a consistent concern for carrying out balancing tests 
that look at the extent to which a measure contributes to the legitimate objective, the 
importance (moral and otherwise) of the value that it is seeking to address1044, weighed 
against the trade restrictiveness of the measure and the availability of less restrictive 
measures.  In addition, general articles such as Article 2.2 of the TBT have been viewed 
as shifting the burden of proof. To the extent that similar terms and language can be 
found in the TRIPS Agreement it appears that such measures should be approached in a 
very similar way.  The broad approach regarding the extent to which a measure 
contributes to the goal brings us much closer to privileging environmental judgment 
over pure trade restrictiveness.  This may be an approach applicable in considering 
necessity within TRIPS. 
The actual application of the standard in GATT article XX to the TRIPS 
Agreement is fairly clear. There can be no direct applicability. As Marceau and 
Trachtman, have argued, it would be more than just a heroic interpretation of the terms 
of the agreement.1045  However, the argument is that the Appellate Body and WTO 
jurisprudence has an interest in having the same term having the same meaning when 
used across the various WTO Agreements unless due cause can be shown as to why it 
should be treated differently.  The next section explores the extent to which the concept 
of necessity in TRIPS shares the same framing, and the extent to which it might be 
made to do so. 
 
II.2. The necessity test in the TRIPS Agreement 
The ‘necessity’ requirement in Article 8.1 of the TRIPS Agreement, states that: 
Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt 
measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote 
the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and 
technological development, provided that such measures are consistent with 
the provisions of this Agreement (emphasis added). 
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There is similarity with respect to the legitimate objectives analyses conducted 
under the GATT, and the TBT agreements.  TRIPS Article 8.1 specifically mentions 
‘public health and nutrition’ as subject matter areas, but also the more general goal ‘to 
promote the public interest’, which is broader than the language in Article XX(b) of the 
GATT 1994, as well as that in Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement and Article 2.2 of the 
TBT.   
Crucially, the wording of Article 8.1 may also be construed as a positive 
obligation of the kind established in Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement and in Article 2.2 
of the TBT Agreement. The burden of proof of non-compliance with Article 8.1 could 
lie on the complaining party to show that such measures were not “necessary”. This 
issue remains unaddressed in the jurisprudence described below, in part because the 
only panel that has addressed the issue appears to have simply treated Article 8.1 as 
synonymous with the limitations and exceptions enumerated in TRIPS Articles 30, 31 
and 40.  
The issue of the burden of proof is complicated by the fact that, unlike GATT 
Article XX exceptions which are premised on the idea that the measures in question are 
not in conformity with the other requirements of the GATT, in the case of Article 8.1 
of the TRIPS Agreement, the test already states that such provisions must be in 
conformity with the TRIPS Agreement before they are tested.  The key part of the 
provision that enables this is final element of the sentence: ‘provided that such measures 
are consistent with the provisions of this agreement.’  The task for any person seeking 
to create some symmetry with Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, Article 5.6 of the SPS 
Agreement and Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994, is to determine the exact effect of 
that last sentence of Article 8.1. 
As an initial premise, we must establish that Article 8 has to be given full effect 
and cannot simply be left as a statement devoid of any specific content.  It cannot be 
that Article 8 is entirely subsumed by article 30 and 31 and other limitations and 
exceptions.1046 The first part of Article 8.1 must be given content separate from that of 
other articles on limitations and exceptions and on balancing rights and obligations.  
Whereas Article 30 (on exceptions) and 31 (on compulsory licenses) can be considered 
specific sub-sets of situations under Article 8, the article itself recognizes a broad right 
that in and of itself constitutes an additional scope beyond those of the ‘exceptions’ in 
the TRIPS Agreement.   
In addition, Article 8 has to be seen as a reiteration of the basic principle of 
state sovereignty and rights to make policy in these crucial areas. As such, restrictions on 
                                                        
 
1046 For a slightly contrary view, see p121, Gervais, D The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis, 
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that broad right must function as exceptions and should be construed narrowly, even 
where those rights are restricted by being submitted to regulation under an international 
treaty. The burden for non-compliance with Article 8 should be on those claiming that 
the discretion under the broad right established by Article 8.1 has been abused.  
However, that burden may be shifted by the last sentence of Article 8.1. We 
are therefore tasked with answering the question of what is meant by “consistent with 
the provisions of this agreement.”  By definition this must of course include ALL the 
TRIPS articles. Thus Article 7 1047  is one of the measures of consistency with the 
agreement, just as much as article 27, 30, or 31. The phrase may also have the 
consequence of shifting the burden of proof that would normally be the case in a 
positive obligation such as this one. In this case, we understand that the burden of 
showing that a measure is not in compliance with the provisions of the TRIPS 
Agreement lies with the defendant.  The question is whether such a finding is final and 
dispositive regarding the TRIPS Agreement. Is it the case that where a measure is found 
to be in violation of one of the rights established by Article 281048, that Article 8 cannot 
be used as an independent defence? That appears to be the case if the language is taken 
literally.  This appears to be the same outcome even where a violation of Article 28 is 
found, AND it is not excused under article 30.1049 Given the literal content of the last 
part of Article 8.1, it does not appear possible to access or give content to the first part 
of Article 8.1 where a measure is already found to be inconsistent with the any of the 
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. Does that mean that the first part of article 8.1 has 
no content?  This would clearly be an absurd outcome and requires some recourse to 
                                                        
 
1047 This requires that the “protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute 
to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the 
mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to 
social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.”.  
1048 Article 28 states: 
1.       A patent shall confer on its owner the following exclusive rights:  
  
(a)     where the subject matter of a patent is a product, to prevent third parties not having 
the owner’s consent from the acts of: making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing(6) 
for these purposes that product; 
  
  
(b)     where the subject matter of a patent is a process, to prevent third parties not having 
the owner’s consent from the act of using the process, and from the acts of: using, offering 
for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes at least the product obtained directly by 
that process. 
  
2.       Patent owners shall also have the right to assign, or transfer by succession, the patent and to 
conclude licensing contracts. 
 
1049 Article 30 states: Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a 
patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the 
patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of 
the legitimate interests of third parties. 
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supplementary materials under Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties.1050 
The formulation in Article 8.1 is unique and not found in any of the other 
WTO covered agreements. For there to be an article that appears to allow flexibility to 
address key issues but conditions that flexibility on compliance is an unusual but, it 
appears, deliberate approach. Some sense of the meaning of the provision can be found 
in looking at the legislative history of the two related provisions,  Article 7 and Article 8 
of the TRIPS Agreement, in the Uruguay Round negotiations. 
The main body of the Anell text1051 included a draft on ‘Principles’:1052  
8. Principles 
8B.1 PARTIES recognize that intellectual property rights are granted not only 
in acknowledgement of the contributions of inventors and creators, but also to 
assist in the diffusion of technological knowledge and its dissemination to 
those who could benefit from it in a manner conducive to social and 
economic welfare and agree that this balance of rights and obligations inherent 
in all systems of intellectual property rights should be observed. 
8B.2 In formulating or amending their national laws and regulations on IPRs, 
PARTIES have the right to adopt appropriate measures to protect public 
morality, national security, public health and nutrition, or to promote public 
interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and 
technological development. 
8B.3 PARTIES agree that the protection and enforcement of intellectual 
property rights should contribute to the promotion of technological 
innovation and enhance the international transfer of technology to the mutual 
advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge. 
With respect to Article 8.1, the later Brussels Draft1053 stated: 
                                                        
 
1050 As argued by Frankel, S “WTO Application of ‘the Customary Rules,’” 46 Va. J. Int’l L. 390 (2006), 
noting that the WTO panels and Appellate body have spent too little time looking at the object and 
purpose of the agreement as required by the interpretive approach of Articles 30 and 31 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
1051 This was a draft titled “Chairs Draft” produced by the Chair of the TRIPS Negotiating Group Mr 
Lars Anell in June 1990, on his own responsibility and then later adopted as a formal negotiating 
document. The text was “Chairman's report to the Group of Negotiation on Goods, document 
MTN.GNG/NG11/W/76, dated July 23, 199 cited by D Gervais “The TRIPS Agreement: Interpretation and 
Implementation” E.I.P.R. 1999, 21(3), 156-162, p157. 
1052 See p 122, ICTSD/UNCTAD Resource Book on TRIPS and Development UNCTAD/ICTSD Capacity 
Building Project on Intellectual Property Rights, June 2005, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005) 
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1. Provided that PARTIES do not derogate from the obligations arising under 
this Agreement, they may, in formulating or amending their national laws and 
regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, 
and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-
economic and technological development. 
The constraint in Article 8.1, as it was finally adopted, is that the measures they 
adopt should not violate the terms of the agreement. The UNCTAD IPRs Resource 
Book suggests that ‘measures adopted by Members to address public health, nutrition 
and matters of vital socio-economic importance should be presumed to be consistent 
with TRIPS, and that any Member seeking to challenge the exercise of discretion should 
bear the burden of proving inconsistency’. 1054  In that sense, this comports with 
approaches from the TBT and SPS Agreements. This approach presumes that the 
sequence of examination begins with whether the measures are of the kind envisioned, 
and if they are, then it goes on to address the issue of whether they are inconsistent. 
Again, this comports with the approach taken under the SPS and TBT Agreements. 
Under such an approach, there therefore exists a difference in scope between Article 30, 
and Article 8.  Where a measure is aimed specifically to “protect public health and 
nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their 
socio-economic and technological development” then Article 8 would create a 
presumption that the measure is consistent that must be rebutted by the complainant.  
This would comport with the structure of Article 30 which requires no subject matter 
limitation on exceptions, or Article 31 which places no subject matter restriction on why 
compulsory licenses can be granted. Article 8 would shift the burden for public interest 
measures whereas all other measures would be directly addressed by Article 30 and 31. 
This would require that a claim be structured in the following way: the complainant 
would assert that a measure either does not fall under those contemplated by Article 8.1, 
and even if they did, the measure was not consistent with the provisions of the TRIPS 
Agreement.  The burden of showing inconsistency would then lie with the complainant 
which can be crucial in the weighing of evidence. This approach however only allows 
Article 8.1 to have a burden shifting role in certain situations. The approach, however, 
does not negate the fact that compliance with Article 8.1 would remain dependent on 
either not violating a right granted by a provision or by coming within the boundaries of 
an exception or limitation enumerated elsewhere in the TRIPS Agreement.  There 
would still be no substantive effect to the first half of Article 8.1 
An alternative approach to that advocated by the authors of the TRIPS 
Resource Book would be to take the approach that measures must be consistent with 
                                                                                                                                   
 
1053 This draft was produced 6 months later at the Brussels Conference in December 1990. See D Gervais 
“The TRIPS Agreement: Interpretation and Implementation” E.I.P.R. 1999, 21(3), 156-162, p157. 
1054 See p 127, ICTSD/UNCTAD Resource Book on TRIPS and Development UNCTAD/ICTSD Capacity 
Building Project on Intellectual Property Rights, June 2005, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005) 
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the TRIPS Agreement before they will be covered by the terms of Article 8.1 In that 
case, an examination of consistency takes place first and if the measures are found to be 
inconsistent, Article 8.1 plays the role of a thumb on the scale to move measures that 
fall under its coverage back into consistency. This would not necessarily be in literal line 
with the wording of the article but not doing so leaves the first part of Article 8 devoid 
of content. The negotiating history, as well as the broader context in which the TRIPS 
Agreement stands suggests that literal consistency with the TRIPS Agreement cannot 
be the limit of the effect of the provision.  Why is the ‘necessity’ language in there if the 
consistency requirement has to be met? Article 8.1 cannot simply be co-terminous with 
the sum of the exceptions and limitations in the agreement. If that is the case why have 
Article 8.1 in the first place? There must already be a sense in which the measures 
contemplated by Article 8 go beyond the strict limits of consistency. Necessity, 
therefore could be seen as controlling how far outside the limits of consistency they may 
go and that it may not allow the provisions of the agreement to be entirely null and void. 
It may be possible to refer back to the broader jurisprudence on ’necessity’ from the 
SPS and TBT Agreements and argue that the necessity test standard of ‘least-
inconsistent and reasonably available measure’ should be applied here. At the very least, 
the option of how the necessity test was construed in the early years should be applied: 
there were no other available TRIPS-consistent measures possible and the least TRIPS-
inconsistent measure was taken.1055 
In addition, Article 8.1 is supported by Article 7, with which the states must 
also comply in their implementation of the TRIPS Agreement 1056 . Authors such as 
Derclaye1057  and Correa1058  argue that Article 7 establishes that intellectual property 
rights clearly must be in service of broader social values. Where the provision of rights 
contradicts or conflicts with broader public welfare goals, the Article provides a means 
by which IP protection can be modified, diminished or removed. Correa also argues that 
while Article 8.1 contains the limitations on ‘consistency’, Article 7 does not and thus, 
one of the provisions with which Article 8 must be consistent is Article 7, as well as the 
preambles.1059  As an overriding principle, interpreters are bound to ensure that Article 7 
is given as much effect as any other provisions of the agreement and cannot be 
considered only hortatory. 
                                                        
 
1055 p149, Bernasconi-Osterwalder, N et al., Environment and Trade: A Guide To WTO Jurisprudence 
Earthscan, London (2006). 
1056 Article 7 states: The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to 
the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the 
mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to 
social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations  
1057 p270, Derclaye, E  ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Global Warming’, 12 J. MARSHALL  REV.  INTELL. 
PROP.  L.  263  (2008).  
1058 p99-101 Correa, C M, Trade  Related  Aspects of Intellectual  Property  Rights:  A  Commentary to The  
TRIPS   Agreement,  , Oxford University Press (2007) 
1059 p107, Id. 
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Article 7 provides guidance for the interpreter of the TRIPS Agreement, 
emphasizing that it is designed to strike a balance among desirable objectives.  As 
Article 7 makes clear, TRIPS negotiators did not mean to abandon a balanced 
perspective on the role of intellectual property in society. However, given the structure 
of Article 8.1 the approach that seems to have won out over others is that  any attempt 
to justify measures to protect health and nutrition and to promote the public interest in 
sectors of vital importance to socio-economic and technological development cannot 
rely solely on Article 7 and 8 but must enter first through other provisions in the TRIPS 
Agreement and then, in the course of applying these articles use the weight of Articles 7 
and 8.1 to tip the scales in favour of justifiable policy actions. This has ostensibly been 
the approach that has been taken in the context of the interpretation of TRIPS 
provisions relating to exceptions and limitations.1060 The interpretation of Article 7 and 
8 remains unclear however as the Appellate Body itself has found that Article 7 and 8 
have yet to be interpreted in a way that provides guidance to their applicability in future 
cases.1061 
The next section addresses the extent to which this issue has been addressed by 
panels with respect to patents, and whether Article 8.1 has truly been given content, 
such that members are actually able to take measures to protect human health and 
nutrition and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to socio-
economic and technological development.  Finding a way to apply necessity within the 
framework of the TRIPS Agreement is crucial if measures to address technology 
transfer of climate technologies are to be available.  Without a balancing test that looks 
at the necessity of action, it may be much harder to justify broad sector-wide actions to 
address climate change as clearly envisioned by Article 8.1.  To the extent that a 
necessity test is not applied in the evaluation of TRIPS measures to address public 
health and nutrition and promote the public interest, the more difficult it may be to 
escape narrow interpretations of TRIPS flexibilities.  The next section examines the 
specific flexibility measures addressed by the TRIPS Agreement, measuring their legal 
availability and their practical availability given the scale and scope.   
 
III. THE AVAILABILITY OF IP MEASURES TO ADDRESS TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER FOR CLIMATE 
CHANGE 
 
III.1. Exceptions to Rights 
III.1.1. Legal Availability 
                                                        
 
1060 para 7.26, Panel Report, Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/R, 
adopted 7 April 2000, DSR 2000:V, 2289 (Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents) 
1061 Para 101, Appellate Body Report, Canada – Term of Patent Protection, WT/DS170/AB/R, adopted 12 
October 2000, DSR 2000:X, 5093 (Canada- Patent Term). 
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The TRIPS Agreement contains no General Exceptions article such as that 
embodied by GATT Article XX, but for each specific category of rights, it establishes a 
standard exception (for copyright in Article 13, for trademarks in Article 17, for patents 
in Article 30).   
In the context of the discussion on transfer of technology, the area of most 
concern is patent law, as well as any technology transfer provisions.  In that context we 
can point not just to Article 8.1, but also to Article 30.1062  
Article 30 was interpreted in the Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents1063 case.  In this 
case, Canada defended the stockpiling of medicines prior to the expiration of a patent as 
well as allowing generic competitors to produce samples of the product for the purposes 
of regulatory approval.  Canada based its entire case on the assertion that the measures 
fell within the Article 30 exceptions. The panel divided the Article 30 test into three, 
cumulative steps. The measure:1064 
(i) must be ‘limited’;  
(ii) must not ‘unreasonably conflict with normal exploitation of the patent’; 
and 
(iii) must not ‘unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent 
owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties.’ 
 
Similarly to Article 13 TRIPS, this article was adopted and somewhat modified 
from the language in Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention.1065 In the context of patent 
law it is sui generis, never having appeared before in any international treaty on industrial 
property. Gervais cautions against the transposition of principles and approaches from 
Article 9(2) Berne Convention on Copyright to one that is primarily aimed at industrial 
property.1066  This is in line with the core difference in rationale for the grant of the right 
and the difference in scope e.g. where copyright protects expressions but not ideas, 
patents protect ideas as well.  While one cannot ignore the intent of creating some 
consistency of approach, this also makes the differences that much more important to 
note. In the case of Article 30, Gervais points to the third step on the need to balance 
the legitimate interests of third parties against those of the right holder as a key textual 
                                                        
 
1062 Article 30 states: Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a 
patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the 
patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of 
the legitimate interests of third parties. 
1063 Panel Report, Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/R, adopted 7 April 
2000, DSR 2000:V, 2289 (Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents) 
1064 para 7.20 Canada-Pharmaceutical Patents 
1065 See p425, Abbott, F “WTO Dispute Settlement Practice Relating to the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Intellectual Property Rights” in Ortino, F and E U Petersmann (eds.) The WTO Dispute Settlement System 
1995-2003 (Amsterdam: Kluwer Law International, 2004) 
1066 See p333, Gervais, D The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis: Third Edition, (London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2008) 
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modification which suggest that Article 30 would have to be read more broadly than 
Article 13 or Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention.1067 
The examination carried out by the Canada-Pharmaceutical Patents panel is 
sequential and cumulative.  All three steps had to be met in sequence, if the measure 
was to be found consistent with Article 30.1068 It is important to note that this need not 
be the case at all.  In the TBT Agreement three factor tests for necessity, the factors 
were balanced against each other. While this has been the practice of panels, the 
Appellate body has yet to address this issue.  This outcome exists in part because the 
parties to the dispute agreed that this should be the sequencing and the panel did not 
dispute their approach.1069 There is little precedent from the interpretation and practice 
under the Berne Convention that suggest that such an approach is required.   
As Abbott notes, the formulation in Article 30 was only adopted after there 
was significant disagreement as to what would be included in an enumerated list of 
exceptions1070 as well as whether such a list would be closed or only exemplary. What 
can at least be presumed from such a failure is that all countries believed the 
formulation encompassed and protected all exceptions to patent rights that they had in 
operation at the time of the signing of TRIPS.  To conclude otherwise is to essentially 
adopt the position of the countries that argued for a limited enumerated list, rather than 
that of countries who argued for the preservation of their own existing patent 
exceptions and the flexibility to provide more.  Gervais points out that the version of 
Article 30 in the Draft of July 23, 1990(W37), creates an exemplary (non-exhaustive) list 
while also allowing for the creation of new exceptions.1071  What list of exceptions can 
we then point to under this reasoning? The first list is that included in the draft: 
a. Rights based on prior use; 
b. Acts done privately and for non-commercial purposes; 
c. Acts done for experimental purposes; 
d. Acts done by a government for purposes merely for its own use; 
e. Extemporaneous preparation of medicines on an individual basis by 
pharmacies; (“pharmacy preparation exception”) 
 
                                                        
 
1067 See p380, Gervais, D The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis: Third Edition, (London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2008) 
1068 para 7.20 Canada-Pharmaceutical Patents 
1069 Id. 
1070 See p425, Abbott, F “WTO Dispute Settlement Practice Relating to the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Intellectual Property Rights” in Ortino, F and E U Petersmann (eds.) The WTO Dispute Settlement System 
1995-2003 (Amsterdam: Kluwer Law International, 2004) 
1071 See p380, Gervais, D The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis: Third Edition, (London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2008) 
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We should note that there is no non-commercial element to the ‘experimental purposes’, 
unlike that for private actions. Garrison also points to other exceptions widely in use 
and accepted at the time of the signing of the TRIPS Agreement, including:1072 
a. Exceptions for use of patented technologies contained in foreign vessels and 
aircraft in in port and in use in international transport; 
b. Civil Aviation Exception (contained as an obligation under Chicago 
Convention on International Civil Aviation of 1944) such as exemption from 
seizure based on patent claims.1073 
As an initial matter, the panel had to first determine the role that Article 8.1 
should play: whether it constituted an independent defence; if not, what role it had on 
the interpretation of Article 30 with respect to burden of proof or the interpretation of 
the terms in Article 30.  The Panel in the Canada-Pharmaceutical Patents case placed the 
burden of proof on the party claiming justification under the exceptions. As noted 
above in discussing the role of Article 8.1, it is not obvious that this would be the case 
given the approach in the TBT Agreement. Reading Article 30 and Article 8.1 together, 
it is equally plausible that since Article 30 contemplates measures which are in conflict 
with other rights provided by the TRIPS Agreement and since the right to take such 
measures is acknowledged and embedded in Article 8.1, the burden for showing that the 
measures do not comply with TRIPS Article 30 should lie with the complainant. In 
contrast, the panel argued that Article 30 functioned as an exception in the same way 
that Article XX(b) did in the GATT 1994.1074  The Article only applies where a measure 
has already been found non-compliant with other positive obligations in the TRIPS 
Agreement, in this case Article 28. Thus as a defence that has to be asserted, the burden 
lies on the respondent who asserts it and should have the burden of showing it.  As 
noted above, this approach to the burden of proof is also in part a function of the 
structure of the claim. The European Communities did not claim that Canada was in 
violation of Article 8.1, but that it was in violation of Articles 27.1, 28.1 and 33, and was 
in violation until it could justify it through some other TRIPS provision.  In its defence, 
Canada did not argue for a restructuring of the claim through Article 8.1 but asserted 
only that it should have interpretive weight in applying Article 30.  No panel has 
addressed what would occur in the circumstances under which a respondent argued that 
a claim challenging the application of a measure to protect health and nutrition and to 
promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to socio-economic and 
technological development is more properly made under Article 8.1.  
                                                        
 
1072 See p9, Garrison, C “Exceptions to Patent Rights in Developing Countries” ICTSD Issue Paper No. 17 
(August 2006). 
1073 Article 27, Convention on  International  Civil  Aviation   
1074 para 7.16, Canada-Pharmaceutical Patents,  citing United States - Measure Affecting Imports of 
Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India a non-intellectual property case.  
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Canada first asserted that Article 30 should be read in light of the objectives 
and purposes of the TRIPS Agreement, in particular Article 8.1.  The Panel 
acknowledged that Article 8.1 had some interpretive force, but viewed the existence of 
Article 30, and the way it was narrowly constructed, as a significant indicator that Article 
30 should not be read to alter the ‘negotiated’ balance exhibited by the TRIPS 
Agreement.1075  The panel stated:  
“Obviously, the exact scope of Article 30's authority will depend on 
the specific meaning given to its limiting conditions.  The words of those 
conditions must be examined with particular care on this point.  Both the goals 
and the limitations stated in Articles 7 and 8.1 must obviously be borne in 
mind when doing so as well as those of other provisions of the TRIPS 
Agreement which indicate its object and purposes.”   
It appeared from this that the panel would at least consider the goals stated in 
Article 8.1 in interpreting the provisions of the three step test.  However, when 
examining the actual reasoning of the panel, the influence of Article 8.1 is difficult to 
discern.1076 
In examining the panel’s interpretation of the first step, i.e. the ‘limited’ nature 
of the measure, there appears to be no way for the Article 7 or Article 8.1 public interest 
elements to enter into what may be considered “limited”.  In the first instance the panel 
adopts the position that the term ‘limited’ must be read in conjunction with the term 
‘exception’, so that limited is read as narrow, rather than as “definite” or defined in 
scope, as argued by Canada.  The panel argued that by definition, an exception is already 
meant to be a curtailment of rights, and the use of the term ‘limited’ in this context must 
modify that curtailment so that it becomes a narrow curtailment.   
In the second instance, regarding whether a measure is indeed ‘limited’ the 
panel’s reasoning means that this is  assessed purely against the extent to which the 
patent right is affected.1077  Therefore, the test is fundamentally one that requires that 
the measure have a small qualitative and quantitative effect on the rights of the patent 
holder.  If a measure does not meet this test, its public policy purpose(s) need never be 
examined or taken into account.  No matter how dire a need the measure is attempting 
to address, if the measure is not limited, then it fails the test. 1078  The stockpiling 
exception failed at the first hurdle because it allowed unlimited production in the 6 
months prior to expiry of the patent, while the regulatory exception passed because it 
was limited to levels of production solely for the purposes of meeting the goal of 
                                                        
 
1075 para 7.26 Canada-Pharmaceutical Patents, WTODS114/R (2000) 
1076 Also noted by para 7.31, Frankel, S “The Consequences of Misinterpreting TRIPS” 1 W.I.P.O.J. 35 
(2009) 
1077 Canada-Pharmaceutical Patents, WTODS114/R (2000),  
1078 Para 7.30 – 7.38 Canada-Pharmaceutical Patents WTO/DS/114/R (2000) 
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regulatory approval.   At no point in the analysis does the panel address Article 7 or 
Article 8.1 in determining how to address the interpretation of the term ‘limited’.   
One can contrast this approach to the way in which an examination of “least-
restrictive trade” measure embodied in GATT Article XX(b), Article 5.6 of the SPS 
Agreement and Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement might take place.  In those provisions, 
the ‘limited’ nature of a measure, i.e. its effect on trade, is assessed against the 
reasonable availability of other measures which would achieve its goal.  In the approach 
to Article 30, there is no way to balance the ‘restrictiveness’ or level of violation of the 
measure against other less restrictive or less violating measures that would achieve the 
same goal. Because the panel approaches the test cumulatively and fails to use Article 
8.1 to influence the interpretation of whether a measure is limited, it is possible to never 
address the public interest goal of a measure in assessing Article 30.  This would seem to 
render Article 8.1 devoid of any content with respect to Article 30.  Whether such an 
approach would be sustained by the Appellate Body is an open question as the panel 
decision in this case was never appealed. While the panel’s decision is therefore not 
required to be carried over into future panel decisions on similar issues, this approach 
will continue to influence the interpretation of Article 30, unless a respondent makes the 
point of raising an Article 8.1 argument in this context. 
In examining the regulatory approval exception’s conformity with the second 
and third steps, the panel continues to fail to apply Articles 7 and 8.1. In interpreting the 
second step, the Panel first defined ‘normal exploitation’ as ‘to exclude all forms of 
competition that could detract significantly from the economic returns anticipated from 
a patent's grant of market exclusivity.’1079 They sought support for this from a dictionary 
definition of ‘normal’, that did not address the normative aspects of the definition but 
focused on the elements referring to “regular, usual, typical, ordinary, conventional".1080     
However, finding that the measure in question (i.e. production for regulatory approval) 
did not conflict with normal exploitation, the Panel did not find it necessary to decide 
whether the conflict was unreasonable. What is key is that the Panel worked on the 
presumption that a patent holder had the right to expect income from ALL forms of 
exploitation. At no point is a normative element included that details certain kinds of 
markets from which a right-holder should not be expected to receive income or be able 
to exploit nor certain kinds of measures that a state has a right to take as articulated by 
article 8.1.  Public interest justifications play no part in this portion of the analysis either. 
The panel made no reference to any influence that Article 8.1 or Article 7 might have on 
their understanding on what constituted normal exploitation which would have been 
modified by the assertion in Article 8.1 that states may take actions to protect human 
health and nutrition and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to 
socio-economic and technological development.  
                                                        
 
1079 para 7.55, Canada-Pharmaceutical Patents, WTODS114/R (2000) 
1080 para 7.54, Id. citing the New Shorter Oxford Dictionary 
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It is possible that the panel would have referred to article 8.1 in determining 
the unreasonableness of the conflict, but since that was not addressed, it remains an 
open question.  If in fact Article 8.1 is not addressed in determining whether or not a 
conflict exists, the only way in which Article 8.1 can have an influence on the 
interpretation of the second step is through an assessment of the reasonableness of the 
conflict.  Applying Article 8.1, - those measures that passed the first step, conflicted with 
the normal exploitation of the right but were of the kind covered by Article 8.1 would 
therefore be presumed to pass the second step. Any other outcome would, again, seem 
to rob Article 8.1 of any content with respect to Article 30. 
The Panel then moved to the third step, describing what the ‘legitimate 
interests’ of the right holder and third parties might be. The Panel noted that ‘[t]o make 
sense of the term ‘legitimate interests’ in this context, that term must be defined in the 
way that it is often used in legal discourse - as a normative (emphasis added) claim 
calling for protection of interests that are “justifiable” in the sense that they are 
supported by relevant public policies or other social norms.’1081  This would appear to 
have been an ideal place to insert the measures contemplated by Article 8.1 into the 
assessment, as a way of deciding the extent of the legitimate interests of the rightholder 
and what were the legitimate interests of third parties. However, while examining what 
were ‘legitimate interests’ of the patent holder, the Panel provided no further indication 
of what might be encompassed by the legitimate interests of third parties, as it found 
that there was no legitimate interest of the patent holder at play in the regulatory 
approval process. As far as patent law goes, there is no indication of how future panels 
or the Appellate Body might view: what would constitute prejudice to the legitimate 
interests of the right holder; what would constitute unreasonable prejudice; what would 
be defined as the legitimate interests of third parties. Again, an approach that would be 
consistent with Article 8.1 would take measures that fell within the scope of the Article 
as presumptively of the kind that lay outside the legitimate interests of the rightholder 
given that Article 8.1 is a clear statement of WTO members’ right to balance the 
interests of the rightholder against others as it deems appropriate in addressing public 
health and nutrition and promoting the public interest in sectors of vital importance to 
socio-economic and technological development.  For exceptions that do not fall within 
the scope of the measures contemplated in Article 8.1, the unreasonableness of the 
prejudice to the legitimate interests could still be tested, including the interests of third 
parties that are not covered by Article 8.1.  
In looking at the entire analytical approach by the panel in the Canada-
Pharmaceutical Patents case, there still seems to be room in the approach for the 
application of Article 8.1 in the second and third steps.  However, if the panel’s 
approach to the application of the first step of Article 30 continues to be the standard, 
and the burden of proof remains as stated by the panel, then the key hurdle that any 
                                                        
 
1081 para 7.69, Canada-Pharmaceutical Patents, WTODS114 (2000) 
 266 
 
measures to address climate change face may be that of being appropriately limited. As 
such, measures can be found invalid long before any policy justification can be 
considered. 
It remains unclear what the effect of Article 30 should be on exceptions that 
existed and were known at the time of the signing of the TRIPS Agreement.  There is 
no document or statement that would represent an” agreement  relating  to  the  treaty  
which  was  made  between  all  the  parties  in  connection  with the conclusion of the 
treaty;” under Article 31(2)(a) of the VCLT regarding the status of such exceptions.   
The case of the obligatory exception under Article 27 of the Chicago Convention on 
International Civil Aviation, may be no clearer. The TRIPS Agreement contains no 
general savings clause relating to obligations in other existing agreements. It only has 
such a specific savings clause in Article 2(2) stating  
Nothing in Parts I to IV of this Agreement shall derogate from existing 
obligations that Members may have to each other under the Paris Convention, 
the Berne Convention, the Rome Convention and the Treaty on Intellectual 
Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits. 
It explicitly does not mention other agreements existing at the time under 
which obligations relating to intellectual property are contained.  The WTO Agreement 
itself has no savings clause. This would imply that such pre-existing obligations would 
and may have been altered by the TRIPS Agreement making the exception in the 
Chicago Convention subject to Article 30.  In the absence of a case it is difficult to 
assess the compliance of Article 27 of the Chicago Convention with Article 30, but as 
Garrison notes, the exception in the convention is quite large. 1082  Article 27(1) 
establishes that there shall be no “seizure or detention of the aircraft or any claim 
against the owner or operator thereof or  any  other  interference  therewith  by  or  on 
behalf of such State or any person therein on the  ground  that  the  construction,  
mechanism, parts, accessories or operation of the aircraft is an infringement of any 
patent, design, or model duly  granted  or  registered  in  the  State  whose territory  is  
entered  by  the  aircraft.”  In article 27(2) this protection extends to the storage and use 
of spare parts, provided that these are not sold internally or exported.  In part, it may be 
possible to explain this provision as one where the aircraft and spare parts are treated as 
not having been ‘imported’ and thus not having legally entered the territory of the state. 
However, where the law of the state considers that such ‘importation’ has taken place, 
the rightholder may still not have any remedies for the infringement of any rights 
embodied in technologies or spare parts for the aircraft. This exception applies to all 
aircraft and would apply to any commonly used technology in aircraft with the potential 
effect of limiting the effect of the patent only to aircraft that are domestically 
                                                        
 
1082 See p41, Garrison, C “Exceptions to Patent Rights in Developing Countries” ICTSD Issue Paper No. 17 
(August 2006). 
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manufactured and perhaps to domestic airline operators.  Foreign airline operators are 
entirely insulated from patent claims. As Garrison notes, the rights of the patent holder 
to use and import would be entirely negated for the term of the patent, something 
which is likely to not be in conformity with the narrow sense of “limited’ used by the 
panel in the Canada-Pharmaceutical Patents case.1083  This leaves us with two possibilities: 
either the panel was mistaken in its interpretation of Article 30, or we are presented with 
a case of a conflict between two provisions in two different treaties that must be 
resolved.  The second issue is addressed in Chapter 7 on how such treaty conflicts are 
resolved under the WTO, but at this stage, it seems appropriate to ask whether or not 
the panel may have been mistaken in its approach to Article 30. Garrison argues that as 
an example of existing state practice at the time of the signing of the agreement, widely 
used exceptions that almost all states had in practice MUST be taken into account in 
determining the scope and meaning of terms such as ‘limited”. 1084  He points, for 
example, to the international aviation and foreign vessels exceptions noting that all 
member states under the Chicago Convention are required to use it and all WTO 
member states have voiced no objections to it. If the Chicago Convention exception is 
allowable, others of commensurate breadth should also be allowed.  One could also 
point to subsequent state practice under Article 31(3)(b) that a practice has been 
established which is evidence of an agreement as to the meaning of the term between 
parties. With respect to the Chicago Convention exceptions, however, it is difficult to 
see how any clarifying legal controversy could apply since any country that wished to 
challenge such a case would itself likely be guilty of the same practice.  The existence 
and use of the exception may be less evidence of agreement as to the meaning of Article 
30, and more an acknowledgement of a common lack of compliance on the part of the 
majority of WTO member that all have agreed to refrain from challenging.  From an 
interpretive standpoint, the lack of a reference to the Chicago Convention exceptions in 
the various drafts leading up to the adoption of the three step test suggest more a lack 
of knowledge as to the existence of the exception than an ‘agreement’ that the exception 
was encompassed by Article 30.  This is borne out by the fact that other exceptions, 
including those such as the “pharmacy preparation” exception are explicitly mentioned 
in the non-exhaustive list in the Draft of July 23, 1990(W37). 
The decision of the panel in this case prompted significant concerns from 
developing countries regarding the interpretation of Article 8.1 and of Article 30 and 
this issue was part of what was addressed by the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health. 1085  Paragraph 4 1086  reiterates members’ rights to use 
                                                        
 
1083 See p41, Garrison, C “Exceptions to Patent Rights in Developing Countries” ICTSD Issue Paper No. 17 
(August 2006). 
1084 Id. See also Correa, C The TRIPs Agreement:  A Guide  for  the  South.  The  Uruguay  Round 
Agreement  on  Trade-Related  Intellectual  Property  Rights (Geneva: South Centre, 1997) 
1085 Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (2001) 
1086 Paragraph 4: We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent members from 
taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our commitment to the TRIPS 
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TRIPS flexibilities, including exceptions under Article 30, to their fullest extent and that 
the Agreement should be interpreted in a way supportive of members’ right to protect 
public health. 
Directly addressing the issue of how TRIPS provisions should be interpreted, 
especially in Article 30, the Declaration notes in Paragraph 5(a) that in “applying the 
customary rules of interpretation of public international law, each provision of the 
TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the light of the object and purpose of the Agreement 
as expressed, in particular, in its objectives and principles.” This directly addresses the 
role that Article 7 and 8.1, which are under the title of “Principles’ in the text of the 
TRIPS Agreement, should play. There is little dispute that, as a declaration by all WTO 
members, the declaration functions as a subsequent Agreement under Article 31(3)(a) of 
the VCLT, which requires that interpreters must take into account as part of the context 
of the agreement “any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the 
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;” Thus it would be 
incumbent upon any judicial interpreter to go further than the panel in Canada 
Pharmaceuticals and actively apply Article 7 and 8.1 to the interpretation of Article 30. 
The interplay between Article 8.1 and Article 30 is crucial when we consider 
what room Article 30 leaves for the creation of exceptions to address access to and 
transfer of climate technologies for adaptation and mitigation. The first question to be 
answered is whether the proposed measures would technically fall under Article 30 as an 
exception. For example, a working requirement for patents would be difficult to 
categorize as an exception in that it functions as an additional burden placed on the 
rightholder to carry out certain activities in order not to lose the patent right.  This 
would be similar to what the patent holder has to do in paying renewal fees at intervals 
during the life of the patent.  In contrast, an exception allows third parties to carry out 
certain acts that would nominally be disallowed by the existence of the patent and either 
justifies a specific category of activities related to the patent (e.g. non-commercial 
research) or allows a specific category of actors to carry out activities related to the 
patent (e.g. exceptions to copying for students or blind-people). Given the structure of 
the TRIPS Agreement, compulsory licenses are also not classified as exceptions and the 
standards for their application are also very different, as will be addressed below. In 
addition, actions to exclude certain categories of technologies from patents would also 
not function as exceptions, as these again, relate to the conditions for grants of patents 
rather than directly enabling third parties to act while a patent is still in force.  In 
addition, the issue would also be whether the proposed measure was one of those 
contemplated by Article 8.1 of TRIPS. 
                                                                                                                                   
 
Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner 
supportive of WTO members' right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to 
medicines for all. In this connection, we reaffirm the right of WTO members to use, to the full, the 
provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, which provide flexibility for this purpose. 
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An additional issue when it comes to exceptions arises in the realm of 
computer software.  Under TRIPS Article 10.1, member states are required to protect 
computer programs as if they were literary and artistic works. Such protection extends 
not just to the human-readable programming language but also to the machine readable 
object code.  In some countries e.g. the US, software is protected by both patents and 
copyright. In Europe it is ostensibly excluded from patent protection (Article 52 of the 
European Patent Convention), except where it has a further technical effect.1087  
Software is a significant element of the management of smart grids, and smart 
grid connections as well as many energy efficiency systems in electronic appliances.  In 
many cases, other companies and programmers may wish to see the source code of a 
computer program to see how it works. In the context of copyright this is well within 
the system as a rightholder is required to communicate his or her “work”.  However, in 
many cases, firms keep the human readable source code as a trade secret while 
distributing the machine-readable object code.  In order to see how the computer 
program was written, it becomes necessary for others to translate the code back into 
human readable source code. Under copyright rules, and absent an exception, for 
copyright, such an act of translation is an infringement of the right of translation or 
reproduction (depending on domestic law). In many countries there are exceptions that 
specifically allow for such acts with respect to copyright (called decompilation), but in 
many countries, they are restricted and set with conditions. 1088  Where software is 
protected by patents then (even where the source code is made available, these 
decompilation activities are governed by TRIPS Article 30 with its very restrictive 
interpretive approach. 
 Where software is only protected by copyright, these are protected by the 
even more restrictive interpretation of Article 13 by another WTO panel in a case 
between the US and the European Union.1089  
Article 13 of TRIPS on copyright exceptions states: 
Members shall confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain 
special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder. 
                                                        
 
1087 T1173/97 (Computer Program product) of 1 July 1998, 10 Official Journal of the European Patent 
Office 609 (1999). Available at: http://archive.epo.org/epo/pubs/oj99/10_99/10_6099.pdf (last visited 
15 August 2014). 
1088 See e.g. Article 6, DIRECTIVE 2009/24/EC  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT  AND  OF  THE  COUNCIL 
of  23  April  2009 on  the  legal  protection  of  computer  programs 111 Official Journal of the European 
Union 16 (2009).  
1089 ‘United States - Section 110(5) of US Copyright Act – Report of the Panel’, WT/DS160/R, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds160_e.htm (last visited 15 August 2014). 
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Importantly, unlike Article 30, Article 13 has no requirement that the legitimate 
interests of third parties must be taken into account in the third step, removing any 
possibility that absent a means for Article 8.1 to enter in the first and second steps, there 
is much narrower room for public welfare interests and goals.  In the US – Section 110(5) 
Copyright Act case, this is compounded by the fact that the panel in this case never 
considered or addressed the role or meaning of Article 7 and 8.1. In addition, the panels 
approach to the term ‘legitimate’ in the third step only looked at the right-holders 
interest and defined them as exploitation interests only with regard to any and all 
income from rights rather than contrasting them or comparing them to the interests of 
other actors.1090  The panel in the US – Section 110(5) Copyright Act case, also established 
the principle that the three step test was to be read cumulatively, rather than as a 
balancing test1091, ensuring that the first step would never be outweighed or balanced 
against the others or the public interest goals of the measure. Again, there was no 
precedent or justification for this under anything other than a literal reading of the text 
as is.1092 The narrow approach extended to the interpretation of all elements of the three 
step test. Essentially, the panel ruled that other than those with de minimus effects on 
the economic activity of the rightholder, few exceptions would pass the test.1093  The 
consequences for software exceptions are clear. Where decompilation and other 
activities are created as exceptions, these may not pass muster under TRIPS unless they 
are carefully limited to activities with limited commercial effect, which contradicts the 
goals of exceptions that would be applied to address climate change activity related to 
smart grids and energy efficiency. However, thirteen years after the complaint was first 
instituted, the US – Section 110(5) Copyright Act panel decision begins to look less like the 
bombshell it first seemed. As a legal matter it remains a fundamentally flawed and 
unreliable indicator of what may occur in future cases, or as a guide to legal 
interpretation at national level. However, the failure to revisit the issue at the WTO over 
the past ten years has allowed the standard to become the de facto yardstick against which 
proposals to further copyright protection or to restrict have been made, possibly giving 
it far more influence than its legal reasoning would deserve.  In addition, it is clear that 
this case significantly influenced the approach of the panel in Canada-Pharmaceutical 
Patents, extending the influence of its poor reasoning into inappropriate territory.  The 
Canada-Pharmaceutical Patents case however raised many of its own problems as well, 
especially relating to how to deal with subsequent state practice. 
                                                        
 
1090 See Shabalala, D “United States- Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act” in C M. Correa (ed.) 
Research Handbook on Intellectual Property Law and the WTO Volume II, Edward Elgar 2010. 
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1092 See in support, p21 Hugenholtz, P B and R G Okediji (2008), “Conceiving an International Instrument 
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1093 See Shabalala, D “United States- Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act” in C M. Correa (ed.) 
Research Handbook on Intellectual Property Law and the WTO Volume II, Edward Elgar 2010. 
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The issue of how to treat subsequent state practice is difficult in the context of 
Article 30.  This divides into two issues: the scope and extent of exceptions in existence 
since the signing of the TRIPS Agreement; exceptions passed since the signing of the 
TRIPS Agreement. Canada-Pharmaceutical Patents essentially split the difference by 
allowing the regulatory exception, existing before the TRIPS Agreement, and 
disallowing the stockpiling exception, passed after the TRIPS Agreement. Garrison 
argues that the reason this was the case relates in part to the standard for assessing 
subsequent state practice proposed by Canada which was that subsequent state practice 
should be assessed according to the extent to which the measure in question was 
broadly in use by member states at the time of the signing of the agreement and was not 
subject to persistent objection by other members.1094 The panel essentially dismissed the 
arguments related to existing state practice stating specifically that: 
“The Panel did not accord any weight to either of those arguments, however, 
because there was no documented evidence of the claimed negotiating 
understanding … because the subsequent acts by individual countries did not 
constitute "practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the 
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation" within the meaning of 
Article 31.3(b) of the Vienna Convention.”. 
This appears to be despite the fact that Canada very clearly points to 
statements and practice on the regulatory review or “Bolar” exception in the US.1095 
This was clearly evidence that needed to be weighed, which the panel simply chooses to 
ignore. It is unclear what ‘evidence’ beyond this the panel would have required to 
substantiate an Article 31.3(b) assertion of state practice but unprotested statements 
during negotiations at the time of the signing of the agreement as well as unprotested 
subsequent practice are clearly evidence. The problem in this case may be that none of 
the exhibits presented by Canada provided statements made during the negotiations or 
after the fact. In addition, the evidence during the case of other state practice pointed to 
the existence and implementation of the regulatory review exception in many other 
developed WTO member states1096  but almost always accompanied by a system of 
patent term extension related to regulatory review delays. The panel, however, does not 
appear to have given any weight, in either direction, to this evidence, simply dismissing 
it as insufficient to meet the requirements of Article 31(.3(b).  This may be a significant 
error as the TRIPS Council has a very specific process for evaluating countries’ 
                                                        
 
1094 See p34, Garrison, C “Exceptions to Patent Rights in Developing Countries” ICTSD Issue Paper No. 17 
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1095 See para 7.41, Canada-Pharmaceutical Patents, WTODS114 (2000) citing First Submission of Canada, 
paragraph 105 and Exhibit 41, quoting letter of US Trade Representative Michael Kantor to Alfred B. 
Engelberg, 1 February 1996. 
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Panel and Replies Received from the Parties and Third Parties on the Practice in Countries Other Than 
Canada as Regards Regulatory Review Exceptions and Patent Term Extension or Supplementary 
Protection Certificate Systems) 
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implementation of TRIPS obligations and failure to refer to these reviews and their 
treatment of regulatory review exceptions is a major evidentiary lapse. For example, in 
the 1997 Review of the US’ implementing legislation on patents the European 
Communities and its member states had an opportunity to specifically question the US 
application of the regulatory review exception, but did not.1097 In contrast it specifically 
asked the US how other provisions complied with the TRIPS Agreement’s Article 30, 
for example, the newly legislated exception for medical practitioners for use of methods 
of treatment.1098  The issue of exceptions generally was raised by other countries such as 
Japan and New Zealand.1099 
There is also significant international law and practice behind the interpretation 
of Article 31.3(b), which the panel also ignored.1100  The failure to apply the appropriate 
standard for considering subsequent state practice creates significant uncertainty for 
countries to create new exceptions, although there may be some comfort drawn 
regarding existing exceptions.  The next section describes what the possibilities are for 
crafting exceptions to patent rights to address climate change and whether they can be 
of sufficient scope.  
 
III.1.2. Types of exceptions that may be available to address climate change 
Article 8.1 of TRIPS clearly envisions measures capable of addressing broad 
sectoral issues. It allows members to take actions to promote the public interest in 
sectors of vital importance to socio-economic and technological development.  
Applying that standard to the area of climate change it can be argued that addressing 
climate change mitigation and adaptation is in the public interest of countries signatory 
to the UNFCCC. It can also be argued that certain specifically identified sectors, (e.g. 
drought-resistant agriculture, or fuel-efficient motor vehicles) constitute sectors of vital 
importance to socio-economic and technological development.  This would apparently 
justify exceptions that are sufficiently broad to have an effect on a whole sector. 
However, the framework for the creation of exceptions under TRIPS as outlined in the 
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Canada-Pharmaceutical Patents case, does not include Article 8.1 in determining whether 
and exception is limited. Only in the second and third steps of the Article 30 analysis 
can the justification in Article 8.1 potentially be considered.  The key design limitation 
may be in ensuring that an exception is sufficiently limited. Given the scope of the 
climate change challenge, is it possible to envision useful exceptions that would meet 
this standard?  If the aim is to fundamentally alter the direction and use of climate 
technologies by producers and consumer, the exception clearly cannot exclude 
commercial activities. It is precisely these commercial activities that an exception would 
aim to address through research, development, and distribution of climate mitigation 
and adaptation technologies. For climate change purposes, an exception that was 
targeted at a limited set of actors may not be very effective as it would limit the kind of 
broad sectoral participation that climate change measures require.  However, there may 
be circumstances, such as a clearly identified bottleneck, where such an exception 
targeted at a limited set of actors might be possible.   The type of exception could relate 
perhaps to size of business enterprise, or to a category of actors such as students or 
universities. For climate change, perhaps the size of the business enterprise could be 
relevant, but probably only when also limited to a specific product or set of products. 
This may be especially appropriate in an economic sector where many of the actors are 
small informal actors.   
The other approach to exceptions, that may be more viable for designing 
climate change measures, would be to look at a specific set of especially desirable 
activities and exempt those from liability. The classic type of patent exception in such 
cases is the research exception.  It is often limited to non-commercial research but that 
can actually be seen as duplicating the function of the disclosure or enablement 
requirement for the grant of the patent.  The disclosure or enablement requirement is 
meant to enable a person skilled in the art to understand and reproduce your patented 
product or process for the purposes of determining that the rightholder has actually 
accomplished what he claims to have accomplished.  In that sense it is a restatement of 
the fundamental scientific principle of falsifiability: that any discovery needs to be tested 
by others to determine whether the claimant has actually discovered or created what he 
states he has.  The research exception can, however, be made broader to include 
research and development that could lead or is meant to lead to a commercial product. 
In the case of the ‘regulatory approval’ exception in the Canada-Pharmaceutical Patents case, 
research and development on the patented drug is allowed to enable third parties to 
learn how to produce generic versions of the drug AND production is allowed to the 
extent that such production is used only for the purposes of showing regulators that the 
generic version in equivalent to the patented product. However, the product cannot be 
stockpiled or sold until after the expiration of the patent.  For the purposes of 
addressing climate change and ensuring technology development, it is clear that research 
and development and the learning that comes from carrying out research on patented 
products is more likely to result in the development of new products and in increase of 
know-how and capacity to reproduce the patented product once the patent expires.  A 
climate research and development exception could then be limited in several 
dimensions: it would be limited to research and development on patented technologies 
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with the aim of addressing climate change mitigation and adaptation; it could be used 
only for the development of improved, adapted or entirely new products or processes; it 
would be limited to research up to the point of prototyping but disallow any activity 
related to marketing, licensing or sales of the new product or process.  Such a research 
exception would be of benefit to stakeholders in emerging economies who already have 
such research capacity, such as Brazil, India and China, who could then produce those 
products in countries where the patent was not protected (many developing countries). 
 However, it may also provide a pathway for those countries who are seeking 
entry into the market for production of technologies by adapting such products to local 
needs and conditions.  The limit on marketing, licensing and sales means that 
permission would still be required, usually in the form of a license for the product to be 
actually commercially exploited.  Thus it would still be possible for the rightholder to 
refuse to provide such a license, but such refusals would have to comply with rules on 
competition, market regulation, and the public interest governing the use of patents. 
The section below on compulsory licenses addresses the circumstances under TRIPS in 
which refusals to license can be addressed, as well as other circumstances under which 
compulsory licenses can be granted. 
Another option to consider is whether an exception might possibly exist that 
would allow any and all production related to the patent for export to countries where 
the product is not patented, or which has a system of international exhaustion. Legally, 
there are two ways this may happen.  
The first is that the exception authorizes production of any patent (or patents 
in a specific sector) for sale directly to enterprises and actors in other countries where 
the product is not patent protected. Theoretically there doesn’t appear to be any barrier 
to such an exception as there is no ‘market’ affected under the second or third step of 
the Article 30 test. Under the first step, the curtailment of the right to make and use is 
affected, but the question is to what extent? In the analysis of the regulatory review 
exception the panel in Canada-Pharmaceutical Patents decided that even though almost all 
the rights were affected, the market effect was negligible and for a specific limited 
purpose outside of the normal market.1101 It should be possible for such an exception to 
pass Article 30 muster. This is in contrast to Article 31(f) which limits the majority of 
production under a compulsory license to the domestic market.  This is the strongest 
argument against such an exception: that such measures were contemplated and 
countries chose to regulate production for export under Article 31, excluding them from 
Article 30 coverage. In particular, the exclusion of compulsory licenses specifically for 
export suggests that countries intended to limit and ensure that no such use of patented 
products should be allowed.  However, as noted in the next section on compulsory 
licenses, several countries have legislation that allows for compulsory licenses 
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specifically only for export purposes, with no domestic distribution allowed. 1102 The 
existence of Article 31(f) may be seen as directed primarily at licenses issued for 
domestic production but does not exclude licenses exclusively for export, or other such 
measures. 
The second is where the exception allows export not just to countries where 
the product is patented but where the product is patented but the country has a system 
of international exhaustion. In those situations, the products have never been placed on 
the market or been sold first or placed in the market in country of production, so it 
would be difficult to argue that the rights have been exhausted, especially where no 
compensation has taken place.  This would be in contrast to a compulsory license where 
compensation for the use would have taken place in the country of production and the 
right would therefore be considered to have been exhausted and would perhaps be a 
basis for allowing parallel importation based on international exhaustion (this is 
addressed in more detail in the next section on compulsory licenses).  In this case, an 
exception that allowed such export would likely fall afoul of the Article 30 second step 
that the exception should not unreasonably prejudice the market of the rightholder, 
which to some extent includes export markets in which the rightholder may compete 
with other producers, where such export may interfere with domestic rights in other 
countries. 
As much as the previous set of suggestions seems to argue for the fact that 
designing TRIPS-compliant exceptions is a real possibility, this is modified by two 
caveats.  The first is that, for such exceptions to be possible, TRIPS jurisprudence must 
be understood to have been altered by the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public 
Health, and that a different approach to the application of Article 7 and 8.1 is included 
in at least the second and third steps of the Article 30, three step test.  The second is 
that exceptions are by definition a limited tool and can never go so far as to 
fundamentally alter the balance of power away from the rightholder.  The question that 
arises is how many exceptions can be created and how large can their cumulative effect 
be before they run afoul of the broader obligation to provide effective patent protection. 
 
III.1.3. Practical Availability 
Timing 
 Exceptions that are placed in regulation can begin to function almost 
immediately. Once in place, all actors who qualify can begin to take advantage of them 
with respect to specific activities or sectors. In that sense they would be ideal tools to 
address activities that need to take place within the 2020 mitigation horizon and the 
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2025 adaptation horizon. The issue is whether they are capable of speeding up the 
distribution and adoption of existing technologies within the timetable. This is 
intimately linked to their scale effect. If they were able to operate at sufficient scale then 
it is likely that several bottlenecks could be addressed allowing for a possible snowball 
effect.  However, as noted below, given the interpretation of the first step in Article 30, 
such a scale effect is not likely. In the context of the debate on pharmaceuticals, the 
ability of exceptions to actually enable sufficient production and distribution have largely 
been avoided. The Doha Declaration chose the path of compulsory licensing as the 
primary means of addressing the production and distribution elements of access 
problems under TRIPS.  To the extent that exceptions are useful and powerful it is with 
two groups: end-users or consumers; and producers who can engage in research and 
development by other producers. 
 Scale 
The use of exceptions as a policy tool would have to be part of a broader 
concerted effort that will have interactions with other patent limitations and TRIPS 
flexibilities.  Using exceptions to manage sectoral development will require a concerted 
effort to identify bottlenecks where exceptions may be appropriately given to categories 
of actors, but will also require action across a broad set of sectors, requiring the 
exemption of certain categories of action.   Multiple sets of individual exceptions 
addressed to specific issues and problems may each be limited but, taken as a whole, 
may have a broad effect.   While not a haven, those exceptions that are based on or are 
extensions of exceptions historically practised by most states are less likely to be 
challenged. Despite the narrow reading provided by Canada-Pharmaceutical Patents panel, 
there is an understanding that certain kinds of exceptions such as private use, research, 
educational and experimental uses, as well as other exceptions existing at the time of the 
TRIPS Agreement and common in most countries’ patent laws would likely fall within 
the scope of Article 30.1103  These, such as the regulatory approval exception, could then 
be extended and designed to specifically address climate change mitigation and 
adaptation technologies.  What is especially clear is that any exception that actually 
involved sale of patented products, or products produced by patented processes into the 
market would never be able to pass the second step as interpreted by the panel in 
Canada-Pharmaceutical Patents. The panel allows no more than a de minimus effect of the 
commercial market of the rightholder. 
While exceptions are still available under TRIPS, the narrow reading by the 
Canada-Pharmaceutical Patents panel means that, as a practical matter, it may not be 
possible to design exceptions with significant market effect of sufficient scale to address 
technology transfer for climate change.  To the extent that an exception involves 
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UNCTAD-ICTSD Project on IPRs and Sustainable Development, October 2006. 
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commercial activity, it is likely to fail under most interpretive scenarios.  The exceptions 
that remain are not likely to be able, individually, or in the aggregate, to operate at the 
scale of technology sectors and the scale and speed of effect required. 
 Geographic scope 
The issue of geographical scope is whether exceptions would be able to 
operate to allow innovation, production and distribution of technologies in major 
emerging economies and allow them to export to other developing countries.  The first 
thing to note is that to the extent that a developing country has a system of international 
exhaustion, the importation of products produced within the framework of an 
exception would be allowed.  However as noted in the discussion above, it is precisely 
the sale or distribution of products that is likely to fail the TRIPS Article 30 test, unless 
perhaps the export was to countries that already did not have patent protection for the 
product or process. In such a case, there is no market in the developing country to 
which the patent holder can be said to have a right.   
 
III.2. Compulsory licenses 
III.2.1. Legal Availability 
In addition to Article 30, public policy concerns beyond simple IP protection 
find their way into the TRIPS Agreement with provisions on compulsory licensing 
(Article 31 on ‘Other Use without Authorization of the Right Holder’). States may use a 
compulsory license to take the patent rights held by another party and either exercise the 
rights themselves, or license the rights to third-parties to help the state exercise such 
rights.  There has been no WTO dispute related to compulsory licensing under the 
TRIPS Agreement to date. However, the issue of compulsory licensing was at the core 
of the debate that led to the adoption of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health.1104 
There are generally two categories of compulsory license that can be taken into 
account, only one category of which is limited by the TRIPS Agreement. To the extent 
that compulsory licenses are issued in the course of addressing anti-competitive 
practices and abuses of patents, countries remain free to determine when and how such 
licenses should be issued in terms of Article 31(k) and Article 40.1105   There is no 
                                                        
 
1104 Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (2001) 
1105 Article 40.2 states “Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent Members from specifying in their 
legislation licensing practices or conditions that may in particular cases constitute an abuse of intellectual 
property rights having an adverse effect on competition in the relevant market As provided above, a 
Member may adopt, consistently with the other provisions of this Agreement, appropriate measures to 
prevent or control such practices, which may include for example exclusive grantback conditions, 
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requirement that there be remuneration to the right holder in such cases. In the US, 
such licenses are issued by judges on a frequent basis for software, merger reviews, and 
other anti-competition remedies.1106 These kinds of licenses are also primarily concerned 
with ensuring that the system operates the way that it is meant to: ensuring enough 
competitive room for innovation in the near and long-term. 
The kind of licences that have caused the most difficulty and have been the 
basis of significant controversy are compulsory licenses for reasons other than 
addressing competitive practices, including such examples as public health emergencies.  
In such cases, the behaviour of the State is regulated by TRIPS Article 31 which 
foresees the use of such compulsory licenses as a way to address significant shortages, 
distribution problems and pricing issues addressed at either meeting short term demand 
for goods and products or at enabling public (government) non-commercial use for any 
reason. It is important to note that the TRIPS Agreement actually places no limitations 
on the grounds for issuance of compulsory licenses but only regulates the process by 
which such licenses are to be granted.  In all the instances of compulsory licenses for 
non-competition purposes, adequate remuneration based on local market conditions is 
required.1107  Generally, good faith negotiation with patent holders is required, except if 
there is national emergency or other situation of extreme urgency, in which case 
government may proceed without first carrying out good faith negotiations.  In the case 
of public non-commercial use, there is never a requirement to negotiate with the patent 
holder. There has been no case testing the application of such compulsory licenses.   
In terms of addressing climate change, Article 31 places no restrictions on the 
domain and sectors in which compulsory licenses can be applied.  This is also true for 
compulsory licenses to address anti-competitive behaviour.  At the very least, Article 8.1 
and article 8.2 can be seen as requiring a broad interpretation of Article 31, provided 
that the basic procedural requirements of Article 31 are met and the substantive 
elements of Article 8.2 are met.1108 A proof of concept can be found in the US Clean Air 
Act codified in 42 USC § 7608. It provides the possibility of compulsory licenses for 
those required to meet a rule or standard set up under the Clean Air Act, where the 
technology to meet such a standard is held by a patent holder and lack of access may 
place such a stakeholder at a competitive disadvantage.1109 As Derclaye points out, the 
                                                                                                                                   
 
conditions preventing challenges to validity and coercive package licensing, in the light of the relevant 
laws and regulations of that Member. 
1106 For more examples see: http://keionline.org/content/view/41/1 (last visited 15 August 2014).    
1107 Article 31(h) TRIPS 
1108 See also p281, Derclaye, E  ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Global Warming’, 12 J. MARSHALL  REV.  
INTELL. PROP.  L.  263  (2008).  
1109 Derclaye also points to this as an example of a compulsory license provision in the public interest. See 
p669, Derclaye, E ‘Not Only Innovation but also Collaboration, Funding, Goodwill and Commitment:  
Which Role for Patent Laws in Post-Copenhagen Climate Change Action’, 9 J. MARSHALL  REV.  INTELL. 
PROP.  L.  657  (2010). She also notes that the system has never been used in the entire time the Clean 
Air Act has existed, although she points to the incentive to cooperate that it establishes. 
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provision has never been the subject of WTO dispute settlement1110 but its existence 
and lack of objection from other states suggests that such provisions can clearly be 
established in the context of other countries actions to address climate change.    
It is easy to conclude that compulsory licensing is legally available under the 
TRIPS for any purposes. 
 
III.2.2. Practical Availability 
Section 84(7) of India’s Patent Act allows for issuance of compulsory licenses if the 
“reasonable requirements of the public are not met”. This includes: 
a) if, by reason of the refusal of the patentee to grant a licence or licences on 
reasonable terms,  
i. an existing trade or industry or the development thereof or the 
establishment of any new trade or industry in India or the trade or 
industry of any person or class of persons trading or manufacturing in 
India is prejudiced; or 
ii. the demand for the patented article has not been met to an adequate 
extent or on reasonable terms; or 
iii. a market for export of the patented article manufactured in India is not 
being supplied or developed; or 
iv. the establishment or development of commercial activities in India is 
prejudiced; or 
b) if, by reason of conditions imposed by the patentee upon the grant of licences 
under the patent or upon the purchase, hire or use of the patented article or 
process, the manufacture, use or sale of materials not protected by the patent, 
or the establishment or development of any trade or industry in India, is 
prejudiced; or 
c) if the patentee imposes a condition upon the grant of licences under the patent 
to provide exclusive grant back, prevention to challenges to the validity of 
patent or coercive package licensing, or 
d) if the patented invention is not being worked in the territory of India on a 
commercial scale to an adequate extent or is not being so worked to the fullest 
extent that is reasonably practicable, or 
e) if the working of the patented invention in the territory of India on a 
commercial scale is being prevented or hindered by the importation from 
abroad of the patented article by 
a. the patentee or persons claiming under him; or 
b. persons directly or indirectly purchasing from him; or 
                                                        
 
1110 p270., Id. 
 280 
 
c. other persons against whom the patentee is not taking or has not 
taken proceedings for infringement. 
 
India’s broad approach is reflective of the freedom to choose the basis on 
which compulsory licenses are issued including for industrial policy to restructure 
markets. Compulsory licenses are ideal tools for market restructuring where sectoral 
development suffers from lack of production, or further research and development, due 
to the existence of a patent or set of patents.  However, for patents that do not address 
anti-competitive practices, TRIPS establishes constraints that may be so limiting as to 
make such licenses ineffective as tools to address production and dissemination of 
climate change mitigation and adaptation technologies.  
The primary limitation is the one requiring that patents be addressed on a case 
by case basis.1111 This limits the granting of public interest licenses to an evaluation for 
each and every patent that must meet the rest of the requirements of Article 31. Where 
the technologies to be addressed are complex technologies that constitute not just a 
single patent but a complex of patents, the application of compulsory licenses can 
become a slow and cumbersome process as each patent in the family will require a 
separate compulsory license.  Such complex technologies include windmills, fuel cells, 
agricultural biotechnologies for biofuels, as well as for seeds.  However, it may be 
possible to issue patents at the product level, covering the suite of patents related to a 
particular product or product category. Correa points to the termination provision in 
Article 31(g) as also problematic from the viewpoint of the recipient of a compulsory 
license. It requires termination once the conditions requiring the license have been met. 
He argues that this creates business uncertainty as the license may be terminated at any 
point.1112  I would argue that this would depend on the framing of the purpose of the 
compulsory licensing. Noting that countries are free to determine the reasons for issuing 
compulsory licenses, I would argue that countries be careful about framing the reasons 
for the licenses to ensure that they provide sufficient business certainty and are 
sufficiently long term. In addition, providing for regulatory timelines for such 
assessment (e.g. at 3 and 5 years from issuance) will also create certainty.  The legitimate 
interests of the person assigned the license have to be taken into account, meaning that 
the business case has to be considered in any assessment.  
A second limitation is that such a license must be granted primarily for supply 
of the domestic market.1113  Some interpretations have suggested that this is limited 
                                                        
 
1111 TRIPS Article 31(a). 
1112 See p8, Correa, C “Intellectual Property Rights and the Use of Compulsory Licenses: Options for 
Developing Countries” Working Paper 5, Trade-Related Agenda, Development And Equity (T.R.A.D.E.) 
Working Papers, South Centre, October 1999. 
1113 TRIPS Article 31(f). 
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exclusively for the domestic market1114, but at least the wording contemplates some 
portion being produced for export. While this clearly contemplates that some portion of 
the supply will be exported, the wording suggests that a significant majority of the 
production should still go to the domestic market. If we consider the role that countries 
such as China, India and Brazil must play in ensuring dissemination of climate 
technologies to other developing countries that do not have as much R&D and 
production capacity, this limitation ensures that these countries will not be able to use 
compulsory licensing effectively to achieve that goal.  This points to the largest problem 
with Article 31, which is that, for those countries with limited or no production capacity, 
compulsory licensing is not an option, since there will be no domestic actors to whom 
such licenses could be granted and who could thus produce for the domestic market.  
Article 31 does not contemplate that a member could grant a compulsory license to an 
actor outside its territory for the purposes of that actor exclusively producing for supply 
of that country’s domestic market.  Patent rights are territorial and can only be exercised 
on the territory of the patent granting state. Thus limitations and exceptions to patents 
created by a state can only be exercised on the territory of the patent granting state.  
 In principle, if the state presents a sufficiently large market, this should 
encourage outside companies to locate production in these states to take advantage of 
the possibility of being granted a compulsory license for production to meet domestic 
needs.  However, in the absence of a guarantee that such a license would be issued, such 
companies are unlikely to take the investment risk. In addition, many developing 
countries, assessed individually, do not present sufficiently large markets to justify 
establishment of production facilities on their territory primarily to supply their 
domestic market, regardless of the existence of patents.  Even where patents exist, such 
small markets are of little interest to originator/rightholder companies and   they 
present an additional barrier to investment by generic or other non-originator/imitator 
companies. The ability to provide compulsory licenses does not add to the attractiveness 
of the investment.1115  Where patents do not exist, these markets remain too small to be 
of interest for investors to establish facilities.   
With respect to governments themselves establishing such facilities, this 
requires an assessment of whether it would be more cost-effective to import the drugs 
from elsewhere or to expend significant amounts of money to import the expertise and, 
facilities to enable domestic production. Such an analysis nearly always falls in favour of 
directly paying for the importation of products, even from markets that are extremely 
                                                        
 
1114 See p16, Adam, A “Technology  Transfer  to Combat  Climate  Change: Opportunities and  Obligations  
under  TRIPS and  Kyoto” 9  J. HIGH  TECH. L.  1 (2009) 
1115 One untested approach to solving this FDI problem is for these countries to issue prospective 
compulsory licenses and then to auction them off to the highest bidder willing to establish production 
facilities in the domestic market.  It is unclear whether such prospectively issued compulsory licenses fall 
within the limitations established by the TRIPS Agreement. 
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expensive.  This is especially true for the relatively short time frames in which shortages 
or other needs arise and at which Article 31 appears primarily aimed.  
The Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health sought to 
address this issue with respect to pharmaceuticals which were seen as particularly crucial 
sector for small developing countries.  Paragraph 6 of the Declaration recognized that 
the use of compulsory licenses was a problem for those countries with insufficient or no 
manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical industry and instructs the TRIPS Council 
to find a solution. The solution proposed by the TRIPS Council was adopted as a 
General Council Decision in August 2003 (The August 2003 Waiver).1116  This decision 
waived the requirements of Article 31(f) and of Article 31(h) (requiring adequate 
remuneration) for those countries with insufficient manufacturing capacities.  It allows 
WTO members with production capacity to export to those members lacking such 
capacity, where a compulsory license has been issued for that purpose in the importing 
country, or if there is no patent in the importing member, where the exporting country 
has issued a compulsory license for that purpose in conjunction with a request from an 
eligible importing member. The decision also contains several other requirements 
related to the packaging, timing, size, and that the entirety of the production must be 
exported to the specific member. The requirement that adequate remuneration be paid 
is waived for the importing member but not for the exporting member.  Of particular 
interest for technology transfer and intellectual property issues related to climate change 
is paragraph 7 of the August 2003 Waiver1117 which notes that the system should be 
implemented in such a way as to increase technology transfer and capacity in eligible 
importing members.   
Paragraph 11 of the August 2003 Waiver ensures that it remains in force until 
such time as an amendment to the TRIPS Agreement implementing the waiver enters 
into force for each member that ratifies it. This led in 2005 to the adoption of an 
amendment (Article 31bis) to the TRIPS Agreement in the form of a protocol attached 
to a General Council Decision.1118 The text essentially restated the conditions outlined 
in the waiver, as well as the paragraph 7 provision on technology transfer.  The 
amendment enters into force after two-thirds of WTO members have ratified it and 
replaces the August 2003 Waiver for those countries that have ratified it. The waiver 
remains in force for all others until they have also ratified the amendment.  
                                                        
 
1116 “Decision on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement 
and Public Health” WT/L/540 and Corr.1 adopted August 30, 2003.  
1117 “Members recognize the desirability of promoting the transfer of technology and capacity building in 
the pharmaceutical sector in order to overcome the problem identified in paragraph 6 of the Declaration. 
To this end, eligible importing Members and exporting Members are encouraged to use the system set 
out in this Decision in a way which would promote this objective. Members undertake to cooperate in 
paying special attention to the transfer of technology and capacity building in the pharmaceutical sector 
in the work to be undertaken pursuant to Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement, paragraph 7 of the 
Declaration and any other relevant work of the Council for TRIPS.”  
1118 Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement WT/L/641 Adopted 6 December 2005. 
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The success of the Waiver system and the amendment is difficult to measure. 
By one measure, i.e. use of the system, the waiver system has been a failure.  Since the 
Waiver was made effective in August 2003, only one importing member (Rwanda) has 
used it to access drugs from Canada. Despite the fact that the product in question was 
not actually patented in Rwanda, the process proved so cumbersome that the company 
that was granted the exporting license under Canadian law declared that the system was 
economically unsustainable.1119 By the same measure, it may be considered unnecessary 
or superfluous as apparently only a fraction of developing countries have felt the need 
to utilise the system. Support for this could be found in the fact that only a relatively 
small number of developing countries have ratified the amendment.1120  However, this is 
modified by two issues: the waiver remains in force and available so there is little 
incentive so far for developing countries to move over to ratifying the amendment; use 
of the system requires implementing legislation, especially in exporting countries as they 
bear the larger administrative burden under both the Waiver and the Amendment.  The 
most recent data shows that very relatively few countries (13 plus the European Union 
25) have actually notified such implementing legislation.1121 It is difficult to escape the 
impression that the system may not be as effective as once thought at enabling access to 
compulsory licensing for small developing countries and economies with little or no 
manufacturing capacity. 
The Waiver and the Amendment apply only to pharmaceuticals and, while it is 
tempting to view it as a model for access to climate technologies, the complexity of the 
system suggests that expanding it to a broader set of products and processes may not 
work. In addition, unlike the pharmaceutical industry, it is not clear that most markets 
for climate technologies have large generic manufacturers who can easily replicate the 
products at a very low cost, making reliance on generic supply a key pillar of polices on 
access.  In the case of agriculture and health this may be the case, but in many energy 
production and efficiency fields, the ‘generic’ industry does not really exist in the same 
way as in the pharmaceutical industry. This suggests that compulsory licensing as 
restricted by TRIPS as a means of managing shortages through reliance on generic 
producers is probably not applicable to the climate arena for economies with little or no 
manufacturing capacity. Even with the application of a paragraph 6-like system, this 
                                                        
 
1119 Apotex Inc. “Submission to the  Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology Bill C-393, 
An Act to amend the Patent Act (drugs for international humanitarian purposes) and to make a 
consequential amendment to another Act” (October 26, 2010). Available at: 
http://www.apotex.com/global/docs/submission_order_en.pdf (last visited 15 August 2014). 
1120 As of January 5, 2012, 2010 (the last date at which official WTO data are available) only 23 developing 
countries had notified their acceptance of the Amendment. See Members accepting amendment of the 
TRIPS Agreement Available at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/amendment_e.htm (last 
visited 15 August 2014). 
1121 As of February 28, 2011, the most recent date on which WTO official data is available only the 
European Union, Canada, Norway, India, Hong Kong, Switzerland, the Philippines, Singapore, Albania, 
Croatia, China, South Korea and Japan, had implementing legislation and/or regulations.,  
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situation seems unlikely to improve.  Only if licenses are more easily available for 
export, as part of a broader commercial process might this become an effective option. 
One option that has not been fully explored is compulsory licensing 
specifically and exclusively for export purposes. This was addressed in the previous 
section on whether such an exception would be available, but there is some state 
practice that suggests that this is possible.  The Indian Patent Act specifically allows for 
issuance of compulsory licenses specifically to service an export market noting that one 
of the bases for issuance of a compulsory license is that “a market for export of the 
patented article manufactured in India is not being supplied or developed”1122 The UK 
Patent Act also contains such a provision but only limited to non-WTO members.1123 
The UK approach suggests a belief that such a provision may not pass muster.   
One final issue to note on licenses issued under Article 31 conditions is that 
they only apply to patents and not to trade secrets, otherwise known as undisclosed 
information, sometimes described as ‘know-how’.  In the context of complex 
technologies which may constitute a large portion of climate technologies, a significant 
portion of the knowledge necessary to replicate, operate and, adapt the technology may 
be retained by the rightholder as trade secrets.1124  Article 31 provides no authorisation 
for the imposition of compulsory licenses on trade secrets, but on the other hand, it 
does not provide a barrier.  Article 39 of TRIPS provides for obligations on the 
protection of undisclosed information.1125 The obligations are rooted in the requirement 
                                                        
 
1122 Article 84.7.a(iii), Indian Patents Act, as amended by Act No. 15 of April 4, 2005. 
1123 Article 48B(1)(d)(i) United Kingdom Patent Act of 1977 (as amended) 
1124 See p13, Consilvio, M “The Role of Patents  in the International Framework of Clean Technology 
Transfer: A  Discussion  of Barriers and Solutions”  3 Intell. Prop. Brief 10 (2011). 
1125 1.       In the course of ensuring effective protection against unfair competition as provided in Article 
10bis of the Paris Convention (1967), Members shall protect undisclosed information in accordance 
with paragraph 2 and data submitted to governments or governmental agencies in accordance 
with paragraph 3. 
  
2.       Natural and legal persons shall have the possibility of preventing information lawfully within their 
control from being disclosed to, acquired by, or used by others without their consent in a manner 
contrary to honest commercial practices(10) so long as such information: 
  
  
(a)     is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the precise configuration and 
assembly of its components, generally known among or readily accessible to persons within 
the circles that normally deal with the kind of information in question; 
  
(b)     has commercial value because it is secret; and 
  
(c)     has been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances, by the person lawfully 
in control of the information, to keep it secret 
  
3.       Members, when requiring, as a condition of approving the marketing of pharmaceutical or of 
agricultural chemical products which utilize new chemical entities, the submission of undisclosed 
test or other data, the origination of which involves a considerable effort, shall protect such data 
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to protect actors against unfair competition contained in Article 10bis of the Paris 
Convention (1967), and paragraph two lays out the positive obligations of members. 
Nothing in Article 39 of TRIPS prevents the application of a compulsory obligation to 
reveal trade secrets and know-how as part of the issuance of a compulsory license on a 
patent.  Some authors argue the opposite1126; that a compulsory license or any other 
mechanism is incapable of mandating exposure of know-how or a trade secret, 
especially since such exposure would essentially ‘destroy’ the secrecy of the trade secret 
as required by the Paris Convention.  However, the silence with respect to the issue of 
mandating sharing does not imply that the obligation to maintain the secrecy could not 
also be transferred with the compulsory license. The ability to issue such concurrent 
obligations makes logical sense in that a compulsory license is intended to allow the 
licensee to practice and reproduce the technology and participate in the market. If a 
portion of the information necessary to actually participate in the market is held as a 
trade secret, it makes sense that the obligation to reveal such trade secrets is not limited.  
Thus, as far as the TRIPS Agreement is concerned, there are no limitations or 
conditions on parties being required to reveal trade secrets in conjunction with a 
compulsory license on a patent, where that trade secret is required to make the 
compulsory license actually effective. Article 5 of the Paris Convention which is 
incorporated into TRIPS by reference1127 also places no limitation on the issuance of 
compulsory licenses related to undisclosed information related to patents.1128  Correa 
points to several examples of such information being revealed as part of judgments 
providing compulsory licenses in US anti-trust practice.1129 
While the forgoing discussion suggests that there are significant limitations to 
compulsory licensing in ensuring or enabling production of technologies and technology 
transfer to developing countries with insufficient or no manufacturing capacity, it 
remains an effective option for those countries with significant manufacturing capacity. 
The complexity of the TRIPS system, however, may need to be mitigated by national 
procedures to make it easier to apply for one.  As Cannady points out, it is in most 
                                                                                                                                   
 
against unfair commercial use. In addition, Members shall protect such data against disclosure, 
except where necessary to protect the public, or unless steps are taken to ensure that the data are 
protected against unfair commercial use. 
 
1126 See p25, Maskus, K “Differentiated Intellectual Property Regimes for Environmental and Climate 
Technologies”, OECD Environment Working Papers, No. 17, OECD Publishing 2010. 
1127 Article 2 of the TRIPS Agreement 
1128 See p57, Khan, B Zorina “Intellectual Property and Development: Lessons from American and 
European History” Study paper 1a, for Commission on Intellectual Property Rights Integrating Intellectual 
Property Rights and Development Policy (London: Commission on Intellectual Property Rights 2002). 
1129 See p7, Correa, C “Intellectual Property Rights and the Use of Compulsory Licenses: Options for 
Developing Countries” Working Paper 5, Trade-Related Agenda, Development And Equity (T.R.A.D.E.) 
Working Papers, South Centre, October 1999. 
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cases, too cumbersome to use regularly as a part of business planning and strategy.1130 
The experience of Korean companies in implementing the Montreal Protocol suggests 
that the complexity of the administrative process proved too much for most companies 
who might have sought to use compulsory licensing.1131  The effectiveness of Article 31 
compulsory licenses however, may lie not so much in their issuance and use, but in the 
way that the existence of such a possibility alters the negotiating balance between 
rightholders and potential licensees.1132  The knowledge that a compulsory license may 
be made available to competitors or to the government itself in cases where the 
government determines there is a shortage, lack of supply, or failure to work of some 
kind, works as an incentive for the rightholder to seek out licensees with whom it is 
comfortable working and to propose reasonable and commercially sustainable licensing 
conditions. In using the kinds of compulsory licenses contemplated by Article 31, to 
address sectoral supply issues, the issue of communicating as clearly as possible the 
willingness of the government to step in to actively manage the market is crucial.  It 
should be noted that frequent actual use of compulsory licensing may have a detrimental 
effect on the dynamic side of the IP equation, reducing incentives for innovation in the 
second generation.1133 
The kinds of compulsory licenses that go beyond addressing supply issues and 
seek to restructure the market so that it is more competitively efficient are those that are 
targeted at anti-competitive practices and abuses of patents.  Article 31(k) exempts such 
compulsory licenses from the requirements of: Article 31(b) (on the need for prior 
negotiations with the rightholder); Article 31(f) (limiting production primarily for supply 
of the domestic market). It also modifies the obligation on remuneration in Article 31(h) 
to allow for providing little or no remuneration. These specific kinds of compulsory 
licenses and their potential for addressing climate change are addressed in the next sub-
section. 
A final note on this section is that it clearly also falls under the kinds of 
measures contemplated by Article 8.1.  As such, where the compulsory license is issued 
in particular to address issues to address health, nutrition or to promote the 
development of vital economic sectors, this must have an influence on the 
                                                        
 
1130 See p4, Cannady, C “Access to Climate Change Technology by Developing Countries: A Practical 
Strategy”, ICTSD’s Programme on IPRs and Sustainable Development, Issue Paper No. 25, International 
Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Geneva, Switzerland (2009). 
1131 See p63, Korea Trade Promotion Agency “Case Study 4: Korea: The Republic of Korea and the 
Montreal Protocol” in Jha, V and U Hoffman (eds.) “Achieving Objectives of Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements: A Package of Trade Measures and Positive Measures Elucidated by Results of Developing 
Country Case Studies” UNCTAD/ITCD/TED/6, UNCTAD 2000. 
1132 See p23, Correa, C “Intellectual Property Rights and the Use of Compulsory Licenses: Options for 
Developing Countries” Working Paper 5, Trade-Related Agenda, Development And Equity (T.R.A.D.E.) 
Working Papers, South Centre, October 1999. 
1133 As argued by Mandel, G “Promoting Environmental Innovation with Intellectual Property Innovation: 
A New Basis for Patent Rewards,” 24(1) Temple Journal of Science, Technology, and Environmental Law 
51  (2005). 
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interpretation of provisions relating to remuneration (Article 31(h)), and level of 
production for domestic supply (Article 31(f)). 
 Compulsory licensing is generally legally available, especially for emerging 
economies with manufacturing capacity.  It may be possible to use the system to address 
sectoral market problems, but blanket measures that are insufficiently specific may fall 
afoul of the requirement of article 31(a), that such use be considered on individual 
merits.   
 
III.3. Compulsory licenses and other action to address anti-competitive practices 
III.3.1. Legal Availability 
Other provisions which may relate to climate policy purposes are Articles 8.21134 and 40 
of the TRIPS Agreement, which address competition policy and abuses of patent rights.  
Parties can adopt any measures, including compulsory licenses to address the following 
issues that are explicitly laid out: 
- preventing the abuse of intellectual property rights by right holders (Article 
8.2); 
- preventing the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade (Article 
8.2); 
- preventing the resort to practices that adversely affect the international transfer 
of technology (Article 8.2); 
 
Specific examples of such practices cited in the TRIPS Agreement include:  
- exclusive grant back conditions; 
- conditions preventing challenges to validity; 
- coercive package licensing 
 
Article 40.1, as does Article 8.2, recognizes that some IP-related practices that 
restrain competition may have a negative effect on trade and technology transfer.1135  In 
pursuance of measures to address this, Article 40.2 ensures that nothing in the TRIPS 
Agreement shall limit the freedom of states to determine the nature, kind and scope of 
                                                        
 
1134 Article 8.2 states “Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the provisions of this 
Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right holders or the 
resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of 
technology.” 
1135 Members agree that some licensing practices or conditions pertaining to intellectual property rights 
which restrain competition may have adverse effects on trade and may impede the transfer and 
dissemination of technology. 
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practices that constitute “an abuse of intellectual property rights having an adverse 
effect on competition in the relevant market.” 1136 Thus, states remain free to address 
anti-competitive behaviour by actors in their domestic markets. 
 
III.3.2. Practical Availability 
For transfer of technologies for climate change mitigation and adaptation it is 
important to note that included in the ambit of restrictive practices are practices that 
adversely affect international transfer of technology1137 and practices that impede the 
transfer and dissemination of technology.1138 This means that, by definition, where a 
WTO member finds that technology transfer of climate change technologies is being 
adversely affected by the licensing (or lack thereof) of a patented technology, action to 
address this can be presumptively justified.  In addition, such measures can be taken 
pre-emptively so as not only to address a problem once it has arisen but also to prevent 
a problem from arising in the first place.  Thus a member can pre-emptively put 
legislation and regulations in place to structure the market is such a way as to enable and 
encourage technology transfer into the relevant markets. Crucially, Article 40 also has an 
international dimension in that it requires consultations and sympathetic consideration 
of requests for information and enforcement regarding their domestic enterprises from 
other members seeking to investigate and/or address anti-competitive behaviour by 
those enterprises in their own market.1139 This encourages cooperation and recognizes 
that a significant amount of the restrictive practices that Article 8.2 and 40 cover occurs 
across borders and that members have a right to legislate and to seek cooperation from 
other members to address such cross-border behaviour. 
                                                        
 
1136 Article 40.2 states in full: Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent Members from specifying in their 
legislation licensing practices or conditions that may in particular cases constitute an abuse of intellectual 
property rights having an adverse effect on competition in the relevant market As provided above, a 
Member may adopt, consistently with the other provisions of this Agreement, appropriate measures to 
prevent or control such practices, which may include for example exclusive grantback conditions, 
conditions preventing challenges to validity and coercive package licensing, in the light of the relevant 
laws and regulations of that Member. 
1137 TRIPS Article 8.2 
1138 TRIPS Article 40.1 
1139 TRIPS Article 40.3 “Each Member shall enter, upon request, into consultations with any other 
Member which has cause to believe that an intellectual property right owner that is a national or 
domiciliary of the Member to which the request for consultations has been addressed is undertaking 
practices in violation of the requesting Member’s laws and regulations on the subject matter of this 
Section, and which wishes to secure compliance with such legislation, without prejudice to any action 
under the law and to the full freedom of an ultimate decision of either Member. The Member addressed 
shall accord full and sympathetic consideration to, and shall afford adequate opportunity for, 
consultations with the requesting Member, and shall cooperate through supply of publicly available non-
confidential information of relevance to the matter in question and of other information available to the 
Member, subject to domestic law and to the conclusion of mutually satisfactory agreements concerning 
the safeguarding of its confidentiality by the requesting Member.”  
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However, both Article 8.2 and Article 40.2 come with the caveat that any 
measures taken to address restrictive practices must be consistent with the provisions of 
the TRIPS Agreement.  Since the most common measures to address anti-competitive 
practices are compulsory licenses, or other involuntary measures, this includes Article 30 
and 31.  Focusing first on Article 31, licenses to address anti-competitive practices must 
still comply with all provisions except Article 31(k), which exempts such compulsory 
licenses from the requirements of: Article 31(b) (on the need for prior negotiations with 
the rightholder); Article 31(f) (limiting production primarily for supply of the domestic 
market; Article 31(h), modifying the obligation on remuneration to allow for providing 
little or no remuneration.  As noted, the use of such licenses remains a powerful market 
restructuring tool, especially because, outside of the Paris Convention and the TRIPS 
Agreement, there exist no international restrictions on the criteria, nature and scope of 
such licenses.  However, there are two issues which any framework for widespread use 
of such licenses for market restructuring will have to address. The first is a conceptual 
issue, which is how to address ‘refusals to deal’; the second (addressed in the following 
sub-section) is how to deal with compulsory licenses for failures of ‘working’ the patent 
in the Paris Convention and the TRIPS Agreement. 
The patent right is, essentially, the right to prevent others from certain acts in 
relation to the patented technology.  The right of refusal is fundamental to the exercise 
of the patent right.  Thus a refusal to deal cannot per se constitute an anti-competitive act. 
The question then arises as to what kinds of refusals to deal fall within the scope of anti-
competitive behaviour or if there must be some other conditions in conjunction with 
the refusal to deal.  There are no internationally agreed standards on this issue but the 
existence of the patent right means that, at a minimum, TRIPS members must 
acknowledge the right of the refusal although that right cannot be a refusal to supply all 
market actors.  One way to deal with this issue is to simply avoid it altogether and focus 
on the market effects of the behaviour such that where certain conditions are met (e.g. 
adverse effect on technology transfer) such a refusal to deal would then fall within the 
ambit of anti-competitive practices.  Another approach is to focus on the other 
constituents of anti-competition regulations that are concerned with the behaviour of 
monopolies, focusing on whether there exists market power or dominance, whether that 
market power is exercised in a manner that negatively affects competition.  Nevertheless, 
compulsory licenses for refusals to deal are available in several jurisdictions1140  and 
courts and legislators continue to struggle with the boundaries.    
In the context of climate change, refusals to deal have been a concern, 
especially given anecdotal evidence from Korea and India of refusals to license 
                                                        
 
1140 See p1, Correa, C “Intellectual Property Rights and the Use of Compulsory Licenses: Options for 
Developing Countries” Working Paper 5, Trade-Related Agenda, Development And Equity (T.R.A.D.E.) 
Working Papers, South Centre, October 1999. Notably however, not in the US. 
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technology under the Montreal Protocol system.1141 Rules put in place prior to such 
negotiations may go a long way to levelling the playing field between rightholders and 
potential licensees, increasing incentives to rightholders to actively seek out licensees 
rather than engaging in blanket refusals. Setting up a clear system for addressing anti-
competitive behaviour may also go a long way to ensuring that restrictive licensing 
practices are kept at a minimum.  As already noted, TRIPS Article 40.1 specifically 
encompasses licensing practices that have an adverse effect on international transfer of 
technology.  
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to enter into a discussion on the full 
scope of approaches to the relationship between competition law and intellectual 
property, other than to note that the TRIPS Agreement leaves ample room for the 
application of competition law to patent licensing practices, in ways that allow 
significant market restructuring.  This will require concerted action ahead of time to 
ensure that the right incentives are in place and where these fail, that speedy action is 
possible to issue and manage compulsory licenses and other measures to address anti-
competitive behaviour.  In addition, significant training of developing country officials 
in the policy and practice of competition law1142, especially in relation to technology 
markets will have to take place. This may need to be supplemented by cooperative 
mechanisms as foreseen by TRIPS Article 40.2 to allow for cross-border cooperation.   
A final note is that, expertise in competition law is sorely lacking in most 
developing countries and thus it is very difficult to address the imbalance inherent in 
providing strong property rights in intellectual property without a strong mechanism for 
addressing abuses.1143 It may be appropriate to consider an a priori set of regulations and 
mechanisms that set the stage for market actors but do not require significant ex post 
action by regulators to determine when competition law has been breached. Clear bright 
line rules may be better than case by case assessments, despite some of the inefficiencies 
this may create in the market. 
 
III.4. Working Requirements 
III.4.1. Legal Availability 
Historically, countries were able to issue compulsory licenses for failures to 
produce the patented product in the country where the patent right is granted.  This is a 
                                                        
 
1141 p531, Hutchison, C J ‘Does TRIPS Facilitate or Impede Climate Change Technology Transfer into 
Developing Countries?’ University of Ottawa Law & Technology Journal, Vol. 3, pp. 517-537, 2006.  
1142 See p26, Maskus, K “Differentiated Intellectual Property Regimes for Environmental and Climate 
Technologies”, OECD Environment Working Papers, No. 17, OECD Publishing 2010. 
1143 See p1, Correa, C “Intellectual Property Rights and the Use of Compulsory Licenses: Options for 
Developing Countries” Working Paper 5, Trade-Related Agenda, Development And Equity (T.R.A.D.E.) 
Working Papers, South Centre, October 1999. 
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right explicitly recognized in the Paris Convention on Industrial Property1144, which 
allows for compulsory licenses in cases where the patent has not been worked.1145 In 
fact, Article 5 allows for forfeiture of the patent in those cases where the compulsory 
license is not sufficient to address the relevant abuses.1146   Notably, Article 5(A)(1) 
provides that forfeiture of the patent under Article 5 shall not be allowed where only 
importation rather than manufacture of the product takes place in the country where the 
patent is granted.  This requirement of importation therefore did not affect the issuance 
of compulsory licenses for those situations where products were imported but not 
locally manufactured.   
The TRIPS Agreement appears to contain a provision very similar to Article 
5(A)(1) and the scope of that provision may have a significant impact on whether 
compulsory licenses to address failures to produce products locally can still be subjected 
to compulsory licenses. Article 27.1 of TRIPS states:  
patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as 
to the place of invention, the field of technology and whether products are 
imported or locally produced. 
The question is, therefore, whether this provision extends the scope of Article 
5(A)(1) to prohibit compulsory licenses for failures to produce locally.  Clearly, failures 
to supply the product market through both a failure to supply and a failure to produce 
locally would not be subject to the anti-discrimination provisions.  In addressing this 
issue, the first thing to note is that Article 27.1 is an anti-discrimination provision.  It 
states that, in determining the granting, scope and extent of rights, states may not make 
an unjustified distinction as to whether products are locally produced or imported.  To 
the extent that sufficient importation takes place to meet market demand, it appears that 
Article 27.1 does indeed apply to compulsory licenses, despite the fact that Article 31 
places no limits on the grounds for issuance of compulsory licenses. Article 32 places no 
such limits either. However, in interaction with Article 27.1, a plain reading suggests that, 
in the product market, justifying a compulsory license by pointing to a failure to produce 
the patented goods locally would not comply with the TRIPS Agreement.1147  To the 
extent that the failure to produce locally leads to anti-competitive effects however, then 
Article 40 would apply and the state would be free to address that problem through a 
compulsory license.  
                                                        
 
1144 Article 5, Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 
1145 Article 5(A)(2) Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 
1146 Article 5(A)(3) Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property. See p3, Correa, C 
“Intellectual Property Rights and the Use of Compulsory Licenses: Options for Developing Countries” 
Working Paper 5, Trade-Related Agenda, Development And Equity (T.R.A.D.E.) Working Papers, South 
Centre, October 1999. 
1147 Contra p82, Correa, C The TRIPS Agreement:  A Guide  for  the  South.  The  Uruguay  Round 
Agreement  on  Trade-Related  Intellectual  Property  Rights (Geneva: South Centre, 1997) 
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Outside of the product market however, the issue is far less clear.  The first 
area is that of process patents. A patented process can be used to make products. Such 
products are not per se patented, although it is possible for a process patent rightholder 
to prevent their import if they were produced outside the country using the patented 
process by someone without authorization. However, importation of products 
manufactured by a patented process does not fall within the literal scope of Article 27.1 
which only applies to patented products. Thus, whether a process patent is used locally 
or not may indeed be grounds for a compulsory license or revocation.  
The second issue is that of the market in technology as contrasted to the 
market in products.  The failure to license is a separate issue from that of the failure to 
produce.  Thus, in addressing access to technologies and know-how, rather than access 
to goods, members may remain free to issue compulsory licenses for failure to license 
into a market even where goods are indeed being produced locally or imported.   
An interesting note on this issue is that a complaint was laid by the US against 
Brazil with respect to an explicit local working requirement in Brazilian law1148A panel 
was established but before matters proceeded further, the issue was settled. One of the 
reasons that the case was settled was the dispute brought by Brazil against the US 
(United States - US Patent Code WTO/DS/224) for the working requirement existing 
in the US patent law with respect to federally supported patented inventions.  This 
appears to have been a case of mutually assured destruction, where because both states 
had crucial industrial policy aims and constituencies behind the challenged provisions, 
success in challenging the other’s provisions would have entailed removal of the similar 
provision in their own law. However, the cases may also be a pointer to the fact that, in 
negotiating the TRIPS Agreement, states such as the United States and Brazil did not 
intend to invalidate the use of working requirements related to domestic production and 
that the concern in Article 27.1 was simply to ensure that there would be no unjustified 
and arbitrary discrimination in the granting and exercise of patents with respect to 
domestically produced and imported patented products. One can point to Section 204 
of the Bayh-Dole Act which requires that licensees of publicly funded technologies must 
manufacture them substantially in the US.1149 
To the extent that states wish to take measures to address shortages in 
accessing products, Article 31 provides a tool for doing so without having to contravene 
the limits that Article 27.1 may place on working requirements.  At the level of the 
market in technology or the market in licenses Article 27.1 appears to be inapplicable 
and failures to license may still constitutes bases for action under article 31 and 40.  
                                                        
 
1148  Brazil — Measures Affecting Patent Protection WTO/DS/199 (2000).   
1149 See 35 USC §204 (2006 and Supp. V 2012). As also noted by p9, Barton, J “Intellectual Property and 
Access to Clean Energy Technologies in Developing Countries: An Analysis of Solar Photovoltaic, Biofuel 
and Wind Technologies” Trade and Sustainable Energy Series, Issue Paper No. 2, ICTSD December 2007.  
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Finally, as discussed is the previous section, the application and scope of 
Article 40 must also fall within the scope of Article 8.1, meaning that there may be even 
more leeway to address Article 40 and 8.2 anti-competitive measures where these are 
“necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in 
sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development.” 
 
III.4.2. Practical Availability 
Given the ongoing impasse between the US and Brazil on the working 
requirement, significant uncertainty surrounds the ability to use working requirements in 
the post-TRIPS period.  It appears that where targeted primarily at process patents, 
Article 27.1 does not negate the flexibility provided by the Paris Convention.  This may 
be crucial for climate change as a significant part of the challenge for many developing 
countries will be process efficiency and use of working requirements may provide 
leverage to push rightholders to license into the economy.  The TRIPS Agreement 
appears to be place few restrictions on the use of compulsory licenses for failure to 
work in such circumstances.  The potential responses may also include revocation of the 
patent, or other measures authorized by the Paris Conventions. I would conclude that 
working requirements remain available for process patents but not for product patents 
but that it is possible to have working requirements at the scale and scope necessary to 
address technology transfer for climate change.   
 
III.5. Patent exclusions and special treatment for climate technologies 
III.5.1. Legal Availability 
The legal basis for exclusion of patents on products or processes or both in the 
TRIPS Agreement is, largely non-existent.  There is little leverage for excluding patents 
related to climate technologies except in a very few, small areas. Article 27 of the TRIPS 
Agreement has some provisions allowing for patent exclusions but also requires that 
patents be available for all fields of technology, both products and processes.  The 
problem, for example, with Article 27.2 is that it ostensibly allows the exclusion of 
patents on particular products or processes for purposes of ordre public or public morals, 
including to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice 
to the environment, but that also means that the purpose of such exclusions aims to 
stop the commercial exploitation of such products and processes.1150 This runs counter 
to the aim of technology transfer, which is to expand the commercialization and 
                                                        
 
1150 Some authors see this as one of the key ways in which the patent system may actually be 
supportive of addressing climate change by disallowing the patenting of GHG emitting technologies. See 
e.g. Derclaye, E  ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Global Warming’, 12 J. MARSHALL  REV.  INTELL. PROP.  
L.  263  (2008).  
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adoption of the relevant technologies.  Article 27.2 therefore does not provide a viable 
pathway to excluding patents on relevant climate technologies so as to allow common 
and public access.1151  
However, looking at Article 27.1, some have argued that there may still be a 
possibility to discriminate among fields of technology.1152  The Panel in the Canada-
Pharmaceutical Patents case argued that establishing special systems for particular product 
sectors was acceptable as long as these were supported by justifiable and specific policy 
purposes.1153 Thus, in that case, a special regime allowing an exception for use of a 
patent for meeting pharmaceutical regulatory requirements was allowed. The Panel saw 
this as a bona fide differentiation. However, the Panel also noted that the point at which 
differentiation began to shade into discrimination was if a policy appeared to be 
deliberately targeted at a sector where foreign right holders dominated. 1154    An 
examination of the negotiating history suggests that the initial rule proposed in 27.1 was 
watered down from an absolute ban on treating different technology sectors and 
technologies differently to one that simply required availability of patents in all fields.1155   
This does not however, reach so far as allowing complete exclusions of those 
inventions which qualify as “technological” or “inventions” within the meaning of 
domestic law.  Patent law does of course allow for exclusions based on the fact that the 
claimed invention is not technological, or that it represents a discovery rather than an 
‘invention’. This provides for the exclusions for patentability for computer software, 
mathematical methods, business methods that are found in some patent laws. 1156  
However, these do not extend to inventions, as such. This may also be the basis for 
excluding products of nature as discoveries, thus countries can exclude genes, and 
derivatives thereof from patentability.1157 
                                                        
 
1151 See also in support, Consilvio, M. “The  Role  of Patents  in the International Framework of Clean 
Technology Transfer: A  Discussion  of Barriers and Solutions”  3 Intell. Prop. Brief 10 (2011).  
1152 See Abbott, F M “Innovation and Technology Transfer to Address Climate Change:  
Lessons  from  the  Global  Debate  on  Intellectual  Property  and  Public  Health”,  ICTSD’s  Programme  
on  IPRs and Sustainable Development, Issue Paper No. 24, International Centre for Trade and 
Sustainable Development, Geneva, Switzerland, 2009. See also, p20, Maskus, K “Differentiated 
Intellectual Property Regimes for Environmental and Climate Technologies”, OECD Environment Working 
Papers, No. 17, OECD Publishing 2010. 
1153 Canada- Pharmaceuticals Patents, WTO Doc. WT/DS1141R, 7 April 2000. 
1154 Para 7.92, Id. 
1155 p2, Abbott, F M “Innovation and Technology Transfer to Address Climate Change:  
Lessons  from  the  Global  Debate  on  Intellectual  Property  and  Public  Health”,  ICTSD’s  Programme  
on  IPRs and Sustainable Development, Issue Paper No. 24, International Centre for Trade and 
Sustainable Development, Geneva, Switzerland, 2009. 
1156 See e.g. Article 52 of the European Patent Convention 
1157 Correa, C The TRIPs  Agreement:  A  Guide  for  the  South.  The  Uruguay  Round Agreement  on  
Trade-Related  Intellectual  Property  Rights (Geneva: South Centre, 1997) 
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Article 27.3 also allows exclusions from patentability of very specific areas of 
technology without the requirement that they also be excluded from commercialization. 
These are: 
a) diagnostic and therapeutic methods for treating animals and people; and 
b) plant and animals other than micro-organisms; essentially biological process 
for the production of animals and plants other than non-biological and 
microbiological processes  
For addressing adaptation needs in the agricultural arena, the prohibition on 
patenting of plants and animals is crucial. This allows free access to new and adapted 
products for adaptation. However, the limitations also require protection of micro-
organisms, possibly limiting access, for example, to new bacteria that can be used to 
create biofuels from cellulosic plants. Countries are also still required to protect non-
biological and micro-biological processes. Thus processes that use bacteria to produce 
biofuels may also be covered for example, as well as possibly processes for genetic 
manipulation of plants and plant genes.  Thus, as Barton points out, while end-user 
access may be enabled by such an exclusion, participation in research may be a greater 
problem given that many tools for biotechnological research are patented1158, and are 
not subject to being excluded in the same way as plants and animals. Even where some 
countries exclude these on the basis that they are not technological inventions but 
discoveries, the ability to export products produced using these processes or products, 
may be limited by patents in export markets. 
In addition, there is the additional requirement that countries provide 
protection to plant varieties through some sui generis regime. However, as the sui generis 
regime is not defined, any method that they use to provide effective protection will pass 
muster. The question is what would constitute an ‘effective’ regime and whether this 
would require exclusive rights.  Barton argues that this would require some kind of 
exclusivity, at least to the extent that it would prevent farmers from carrying out 
traditional exchange of seeds from crops they have farmed.1159  Correa has argued that 
the lack of definition leaves countries much freer.1160 I am more inclined to argue that 
because such exchange was allowable under UPOV 1977, and that since UPOV 1977 
was encompassed as one of the methods of implementing such a sui generis regime that 
                                                        
 
1158 See p15, Barton, J “Nutrition and Technology Transfer Policies” Issue Paper 6, UNCTAD-ICTSD Project 
on IPRs and Sustainable Development, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, May 
2004) 
1159 See p19, Barton, J “Nutrition and Technology Transfer Policies” Issue Paper 6, UNCTAD-ICTSD Project 
on IPRs and Sustainable Development, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, May 
2004) 
1160 See p29, Correa, C The TRIPs  Agreement:  A  Guide  for  the  South.  The  Uruguay  Round Agreement  
on  Trade-Related  Intellectual  Property  Rights (Geneva: South Centre, 1997) 
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some more flexibility was considered. In particular, the fact that some version of UPOV 
was not explicitly mentioned militates against requiring an exclusive rights approach. 
Thus a country could conceivably choose a liability regime that ensures not 
only access for third parties but also remuneration for the rightholder, without requiring 
lengthy negotiations or permitting processes. There is no term requirement or criteria 
for grant so countries are free to design whatever system they feel is appropriate.  What 
is clear, however, is that many countries have chosen to become members of the UPOV 
1991 which provides very strict standards of intellectual property protection for plant 
varieties and restricts their ability to allow other breeders to make use of the protected 
variety. In particular, UPOV 1991 restricts the ability of countries to provide exceptions 
for their farmers to save, re-use and exchange1161 seeds that they have planted on their 
own fields. Fortunately, there is much more flexibility for those countries who wish to 
withdraw from UPOV 1991 to do so, without the level of costs that might be associated 
with withdrawing from the TRIPS Agreement. 1162  However, such withdrawal still 
requires the preservation of rights that were in existence at the time of the notice of 
withdrawal and thus cannot have retroactive effect to existing protected varieties. Given 
that the required term of protection under UPOV 1991 is 20 years, this limits the 
usefulness of such a withdrawal.  
 I conclude that, except for the area of plants and animals, there is no legal 
availability for excluding from patentability climate related technologies.  
 
 In terms of timing, such an exclusion of plant and animal patents can take 
place almost immediately. It places the cost of losing protection on both domestic and 
foreign innovators.  However, it also allows domestic users freer access to innovations 
that are protected elsewhere. 
 
It is also not clear that such exclusion can be enacted retroactively to existing 
protection.  In such cases, domestic case law on expropriation will have to be taken into 
account. Where the country is signatory to investor-state dispute arbitration in a bilateral 
investment treaty, there may also be the possibility of an expropriation claim. 
 
 
III.6. Parallel importation 
III.6.1. Legal Availability 
                                                        
 
1161 Article 15, UPOV 1991. 
1162 Article 29, UPOV 1991.  
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TRIPS Article 6 on exhaustion1163 of IP rights is very clear. Nothing in the 
Agreement shall be deemed to address the issue of exhaustion, so Members are free to 
determine when and how products that have been legitimately placed on the market in 
other countries can be imported without the consent of the patent holder. This is called 
parallel importation and it is fundamental to ensuring that access to goods is enabled. 
This would allow products produced legitimately in other countries to be imported.   
III.6.2. Practical Availability 
However, the key question here is what constitutes ‘legitimately placed on the 
market’. The traditional test is that such products have been placed on foreign markets 
with the consent of the right holder. Thus goods that are infringing IP rights in those 
foreign markets where they are produced would not be subject to the exhaustion 
principle.  Goods produced under a compulsory license would be another matter.  It can 
be argued that such goods, while not produced with the consent of the right holder, 
have been lawfully placed on the market in the foreign country where the product has 
been made and can therefore lawfully be imported. Article 107A(b) of the Indian Patent 
Act directly addresses this issue by ensuring that rights are exhausted when the products 
are placed on the market by an "authorised person”, whether by the rightholder or a 
compulsory licensee.  While it could be argued that such an approach clashes with the 
TRIPS Article 31 requirement that compulsory licenses be issued primarily for domestic 
supply, at the very least some portion of products produced under a compulsory license 
can be expected to be sold, directly across borders, even if the license is primarily for 
domestic production. In addition, once products have been placed on the market, 
Article 31(f) would not function as a limitation on onward sales by others besides the 
compulsory licensee, especially where the rightholder had already received adequate 
compensation. Thus direct sales by the producer may be limited but those by others 
would not be.  More importantly, with respect to the right of importation, a country that 
applies such a regime of exhaustion cannot be brought before a WTO panel as, 
according to Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement, the issue is entirely non-justiciable 
under the WTO.   
 
III.7. Setting Specific standards for patentability including disclosure 
III.7.1. Legal availability 
                                                        
 
1163 Exhaustion applies primarily to product patents and the extent to which a rightholders’ right to 
control the ‘sale’ and distribution of such products ends after the first sale.  The principle states that, 
once a patented product has been placed on the market by the rightholder through a sale or distribution, 
the rightholder has ‘exhausted’ the right of sale, having benefitted from the first sale.  The rightholder 
cannot prevent the onward sale or expect to benefit from such follow-on sales of the exact same 
product. However, the rightholder retains all the other rights granted by the patent.  The principle of 
exhaustion is most significant when it interacts with the right of importation of the patented product.  
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 The TRIPS Agreement requires states to provide patents provided that such 
patent are novel, inventive and industrially applicable.  The TRIPS Agreement however, 
does not define these terms and countries are free to place the threshold for them as 
high or as low as they wish. While disclosure is not mentioned in the rules it is presumed 
that the process of application of a patent creates a disclosure.  Historically some states 
have made sufficient and best mode disclosure a patent requirement as well, which 
could be the basis for refusal or revocation of the patent.  The US, in the America 
Invents Act in 2011 has recently removed its best mode requirement as a basis for 
invalidating patents in infringement suits.1164  Nevertheless states are free to impose 
such best mode conditions which may be appropriate to take advantage of the teaching 
effect of patent disclosures.  To the extent that a patent should enable a person of 
ordinary skill in the art to reproduce it, disclosure should be a useful learning tool. This 
is especially true for those readers who are not located in the country of patenting.  
However, there is a structural tension within the patent system, as patent applicants will 
work to disclose as little as they can get away with in order to receive the patent.1165 
Without an active surveillance mechanism and disincentives for applicants to engage in 
such gaming of the system, patents will not be able to perform this information function 
that is so central to the patent social bargain.  States are free to require levels of 
disclosure that actually enable a person of skill in the art to reproduce the invention, 
something which can be tested after the fact by competitors and, as used to be the case 
in the US, be used as a basis for invalidating or narrowing the scope of the patent. 
Could a state provide differentiated standards of inventive step for climate 
technologies, thus limiting the number of patents in the field compared to others? This 
could entail ensuring that patents are not granted for climate technologies specifically 
unless they met a very high standard of inventive step. Even if justified by a strong 
public policy goal, i.e. focusing patent activity in this specific sector on significant 
technological advances rather than smaller incremental steps, such an approach would 
likely still be considered a form of discrimination. In particular, where the approach had 
a disproportionate effect on foreign rightholders, such as seeking to ensure technology 
transfer, it is highly unlikely that such discrimination would be allowed, under the 
Canada-Pharmaceutical Patents analysis. To succeed such a proposal would have to apply 
such a standard to all fields of technology rather than just climate technologies. 
 
III.7.2. Practical Availability 
                                                        
 
1164 See 35 U.S.C.A. § 282(3)(A) (2011) 
1165 See p5, Cannady, C “Access to Climate Change Technology by Developing Countries: A Practical 
Strategy, ICTSD’s Programme on IPRs and Sustainable Development, Issue Paper No. 25, International 
Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Geneva, Switzerland (2009). 
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One solution that remains within the limits of the TRIPS Agreement is to use 
such a high standard for novelty and inventive step1166 and then focus on a system of 
utility or petty patents or a liability regime, more suited to developing country 
entrepreneurs and creates incentives for the kind of small scale incremental innovation 
that developing country entrepreneurs work on.  What this would allow is local, 
incremental and adaptive innovation, based on free access to products patented 
elsewhere, but not domestically, and enable export to other countries where the 
improved products may not be patented. The practicality of this approach is limited by 
the fact that the majority of developing countries have patent registration systems that 
do not examine their patents prior to grant. Patents are only assessed for novelty, 
inventive, step and industrial applicability if a challenge is made to their validity, usually 
during litigation. The major emerging economies have shifted to an examination system, 
so China, India and Brazil have better access to such possible differentiation as a policy 
lever. 
III.8. Limiting the number of allowable claims in a patent, potentially down to 1. 
III.8.1. Legal availability 
This was a technique that was used by many countries to limit the number of 
inventions that could be included in the same application and benefit from the same 
priority date and from the single fee.  This raised the cost of patenting, made applicants 
disclose more carefully the specific invention they were claiming and limited the extent 
to which a whole sector or technology field might be claimed by a single applicant.   
This capacity was limited by the Paris Convention in Article 4G, which requires 
countries that object to multiple inventions in the same claim to nevertheless allow them 
to file a separate divisional application that retains its priority date.  They may also not 
require a divisional application to lose its priority simply because it claims matter that 
was not claimed in the original patent, as long as is disclosed in some fashion in any 
other part of the original patent application.  This requirement also significantly narrows 
the utility of this intervention against the amount of patenting that can be done by a 
single applicant relating to a single invention or set of inventions.  The incorporation of 
the Paris Convention into the TRIPS Agreement thus makes this a requirement under 
the TRIPS Agreement.  However, countries may still charge fees for such applications, 
on an increasing scale1167 or even at the same rate as the original patent.  In terms of 
legal availability, this intervention is no longer available. 
                                                        
 
1166 Maskus suggests this as an option against actual exclusions on patents, see p25, Maskus, K 
“Differentiated Intellectual Property Regimes for Environmental and Climate Technologies”, OECD 
Environment Working Papers, No. 17, OECD Publishing 2010. 
1167 As planned by the EPO beginning in May 2014. See Rule 36, Implementing Regulations to the 
Convention on the Grant of European Patents. Available at: http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-
texts/html/epc/2010/e/r36.html (last visited 15 August 2014). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
  
Looking at the portfolio of actions gathered in Chapter 5, that countries would 
like to take, what does the preceding analysis tells us about their availability under the 
TRIPS Agreement and the WTO?  For a significant portion of them TRIPS is entirely 
silent and does not address the issue.  On others, TRIPS simply forbids them generally, 
such as those that seek to discriminate between foreign nationals and domestic actors in 
acquisition, exercise or exceptions to rights.  However, as noted, this does not mean that 
many of these may not be subject to further restrictions by regional and bilateral free 
trade agreements, or by bilateral investment treaties.  To the extent that these are 
restricted in that fashion, countries may wish to revisit the wisdom of agreeing to such 
provisions when they need economy wide measures to address climate change. 
We can divide the measures into three categories; those that are legal and 
practically available; those that are legally available but practically unavailable; those that 
are legally unavailable. For ease of assessment we can put these into these three 
categories: 
Legally Available, Practically Available 
1. Compulsory licenses for use by emerging economies; including of trade secrets  
2. Working requirements for process patents 
3. Compensatory liability regimes for sub-patentable inventions 
4. Product patent exclusions for plants and animals 
5. Application of competition law to address anti-competitive behaviour relating 
to IP including standard setting 
6. Parallel Importation of products produced under authorization in another 
country. 
7. Technology transfer and other performance requirements to qualify for 
establishing foreign direct investment presence 
8. Regular, consistent and detailed monitoring of licensing terms in licensing 
contracts to guard against anti-competitive clauses. This may require a pre-
approval and registration process; 
9. Higher fees for applications and renewals higher fees for large firms; 
10. Requiring full disclosure of the patent and the best mode known at the time of 
patenting including all know-how required to practise it; 
11. Requiring early and significant pre-grant publication of patent applications, 
coupled with a process for dissemination to local firms; 
12. Shifting from patent registration to examination while creating and maintaining 
strong utility model registration system; 
13. Setting higher inventive step and novelty standards; 
14. Strong pre-grant and post-grant opposition procedures; 
15. Requirements for Joint Venture for investment in a specific sector or sectors. 
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16. Limiting restrictions on the movement and employment of employees once 
they have left the firm, such as non-compete clauses; 
17. Providing specific loans and capital for mergers with and acquisitions 
(shareholdings or outright purchases) of foreign companies with significant 
patent portfolios of relevance to climate change with the express purpose of 
transferring technology, know-how to the acquiring company 
 
Legally Available, Practically Unavailable 
1. Working requirements 
2. Research and other exceptions to patent rights 
3. Compulsory licenses for public interest purpose use by LDCs 
 
Legally Unavailable 
 
1. Compensatory liability regimes for patents 
2. Working requirements for product patents 
3. Product and process exclusions generally 
4. Compulsory licensing for export to other countries 
5. Limiting the patent term to less than 20 years, generally or in specific sectors 
6. Using a relative standard of novelty for specific sectors 
7. Higher fees for patent application and renewal for foreign patent applicant 
firms; 
8. Limiting the number of allowable claims in a patent, potentially down to 1. 
 
 
 At a glance, it is possible to see that the majority of measures that countries 
have under consideration to address IP issues related to technology transfer remain 
available under the TRIPS Agreement.  This seems to suggest that the TRIPS 
Agreement may not be the limiting factor when it comes to countries use of these policy 
levers to address technology transfer of IP protected products and processes into their 
economies.  However the analysis also shows and I would argue that the most effective 
IP-related levers have been marginalized and reduced in scope and effectiveness by the 
TRIPS Agreement.  The use of the working requirement, one of the more powerful 
historical incentives for encouraging licensing and FDI has been curtailed.  The use of 
patent exclusions in key sectors of public interest such as pharmaceuticals and 
agriculture is no longer available.  Most importantly, few of the remaining flexibilities 
allow for the emerging economies to play the role as intermediaries and export products 
as they need to do if technologies are to be transferred to other developing countries at 
the scale and speed required. 
The most useful tools that are left legally and practically available by the TRIPS 
Agreement are the application of competition law and the use of performance and 
technology transfer requirements, as well as requirements to have FDI take place in the 
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form of JVs.  The rest are smaller, marginal, adjustments to domestic intellectual 
property systems.   
What the analysis tells us is that TRIPS may not present an absolute barrier to 
measures taken to address technology transfer but it creates a system that slows down 
the pace and scope of measures that developing countries can take to address 
technology transfer.  This within our framework, it seems difficult to avoid the 
conclusion that, on the whole; TRIPS does indeed limit the capacity of developing 
countries to: 
3. Appropriately define necessity as: 
a. Affordability - ensuring that prices of products are not set 
so high that it is too expensive for all the relevant economic 
actors to afford.  
b. Adoptability - ensuring that prices of products and or 
know-how are not set so high that they make it 
commercially unviable for all relevant actors to adopt 
‘climate-friendly’ technologies. 
c. Adaptability – ensuring sufficient distribution of knowledge 
(information, skills, know-how) to enable a critical number 
of existing producers/service providers in the market to 
adopt, adapt and replicate climate technologies and ensure 
their participation in the market. 
4. Take actions that:  
a. address the full scope of technologies required by them to 
meet the climate change mitigation and adaptation needs; 
b. at the rate and level of diffusion appropriate to achieving 
those mitigation and adaptation needs; 
c. in the developing countries and regions that most 
effectively meet the climate change need. 
 
However, it is also clear that the extent to which TRIPS does pose a barrier is 
not absolute nor is it extreme.  There remains room to act at the margins and, with 
respect to competition law to address egregious behaviour affecting the functioning of 
the market.  What it does not allow is for member states to use intellectual property 
interventions to decisively shift their domestic technology markets in favour of domestic 
firms seeking access to knowledge and technologies.  The ability to actively use such 
interventions to aggressively localize technologies and enable adoption, adaptation and 
replication is significantly restricted. This is the case within the case law and existing 
interpretations of the TRIPS Agreement.  However, the question arises as to whether 
there are approaches to interpretation that may nevertheless expand the room for 
measures that may not be fully in compliance with the TRIPS Agreement, by reaching 
out to other rules to be used as applicable law within the TRIPS Agreement and 
opening up some further flexibility. While the analysis in this chapter stayed within the 
traditional framework of how to interpret the TRIPS Agreement and the broader WTO 
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jurisprudence, the next chapter explores whether other international rules, such as the 
UNFCCC and the human rights regime can be brought to bear to increase the flexibility 
that developing countries have under the TRIPS Agreement. 
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Chapter 7 
The Role  
of other  
Multilateral Regimes 
 
 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
While the TRIPS Agreement appears to limit the scope of unilateral action 
within its own legal framework, there may be a role for other multilateral obligations in 
expanding the limits on action imposed by the TRIPS Agreement.  In the case of 
climate change, the argument would be that the UNFCCC imposes obligations on states 
that WTO panels must take into account in TRIPS-related actions that are challenged. 
Such an approach requires two conditions to succeed: first that there are obligations 
within the UNFCCC and COP decisions that impose obligations to take action that may 
affect rights and obligations under the TRIPS Agreement; and second, that there is a 
mechanism, or interpretive approach, within the WTO for taking into account the rights 
and obligations imposed by other multilateral treaties.  This section will explore whether 
both elements are present, and what solutions may be proposed, if they are not. 
 
II. THE UNFCCC AND ITS LEGAL RELATIONSHIP TO THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND OTHER FORA 
 
To a significant extent, in order to trigger a shift in the interpretation of the 
TRIPS Agreement by using another treaty or regime as applicable law, there would have 
to be a conflict of laws (in terms of obligations or rights) between the TRIPS and the 
other regimes. There would have to be obligations within the UNFCCC or other regime 
that developing countries cannot meet, or rights that cannot be exercised without to 
some extent violating their obligations under the TRIPS Agreement. Such a conflict 
would then trigger in international law an obligation on the part of interpretive 
mechanisms in both regimes to resolve the conflict in some manner. In this case, I 
adopt the Pauwelynian notion of ‘conflict’, not just encompassing a purely direct 
conflict where the need to meet the obligations of one treaty, necessarily require a 
breach of the other.  As Pauwelyn does, I also embrace the notion of conflict that 
encompasses where a treaty provides rights the exercise of which would necessitate a 
breach of obligations under another treaty and of course, where in order to meet the 
requirements of another treaty, a party is so limited in meeting its obligations under 
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another treaty as to render its actions practically ineffective, even if not legally in 
breach.1168  If developing countries can point to such a conflict then they would trigger 
an obligation on the part of interpretive mechanisms at the WTO and the UNFCCC to 
resolve it in a mutually supportive manner. 
Do we have a ‘conflict’ between the UNFCCC and the TRIPS Agreement in 
the Pauwelynian sense?  There is little indication within the UNFCCC of what the 
relationship to the broader environmental regime and to the WTO should be.  Within 
the Convention itself, there are few mentions of how to relate to other regimes.  The 
preamble affirms ‘that responses to climate change should be coordinated with social 
and economic development in an integrated manner with a view to avoiding adverse 
impacts on the latter, taking into full account the legitimate priority needs of developing 
countries for the achievement of sustained economic growth and the eradication of 
poverty.’  
Article 3.5 on principles notes:  
The Parties should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international 
economic system that would lead to sustainable economic growth and 
development in all Parties, particularly developing country Parties, thus 
enabling them better to address the problems of climate change. Measures 
taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised 
restriction on international trade.  
This provision suggests that the UNFCCC asks Parties to act in this manner in 
other fora relevant to the international economic system. The test that they impose here 
is one that imports language from the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT which, as 
discussed in Chapter 6, embodies the General Exceptions clause.  To the extent that 
measures affecting trade in goods are used to address climate change, this principle 
provides interpretive guidance from the UNFCCC as to how the UNFCCC views the 
relationship between actions aimed at achieving climate aims and those actions as they 
relate to rules on trade in goods. The language does not, however, translate well into the 
TRIPS arena. As noted before, TRIPS provisions on exceptions and limitations to 
patents are primarily to be viewed through the lens of Articles 7 and 8, 30 and 31.  The 
only equivalent in the TRIPS Agreement may be language pointing to arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination (implicating TRIPS Article 27). Within the TRIPS 
Agreement there is no analogous 'disguised restriction on international trade’ language 
or principle.  
                                                        
 
1168 Pauwelyn, J Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other Rules of 
International Law. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.). In line with Condon, B “Climate 
Change and Unresolved Issues in WTO Law” 12 J. Int'l Econ. L. 895 (2009). 
 306 
 
UNFCCC Article 4.5 commits Parties to:  
Take climate change considerations into account, to the extent feasible, in their 
relevant social, economic and environmental policies and actions, and employ 
appropriate methods, for example impact assessments, formulated and 
determined nationally, with a view to minimizing adverse effects on the 
economy, on public health and on the quality of the environment, of projects 
or measures undertaken by them to mitigate or adapt to climate change. 
This provision, however, seems more aimed at not interfering with economic 
issues, while also suggesting some degree of balancing and consideration of climate 
change policies in other fora.  It is not clear that this translates into a commitment also 
to act in pursuance of climate change mitigation objectives in other international fora. In 
the Kyoto Protocol there is also little, if any, direction to states on how the Protocol 
relates to other regimes. 
There is no language in the UNFCCC specifically addressing intellectual 
property, although the clear language on who should bear the costs of action suggests 
that the costs of paying for IP licenses should be financially supported by developed 
countries, in the absence of other measures to ensure that technology transfer takes 
place.  It is the issue of costs that points to a key missing element: that the technology 
transfer and financial support obligations of the UNFCCC fall squarely on the shoulders 
of developed countries. Developing countries wishing to take unilateral action to enable 
technology transfer cannot rely on those obligations to justify their actions under the 
TRIPS Agreement.  This suggests that other obligations or avenues are necessary. Two 
possibilities emerge as the most likely: first, that developing countries point to their own 
obligations in Article 4 of the UNFCCC to take action both individually and jointly with 
other UNFCCC members to mitigate GHG emissions and address climate change 
adaptation; or that climate change implicates these countries’ human rights obligations 
to deliver on areas such as the right to health and the right to shelter and requires them 
to take actions that may not be in conformity with the TRIPS Agreement (addressed 
further below). 
Regarding the obligation in Article 4 of the UNFCCC, developing countries 
could point to Article 4.1(b) which requires all parties to formulate and implement 
measures to mitigate climate change.1169 The counter to that would be that this is not a 
                                                        
 
1169 1. All Parties, taking into account their common but differentiated responsibilities and their specific 
national and regional development priorities, objectives and circumstances, shall:  
[…]  
 (b) Formulate, implement, publish and regularly update national and, where appropriate, regional 
programmes containing measures to mitigate climate change by addressing anthropogenic emissions by 
sources and removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, and 
measures to facilitate adequate adaptation to climate change; 
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true obligation in that developing country parties are not required to take action where 
the full incremental costs of implementing measures are not covered by developed 
countries.1170 Article 4.4 addresses the same issue with respect to adaptation.  To the 
extent that the measures taken are ones that should nominally be supported under 
Article 4.3 or 4.4, Article 4.1 would be interpreted as not imposing a requirement of 
action on developing country parties.  This is borne out by the statement in UNFCCC 
Article 4.7 that: 
The extent to which developing country Parties will effectively implement their 
commitments under the Convention will depend on the effective 
implementation by developed country Parties of their commitments under the 
Convention related to financial resources and transfer of technology …. 
Developing countries are not truly in the position of having obligations as yet, 
unless and until such obligations are embedded in a new post-2015 treaty that actually 
imposes a non-dependent obligation of action on developing countries.   
 
III. THE WTO AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER FORA 
 
The usefulness of statements in the UNFCCC or approaches to establishing 
obligations in the UNFCCC relies on one other key issue: whether and how the WTO 
jurisprudence makes space for considering these obligations.  There is an enormous 
literature on the relationship between trade and environment and several analytical 
frameworks have been developed to deal with the interaction.1171 These frameworks are 
generally addressed at three potential access points: jurisdiction, in which a WTO panel 
decides whether the dispute or claimed violation falls within the scope of rights and 
obligations of the covered agreements; applicable law, which is the sources of law which 
determine the scope and nature of the rights and obligations over which the panel has 
jurisdiction; and interpretive weight, addressing the evidentiary weight to be given to 
various sources in determining the meaning of specific terms and provisions of a 
covered agreement.  In practice, where environmental issues are concerned this has 
meant that a panel has to determine whether an environmental measure is within its 
                                                        
 
1170 UNFCCC Article 4.3 “The developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in Annex II 
shall provide new and additional financial resources to meet the agreed full costs incurred by developing 
country Parties in complying with their obligations under Article 12, paragraph 1. They shall also provide 
such financial resources, including for the transfer of technology, needed by the developing country 
Parties to meet the agreed full incremental costs of implementing measures that are covered by 
paragraph 1 of this Article and that are agreed between a developing country Party and the international 
entity or entities referred to in Article 11, in accordance with that Article. The implementation of these 
commitments shall take into account the need for adequacy and predictability in the flow of funds and 
the importance of appropriate burden sharing among the developed country Parties.  
1171 See e.g. Pauwelyn, J Conflict of Norms in Public International Law - How WTO Law Relates to Other 
Rules of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003). 
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jurisdiction to address; whether the environmental treaty or regime which governs that 
environmental measure should be applicable law in a WTO dispute; and failing that, 
whether the meaning ascribed to a term or provision in an environmental treaty/regime, 
should inform (either by expanding or narrowing) or have the same meaning as a similar 
or identical term in a WTO covered agreement.   
These questions have been addressed with respect to trade in goods and in the 
context of the SPS Agreement and the TBT Agreement. It is not the intent of this 
chapter to go over discussions that are much more effectively covered by other authors 
but the aim is to explore how these principles would apply in the context of a TRIPS 
dispute that addressed unilateral measures on technology transfer. Drawing from the 
jurisprudence we find that: 
- jurisdiction over WTO matters is compulsory and, because the Appellate body 
uses an ‘effects’ test to determine jurisdiction, this requires the WTO dispute 
settlement system to be involved in ALL disputes that affect the rights and 
obligations of members under WTO covered agreements.1172  Thus, it is not 
how a measure is characterized or justified but whether it has an impact on 
trade that triggers the compulsory jurisdiction of the dispute settlement system.   
- In applying Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
all sources of law can be considered as applicable law including customary law, 
principles of international law as well as treaties. However, as applicable law in 
the context of a dispute between WTO members, only those rules that are 
applicable between the parties to the WTO can be considered meaning that 
only treaties to which ALL WTO members are party can be considered 
applicable law in a WTO dispute.1173  
- Other rules of international law may nevertheless play a role in providing 
evidence of the ordinary meaning of a term or provision in a WTO covered 
agreement, but a panel is not required to use such evidence where it does not 
consider it necessary or relevant.1174 Whatever the outcome, decisions by the 
DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations of members.1175 This 
                                                        
 
1172 Article 3.2, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), 
Annex 2 to  the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement), 
Marrakesh, 15 April 1994, in force 1 January 1995, 1867 United Nations Treaty Series (1995) 4. 
1173 See p334, Panel Reports, European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing 
of Biotech Products, WT/DS291/R / WT/DS292/R / WT/DS293/R, Add.1 to Add.9, and Corr.1, adopted 21 
November 2006, DSR 2006:III-VIII, 847 (EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products) 
1174 See p341, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products 
1175 Article 3.2, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), 
Annex 2 to  the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement), 
Marrakesh, 15 April 1994, in force 1 January 1995, 1867 United Nations Treaty Series (1995) 4. 
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suggests that no other law can function as applicable law within the context of 
WTO disputes. 
- The Appellate body’s understanding of ‘exhaustible natural resources” is an 
evolving definition that relies on gathering international consensus around 
issues of concern to sustainable development.1176 
Significant controversy has attended the panel’s approach in EC – Approval and 
Marketing of Biotech Products that the applicable law referred to by Article 31(3)(c) VCLT 
was limited only to those treaties to which all WTO members were parties at the time of 
the dispute.1177 The International Law Commission’s report on the Fragmentation on 
International Law went so far as to suggest that the panel made a fundamental error, 
arguing that this would make it impossible for any treaty to have the role of applicable 
law in a WTO dispute as none could have the exact same scope of membership as the 
WTO1178, or even be one to which the membership of the WTO is a subset. In the case 
of the Kyoto protocol for example, only 80% of Kyoto protocol parties are also WTO 
members.1179 
The effect of this approach in the technology transfer, climate change and 
TRIPS discussion is clear. If one presumes that the approach in EC – Approval and 
Marketing of Biotech Products remains applicable, then, absent any other statement from 
within the institutions of the WTO, the UNFCCC cannot be used as applicable law 
between the parties to a dispute at the WTO that challenges a unilateral measure that 
has an effect on a TRIPS-related right or obligation. However, this does not preclude 
the use of UNFCCC terms and provisions in informing the meaning and scope of 
similar or identical terms in the TRIPS Agreement. Since these could not be used to 
actually alter or justify a measure that is TRIPS - inconsistent, this would have to enter 
through the traditional interpretive route of exceptions and limitations as discussed in 
Chapter 6.   
This pattern is evident in at least one IP-related panel decision. In the context 
of the US – Section 110(5) Copyright Act1180 copyright case, we do have an example of a 
                                                        
 
1176 WTO, United States – Import Prohibition of Shrimp and Shrimp Products (6 November 1998) 
WT/DS58/R/AB, para 129-130. 
1177 See para. 7.70 – 7.71, Panel Reports, European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and 
Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/DS291/R / WT/DS292/R / WT/DS293/R, Add.1 to Add.9, and Corr.1, 
adopted 21 November 2006, DSR 2006:III-VIII, 847 (EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products) 
1178  See p227, 237, Koskenniemi, M et al. “Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from 
the Diversification and Expansion of International Law: Report of the Study Group of the International 
Law Commission” International Law Commission, 13 April 2006 , UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 p. 1 -256 and 18 
July 2006, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.702 
1179 Adam, A “Technology  Transfer  to Combat  Climate  Change: Opportunities and  Obligations  under  
TRIPS and  Kyoto” 9  J. HIGH  TECH. L.  1 (2009) 
1180 Panel Report, United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, WT/DS160/R, adopted 27 July 
2000, DSR 2000:VIII, 3769 (US – Section 110(5) Copyright Act) 
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panel using a provision from the WIPO Copyright Treaty to inform the meaning of the 
copyright exception in TRIPS Article 13.1181 In particular, the panel in that case stated: 
In paragraph 6.66 we discussed the need to interpret the Berne Convention 
and the TRIPS Agreement in a way that reconciles the texts of these two 
treaties and avoids a conflict between them, given that they form the overall 
framework for multilateral copyright protection. The same principle should 
also apply to the relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the WCT. 
The WCT is designed to be compatible with this framework, incorporating or 
using much of the language of the Berne Convention and the TRIPS 
Agreement. (footnote omitted)  The WCT was unanimously concluded at a 
diplomatic conference organized under the auspices of WIPO in December 
1996, one year after the WTO Agreement entered into force, in which 127 
countries participated. Most of these countries were also participants in the 
TRIPS negotiations and are Members of the WTO. (Footnote omitted) For 
these reasons, it is relevant to seek contextual guidance also in the WCT when 
developing interpretations that avoid conflicts within this overall framework, 
except where these treaties explicitly contain different obligations. 
The panel argued that where a treaty forms part of a general framework and 
has similar provisions and wording, it should be interpreted in a manner that avoids 
conflicts with the broader framework.  The overall framework of treaties that they 
consider relevant are those that cover intellectual property and are developed within 
related institutions, and that are concluded by a significant number of WTO members 
even if they are not in force.  While not extending to making these treaties part of the 
applicable laws, the panel clearly stated that similar provisions using similar wording and 
reflecting specific understandings should be interpreted to mean the same thing so as to 
avoid conflict.  While this discussion was in reference to article 13 on exceptions and 
limitations and the similarity to the same terms in Article 10 of the WIPO Copyright 
Treaty and to Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention, this also opens the door to the 
interpretation of the terms in Article 7 and 8, as well as to the provisions on working 
requirements in the Paris Convention.  In principle, if it could be argued that technology 
transfer was part of the same framework of treaties as referred to by the panel, then the 
necessity to avoid conflicts could be applied to the provisions of the UNFCCC.  At the 
very least, such an approach would require that the meaning of the terms should be read 
to be consistent across the international framework of treaties addressing the same issue. 
Nevertheless, the panel in this case appeared to limit its approach to the network of 
intellectual property treaties negotiated at WIPO, some of which are incorporated by 
reference in the TRIPS Agreement. It remains unclear the extent to which the panel 
decision’s approach will be carried forward, especially to patent related disputes. 
                                                        
 
1181 para 6.66 – 6.70, US – Section 110(5) Copyright Act 
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As a general matter therefore, there appears to be a very limited set of ways in 
which WTO panels must or can take into account other international treaties. 
Nevertheless, some specific developments on intellectual property, subsequent to the 
panel decisions have provided some clarity on what the WTO access points for these 
other treaties may be, although not necessarily enabling those treaties to function as 
applicable law in a dispute.  The most current and salient are the public health issue and 
the issue of how to relate to the Convention on Biological Diversity.  
The Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health1182 serves as the most 
authoritative statement of the WTO rule-making process' views on how the WTO 
relates to public health interests.  There is an explicit interpretive direction in this 
Declaration with regard to how to interpret the TRIPS Agreement as regards other 
regimes related to health. Paragraph 5(a) therefore states: ‘In applying the customary 
rules of interpretation of public international law, each provision of the TRIPS 
Agreement shall be read in the light of the object and purpose of the Agreement as 
expressed, in particular, in its objectives and principles.’ This means that, in particular, 
Article 7 and 8 must be given due weight in interpreting other provision of the treaty.  
This statement is a direct instruction to panels and the Appellate body and a rebuke to 
the approach taken by the panel in Canada – Pharmaceuticals which did not appear to 
actually apply article 7 and 8 to its analysis of Article 30.   
In addition, and of the most relevance to the exercise of compulsory licenses 
for climate change technologies, paragraph 5(c) states that, ‘[e]ach member has the right 
to determine what constitutes a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme 
urgency, it being understood that public health crises, including those relating to 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can represent a national 
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency.’ While expressly mentioning 
public health crises as a basis for the issuance of compulsory license, the Doha 
Declaration also makes clear that other situations can be declared circumstances of 
extreme urgency.  To the extent that the climate crisis can be declared a situation of 
extreme urgency, member states are free to use the more flexible requirements of Article 
31(b). 
The legal effect of the Declaration is unclear.  As an authoritative instruction 
by the WTO General Council, it must clearly place an obligation on WTO institutions 
to comply with its provisions. The Dispute Settlement Body is obliged to follow the 
instruction contained in the Declaration. It may also function as a subsequent agreement 
regarding the interpretation of the treaty, in the sense of Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna 
                                                        
 
1182 Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2  (Adopted 14 November 
2001) 
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Convention of the Law of Treaties.1183  Its content does not suggest that it is altering or 
adding to the obligations or rights of members, but it nevertheless clearly creates a 
preference for specific interpretive outcomes.  However, the Declaration provides no 
clear instruction to make other treaties function as applicable law in a TRIPS dispute by 
interpreting VCLT Article 31(3)(c) more broadly.  
The second area, in which there has been significant debate in the WTO on 
how to relate to other regimes, has been the discussion on whether the TRIPS 
Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) contradict each other, 
thereby requiring an amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, or whether they can be 
implemented in a mutually supportive manner. The debate is ongoing, but has focused 
on a proposal (now part of the single undertaking negotiations in the Doha Round) for 
a new Article 29bis to prevent misappropriation of genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge, through a mandatory disclosure requirement. 1184   This debate is largely 
polarized between developed and developing countries and thus there is no single 
direction or decision from the WTO.  Nevertheless, the existence of the internal debate 
suggests that there may be room in other fora to address the linkage. The ongoing 
impasse in the WTO suggests that the issue is hostage to other issues relating to market 
access in the WTO. It may also be the case, however, that the issue itself represents a 
fundamental disagreement that cannot be resolved through negotiations but only 
through dispute settlement.   
While there exist obvious links between the CBD and the TRIPS Agreement, 
the inability to state something conclusive about what that relationship is and should be 
in the WTO suggests that there is little room for consideration of other regimes except 
through the narrow lens provided by dispute settlement. How much more difficult then, 
for the UNFCCC agreement which has no provisions on intellectual property and has a 
specific structure on technology transfer that makes it an obligation of developed 
countries rather than a right of developing countries, to find a point of entry into the 
WTO.  As noted in the section on unilateral actions, the existing flexibilities and the 
existing jurisprudence in the WTO suggest that there is little room for even partially 
integrating the technology transfer aims and goals of the climate change regime into the 
TRIPS framework.  Where neither the UNFCCC nor the WTO provides sufficient 
purchase for developing countries to justify their otherwise non-TRIPS compliant 
actions, one avenue where they have clear obligations that can be linked to both 
intellectual property and climate change in is human rights. The following section 
                                                        
 
1183 See p979, Yu, P “Objectives and Principles of TRIPS” 46 Houston Law Review 4 in support of this 
approach. 
1184 “DRAFT DECISION TO ENHANCE MUTUAL SUPPORTIVENESS BETWEEN THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND 
THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY: Communication from Brazil, China, Colombia, Ecuador, 
India, Indonesia, Peru,  Thailand, the ACP Group, and the African Group” TN/C/W/59 (19 April 2011  
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explores how human rights may be able to knit together developing country obligations 
that justify non-TRIPS compliant IP measures to address climate change 
 
IV. HUMAN RIGHTS AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER FOR CLIMATE CHANGE1185 
 
The difficulties associated with the approach of the WTO to the flexibilities 
under TRIPS has prompted some scholars to seek methods to expand the limits 
imposed by the TRIPS Agreement, primarily by drawing on a human rights approach to 
technology transfer.  In part this draws on insights from Pauwelyn that even in a 
situation where the majority of human rights treaties do not have as broad a 
membership as the WTO, the differential nature of the types of obligations, (reciprocal 
and bargained for in the case of the WTO versus integral and fundamental to general 
international law in the case of human rights) direct conflicts between human rights law 
and WTO law would be resolved in favor of human rights law.1186 Thus if developing 
countries could argue that their climate needs for technology can be framed as necessary 
for meeting their human rights obligations, not only would they be in a position to 
trigger a conflict resolution process, but, it would be one that would be resolved in favor 
of the human rights obligation. 
Any successful approach requires establishing: what, if any, rights there may be 
that implicate technology transfer and how these could be implemented and applied; 
what the relationship is or should be between the human rights regime and the TRIPS 
Agreement. 
To answer the first part we need to determine:  
- Are there Obligations in Human Rights Law that Relate to Technology 
Transfer? 
- How Relevant is the Issue of Intellectual Property for a Rights-Based 
Approach to Technology Transfer in the Climate Change Context? 
- What are the Possible Avenues for Adopting a Rights-Based Approach to 
Technology Transfer for Climate Change? 
                                                        
 
1185 An earlier version of some of this material can be found in Orellana, M, D Shabalala, B Tuncak 
“Technology Transfer in the UNFCCC and other International Legal Regimes: The Challenge of Systemic 
Integration” ICHRP Working Paper 2010.  Available at: 
http://www.ichrp.org/files/papers/181/138_technology_transfer_UNFCCC.pdf (last visited 15 August 
2014). 
1186 Pauwelyn, J Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other Rules of 
International Law. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.). 
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IV.1. Are there Obligations in Human Rights Law that Relate to Technology 
Transfer?  
There are two aspects to the question about the existence of human rights 
obligations relating to technology transfer. The first relates to whether there is a right to 
technology transfer per se, broadly framed. This could include a concept of a right to 
access technology that has extra-territorial reach or implications. The second is whether 
there are human rights which require technology transfer for their fulfillment.  
 
IV.1.1. A Right to Technology Transfer? The Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress and its 
Application (ICESCR Article 15(1)(b)) 
The scope and full legal meaning of Article 15(1)(b) of the International 
Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) has yet to be articulated. 
While conceptually attractive, there is very little literature on the relation of this article to 
technology transfer. In addition to analyzing its text, it must read in the context of 
Article 15(1) as a whole,1187 which requires States to recognize the right of everyone:  
(a) To take part in cultural life;  
(b) To enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications;  
(c) To benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting 
from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.  
The provision would appear to establish an individual right for persons to benefit from 
scientific progress. Legally, this raises two questions: what does it mean to “enjoy the 
benefits,” and what is meant by “scientific progress and its applications.”  The history of 
the article suggests that a deliberate distinction was being made between pure science 
research, which is generally not done for purposes of commercialization and sale versus 
“the applications” of science, which are more applicable to technologies and more 
closely linked to patents.1188 Both categories of knowledge are included within the scope 
of the provision. The definition of benefit has not been elaborated. However, Article 
15(1)(c) suggests that benefit should, at the least, mean access to the use, for their 
benefit, of scientific knowledge and applications of which others are the creators. Some 
                                                        
 
1187 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights views the provisions as a unitary set, despite 
the fact that it has chosen to elaborate different General Comments to address each one. 
1188Schabas, W A “Study of the Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific and Technological Progress and Its 
Applications,” in Donders, Y and V Volodin (eds) Human Rights in Education, Science and Culture: Legal 
Developments and Challenges, UNESCO 2007, at 275. 
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work has begun at UNESCO1189 on elaborating Article 15(1)(b).  The provision has 
been included in the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (Article 
15),1190 which states: 
 
1.  Benefits resulting from any scientific research and its applications 
should be shared with society as a whole and within the international 
community, in particular with developing countries. In giving effect to this 
principle, benefits may take any of the following forms: 
(a) special and sustainable assistance to, and acknowledgement of, the persons 
and groups that have taken part in the research;  
(b) access to quality health care;  
(c) provision of new diagnostic and therapeutic modalities or products 
stemming from research;  
(d) support for health services;  
(e) access to scientific and technological knowledge;  
(f) capacity-building facilities for research purposes;  
(g) other forms of benefit consistent with the principles set out in this 
Declaration.  
 
Thus, at least within the realm of health and bioethics, the concept of 
“benefit” has been interpreted to include access to scientific and technical knowledge, as 
well as the provision of new scientific products and capacity building. However, this has 
been in the context of research and what is owed to participants in research.  To extend 
this approach to climate change, a broader approach may be needed. An experts 
meeting in 2007 addressed the issue.1191  UNESCO considers that the fulfillment of the 
right is necessary for the fulfillment of other rights such as: the right to health, the right 
to education, the right to information and the right to food.1192  Thus, it may be that the 
power of the provision lies at its junction with the delivery of other rights rather than as 
a provision which in and of itself requires technology to be transferred. 
A common refrain of the experts meeting was the sense that there was an 
inherent tension between IP rights and the Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific 
Progress (REBSP).1193  In part, this viewpoint has been informed by the experience of 
                                                        
 
1189 UNESCO “Report of Experts Meeting on the Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress and its 
Applications” Amsterdam, 7-9 June 2007. Available at 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0015/001545/154583e.pdf (last visited 15 August 2014). 
1190 Available at http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=31058&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (last visited 15 August 2014). 
1191 UNESCO “Report of Experts Meeting on the Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress and its 
Applications” Amsterdam, 7-9 June 2007. 
1192 See p4, Id. 
1193 See p7, Id.  
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access to medicines activists in their attempts to ensure that the TRIPS Agreement was 
not interpreted in ways that restricted access to medicines for poor and marginalized 
populations.  However, the direct link to the REBSP is relatively new, as the majority of 
actors viewed the access to medicines issue through the lens of the right to health.  
Nevertheless, experts at this meeting almost unanimously viewed IP rules as a major 
source of tension for fulfilling the REBSP and related rights, such as the right to health. 
One conclusion of the meeting was key support for a General Comment 
addressing the REBSP, especially its relationship to other economic, social and cultural 
rights.1194  In particular, the extent and nature of the relationship between the REBSP 
and other rights remained unclear and required elaboration.  Given the complexity of 
the needs and the different forms of technology implicated by each right, it may be 
appropriate to elaborate on that relationship on a case-by-case basis.  It may be that 
climate change is just such a case, albeit, a broad one. The issues concerning balancing 
and conflicts of rights with Article 15(1)(c) would also have to be addressed, in 
determining the scope of the right and its application to technology transfer. General 
Comment 17 on Article 15(1)(c) has prompted groups to consider the relevance of 
Article 15(1)(b) in part because many felt that it had gone too far in the direction of 
privileging patterns of exclusive ownership over knowledge. However, the first thing 
that should be noted is that the General Comment is quite clear that while there may be 
parallels between human rights and IP, the content of Article 15(1)(c) is not 
synonymous with IP, by virtue of the different characteristics and the utilitarian nature 
of IP protection.1195   
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) also recognized 
an intrinsic link between Article 15(1)(c) and Articles 15(1)(b) and (a).1196  Of particular 
relevance is the concept that the right in Article 15(1)(b) is not absolute and must be 
limited by the need to ensure that: 
4. the “moral’ interests of the author are protected, i.e. the connection between 
the creator and the creation is maintained and that the aims and goals of the 
creator with respect to the creation are not unjustifiably distorted;1197 and 
5. the material interests of the author are protected, i.e. some kind of 
remuneration with respect to the creation is provided and is linked to some 
                                                        
 
1194 p9, UNESCO “Report of Experts Meeting on the Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress and 
its Applications” Amsterdam, 7-9 June 2007. 
1195 CESCR “General Comment 17: The right of everyone to benefit from the protection of the moral and 
material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author 
(art. 15 (1) (c))” E/C.12/GC/17 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 2005 at 2. Ava ilable at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/E.C.12.GC.17.En?OpenDocument 
1196 Id. 
1197 See p3, Id. 
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extent with the standard required for the author to make an adequate standard 
of living.1198 
Thus, as long as some form of recognition of creators is established and some 
form of ensuring some kind of earnings from the creation is maintained, States may 
deliver on Article 15(1)(b) by whatever means they choose. The beneficiaries of Article 
15(1)(c) protection are also limited to natural persons or groups of natural persons, not 
legal entities.1199  Thus, neither transnational corporations nor States have direct claims 
under this article.  
What has been of the most significant concern for many organizations has 
been the language of the General Comment on limitations outside the context of Article 
15.  The committee states that any such limitation must be proportional and “must 
pursue a legitimate aim, and must be strictly necessary for the promotion of the general 
welfare in a democratic society, in accordance with Article 4 of the Covenant.”1200  The 
Comment contains very well-articulated sets of restrictions on what States must do to 
respect, protect and fulfill Article 15(1)(c), in language that is virtually indistinguishable 
from that used in the context of IP rights. Therefore, in the absence of equally 
compelling language and discussion on Article 15(1)(b), States and private actors may 
provide greater protection to technology and knowledge holders, and focus less on 
providing access and benefits to scientific progress and its applications. 
Nevertheless, the General Comment notes that Article 15(1)(c) should not be 
implemented in a way that systematically impedes the fulfillment of other rights, such as 
the right to health, the right to education, the right to food, as well as the REBSP. In 
addition, a strong statement on balancing interests can be found in the discussion of the 
core obligations that States must comply with immediately to give effect to Article 
15(1)(c) which includes:  
To strike an adequate balance between the effective protection of the moral 
and material interests of authors and States Parties’ obligations in relation to 
the rights to food, health and education, as well as the rights to take part in 
cultural life and to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications, 
or any other right recognized in the Covenant.1201 
General Comment 17 suggests that work on the REBSP is further along than 
may appear at first glance. It is a right that underlies several others, although its 
                                                        
 
1198 See p4, Id. 
1199 See p3, Id. 
1200 See p7, Id. 
1201 See p11, CESCR “General Comment 17: The right of everyone to benefit from the protection of the 
moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the 
author (art. 15 (1) (c))” E/C.12/GC/17 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 2005. 
 318 
 
relationship to them may need to be further elaborated.  In addition, the statements on 
the requirement of balance by the General Comment provide some purchase for further 
elaboration of the REBSP without the need to wait for the committee to begin 
developing a General Comment outlining the content of the REBSP.  The existence of 
the REBSP itself can enable the review of other more established rights for the 
components that require access to technological products and processes for their 
fulfillment, especially the fulfillment of their core obligations.  In the context of climate 
change, the obligation to transfer technology can be harmonized with the REBSP if it is 
considered in combination with the need for access to technologies necessary for the 
fulfillment of other human rights. 
 
IV.1.2. Are there Climate-related Human Rights Obligations which may Require Technology Transfer 
for their Fulfillment? 
In addressing the issue of which climate-related human rights may require 
access to technology for their fulfillment we can look to two sources.  The first is the set 
of rights that will be directly impacted by climate change and are directly in danger of 
being regressed by climate change. There are several human rights that may be 
implicated by climate change, including1202 the right to health, the right to food, and the 
right to water.   
In addressing some of these, the sections below will:  
 outline the relationship of the right to climate change; and 
 identify what climate-related technology and knowledge the right requires 
access to. 
In addition to specific rights, the climate discussions could be strongly 
impacted by Article 2(1) of ICESCR regarding the duty to provide international 
assistance and cooperation in fulfilling the relevant economic, social and cultural rights.  
In this regard, Article 2(1) ICESCR may also add a powerful rights-based substrate to 
the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and the duties established 
under Article 4.5 of the UNFCCC for developed countries to transfer technology.   
 
a. The Right to Life 
                                                        
 
1202 See Appendices, Humphreys, S “Climate Change and Human Rights: A Rough Guide” International 
Council for Human Rights Policy 2008.  
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The right to life is protected by Article 6(1) of the International Convention on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). It has also been protected in numerous other 
international and regional human rights instruments.1203   
i. How does the right to life relate to climate change? 
The occurrence of extreme weather events and the attendant effects exemplify 
the impact of climate change on the right to life.  The IPCC Fourth Assessment Report 
Working Group II Report on "Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability” points to 
climate-related extreme weather events, such as “extreme river floods, intense tropical 
and extra-tropical cyclone windstorms (along with their associated coastal storm surges), 
as well as the most severe supercell thunderstorms."1204 The IPCC points to increases in 
extreme river flows in some regions,1205 increased intensity of tropical cyclones with the 
attendant storm surges and flooding. All these events can result in severe loss of life.  
ii. What climate-related technology and knowledge does fulfillment of the right to life require access to? 
The key link to the right to life would be tools and resources to prevent, 
prepare for, manage, and recover from extreme weather events and disasters.  Thus, the 
technologies and resources to address the right to life will require the State to implement 
such measures, provided that they can be attributed to action or omissions of the State. 
Tentatively speaking, the technologies would include:  
a. early warning systems (including communications); 
b. systems for stockpiling and distributing food, water, and medicines;. 
c. systems for storing and managing water resources; 
d. alternative disaster-appropriate transport systems (e.g., boats); 
e. systems for strengthening waste disposal sites against leakage during disasters; 
f. disaster mitigation systems, such as flood and sea walls, flood channels; and 
g. extreme weather event resistant building materials. 
 
What is key about these technologies is that they also relate to reducing vulnerability and 
enhancing response capacity. 
                                                        
 
1203  Article 6 of the Convention of the Rights of the Child (recognizing an inherent right to life and 
ensuring to the maximum extent possible the survival and development of the child); Article 2 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights; Article 1 of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of 
Man; Article 4 of the American Convention on Human Rights; and Article 4 of the African (Banjul) Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
1204 See p9, IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working 
Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, UK 2007.  
1205 Id. 
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b. The Right to Health 
Article 12 of the ICESCR affords the right to the “highest attainable standard of 
physical and mental health.”   
i. How does the right to health relate to climate change? 
The CESCR General Comment 14 defines health broadly. The key element to 
the link to climate change impacts, as well as climate change vulnerability and adaptive 
capacity, is the idea that health includes a right to a healthy environment.  It extends to 
the underlying determinants of health, such as food and nutrition, housing, access to 
safe and potable water and adequate sanitation, safe and healthy working conditions, 
and a healthy environment. 
There are two levels at which links can be made. They can be made at the level 
of direct health effects such as disease burdens, but they can also be made at the level of 
the underlying determinants of health, especially the right to a healthy environment. 
At the level of direct health impacts, climate change will result in changes in 
precipitation patterns, length of rainy seasons, and length of warm seasons. 1206  The 
IPCC report points to significant uncertainty as to the increased frequency and intensity 
of diseases due in large part to lack of long term epidemiological data.1207  They note 
that disease incidence may in fact actually be a result of the social changes resulting from 
climate change as migration and population density patterns change. Nevertheless, the 
IPCC points to four major categories of health impacts:1208 
 Direct effects of heat or cold 
◦ there have been increases in the intensity of heat waves, which 
seriously affect the elderly and the very young. 
 Vector borne diseases 
◦ there is evidence for an increase in tick and insect vectors of disease 
that may result in greater human incidence of diseases. 
◦ there is greater incidence of Lyme disease further north than 
previously thought. 
◦ ecological change may also be a contributing factor to widening 
malarial belts 
 Pollen and Dust-related diseases 
                                                        
 
1206 IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II 
to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change , Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, UK 2007 at 107.  
1207 Id. 
1208 See p108, Id. 
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◦ increase in the global incidence of dust and dust storms may lead to 
greater respiratory problems.  Evidence suggests that this may already 
be occurring in the Caribbean.1209 
 
In general, the IPCC notes, “there is now good evidence of changes in the 
northward range of some disease vectors, as well as changes in the seasonal pattern of 
allergenic pollen. There is not yet any clear evidence that climate change is affecting the 
incidence of human vector-borne diseases, in part due to the complexity of these disease 
systems.”1210  Nevertheless, there is some guidance from the IPCC as to the elements of 
health relevant to climate. 
At the level of the determinants of health, climate change could be considered 
to threaten the right to a healthy environment.  However, it remains difficult, beyond 
the conditions surrounding extreme weather events, to characterize major ecological 
changes as unhealthy if they do not entail shifts in disease burdens or increases in 
toxicity.  However, other determinants of health such as food/nutrition and water, and 
related aspects that can reduce climate vulnerability and enhance adaptive capacity may 
indeed be considered climate-related.  The other determinants will be addressed below. 
ii. What climate-related technology and knowledge does fulfillment of the right to health require access 
to? 
States must deliver public health and health-care facilities, goods and services, 
as well as programmes. Given the difficulty in linking specific health effects to climate, 
the broader link to reducing vulnerability and enhancing adaptive capacity means that 
the technologies required to address climate issues are those that ensure sufficient health 
to survive and adapt to ecological changes.   
From the links that have been established we can include: 
- Medical products, processes and services related to managing health needs 
during extreme weather events; and 
- Medical products, processes and services related to managing health needs 
during periods of extreme heat (heat waves) and extreme cold, especially for 
vulnerable populations such as the elderly and young children. 
In addition, to address climate change vulnerability and adaptive capacity generally: 
                                                        
 
1209 See p109, IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working 
Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, UK 2007. 
1210 Id. 
 322 
 
- Medical products, processes and services related to increasing resistance to 
vector borne and temperature sensitive diseases; 
- Medical products, processes and services related to increasing general immune-
capacity, e.g. vaccines; 
- Products, processes and services designed to create hygienic and sanitary living 
and working conditions, such as access to potable water and sanitary facilities. 
The CESCR notes in General Comment 14 para 12, that delivery on the right 
to health entails at least two major elements: availability and accessibility. 
Availability means, therefore, that health resources and technologies must be 
available in sufficient quantity. This means sufficient to address the needs of the 
relevant affected population. At a minimum they must include “safe and potable 
drinking water and adequate sanitation facilities, hospitals, clinics and other health-
related buildings, trained medical and professional personnel receiving domestically 
competitive salaries, and essential drugs, as defined by the World Health Organization 
(WHO) Action Programme on Essential Drugs.”1211 
Accessibility means that the products, processes and services must be available 
within a reasonable distance of where the relevant populations live or can easily access, 
and that the products are available at a price affordable by all. 
c. Right to Water 
The right to water is not explicitly mentioned in the ICESCR. However, the 
Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights has concluded that the right to 
water is implied in Article 11 as an aspect of the right to an adequate standard of 
living.1212  
i. How does the right to water relate to climate change? 
Climate is linked to the right to water in two ways. The first is that extreme 
weather events associated with climate change are likely to result in temporary but 
severe disruptions of water supply that deprive portions of the population of access to 
water. During an extreme weather or sea event, water supply can be cut off due to the 
malfunction of desalination plants, damage to rainwater collectors, and contamination of 
wells. 
                                                        
 
1211 para 12(a), CESCR General Comment 14 (2000) 
1212 CESCR, General Comment 15, (2002) 
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The second linkage is the reduction in available freshwater and the incidence 
of drought, as surface temperatures increase and surface moisture evaporates more 
quickly. The reduction in access to water due to climate change can be traced to: 
- increased glacial melt, as well as melting of other ice systems and the general 
reduction in the amount of water held in ice each winter season.1213  Such ice 
systems provide freshwater for much of the Indian sub-continent, for example. 
- increased intensity of droughts as well as expansion of dry areas.1214 While 
there will be some changes in precipitation, the data for the scale of change is 
still uncertain. The evaporation of surface moisture may be a greater problem. 
Hydrological effects may be some of the clearest impacts of climate change 
resulting in uneven regional distributions of water. Dry areas appear to be getting drier, 
while wet areas seem to be getting wetter.  However, in areas of increased run-off, they 
may be experiencing only temporary increase until glacial and other mountain ice 
systems are depleted.  Centralized systems of water supply will be strained especially in 
terms of ensuring physical access.  For example, water will have to be transported from 
one area to another; water storage systems will have to become more widespread; and 
water use will have to become more efficient.   
ii. What climate-related technology and knowledge does fulfillment of the right to water require access to? 
Water is generally supplied by local water authorities in centralized systems 
where capable local authorities exist. The vast majority of people living in rural areas rely 
on groundwater wells, and access to river water. The UN Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) does not provide guidance on what 
technologies and knowledge are necessary, but given the direct impact on the right to 
water, all technologies related to fulfilling the right to water are covered. At the least, we 
can see several related technology categories: water capture and storage products and 
processes; water distribution products and processes; and efficient water use and 
reclamation products and processes. Some of the technologies involved would therefore 
include: 
- Water capture and storage products and processes 
o Rainwater harvesting from roofs into hardened storage tanks 
o Direct spring access and protection from contamination 
o sub-surface dams to capture underground streams and run-off 
                                                        
 
1213 See p86, IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working 
Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change , Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, UK 2007. 
1214 See p90, Id. 
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o covered, lined and sealed hand-dug wells, to prevent wall collapse and 
contamination 
o tubewells and boreholes 
- Water distribution products and processes 
o gravity fed schemes to distribute water from higher altitude 
catchment areas 
- Water treatment and sanitations products and processes 
o filtration processes 
o chemical treatment 
o sewerage systems 
o latrine systems 
- Efficient water use and reclamation technologies 
 
d. The Right to Food 
The right to food is addressed in a number of international human rights 
conventions,1215 and has been further recognized in subsequent declarations made by 
the international community.1216   
i. How does the right to food relate to climate change? 
Food production, both plant and animal and usually for subsistence, is the 
primary source of GHG emissions in many developing countries.  Thus agricultural 
practices that involve fertilizers, soil tilling methods and bovine farming contribute to 
GHG emissions through nitrous oxide and methane release.1217 Deforestation to create 
more agricultural land also removes carbon sinks. 
On the other hand, food production is also one of the areas affected by 
increased dry areas and drought, as well as flooding.  The loss of productive land may 
result in the lowering of food production.  For coastal lands, increased sea-related 
extreme weather events such as storm surges can also lead to loss of cultivable land due 
to salination of the soil. 
                                                        
 
1215 Article 25 UDHR (right to adequate standard of living, including food); ICESCR Article 11.1 and 11.2; 
CEDAW Article 12 (adequate nutrition during pregnancy and lactation); Article 24 CRC (combat 
malnutrition and provide adequate nutritious foods) 
1216 In the Rome Declaration on World Food Security, Heads of State and Government “reaffirm[ed] the 
right of everyone to have access to safe and nutritious food, consistent with the right to adequate food 
and the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger.”  The Millennium Development Goals 
included the goal to halve the proportion of people in the world suffering from hunger. In 2004, FAO 
released the Voluntary Guidelines on the Right to Adequate Food. 
1217 See p85, Baumert, K A et al Navigating the Numbers: Greenhouse Gas Data and International Climate 
Policy, World Resources Institute 2005. 
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In addition, changing weather patterns are affecting the lengths of growing 
seasons as well as humidity levels, soil acidity and a whole host of other factors.  This 
can make existing plant varieties that have been long in use no longer as productive.1218 
The IPCC report points to increased vulnerability to extreme drought events.1219 
ii. What climate-related technology and knowledge does fulfillment of the right to food require access to? 
The relationship of the right to access to food to patterns of food production 
is crucial.  In particular, given the increasing urbanization of poor and marginalized 
communities in developing countries, food production and food distributions systems 
are also critical. Climate-related technology and knowledge related to the right to food 
will have to address: 
- access to diverse plant varieties and seeds, especially resistant to drought and to 
salinated soil; and 
- access to water for food production, including irrigation systems, water capture 
and storage systems 
One consideration, especially for considering a rights approach to climate 
change is that the food sector has become increasingly privatized as public funding in 
agricultural research has been reduced, and private companies have been able to 
appropriate germplasm through plant patents, plant variety protections, and patents on 
plant and animal genetic resources.  This means that more so than in many other 
industries, the technologies and knowledge for fulfilling the right to food are in private 
hands and may be protected by IP. 
e. The Right to Development 
The right to development, despite a long history, is still broadly debated.  
Article 1 of the Declaration on the Right to Development1220 states that "the right to 
development is an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person and 
all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, 
cultural and political development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms 
can be fully realized."   
While the right to development is framed as an individual right, it has largely 
developed out of a dialogue between States as a means to address policy space by 
                                                        
 
1218 IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II 
to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change , Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, UK 2007 at 104. 
1219 See p107, Id. 
1220 General Assembly resolution 41/128 1986  
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developing countries and to establish responsibilities on developed countries to provide 
development assistance. In particular it establishes an obligation for States to promote 
fair development policies and effective international cooperation.  The right can be 
invoked by both individuals and peoples, suggesting that States as representatives of 
people can invoke some of the provisions. 
The 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development has no mention of 
technology transfer or access to technology.  However, Article 11 of the Vienna 
Declaration explicitly calls on the wording of ICESCR Article 15(1)(b) stating that, 
“Everyone has the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications.” 
In addition, developing countries have sought to have technology transfer viewed as an 
integral component of the right (see e.g. a 2003 Non-Aligned Movement Draft 
resolution on the Right to Development at the 59th Session of the Human Rights 
Commission).1221 
The Independent Expert on the Right to Development has also provided some 
guidance on technology transfer as a component of the right to development. In his 
report he examines the obstacles that TRIPS poses for access to technology. In 
particular he notes that the development path of unilateral measures to ensure 
technology transfer that was used by the Asian Tiger economies may no longer be 
available because of the TRIPS Agreement.1222  
i. How does the right to development relate to climate change? 
Within the UNFCCC and the discussion on climate, developing countries have 
drawn on the right to development to establish basic principles such as common but 
differentiated responsibilities.  They have not necessarily stated it in terms of the right to 
development but they have nevertheless ensured that the UNFCCC recognizes it in 
Article 4.7. 
ii. What climate-related technology and knowledge does fulfillment of the right to development require 
access to? 
In general, therefore, the right to development would point to all technologies 
required to address climate impacts as outlined in all the other rights outlined in this 
section. The right to development draws on other rights with the added element that it 
is also directed at imposing obligations on developed countries.  The lack of 
development of the right may be an impediment, but, in conjunction with other rights, 
may be examined for the role it can play in making the connection between human 
rights, technology transfer and climate change. 
                                                        
 
1221 E/CN.4/2003/L.14 8 April 2003. 
1222 See p11, Review of progress and obstacles in the promotion, implementation, operationalization, and 
enjoyment of the right to development, E/CN.4/2004/WG.18/2, 17 February 2004.  
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f. The Duty to Provide International Assistance and Cooperation 
As this paper has focused on international technology transfer, the human 
rights that we have examined in this study all place obligations on States to provide 
access to technologies for the fulfillment of those rights. To address international 
transfer of technology however, each right has had to establish some kind of extra-
territorial obligation for other States and actors.  For the economic, social and cultural 
rights, the international element of technology transfer to fulfill the rights comes from 
the duty to cooperate and provide assistance in Article 2 of the ICESCR.  For other 
rights, the legal basis for extraterritorial obligations remains contested.   
ICESCR Article 2 requires each State Party “to take steps, individually and 
through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to 
the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means...” 
ICESCR Article 23 elaborates on this requirement, stating that international action 
includes “the conclusion of conventions, the adoption of recommendations, the 
furnishing of technical assistance,” and other methods. 
The CESCR has repeatedly drawn attention to the essential role of 
international cooperation in achieving the full realization of particular rights under the 
ICESCR, stating that State Parties should “comply with their commitment to take joint 
and separate action” to achieve this goal.1223 With respect to the right to health, the 
CESCR has more fully described the contours of the obligation for international 
cooperation.  States must firstly respect the enjoyment of the right to health in other 
countries and, where possible, protect this right from violation by actions of third 
parties.  In addition to the duty to respect and protect, the international community has 
an obligation to facilitate access to essential health facilities, goods, and services, and 
“wherever possible” to provide such aid when it is needed. Finally, the CESCR has 
stated, “State Parties should ensure that the right to health is given due attention in 
international agreements, and to that end, should consider the development of further 
legal instruments.” 1224  The CESCR has defined a similar role for the international 
community with respect to the right to food and the right to water. (CESCR General 
Comment 12, 1999; CESCR General Comment 15, 2002.) Moreover, in its discussion of 
the right to water the Committee has been clear that State Parties must also refrain from 
actions that indirectly interfere with the enjoyment of rights in other countries. 1225 
(CESCR General Comment 15, 2002).  The committee is also particularly clear that 
                                                        
 
1223 Id.  
1224 CESCR General Comment 14, 2000 
1225 para 31, “International cooperation requires States Parties to refrain from actions that interfere, 
directly or indirectly, with the enjoyment of the right to water in other countries. Any activities 
undertaken within the State party’s jurisdiction should not deprive another country of the ability to 
realize the right to water for persons in its jurisdiction.” (CESCR General Comment 15, 2002).  
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States should “depending on the availability of resources, [...] facilitate realization of the 
right to water in other countries, for example through provision of water resources, 
financial and technical assistance, and provide the necessary aid when required. [...] The 
economically developed States Parties have a special responsibility and interest to assist 
the poorer developing States in this regard.”1226 The CESCR reiterates this even more 
strongly in paragraph 38 of General Comment 15, noting that: 
for the avoidance of any doubt, the Committee wishes to emphasize that it is 
particularly incumbent on States Parties, and other actors in a position to assist, 
to provide international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and 
technical which enables developing countries to fulfill their core obligations 
indicated in paragraph 37 above. 
The CESCR has indicated particular areas that implicate the joint and 
individual responsibility of State Parties and necessitate international cooperation.  
Notably, it has stated that it is the responsibility of all State Parties to cooperate in 
providing disaster relief and humanitarian assistance in times of emergency. Further, 
“[e]ach State should contribute to this task to the maximum of its capacities.” Priority in 
the provision of aid and funding should be given to the most vulnerable or marginalized 
groups of the population. 1227  The CESCR has also indicated the international 
community has a “collective responsibility” to address threats to human rights that are 
trans-boundary in nature, such as certain diseases.  In addressing these trans-boundary 
issues, “[t]he economically developed States Parties have a special responsibility and 
interest to assist the poorer developing States…”1228     
The obligations of all the State Parties to respect and protect rights, and to 
facilitate or provide access to resources necessary to ensure such rights apply equally to 
the threats posed by climate change to rights under the ICESCR.  Climate change, 
because of its trans-boundary nature and the acute threat it poses to economic, social, 
and cultural rights among vulnerable populations, is an issue that implicates the 
responsibility of all State Parties to cooperate.   
 
IV.2. What are the Possible Avenues for Adopting a Rights-Based Approach to 
the Arguments for Technology Transfer for Climate Change? 
One way to view a rights-based approach is that there would be a basis for 
making a direct demand for access to technology from those who are holders of 
technology. Such a demand would be based on a direct right to access technology or on 
access to technology as a necessary component for the fulfillment of other rights.  The 
                                                        
 
1226 para 34, CESCR, General Comment 15, 2002. 
1227 CESCR General Comment 14, 2000 
1228 Id. 
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other view of a rights-based approach is that, in the exercise of policy choices to require 
third parties to transfer technologies, the human rights obligations of the party doing so 
could form the basis for justifying such action, even where such action would not be in 
conformity with the TRIPS Agreement. 
The rights that I have outlined remain largely linked to adaptation in the climate arena. 
There is little in the analysis that enables a rights-based approach to technology transfer 
for mitigation, except for perhaps Article 15(1)(b). The uses of human rights to justify 
otherwise non-conforming measures is strongest for adaptation although there may be 
some purchase for mitigation based measures. 
IV.2.1. Adaptation 
Climate change adaptation has a basic normative structure.  Developed 
countries have largely caused climate change.  The effects of climate change will be 
broad-based and cross-regional and all States will have to make adjustments and adapt 
to new weather patterns and weather events.  Developed countries are in the privileged 
position of having sufficient resources to pay the costs of that adjustment.  In contrast, 
many developing countries do not have the resources to fully adapt and will suffer from 
the negative effects on their development from climate change. Therefore, developed 
countries bear a special responsibility to assist developing countries to adapt.  That 
principle is enshrined in the UNFCCC’s Article 4.8.1229  Technology transfer is strongly 
related to adaptation, as it requires new and alternative products and processes to 
effectively enable the necessary shifts in production and consumption patterns. 
The inclusion of technology transfer within the framework of adaptation is 
common throughout the UNFCCC documents. The Nairobi Work Programme, 
established in 2005 outlines the framework for adaptation in the UNFCCC. The 
                                                        
 
1229 In the implementation of the commitments in this Article, the Parties shall give full consideration to 
what actions are necessary under the Convention, including actions related to funding, insurance and the 
transfer of technology, to meet the specific needs and concerns of developing country Parties arising 
from the adverse effects of climate change and/or the impact of the implementation of response 
measures, especially on:  
(a) Small island countries;  
(b) Countries with low-lying coastal areas;  
(c) Countries with arid and semi-arid areas, forested areas and areas liable to forest decay;  
(d) Countries with areas prone to natural disasters;  
(e) Countries with areas liable to drought and desertification;  
(f) Countries with areas of high urban atmospheric pollution;  
(g) Countries with areas with fragile ecosystems, including mountainous ecosystems;  
(h) Countries whose economies are highly dependent on income generated from the production, 
processing and export, and/or on consumption of fossil fuels and associated energy-intensive products; 
and  
(i) Land-locked and transit countries.  
Further, the Conference of the Parties may take actions, as appropriate, with respect to this paragraph 
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Programme has 9 sub-themes, one of which is technologies for adaptation.1230 The work 
on technologies for adaptation is however, quite preliminary within the UNFCCC. One 
of the issues is the underlying justification for adaptation. In the UNFCCC it is framed 
as an equity issue for whom the obligation lies entirely with developed countries. The 
question then is twofold: whether there may be a role for human rights in more clearly 
articulating the equity justifications for technology transfer to address climate change 
adaptation; and how such a role would be operationalized.   
From an examination of the broader literature as well as the approach within the 
UNFCCC, two main roles for technology transfer can be found. These are: 
- technology transfer as an overarching commitment, separate from new and 
additional funding for adaptation; and 
- technology transfer as an integral component of adaptation. 
These two approaches have significant consequences for targeting action and 
for how a human rights framework may find purchase. If technology transfer is viewed 
as a separate commitment under the UNFCCC, which has to be delivered on separately 
from adaptation programmes, it enables the inclusion of technology transfer for 
mitigation. However, it has only a small overlap with the set of rights that we have 
examined in above. On its own, there are few if any justice claims involved beyond 
those of fairness and equity related to the polluter pays principle and other distributive 
justice claims.   
Another view sees technology transfer as an integral part of the adaptation 
program. In the same manner that we examined the rights above for the technologies 
that are necessary for their fulfillment, in this view, technology transfer is justified as a 
means of fulfillment of adaptation aims. The justification for technology transfer for 
adaptation within the UNFCCC is largely from a corrective justice viewpoint: 
developing countries are being harmed by climate change; developed countries are 
responsible for climate change; ergo they are responsible for addressing and correcting 
the harms that they caused. Corrective justice approaches are also inherent to human 
rights discourse, especially where, as we have established, climate change negatively 
impacts the realization of specific rights. The congruence between the climate change 
impacts by sector (health, food, water) and climate change impacts by human rights 
effect is very clear. Economic, social and cultural rights also have strong congruence 
with the manner in which development work is carried out and the development 
framework has been key to informing the way that climate impacts and adaptation have 
been framed. Climate impacts have been seen as undermining development.  
                                                        
 
1230 More information available at 
http://unfccc.int/adaptation/sbsta_agenda_item_adaptation/items/3995.php (last visited 15 August 
2014). 
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IV.2.2. Mitigation 
While corrective justice claims for technology transfer for adaptation make it 
easier to establish a link to human rights, the justice claims for transfer of technologies 
for mitigation are different altogether.  As noted in chapter 4, transfer of technologies 
for mitigation is part of the basic contractual bargain underlying the UNFCCC.  
Developing countries will only take on GHG emissions reduction commitments once 
they have access to technologies that enable a carbon-efficient pathway, paid for by 
developed countries.  There remains very little purchase for a rights-based approach to 
technology transfer for mitigation, except perhaps invoking Article 15(1)(b) in the 
context of fulfilling the right to development as partly articulated in UNFCCC Article 
4.7. The right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications may 
provide significant theoretical purchase for arguing that each State must deliver on it to 
its citizens.  However, the practical obstacles for a human rights justification for 
technology transfer mitigation remains far weaker than for adaptation.   
 
IV.3. The relationship between Human Rights, Intellectual Property and Climate 
Change 
Traditionally, human rights obligations function in international law as 
obligations erga omnes and thus, by definition, are applicable law for all States in all their 
activities.  Moreover, human rights are fundamental and cannot be contracted out of.  In 
addition, certain human rights are recognized as jus cogens, having formal primacy over 
other international norms.  Outside of jus cogens, human rights norms generally have 
more force than other norms given that they concern fundamental values of the 
international community.     
To the extent that the issue of how to relate to other regimes has been taken 
up, the human rights committees have consistently applied the standard that human 
rights are fundamental obligations of states which are not subject to ‘balancing’ tests.  
They can be mutually supportive with other regimes but only to the extent that such 
regimes remain compatible with human rights law.  Even in the realm of the application 
of economic sanctions the CESCR conclusively stated in General Comment 8, that:  
the provisions of the Covenant, virtually all of which are also reflected in a 
range of other human rights treaties as well as the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, cannot be considered to be inoperative, or in any way 
inapplicable, solely because a decision has been taken that considerations of 
international peace and security warrant the imposition of sanctions.  Just as 
the international community insists that any targeted State must respect the 
civil and political rights of its citizens, so too must that State and the 
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international community itself do everything possible to protect at least the 
core content of the economic, social and cultural rights of the affected peoples 
of that State.1231 
This is, however, nuanced by several doctrinal elements, especially for 
economic, social and cultural rights.  This includes the principle of “progressive 
realization” of rights, taking into account the different capacities of countries to deliver 
on these rights, and the different timeframes in which the realization of some rights will 
have to occur. 
From the point of view of the regime-fora relationship, the human rights 
bodies clearly view human rights as having priority over other standards or objectives.  
It is the rhetorical and substantive power of human rights that has made human rights 
language attractive, both to those wishing to limit the power and role of IP rights, as 
well as to those wishing to expand its role and power.   
More importantly human rights that function as obligations erga omnes may 
provide a way back into the WTO but only if there exists a framework through which 
the WTO and TRIPS Agreement can address and apply human rights within their 
interpretive mechanisms.  To the extent that the ‘necessity’ requirement provides an 
avenue in the GATT, the TBT and the SPS Agreement, human rights as a justification 
for otherwise non-conforming measures is possible.  There remains considerable 
disagreement as to the flexibility of WTO bodies to take into account human rights.  
While Pauwelyn would be more likely to find some room, Marceau is relatively 
determined that human rights could never be directly applicable or set directly against 
WTO law in a panel.1232 
The TRIPS Agreement poses a particular problem because the existing 
interpretation of necessity cannot take into account or be balanced with the moral 
power and common interest of the human rights regime.  In addition, the role of 
intellectual property as a human right muddies the water, elevating the rights of 
intellectual property holders towards those of intellectual property users, in ways that 
make it difficult to argue that intellectual property is per se in opposition to human rights, 
or technology transfer for climate change conceived in human rights terms. To 
successfully use human rights to address TRIPS, another additional step may need to be 
taken in the broader interpretive approach. The next chapter examines the International 
Law Commission’s approach and applies it to the case of technology transfer, outlining 
                                                        
 
1231 See p8, UN Economic and Social Council, ‘The relationship between economic sanctions and respect 
for economic, social and cultural rights’ (12 December 1997) para. 7,  S/C.12/1997/8, CESCR General 
Comment 
1232 Marceau, G “WTO dispute settlement and human rights` 13 European Journal of International Law 
753 (2002). 
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how the issue can be broadened in the WTO and outlining how the UNFCCC itself can 
take up the issue of intellectual property to expand the limits of the TRIPS Agreement. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
The attempt to find a way to bring human rights into conflict with TRIPS in 
order to trigger the mechanisms for interpretive conflict resolution are not likely to 
succeed.  Such attempts fail because of the structure of the climate change obligations 
for developing countries in the UNFCCC; and the acknowledgement of intellectual –
property like rights in the human rights framework itself.  Thus rather than being 
external to the human rights framework the basic debate about the proper balance 
between rightholders and users is built into the structure of Article 15 of the ICESCR. 
This leaves one final option for developing countries to expand the room that they have 
under the TRIPS Agreement: the appeal to the rules of general international law as an 
overarching set of obligations and principles common to all the involved regimes that 
creates a framework for how they should be interpreted together, even in the absence of 
direct conflicts. 
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Chapter 8 
Systemic Integration  
and Action on Norm setting 
at the WTO and the UNFCCC 
 
 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the absence of internal mechanisms at the WTO for integrating other 
regimes such as the UNFCCC and human rights as applicable law, allowing for 
justification of TRIPS non-conforming measures, two options remain – creating a 
framework to re-enter the WTO; creating a framework for other fora to take up the 
issue of increasing flexibility for non-conforming measures. This requires a framework 
for integration of international law rather than the fragmentation that has been the 
consequence of WTO jurisprudence. 
The most significant and authoritative attempt to address the question of 
fragmentation and expansion of international law has been undertaken by the 
International Law Commission (ILC).1233  This chapter describes the basic principles put 
forward by the ILC and the basic solution to conflicts that it prescribes.  It then outlines 
some of the potential solutions to addressing the tensions between the various 
international regimes bearing on technology transfer and climate change, studied above.  
The ILC’s report on the fragmentation of international law is actually titled: 
“Fragmentation of International Law:  Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and 
Expansion of International Law”.  This reflects one of its key conclusions: that there is 
not necessarily a danger in the increasing complexity and diversity of international 
law.1234 This follows from the ILC’s belief that there are no conflicts between existing 
treaties that cannot be addressed within the framework of existing legal methodologies, 
including customary law and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).   
                                                        
 
1233 Koskenniemi, M et al. “Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law:  Report of the Study Group of the International Law 
Commission” International Law Commission, 13 April 2006, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 p. 1-256 and 18 July 
2006, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.702 p. 1-25. 
1234 para 222, Id. 
 335 
 
The ILC’s approach relies on the existence of the VCLT as a common frame 
for considering the issue of conflicts of rules and rule-making.  The ILC analyzes 
concepts such as lex specialis and lex posteriori, but cautions against overly literal 
application of these principles.  In particular, the ILC cautions that using such tools to 
invalidate a prior or more general law may be a fundamental error, unless a broader 
understanding of both treaties as operating within a system that maintains the existence, 
at least as an interpretive fact, of the prior or more general law.1235  In addition, in 
seeking to apply such principles, the ILC grapples with the issue of “same subject 
matter” outlined in VCLT Article 30 on prior and subsequent treaties.  The report notes 
that categories such as trade law, environmental law and human rights law are 
professional designations not based on any fundamental, natural partitioning of 
international law.1236 
The ILC divides the kinds of conflicts into four categories1237: 
(a) Relations between special and general law; 
(b) Relations between prior and subsequent law; 
(c) Relations between laws at different hierarchical levels; and 
(d) Relations of law to its “normative environment” more generally. 
The difficulty, of course, is in defining the type of relations at issue.  For 
example, which law can be understood to be special and which one general?  There can 
be reasonable disagreement, especially with respect to international environmental law 
and international economic law, as well as the increasing linkage between international 
environmental law and international human rights law.  The issue of prior law is simpler, 
but surrounded by complications regarding whether the laws cover the same subject 
matter.  For instance, the ILC categorizes the debate over trade and environment as a 
dispute between two special regimes under category (a), above.   
 
II. DESCRIBING THE BOUNDARIES OF CONFLICTS & INTER-REGIME TENSIONS 
 
The ILC defines conflicts as “a situation where two rules or principles suggest 
different ways of dealing with a problem.” 1238   In addition to conflicts, this paper 
                                                        
 
1235 para 32, Koskenniemi, M et al. “Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law:  Report of the Study Group of the International Law 
Commission” International Law Commission, 13 April 2006, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 p. 1-256 and 18 July 
2006, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.702 p. 1-25. 
1236 para 254, Id. 
1237 para 18, id. 
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addresses the question of inter-regime tensions, which, in addition to the interplay 
between rules or principles, involves governance and other structures set up within each 
regime that have a bearing on the attainment on other regimes’ objectives.  The ILC 
proposes to resolve conflicts in international law by emphasizing systemic integration 
anchored in VCLT Article 31(3)(c).  This provision and the role of systemic integration 
are well known elements of customary law on treaty interpretation.  VCLT Article 
31(3)(c) states: 
3.There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties. 
Thus, general international law as well as the treaties in force between parties 
to the dispute must form part of the applicable law for interpreting provisions in each of 
the agreements. Given its emphasis on dispute settlement in its work on systemic 
integration, the ILC also makes a useful distinction between jurisdiction and applicable 
law.  While jurisdiction arises from a given instrument and is therefore limited, there 
need not be any limit to the scope of applicable law, unless the instrument also explicitly 
defines one.    The issue of applicable law is crucial because a party must be presumed to 
have intended to situate itself within a broader corpus or system of law, which includes 
prior and/or related treaties existing at the time of signature.1239  Thus it takes the panel 
to task in EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products for an overly restrictive reading 
of Article 31(3)(c), that would not allow for interpretive weight to be given to a treaty 
unless all WTO members were also parties to the treaty.1240 
The ILC also spent significant effort analyzing the literature on “self-contained 
regimes” and whether they could truly exist in isolation from other elements of 
international law.  The report concluded that the concept of “self-contained regimes” 
was an artificial construct that was not accurately descriptive of existing relationships 
between subject matters in international law.1241  Except in rare cases it was not possible 
to contract out of general international law, and create an entirely sui generis regime that 
had no contact with others. In particular, it is impossible to characterize the WTO as a 
                                                                                                                                   
 
1238 para 25, Koskenniemi, M et al. “Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law:  Report of the Study Group of the International Law 
Commission” International Law Commission, 13 April 2006 , UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 p. 1-256 and 18 July 
2006, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.702 p. 1-25. 
1239 para 45, Id. 
1240 See para. 7.70 – 7.71, Panel Reports, European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and 
Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/DS291/R / WT/DS292/R / WT/DS293/R, Add.1 to Add.9, and Corr.1, 
adopted 21 November 2006, DSR 2006:III-VIII, 847 (EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products) 
1241 Para 193, Koskenniemi, M et al. “Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law:  Report of the Study Group of the International Law 
Commission” International Law Commission, 13 April 2006, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 p. 1-256 and 18 July 
2006, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.702 p. 1-25. 
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self-contained regime precisely because in Article 3.2 of the DSU it explicitly relies on 
general international law to interpret its own terms, and in GATT Article XX it 
explicitly refers to prison labor1242, and protecting human, animal and plant life or health. 
To the extent that the mechanisms for providing such protections are international 
treaties they fall fully within the WTO regime as applicable law.  Even where they do 
not do so, they may by virtue of Article 31(3)(c) be applicable law as between parties to 
the dispute, to the extent that this does not unduly affect the rights and obligations of 
other WTO members not party to the dispute. 
In addition to the concept of “self-contained regimes”, the literature has also 
discussed the idea of “specialized regimes”1243 to describe the nature of the relationships 
operating in international law and policy.  In this regard, decisions in one specialized 
regime can act to limit or prevent action in another.  In the face of that reality, e.g. 
between trade and environment and the way that the trade regime has limited particular 
kinds of environmental actions, there is a real substantive and legal effect.  This gives 
rise to the issue of inter-regime tensions, where the objectives of the regimes may be 
undermined by decisions adopted in another forum, even where there is no formal 
conflict.   The ILC Report, while also noting that specialized regimes may benefit from 
the lex specialis priority, nevertheless establishes that they may not derogate from jus cogens. 
Moreover, the following situations arise:1244 
(1) The regime may not deviate from the law benefiting third parties, including 
individuals and non-State entities; 
(2) The regime may not deviate from general law if the obligations of general 
law are of “integral” or “interdependent” nature, have erga omnes character or 
practice has created a legitimate expectation of non-derogation; 
(3) The regime may not deviate from treaties that have a public law nature or 
which are constituent instruments of international organizations. 
However, while this provides a framework for looking at specialized regimes 
with respect to general international law, it provides limited guidance as to the relations 
between specialized regimes.  In addition, there is not much guidance as to what actually 
defines a specialized regime, except as instantiated in a treaty or a set of treaties forming 
a formal framework, e.g., the WTO Agreements.  The ILC also has an extensive 
discussion on the limitations of so-called savings clauses that purport to define a 
                                                        
 
1242 Article XX(e) 
1243 Lindroos. A and M Mehling, “From Autonomy to Integration. International Law, Free Trade and the 
Environment” Vol. 7 Nordic Journal of International Law 253-273, 2008. 
1244 para 154, Koskenniemi, M et al. “Fragmentation of International Law” 
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particular relationship to other treaties and regimes.1245  The report notes that most go 
only so far as to seek coordination and harmony with either a specific regime or all other 
related regimes, but do not go so far as to detail specific rules of priority with respect to 
other treaties or regimes.1246 
 
III. THE PRINCIPLE OF SYSTEMIC INTEGRATION 
 
The ILC report puts forward an approach it calls “systemic integration,” 
rooted in the application of VCLT Article 31(3)(c), to address the potential conflicts that 
arise as a result of the diversification and expansion of international law.  The approach 
is premised on the insight that at the core of all the legal approaches and techniques to 
address conflicts is the idea of relationships within a broader system.  The ILC suggests 
that all interpretive decisions should take place against that broader systemic 
background with full awareness of the links, accompanied by a proactive attempt to 
integrate different rules with each other and that broader systemic background which 
consists of general international law, jus cogens obligations, and obligations erga omnes.1247 
Thus, care must be exercised not to invalidate other provisions in other treaties and 
regimes.  Interpretation should render both provisions operational and compatible, and 
if that is not possible, the rule that is determined to have priority must nevertheless take 
the other rule into account.   
Fundamentally, systemic integration is about ensuring coherence by treating 
each regime as if it is part of an intentional system with a particular shared direction.  
The ILC reiterates, and is quite adamant, that VCLT Article 31(3)(c) is explicitly meant 
to treat other treaties and regimes as part of the systemic background against which 
interpretation should take place.  It is a mandatory part of the interpretation process and 
is not subordinate to other interpretive sources in Article 31, including any examination 
of the ordinary meaning of the text. In light of the ILC’s conclusions regarding the 
ability of systemic integration to address conflicts and tensions between specialized 
regimes, I propose a methodology for applying this framework to the issue of 
technology transfer at the UNFCCC.   
                                                        
 
1245 For example, the TRIPS Agreement states in Article 2(2) “Nothing in Parts I to IV of this Agreement 
shall derogate from existing obligations that Members may have to each other under the Paris 
Convention, the Berne Convention, the Rome Convention and the Treaty on Intellectual Property in 
Respect of Integrated Circuits” 
1246 para 272 – 282, Koskenniemi, M et al. “Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from 
the Diversification and Expansion of International Law: Report of the Study Group of the International 
Law Commission” International Law Commission, 13 April 2006 , UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 p. 1 -256 and 18 
July 2006, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.702 p. 1-25. 
1247 paras 410 – 415,  Koskenniemi, M et al. “Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from 
the Diversification and Expansion of International Law: Report of the Study Group of the International 
Law Commission” International Law Commission, 13 April 2006 , UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 p. 1-256 and 18 
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IV. SYSTEMIC INTEGRATION APPLIED TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AT THE UNFCCC  
 
An effective fight against climate change will require action across various 
areas that will merit a framework of systemic integration.  Systemic integration should 
address international, regional, and national regimes, and the interaction among the 
various regimes.  Van Asselt, Sindico and Mehling have recently pointed out the 
relevance of the systemic integration concept of the ILC to the UNFCCC.1248  This 
paper tries to take their point a step further and apply it to the specific case of 
technology transfer for climate change, IP, and human rights.  
Van Asselt, Sindico and Mehling critique the narrow focus on ‘conflicts’ that 
emerged after the ILC report. This narrow focus on ‘conflicts’ only examined treaty 
language, ignoring other venues of activity and decision-making that can sometimes be 
more relevant.1249  Specifically, they examine the legal role and force of decisions by 
bodies such as the UNFCCC COP and the relationship to other treaty fora and decision 
making bodies.  This paper is concerned in particular with the relationship between the 
UNFCCC COP, the WTO TRIPS Council, the WTO General Council and the two 
major human rights committees (the Committee on Civil and Political Rights, and the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights). This thesis will focus on how a 
broader view of the venues for decision-making may provide a better indication of 
where actual conflicts may be, and where actual opportunities for systemic integration 
may exist.  
The first form of application of the principle of systemic integration requires 
the determination of a methodology that can identify which regimes and treaties merit 
integration.  Regimes and treaties that merit integration will depend on whether a treaty 
deals with the same or related subject matter.  In this connection, a “basic effects” test 
could be employed, involving an examination of whether or not one set of provisions in 
a treaty would essentially limit, negate or impair the effectiveness of other provisions or 
regimes. However, when looking at applying the basic effects test, i.e., on the realization 
and/or effectiveness of the provisions in another treaty or regime, the first place to look 
for guidance is to treaties that share objectives.  Once shared objectives are established, 
a connection can be clarified by seeking specific shared provisions that suggest that the 
provisions need to be read together in some fashion to give effect to all of them. 
A second form of application of the systemic integration principle may be 
applied by looking at the competencies of particular treaty regimes and their obligations 
to address particular issues.  Competency is a subject matter question which overlaps 
                                                        
 
1248 Van Asselt, H et al, “Global Climate Change and the Fragmentation of International Law” 30 Law and 
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1249 See p425, Id. 
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with jurisdiction to a certain extent.  Although competency will be rooted in the 
constitutive instrument of the treaty or forum, a second effects test will require a fora 
examination of the areas of law that may determine the effectiveness of the regime and 
will integrate those bodies of law as applicable law within the fora.  The aforementioned 
approach has been adopted by the WTO Panels and the Appellate Body.  Arguably, this 
approach should be adopted by other regimes because it provides the target for action, 
albeit with an important variation:  competency will require a minimum awareness of the 
applicable law and an obligation to not to impair its effectiveness.  The required 
minimum awareness will create an obligation to act and incorporate relevant standards 
into norm-setting and treaty interpretation. 
The second approach above provides the tools and a methodology to 
determine the regime that can be integrated with outside norms against the general 
background of international law. By following this approach, the forum’s interests and 
goals will continue to be pursued while also integrating common provisions to ensure its 
effect and proper execution of measures.  In addition, the approach will ensure the 
elimination of artificial barriers to engagement on issues of common concern. 
 
IV.1. Objectives and Methodologies 
Within the regimes of IP, international human rights, and technology transfer 
the shared objective is sustainable development.  The preamble to the Marrakesh 
Agreement establishing the WTO recognizes the objective of sustainable development.  
The TRIPS Agreement gives effect to sustainable development in Articles 7 and 8.1.  
The Appellate Body has acknowledged that the concept of sustainable development 
must “give colour and texture” to WTO obligations under the WTO covered 
agreements.1250 
The UNFCCC also has sustainable development as a key objective.  The 
Preamble and Objectives (Article 2) of the UNFCCC recall the principle sustainable 
development, as well as the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment, adopted at Stockholm on 16 June 1972. 
While the ICESCR predates some of the conceptual framework that built the 
concept of sustainable development, human rights are the third pillar of sustainable 
development, and are thus understood as core to the concept.  The International Law 
Association, for example, in its New Delhi Declaration Of Principles of International 
Law Relating to Sustainable Development, has formulated the “principle of integration 
                                                        
 
1250 WTO, United States – Import Prohibition of Shrimp and Shrimp Products (6 November 1998) 
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and interrelationship, in particular in relation to human rights and social, economic and 
environmental objectives”.1251   
Sustainable development has been a useful way of reconciling objectives that 
have sometimes been considered conflicting i.e. social equity and stability, economic 
growth and environmental protection.  While it has been a useful rhetorical tool, it also 
has substantive content which can inform legal analysis.  The WTO has done so, for 
example, in its jurisprudence on Article XX, in considering what are exhaustible natural 
resources.1252  
The Brundlandt Report (Our Common Future, 1987) 1253  defines sustainable 
development as, “development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”  In addition, 
the report outlines other elements including: 
- efficient resource allocation to meet basic human needs;  
- equitable and just allocation of resources and benefits arising from their use;  
- ecological sustainability – maintaining the long-term viability of supporting 
ecosystems;  
- social sustainability – fulfilling people’s cultural, material, and spiritual needs in 
equitable ways;  
- increased accountability in institutions of governance;  
- increased and meaningful public participation;  
- strengthening of local democracy;  
- focus on environmental rights;  
- economic viability; and finally,  
- greater sensitivity to conditions in the Global South. 
 
The dynamic nature of the definition of sustainable development lends itself 
well to the intellectual property framework. 1254  The primary concern in intellectual 
property policy making is finding a balance between static efficiency (the present 
interests of present populations to access products and knowledge) with dynamic 
efficiency (meeting the need for the generation of new technologies that address future 
challenges).  With such a concern at the heart of intellectual property-making, the 
                                                        
 
1251 International Law Association Resolution 3/2002, ‘Sustainable Development, New Delhi Declaration 
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1254 Cullet, P Intellectual Property and Sustainable Development (London: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2005) 
 342 
 
concerns and framing of sustainable development have a direct translation into the 
legislation and interpretive tradition in intellectual property regarding the appropriate 
balance between the interests of rightholders in the present and the interests of 
competitors and end-users on the other, and the effect that allowing greater access in 
the present might have on incentives for generation of new technologies in the future.  
In many ways, this is an argument that cannot truly be solved empirically, as it depends 
on finding a concrete answer to the question of whether and to what extent stronger IP 
protection actually does result in actual innovation. That some level of protection does 
provide an incentive for generation of new inventions and innovations seems intuitively 
true and to some extent empirically true, but generation is not the only concern of the 
intellectual property system. In many ways, the intellectual property system can be seen 
as equally concerned with ensuring disclosure and dissemination of knowledge and does 
so by creating a market for that knowledge.1255  Constructed in that way, the issue is not 
about whether or not intellectual property protection should be provided but whether 
the level of intellectual property protection provided distorts and prevents the efficient 
functioning of a market in the knowledge so that all who wish to participate in the 
market can do so in commercially viable ways, both from the perspective of the 
rightholder and the user.  Normally, such markets can be left to function by 
themselves1256, but as noted in Chapter 5, there exist some asymmetries in markets for 
knowledge (especially across borders) that create market imperfections and make it less 
likely that such transactions (e.g. licensing) will take place.1257  
 In addition anti-competitive behaviour on the part of market participants remains a 
concern in knowledge markets given the statutory grant that give significant potential 
for market power. Remuneration (especially as reward for investment risk) is a 
fundamental element of the system of intellectual property and maintaining that 
remuneration is key to ensuring dynamic efficiency, but both dynamic efficiency and 
static efficiency require a properly functioning market in the knowledge.  It is along that 
vector that government interventions can work to ensure diffusion without reducing 
dynamic or static efficiency.  This means that policy-makers and judicial interpreters can 
take actions to address market failures of dissemination to the extent that these are 
limited to pricing and undue barriers to market entry, to ensure that unmet demand is 
addressed. Framed in this way, sustainable development in the intellectual property 
framework requires an efficient market in knowledge and knowledge products, where 
intervention by government is meant to ensure that the rightholder is sufficiently 
remunerated to maintain incentives for future generation of technologies, but that the 
structure of the market in knowledge and knowledge products does not result in unmet 
                                                        
 
1255 See 609, Arrow, K “Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention’ in The Rate and 
Direction of Economic Activity Economic and Social Factors (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962). 
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demand, especially in areas crucial to economic welfare. 1258   Such an approach 
emphasizes remuneration over control, somewhat contrary to the tradition that has 
developed of viewing intellectual property as a means for the rightholder to structure 
the market according to their preferences.  However, regulatory authorities, primarily in 
the competition or anti-trust arena have, over time, been more or less willing to 
intervene1259  and remove some control from the rightholder where they view such 
control to have been exercised in an unduly restrictive or market damaging manner.  It 
is at this interface that sustainable development may be best integrated into the 
intellectual property framework – along the economic leg of the tripod.  This may 
require sustainable development institutions that are concerned about technology 
transfer to more explicitly address and frame this issue in the context of norm-setting 
and implementation of technology transfer obligations. 
The concept of sustainable development has become a core element of 
international norm-setting. 1260   All mainstream definitions require three things: (1) 
integration of social, environmental and economic objectives and methodologies; (2) 
integration of the interests of future generations; and (3) transparency, participation and 
accountability of all relevant stakeholders.1261  The definition provides a framework for 
standards and norms from other institutions to integrate and apply sustainable 
development as applicable law, or a form of information as to the meaning of the 
applicable law of another regime. 
However, the concept is also useful in the way that it is fundamentally tied to 
human rights through its social objective and thereby linking human rights to economic 
and environmental considerations.  The link between human rights and the environment 
has become an accepted element of broader international law.  Specifically, the right to a 
healthy environment has become an increasingly important element of international 
policy making and has lent strength to legal challenges against environmental 
degradation or pollution that affects the right to life, the right to health, as well as other 
human rights affected by particular acts of environmental degradation or pollution.  The 
right to a healthy environment can be found in Article 12(2)(b) of the ICESCR that calls 
on states to “improve all aspects of industrial and environmental hygiene.”  It is also 
found as a corollary to the realization of other rights such as the right to life, health, and 
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a safe working environment.1262   However, human rights are an integral element of 
international law making, where they function as erga omnes obligations.  Thus, the failure 
to explicitly mention human rights law as applicable law in a treaty is no obstacle to its 
application in that treaty.   
In addition, the standards for when and how human rights may be abrogated 
or limited would apply, thus placing the burden on those seeking to invalidate a measure 
that achieves or is aimed at achieving fundamental human rights.  As noted earlier, the 
role of human rights in the specific context of technology transfer for climate change 
may pose some problems given the unfortunate role that General Comment 17 has 
played.  However, the human rights impacts of climate change on the right to health, 
food, and water provide a way to argue that technology transfer is required to meet 
human rights standards.  Thus, measures pursued with the aim of ensuring the right to 
health, food, and water would also be subject to the same analysis. 
Finally, sustainable development is crucial to the way in which the climate 
change problems must be solved.  Addressing climate change requires a fundamental 
change in economic production that will address negative impacts on human rights, 
while ensuring development and the progressive realization of economic, social and 
cultural rights. Focusing on shared objectives, such as sustainable development, may 
also enable a way around the problem of scope of membership of different treaties.   
Per VCLT Article 30(4), as between two parties who are parties to the same set 
of agreements, an earlier treaty only applies to the extent that its provisions are 
compatible with the later treaty.  While addressing a relatively narrow set of 
circumstances, the VCLT envisions some divergence of interpretation as to obligations 
between specific member states.  The consensual divergence of interpretation suggests 
that there is no blanket restriction on the application of Article 31(3)(c) only to 
circumstances where all member states are parties to an agreement.  In particular, the 
examination of whether there is incompatibility will require the application of all 
elements of Article 31.   
Article 30(2) VCLT also provides guidance on how to relate to other treaties 
on the same subject matter.  It notes that: “When a treaty specifies that it is subject to, 
or that it is not to be considered as incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty, the 
provisions of that other treaty prevail.” In this context, there is an obligation on the part 
of a forum to seek out those other treaties and regimes that may state such facts and 
may influence the applicability of the existing treaty as to the specific parties in a dispute.  
Arguably, where a treaty’s jurisdiction and competency reaches out to matters also 
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covered by other agreements, this constitutes the “same subject matter” for the 
purposes of establishing an Article 30 conflict.1263   
By focusing on a congruence of shared objectives between the treaties and the 
governing bodies, we can seek entry of the objectives of another agreement through 
VCLT Article 31(1), “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light 
of its object and purpose” (my emphasis).  Thus, despite the fact that a party may not 
be a member of another treaty, where the treaty makes reference to another agreement 
or shares its objectives, the party should be the subject of attempts to integrate and to 
select among methods of achieving those goals that that still enable the achievement in 
both agreements of the shared objective.  In this sense, they can be mutually limiting 
and supportive. 
Going forward, an agreement regarding the role of an agreement to which 
another party is not a member would still be effective regarding non-parties because it 
would be a commitment that they have expressly agreed to in another forum.1264  Article 
35 of the VCLT would apply, as the State’s agreement would be considered to have 
agreed to be bound, in a specific manner, in writing.  Interestingly, Article 35 does not 
require that this be done through accession or treaty amendment but through some 
form of agreed decision, thus enabling COP decisions, and perhaps decisions of other 
governing bodies, to have effect.  Such an agreement would also apply as an agreement 
between the parties to a treaty under Article 31(3)(b) on the interpretation of a treaty or 
the application of its provisions. 
Another way to look at the shared objectives is to look at specific shared 
provisions aimed at technology transfer.  In the TRIPS Agreement (Articles 7 and 66.2), 
in the ICESCR (Article 15(1)(b)) and in the UNFCCC (Article 4.5) there are shared 
provisions that emphasize the promotion of transfer of technology to developing 
countries as an important aim of the agreement.  Thus, in addition to shared objectives, 
there are shared provisions that outline a particular methodology for achieving the goals 
i.e. technology transfer that goes beyond the protection of IP and requires some action 
by developed country governments.  The effect of a systemic integration approach 
would be to ensure that all these provisions are made operative.  A UNFCCC 
technology transfer mechanism that may affect IP rights and might be challenged on the 
basis of the TRIPS Agreement may find shelter under the principle of ensuring 
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effectiveness under both the UNFCCC and TRIPS Agreement.  Consideration of the 
jointly shared objectives will have to take into account that such methods were 
envisaged within the TRIPS Agreement in referring to technology transfer and that 
UNFCCC parties were aware and knowledgeable about the scope and meaning of such 
provisions when constructing a mechanism under the UNFCCC. 
Finally, while the foregoing discussion focuses on the way that a shared 
objective analysis would enable international trade fora to better identify the outside law 
to apply to the interpretation of WTO Agreements, it is important to note that the 
analysis flows in the other direction as well.  To the extent that economic fora share 
similar objectives and shared provisions, the objectives and relevant provisions of that 
agreement would be treated as applicable law in the environmental and human rights 
regime.  While this may pose some danger, given that international trade law has already 
had a significant chilling effect on multilateral environmental policy-making, it may be 
appropriate to have that occur within a predictable and equitable framework, in which 
both fora are recognized to have shared competencies. 
 
IV.2. Competencies 
One of the key lessons to be learned from the TRIPS Agreement and public 
health debate is that economic policy, especially IP policy, is not separate from other key 
policy areas.  Economic policy is integral to the development and achievement of issues 
like food security, health, and, in this case, technology transfer for climate change.  
Patent protections and transactions form part of the set of policy tools provided within 
IP frameworks i.e. the broad panoply from patent pools, open source approaches, utility 
models, etc.  No one would suggest that policies on food security, health or technology 
transfer be left only to WIPO or to the WTO.  The competence of WIPO in IP is 
extensive, but it is also limited by lack of internal expertise and knowledge regarding the 
various subject areas that its work affects.  Likewise, the same applies to member state 
participation and rule-making at the WTO.  Therefore, the argument that separate 
organizations should limit themselves to the areas of work where they have mandate 
and competence is no longer viable when faced by challenges of broad scope, such as 
climate change.  Thus, one of the ways in which systemic integration is to be 
operationalized, in this context, is for organizations to integrate their programmes and 
work together.  This can be referred to as the “competencies approach.” 
A first step in ensuring systemic integration under the competencies approach 
is to identify linkages between fora that require that they be linked and address the same 
issues.  Recognition of that linkage is crucial.  There may in fact be gradations of 
linkages, for example, the link between IP policy and child labor may be more tenuous 
than the link between IP and public health.  In the broader context of IP, other fora 
who should be involved and who have competence related to IP and its relationship to 
other issues include: the UN Economic and Social Council and the Commission on 
Science and Technology for Development; the International Labour Organization 
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(through Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 
Independent States); the Food and Agricultural Organization and the International 
Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture; United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; the Convention on Biological 
Diversity; the World Health Organization;  the United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; the WTO and 
TRIPS; the Human Rights Council; the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights; and finally, the UNFCCC.1265 
The argument for the institutional competencies approach is also supported by 
the role that the WTO has played in IP policy-making.  IP is not a natural fit with a 
system intended to remove barriers to trade and the movement of goods.  IP is 
specifically aimed at restricting the movement of knowledge.  The WTO was able to 
make an argument for including IP by arguing that there are crucial ‘trade-related’ 
aspects of IP that it had to deal with.  That same argument can therefore be applied by 
other fora, such as the UNFCCC, with far more justification.1266  
The competencies approach also has another strong argument in its favor.  
The issue of how IP can ensure global welfare cannot be addressed in a single forum 
because no one organization has the mandate to ensure global welfare.  However, some 
organizations may have a broader mandate that approaches ensuring global welfare, 
such as the UNFCCC, in addressing climate change.  These types of organizations 
would be obligated to take on these issues and to engage other institutions in norm-
setting processes to ensure that there is systemic integration.  The increasing tension in 
this regard is due to the fact that such large issues have been left to organizations with 
limited mandates.1267  
Unfortunately, this may encourage institutions to engage in fields where they 
have little experience or perhaps even an active antipathy.  For example, institutions 
such as the World Bank, the WTO and others have not refrained from becoming 
involved with subject matter tangentially related to their regimes, with which they have 
little or no competence.  In that sense, such institutions are already addressing human 
rights and environmental standards and rules within their systems.  The danger that 
exists is that they have not recognized the need for also applying the international law 
related to that subject matter or their own lack of knowledge in that field.  It has to be 
recognized that there is a need to apply other international law and that there is a lack of 
in-house knowledge within a particular fora.  The recognition reasonably suggests the 
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need to interact with the decision makers who have more expertise in the relevant 
applicable law. 
The competencies approach to systemic integration is also attractive because, 
before decisions are made to codify one particular approach over another, the approach 
allows for ongoing dialogue and innovation 1268 , in multiple fora.  Therefore, this 
suggests that each venue should fully engage in the attempt to integrate with other 
venues, while simultaneously bringing each actor’s skills and viewpoint to the problem.  
This may be another way for the regular balancing to still take on some force after the 
fact. 
In sum, fora should be far more conscious about how they intend to relate to 
other regimes and fora.  The relationships to other regimes and fora should be based on 
the principles of integration, coherence, and the achievement of shared objectives like 
sustainable development. In many ways, the fragmentation of international law arises 
from the mistaken assumption of many regimes that their silence on how they should 
relate to other regimes will protect them from interference from other regimes.  The 
increasing interlinkages created by the expansion and diversification of international law 
have put that illusion to rest.  The only option available is active engagement.  It is the 
terms of that engagement that this chapter has tried to elucidate for technology transfer 
to address climate change.  The first lesson of the ILC report is that regimes and fora 
need to be far more aware of the areas of subject matter which impact their mandates, 
and upon which their mandates impact.  This chapter has tried to provide some 
methodologies for accomplishing that in this specific case.   
The second lesson is that regimes and fora need to be as clear as possible, 
without necessarily detailing every aspect, on the nature of the relationship between 
their norms and other relevant norms.  This author believes that the systemic integration 
concept put forward by the ILC presents the best chance for doing so in a manner that 
maintains the integrity of each regime while engaging in respectful and innovative 
dialogue with other regimes that have shared objectives. The freedom that the climate 
change regime has to fashion its relationship with other fora is important because it is a 
rare opportunity due to the scope and scale of the challenge that is to be faced within 
the next few decades. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
 While the discussion above provides a way for the UNFCCC to take up action 
to address technology transfer for climate change and to take on IP issues specifically 
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with the systemic integration framework, there still remain significant difficulties where 
TRIPS cannot find a way to justify otherwise non-conforming measures in the public 
interest, especially for an important norms such as climate mitigation and adaptation.  
However, part of the problem arises from the internal structure of the UNFCCC itself.  
The fact that developing country obligations are conditional mean that they have no 
justification in the UNFCCC text for taking actions to unilaterally ensure technology 
transfer.  In order to create a conflict and the need for systemic integration and to justify 
non-conforming measures, it may be necessary for developing countries to take on 
measurable, reportable and verifiable quantified emissions reduction obligations 
commensurate with their historical responsibility and capacity.  They should not, 
however, give up the conditionality.  In this case, developing countries would agree to 
such obligations and build in countermeasures if developed countries fail to deliver on 
technology transfer.  They would reserve the right to take unilateral measures to enforce 
technology transfer, where the developed countries failed to meet certain negotiated 
benchmarks for technology transfer and financial support.  This would create a more 
powerful dynamic for developing countries whose obligations to reduce emissions 
would then either be fulfilled through provision of support or through unilateral 
measures; either way they would be fulfilled.  Such an approach requires a small but 
significant shift in developing country tactics at the UNFCCC but may lead to more 
productive outcomes for them and for climate change more generally.  Innovative 
solutions are needed now in the climate negotiations, ones that are focused on 
circumventing old patterns of debate on technology transfer and seek to harness the 
market power of intellectual property to enhance technology transfer in combination 
with the institutional strength and convening power of the UNFCCC. Chapter 9 
proposes a portfolio of solutions that as a whole may go some way to increasing 
opportunities for technology transfer to developing countries overall. 
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Chapter 9 
Proposals for Action 
at the UNFCCC 
 
 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the aim of this thesis was to determine the necessity 
for the UNFCCC to act to address intellectual property. That necessity was to be 
determined by two main issues: 
1. The extent to which there is evidence that intellectual property 
standards create structural impediments in the international global 
market for climate technologies that prevent them from being 
generated and disseminated at the rate (timing), scope (volume and 
scope of technologies) required and to the countries required (major 
developed countries, as intermediaries ton other developing 
countries); 
2. The extent to which the TRIPS Agreement bars or limits the use and 
effectiveness of unilateral intellectual property interventions by 
developing countries to enable adoption, adaptation and replication 
of climate mitigation and adaptation technologies. 
What does the analysis in the previous chapters allow us to conclude?  I argue 
that in many ways, developing countries are left with little but recourse to international 
institutions and their processes for norm-setting and decision-making. As noted, 
Chapter 6 finds that to a significant extent the TRIPS Agreement does act as a barrier.  
The answer to the first question is more complex and less certain.  In Chapter 2, I 
identify several parameters for measuring the necessity for the UNFCCC to act on 
intellectual property.  Thus I identify the timing by which technologies need to be 
generated and diffused into developing countries (between 2015 and 2025); the scope of 
technologies (almost all sectors but especially agriculture, energy efficiency, industry, 
buildings, transport, power generation); the most important countries (the major 
emerging economies of Brazil, China, India, South Africa).  In Chapter 3, I critically 
assess the existing literature on intellectual property and the role patterns of ownership 
and distribution play in enabling or retarding the ability to distribute technologies within 
the appropriate time frame, address the full scope of technologies and to the appropriate 
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countries. In general, the data on the distribution and existence of patent protection was 
sparse and limited and did not address the key issue of the ways in which intellectual 
property was being used or licensed. However some basic patterns, based on the limited 
information, could be discerned: 
- The mitigation technology areas studied appear to have significant variation in 
how highly patented they are, but the trend is for increasing numbers of 
patents in almost all sectors (except for fossil fuels). 
- The ownership of patents in climate change mitigation and adaptation is 
almost exclusively in the hands of OECD firms. However, there may not be 
high levels of firm concentration in terms of ownership of existing patents in 
the mitigation fields studied suggesting that licenses may be available at 
reasonable costs 
- From the patent license patterns that have been made available, there exist 
pricing concerns and concerns about geographical and other restrictions on 
licenses. Where licensing has been seen to occur, it has largely been from 
national firms or non-producing entities rather than multinational firms. 
- The majority of patenting of climate mitigation technologies occurs in 
developed countries and the emerging economies, especially China. There are 
few if any in other lower middle income and least developed countries.  
However, this means that major developing countries are not likely to be able 
to act as major exporters of technology and know-how to these countries, in 
those sectors that are highly patented. 
- The rate at which climate mitigation technologies are diffusing is very slow and 
vast majority of technology exchanges are happening between developed 
countries. Developing countries remain a small percentage on international 
technology flows, both in terms of hardware and know-how. 
More generally, we know that some sectors, agriculture and health have 
significant amounts of patenting. 
It is important to note that much of this data is preliminary and limited to a 
relatively narrow group of technologies. A policy decision can clearly not be based on 
these data alone. More will be required to establish any necessity for the UNFCCC to 
act to address intellectual property norm-setting.  Clearly national data as to licensing 
practices and experience on the ground would be the best possible evidence, especially 
when aggregated across countries, as well as data relating to FDI and trade spillovers. 
Such assessments would need to assess the pattern and existence of patents in core 
areas; the actual level of licensing and any problems related to licensing and knowledge 
sharing.  The research would assess whether the behaviour in the national market by an 
intellectual property holder of any relevant technologies limits:  
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a. Affordability - ensuring that prices of products are not set so 
high that it is too expensive for all the relevant economic actors 
to afford.  
b. Adoptability - ensuring that prices of products and or know-
how are not set so high that they make it commercially unviable 
for all relevant actors to adopt ‘climate-friendly’ technologies. 
c. Adaptability – ensuring sufficient distribution of knowledge 
(information, skills, know-how) to enable a critical number of 
existing producers/service providers in the market to adopt, 
adapt and replicate climate technologies and ensure their 
participation in the market. 
 
While such data is valuable, it is clear that where a country finds such problems, 
it would not be in a position to address the issue in as broad and effective manner as it 
could have in the pre-TRIPS era and as would be necessary to meet the climate change 
challenge. In addition, the process of ascertaining such data does not take into account 
the interventions that countries might wish to take to prevent such problems from 
arising in their market in the first place and to pro-actively restructure their market.  In 
addition, it is also clear that the existing mechanisms for delivery of technology transfer 
in the UNFCCC have been insufficient but present real potential to exert influence on 
international technology markets. 
Thus I return to the basic framing that drove this thesis: the important 
question is the contingent one. What options remain for developing countries to 
intervene in technology markets where the behaviour of intellectual property rightholder 
bars or limits the adoptability, adaptability and replicability of technologies in the 
domestic market?  The answer of this thesis is that few such effective options remain. 
This is not to say that developing countries cannot take significant steps to increase their 
basic absorptive capacity and to create appropriate enabling environments for demand 
and for technology transactions. It is simply that paths taken by countries prior to the 
advent of the TRIPS Agreement are no longer available and there exist no examples of 
how to move up the technology value chain with an initially high protection of 
intellectual property. 
What then should the UNFCCC do to address the intellectual property issue? 
The key issue is how the UNFCCC can help to move the technologies that are in the 
hands of developed country actors into the hands of developing country actors as fast as 
possible in order to enable peaking between 2015 and 2025 and building adaptive 
capacity by 2025-30.  This is fundamentally a market restructuring question.  What can 
the UNFCCC do to shift the incentives of the actors in global technology markets to 
engage in far greater amounts of technology transactions into developing countries? 
As noted in Chapter 4, provision of sufficient financial support is fundamental.   
However, as also noted in chapter 4, there is no realistic prospect of any significant 
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portion of this money being public sector funds. Instead the framework will depend on 
private sector financing and investment, requiring policy changes in developing 
countries to attract investment, primarily as FDI, but also as licensing.  That private 
sector actors will seek to limit spillovers is axiomatic, and in direct tension to the policy 
aim of encouraging such investment, which is to increase and expand technology 
spillovers.  That increasing intellectual protection (thus limiting potential imitative 
behaviour) will attract investment and exports and encourage licensing is also 
considered axiomatic but is again, in tension with the goal of increasing spillovers 
directly into the broader economy as quickly as possible, not just to one firm or to one 
wholly owned subsidiary.  As long as developing countries are acting individually to try 
to create attractive investment destinations, there will always be better, lower risk 
countries in which to invest or, as is the case with China, where the return on 
investment is so great that certain risks are worthwhile. This tension between attracting 
investment with the goal of ensuring significant spillovers into the economy at a pace 
necessary to meet the climate challenge in most developing countries that do not have 
the ‘China premium’.  Thus one of the considerations for action by the UNFCCC in this 
area, given that public funds may not be forthcoming, is to use its institutional and 
financial power to address: 
- The risk issue related to engaging in transactions in developing countries, 
identified in chapter 3 as concerns for developed country firms; 
- The aggregation problem of insufficient market power to attract investment, 
identified in chapter 3 and 4; 
- The lack of structural incentives for firms to allow and enable spillovers of 
technological know-how into the relevant economies, identified in chapter 3 
and 5; 
- The lack of absorptive capacity, skills and know in developing countries in the 
relevant technology sectors identified as an issue in chapter 3 and 4. 
These actions are very clearly non-norm setting solutions that do not address 
the issue of regulatory flexibility for developing countries to address intellectual property 
individually. However, this is not to say that the UNFCCC cannot play a significant part 
in making the remaining interventions available to developing countries more effective 
through international cooperation.  Thus, while not engaging in norm-setting the 
UNFCCC can act to increase the power of such measures by enabling joint action, 
especially between major emerging economies and other developing countries.  This is 
not to say that norm-setting is not desirable.  There is clearly a policy need to increase 
the regulatory flexibility of developing countries to address intellectual property 
problems when they arise in the domestic sphere.  However, the structural nature of the 
intellectual property problem as it relates to investment and the reliance on private 
sector investment for climate action means that enabling such unilateral actions by 
member states may be the least effective way for the UNFCCC to act, unless it also does 
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a whole suite of other things.  Any effective action to increase the regulatory freedom of 
developing countries on intellectual property will have to be on a much larger scale, in 
order to avoid this structural problem. 
   
This chapter will provide some proposals for ways in which the UNFCCC can 
act to address intellectual property within the systemic integration framework.  Before 
doing so, I discuss the key drivers and principles that frame the timing and scope of 
action by the UNFCCC.  Following that, I propose a set of UNFCCC actions to 
facilitate investment and market access for technology and know-how in developing 
countries, placing them in the context of other proposals.   
 
II. DRIVERS AND PRINCIPLES FOR FRAMING UNFCCC ACTION – UNCERTAINTY AND PEAKING 
DATES 
 
One of the limiting factors when it comes to technology policy and especially 
to intellectual property policy with respect to climate change is that there remains 
significant uncertainty surrounding long-term projections of climate change and climate 
impacts.  The farther out in time, the greater the uncertainty.  Even in the near term, 
however, some uncertainty remains, especially on the peaking dates that may be required.  
In the face of such uncertainty, caution appears to be required before making major 
changes, some argue.1269 
 
However, there is greater certainty on some of the projected changes and 
impacts and thus the necessary action in the near term leading up to about 2030.  
Climate change embodies a clear asymmetry between the relatively low cost of action in 
the present versus the potentially catastrophic cost of delaying action in the long term.  
The Stern report also points out to the inertia built into climate change: negative 
changes become increasingly difficult to reverse the longer action is delayed.1270  
 
Much of the decision on what interventions need to take place and on what 
scale depends on an assessment of the timing for peaking and necessity for radical 
innovations and inventions in the post-peaking period.  As discussed in Chapter 2, there 
is no consensus on whether staying below 2 degrees Celsius is achievable with existing 
technologies. However, there is more certainty regarding the conclusion that existing 
technologies are sufficient to address GHG emissions reductions to peak in 2015-2018, 
reduce by 80% by 2050, and to adapt by 2025-20301271 provided that there is sufficient 
                                                        
 
1269 See p12, Maskus, K “Differentiated Intellectual Property Regimes for Environmental and Climate 
Technologies”, OECD Environment Working Papers, No. 17, OECD Publishing 2010. 
1270 p292, Stern, N et al. The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007). 
1271 See p65, IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to 
the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, 
Pachauri, R.K and Reisinger, A. (eds.)]. (Geneva: IPCC, 2007). 
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distribution and diffusion of existing technologies, and the pushing of near term and 
foreseeable technologies through deployment into diffusion.  
There appears, therefore, less of a need to be concerned about the dynamic 
efficiency elements of the IP balance: there is no crucial need for a breakthrough 
technology to be created in the period to 2050 that can address mitigation.  With respect 
to adaptation, there is little question that this can be accomplished with existing or 
foreseeable technologies even in the area of neglected medicines such as dengue fever. 
In the power sector where technology choices may last the 20 – 30 year lifetime of a 
specific power plant, there is an inertia to technology selections that are not GHG 
emission-reducing. Some nevertheless argue for focusing on technology development in 
the near term due to the uncertainty of the innovation process itself1272 as well as the 
need to ensure a sufficient portfolio of technologies to be developed for the long term.  
 
However, in the post-peak period, and in the period to 2050, there may be an 
increasing need for some breakthrough innovation and in that case, the question will 
arise of how to provide the most effective incentives for rapid, breakthrough research 
and development of technologies and whether the patent system or some other 
mechanism may be best suited to achieve that.  In any case, this will require a 
strengthening of incentives for post-2050 technology research and development. 
 
Reasonable risk assessments suggest that present costs, both in terms of price, 
regulatory changes, and behavioural shifts may all be less severe if carried out more 
immediately rather than only once greater certainty about impacts is achieved.  It would 
be a case of too little too late.  In an otherwise stable economic world there is a strong 
argument for largely maintaining the status quo.  However, given the situation in which 
climate change places us i.e. a need for an unprecedented shift in the way technologies 
are generated and distributed in the near and long term, this may be precisely the time to 
review the ways in which the patent system in particular can be prodded to emphasize 
speed and scale of distribution, as well as generation of new technologies.  The Stern 
Report’s analyses on when action should be taken 1273  imply that changes to the 
international IP system that might be made in the near term would therefore be less 
drastic than would need to be the case if action were delayed.   
 
All things being equal, a carbon price should be sufficient to generate the 
technology required and push the adoption of such technologies to the necessary levels. 
This would be a strong argument for leaving the global innovation system as it is and 
simply pushing for a sufficiently high carbon price.  However, all things are not equal 
and in fact, climate change poses some unique problems that require an intervention in 
the global innovation system, regardless of the carbon price. 
                                                        
 
1272 p360, Stern, N et al. The Economics of Climate Change (2007). 
1273 p297, Id. 
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- patent protection does not seem to play as large a part in providing incentives 
for R&D of environmentally sound technologies;1274 
- the long-term challenge requires not just breakthroughs in the first generation 
but extremely rapid learning and follow-on innovation; 
- the near-term challenge requires diffusion of technologies that requires a huge 
leap in the number of transactions related to technologies both in terms of 
product sales as well as licenses. 
- Lock-in into existing technologies in key sectors such as power generation 
creates a significant problem for technology diffusion;1275 the learning curves 
are, at present quite extended and thus limit the rate and necessity for 
technology development and adoption for most market actors. 
- Many sectors, e.g. electricity generation and distribution, are not true markets 
in the sense of multiple generators and distributors of electricity, and the end 
product (electricity) cannot really be differentiated according to quality.  In that 
sense, research, development and diffusion in some sectors is not likely to 
occur without some other form of intervention. 
- In some sectors, infrastructure presents a significant barrier to entry for new 
technologies. For example, in transport (hybrids, plug in electrical vehicles) and 
in energy (electricity), the only customer for infrastructure innovations is 
largely the government, as existing incumbents that depend on existing 
infrastructure are unlikely to invest in R&D which can only serve to assist their 
competitors.1276 Technologies that have network effects, those that would be 
best able to enable sector-wide changes are precisely those in which under-
investment is likely by private sector actors unless they can capture the value of 
those network effects for themselves. 
Nevertheless, there may be some division of labour that can be envisioned. 
Government policy can focus on research and development while deployment and 
diffusion is carried out by the private sector.  Basic technologies could either be 
disseminated into the public domain and then picked up and turned into innovations by 
the private sector, or such innovations could be developed with government funding 
and then transferred to private sector holders to engage in transactions. Whether 
governments retain any ownership in the intellectual property so generated is one of the 
policy options open to governments in managing the challenge of diffusion. 
 
One of the things to note in considering the scale of action is that, while IP 
systems, and the patent system in particular are useful for generating inventive, largely 
                                                        
 
1274 p17, Maskus, K “Differentiated Intellectual Property Regimes for Environmental and Climate 
Technologies”, OECD Environment Working Papers, No. 17, OECD Publishing 2010. 
1275 p352, Stern, N et al. The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007). 
1276 p355, Id. 
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incremental products and processes, the system is not necessarily ideal for generating 
the kinds of broad and radical innovations that can impact on several branches of the 
economy, or even have economy-wide restructuring effects e.g. the internet.1277 Patents, 
for example, are particularly useful for enabling market actors to differentiate 
themselves by products, rather than along quality alone. In that sense, innovation is a 
by-product of the competitive process in a competitive market.  This shifts the focus 
from radical innovations to largely incremental innovations that either confer a 
competitive advantage due to process and production efficiency or a competitive 
advantage due to greater product effectiveness for end-consumers.  In this view, 
innovation is an iterative process with firms continuously innovating to achieve product 
differentiation and taking advantage of the lead time provided by market exclusivity, 
until other firms have learned and caught up and are able to exploit the technology once 
the term of protection has expired.  In some cases, the innovation can be sufficiently 
large and market defining that the innovator achieves windfall advantages for the period 
of protection by being able to define a whole new product category over which they 
have exclusive control.  While not entirely desirable, such a possibility is the natural 
outcome of a system that provides the possibility of such extensive exclusivity. 
Only in rare cases is innovative activity the primary market activity of a firm 
and the primary method of product differentiation available.  In mature markets, with 
multiple actors, and in which learning and production capacity is evenly distributed and 
costs of absorbing and implementing new innovations are fairly low, the ability to fully 
capture the benefits of exclusivity arising from an innovation become increasingly 
important.  In newer markets, with high barriers to entry, exclusivity is less important 
than lead-time and the ability to define the product market.  
Radical economy wide restructuring innovations are more likely to arise from 
research and development carried out at the level of basic science which is not directly 
linked to a specific production processes.  Most private sector market actors cannot 
justify the levels of investment in research required to achieve such breakthroughs.1278  
Governments step in to provide funding for such basic research. In the US, the 
government funded 31% of national R&D in 2009 and 53% of basic research.1279 Over 
14% of R&D was performed by academic institutions.1280 
Public funding de-links the production of radical innovations from the need to 
ensure return on investment for private sector actors that exclusivity provides.  This 
means that price may no longer need to be the basis for recouping R&D costs in some 
                                                        
 
1277 Also suggested by p348, Id. 
1278 See p4, Lee, B et al. “Who owns our Low Carbon Future: Intellectual Property and Energy 
Technologies” Chatham House, September 2009. 
1279 See p4.4, National Science Board Science and Engineering Indicators 2012 (Arlington VA: National 
Science Foundation 2012). 
1280 Id. 
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sectors. Intellectual property protection may not be the overriding factor in encouraging 
the kind of breakthrough innovations necessary to address climate change in the post-
2050 period meaning that limiting the exclusivity available may be less of a concern.  
This suggests that interventions and policies to enable those interventions should be 
weighed more toward diffusion in developing countries rather than using market 
mechanisms to encourage R&D by developing country firms.  Public R&D may be 
more suitable for developing countries and this can enable partnerships with developing 
country public and academic institutions that also carry out R&D. The developing 
country institutions could be allowed licenses for the purposes of carrying out proof of 
concept and demonstration of adapted technologies, including those that are new and 
inventive but largely those that are new to the industry and new to the firm.  Immediate 
involvement in early basic R&D even for the most advanced emerging economies may 
not be appropriate, except in proof of concept and demonstration. 
In the absence of proactive policies, insufficient technology transfer will take 
place under existing international market conditions.  Fear of losing control over 
intellectual property rights by private actors, as well as the fact that IP rights can lead to 
prices above the socially optimal (competitive) level, means that technology 
development and diffusion to address climate change, at the required pace and at the 
required scale, is unlikely to happen without significant interventions.1281  While many of 
the policies that developing countries wish to pursue are available as a legal matter, they 
are not available at sufficient scale and scope to achieve the kind of sector-wide effect 
required to address climate change, even when operating in the aggregate.1282   This 
limiting effect is a deliberate rather than accidental outcome of the TRIPS Agreement 
which aimed to reduce state interventions against rightholders to a relatively small set of 
cases on the margins and to limit the use of tools best suited to enabling industrial 
policy level measures.   
There are basic problems of governance endemic in many developing 
countries, related to lack of capacity as well as corruption and insufficient regulatory 
oversight.1283  While many of these problems may be susceptible to policy changes in the 
short term, others, such as lack of governance capacity and investment climate are going 
to have to be addressed in the longer term.  This suggests that urgent near term action 
should focus on simple interventions that provide clear rules and signals to private 
sector actors to carry out their activities rather than on developing country governments 
to act and intervene by themselves.  This is especially crucial for opening up and 
                                                        
 
1281 See p16, Hoekman, B, K E Maskus, and K Saggi, "Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries: 
Unilateral and Multilateral Policy Options" World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3332. June 1, 
2004. 
1282 See Chapter 6. 
1283 p438, Stern, N. et al. The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007). 
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increasing access to existing technologies in the 2015 – 2018 timeframe for mitigation, 
and for adaptation, by 2025.1284 
Chapter 2 and 3 showed that while the emerging economies are best placed to 
participate in and benefit from knowledge transfer, and may even have the capacity to 
pay market prices, there is a significant concern related to anti-competitive activities, 
including refusals to license and restrictive terms.  Smaller developing countries and 
LDCs suffer from not being served by technology product or knowledge distribution 
channels. They present neither interesting nor capable markets for technology 
development and deployment under present market conditions, despite having almost 
uniformly increased their levels of IP protection since the TRIPS Agreement was signed.  
Cooperation between major emerging economies and other developing countries, 
especially LDCs must be a cornerstone of IP –related action at the UNFCCC. In parallel 
to this, UNFCCC action has to address the competitiveness concerns of firms and 
actors in developed countries, at least in the near term.  In the long term it is inevitable 
that there will develop new market entrants and competitors in developing countries 
who will compete with firms in developed countries.  They will have entered the market 
by benefiting from the knowledge and information created to a significant extent by 
firms in developed countries.  It may be appropriate to consider ways in which market 
segmentation may be employed in order to address some of the competitiveness 
concerns.  However, it should be noted that, within the climate framework such 
competitiveness concerns can never be fully addressed, as the final outcome of the 
climate change process is precisely aimed at creating competitive market actors in 
mitigation and adaptation technologies in developing countries. 
Any proposed solutions by the UNFCCC must address the issue of the scale 
and scope of existing market measures; and the need for enabling industrial policy 
measures related to intellectual property.  The first part requires the UNFCCC to take a 
significant role in facilitating transactions, reducing transaction costs and expanding 
markets. Such policy interventions should be addressed at:  
- decreasing transaction costs of developing country buyers in accessing the 
international knowledge market; 
- decreasing the transaction costs of international rightholders when making 
their knowledge and technologies available to developing country actors, 
especially in emerging economies; 
- reducing the cost of acquiring technological knowledge; 
- reducing the cost of absorbing existing technologies; 
- increasing capacity and incentives for domestic innovation;1285 
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- encouraging and enabling trade in products and knowledge between emerging 
economies and other developing countries, especially LDCs; 
- focusing on the needs of the most vulnerable countries. 
 
Proposals to address intellectual property issues at the UNFCCC also need to 
take into account the existing framework of institutions. As discussed in Chapter 4, the 
UNFCCC has several institutional bodies with the potential to be useful vehicles for 
ramping up the scale of technology transfer to developing countries.  These include the 
Green Climate Fund, the CDM and other new market mechanisms that will come out 
of the planned 2015 agreement; the Technology Mechanism, comprising the 
Technology Executive Committee, the Climate Technology Center & Network.  
However, the ways in which each of these operate will clearly have to take into account 
and address several key weaknesses identified in chapter 4: 
- the need for measurable, reportable and verifiable indicators of technology 
transfer; 
- clarity on the kinds of activities that are eligible for financial support; 
- acting at the scope and rate required to move existing technologies into 
developing countries to enable peaking in time. 
 
It is difficult to determine the exact scope of action required at the UNFCCC. 
As discussed in Chapter 2 and 3, it will have to embody a portfolio approach, 
sufficiently broad to address all relevant technology sectors, with a broad range of 
measures.  It will have to avoid being overly prescriptive in order to give enough room 
to private sector actors to exercise their own economic judgment. At the same time it 
has to work at a large enough scale that it can shift the structure of market incentives so 
that private sector actors are sufficiently comfortable providing technology and allowing 
sufficient scale of spillovers, formal and informal, to firms in developing countries.  It 
will also have to enable a shift towards relatively frictionless transactions for technology. 
That complexity means that a multistakeholder process is likely to be needed in order to 
fully elaborate the framework for action at the UNFCCC.  However, it may be 
appropriate to provide an illustration of what such a suite of actions should look like, 
encompassing a response to each of the issues identified in chapters 2, 3, 4 and 6 of this 
thesis. With that in mind the next section provides an illustrative suite of proposals for 
action by the UNFCCC. 
III. AN ILLUSTRATIVE PORTFOLIO OF PROPOSALS FOR ACTION AT THE UNFCCC1286 
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As discussed in chapter 8, a key step to enable the UNFCCC to address 
technology transfer and intellectual property will be to rely on proactively avoiding 
recognized conflict conditions.  This means solutions that do not require establishing 
new IP norms or UNFCCC norms.  In particular, many can be seen as detailing and 
implementing already ongoing commitments under the UNFCCC and other 
international agreements.  These actions by the UNFCCC, if implemented as a whole, 
are aimed at using the financial and institutional power of the UNFCCC mechanisms, 
and the platform provided by the Technology Executive Committee (TEC), Technology 
Advisory Board and Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTC&N).   
 
III.1. Market access, Encouraging FDI and Licensing 
A key set of recommendations relate to investment and licensing in terms of 
enabling distribution of products as well as for products produced by specific processes.   
This can be envisioned as a two way flow: moving technological products into LDCs 
and other countries with little or no manufacturing capacity; and encouraging location 
of manufacturing and other activities such as R&D in LDCs to encourage skills training 
and transfer of know-how to institutions and firms in developing countries.  The aim 
would be to use the leverage of financing by the UNFCCC, largely through the Green 
Climate Fund and with the assistance of the CTC&N, to provide an incentive for 
developing country and developed country firms to participate. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, emerging economies are the countries in which 
there may be clearest evidence of significant patenting of clean technologies. 1287  
However, they are also the most likely developing countries to be able to afford to pay 
reasonable market rates for licensing of technologies.  The problems that they face are 
ones of accessing licenses for existing technologies from potential competitors in 
developed countries thus dealing with such issues as refusals to license, above market 
rates for technology or restrictive licensing practices, especially for best available 
technologies which present the cutting edge and may be a competitive advantage in 
developed country markets.  They also urgently want to participate in new and 
innovative research on climate technology and generate leading companies that are IP 
holders themselves.   
The means to addressing the issues they face largely lie in using existing tools 
in the international IP system. They may be assisted by easier and more transparent 
licensing platforms and markets. In terms of participating in new technologies, these 
countries would be happy to see more joint research and development projects, both 
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co-funded and multilaterally funded. In a sense, it is the creation of a transparent and 
equal playing field for licensing of technologies that is their most urgent need as they 
generally have sufficient domestic production capacity.  
However, they are the countries from which LDCs and other developing 
countries tend to purchase low cost technology products, especially China and India, 
and these may be increasingly unable to provide such products if they are unable to 
access licenses for technologies that allow them to export to other developing countries.  
China, Brazil and India tend to be best placed to provide low cost mitigation and 
adaptation technologies to other developing countries because their companies are 
better placed and more willing to establish production centres and distribution systems 
in economies that are less interesting, or too risky for companies from developed 
countries.  The analysis from chapter 3 shows that: 
- The potential for South-South technology flows is large but there is a danger 
of replicating the lack of capacity building, training and know-how transfer 
between major emerging economies and other developing countries; 
- Building sufficient domestic absorptive capacity is a necessary condition for 
enabling adoption, adaptation and replication of technologies; 
- access to export markets is a crucial driver for the adoption of best available 
technologies by domestic producers in emerging economies; 
- developed country firms are less inclined to make best available technologies 
available in emerging economies due to market share and competition 
concerns in their home markets and in emerging economy markets; 
- with respect to products, parallel importation and market segmentation may be 
useful ways to address some of the competitiveness concerns of developed 
country firms; 
The approach to licensing would seek terms on licenses to firms in developing 
countries that would allow export to other developing countries but limit them to 
developed countries.  Proposals for doing this in the case of pharmaceuticals have been 
made1288 and even implemented within the compulsory license for export system set up 
the by the Article 31bis amendment to the TRIPS Agreement. That system allows 
countries to issue compulsory licenses for production of patented medicines for export 
to LDCs and other countries without domestic manufacturing capacity.  Other 
variations come under the umbrella of voluntary ‘humanitarian’ licensing, where 
                                                        
 
1288 See e.g. Moon et al. “A win-win solution?: A critical analysis of tiered pricing to improve access to 
medicines in developing countries” 7 Globalization and Health 39 (2011).  
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developed country actors provide free access to their IP for actors in developing 
countries, with conditions. These approaches were pioneered in the realm of health 
where ease of manufacture by generics made such segmentation easy and have been 
implemented in projects such as the Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative.1289 
The approach I propose would not be based on a compulsory license system 
but on an incentive system that would encourage the use of model licenses with market 
segmentation provisions in return for access to financing.  The licenses would also 
address the knowledge transfer into other developing countries by firms in emerging 
economies. This would be primarily aimed at encouraging knowledge based FDI in least 
developed and developing countries by firms from any other UNFCCC party. The 
incentive in the license would be that export of products to developed country markets 
would be possible.  
The model licenses are targeted at two groups. The first is at emerging 
economy firms who may need incentives to take on licenses with such restrictions and 
to encourage them to focus on LDCs and other developing countries as prime markets 
and launch pads for their products.  It also removes the LDCs and smaller developing 
countries from the arena of competition between emerging economy firms and 
developed country firms. To the extent that emerging economy firms wish to have 
access to developed country markets they can compete on the international global field 
directly, or they can go through LDCs.  This allows for LDCs to benefit both from the 
employment and technology transfer from emerging economies but to also benefit from 
the market access into developed economies.  While many already enjoy significant tariff 
free access for their goods into developed economies under various preferential regimes 
(e.g. the Everything But Arms initiative of the European Union)1290 these do not extend 
to IP protected goods or goods produced by an IP protected process, and many are 
bound by restrictive standards on rules of origin that limit the ability of firms from other 
countries to use their location in LDCs to also benefit from such access.  This proposed 
system piggy-backs on this existing framework but requires some more flexibility in 
terms of rules of origin but strict standards in terms of technology transfer and benefit 
to the LDC. 
 
Another key issue is the risk premium that exists in terms of licensing into 
developing countries.  There is evidence that a significant barrier to IP related 
transactions is uncertainty of contract enforcement and IP enforcement rather than the 
                                                        
 
1289 See p18, Abbott, F M “Innovation and Technology Transfer to Address Climate Change:  
Lessons  from  the  Global  Debate  on  Intellectual  Property  and  Public  Health”,  ICTSD’s  Programme  
on  IPRs and Sustainable Development, Issue Paper No. 24, International Centre for Trade and 
Sustainable Development, Geneva, Switzerland, 2009. 
1290 REGULATION  (EU)  No  978/2012  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT  AND  OF  THE COUNCIL of  25  
October  2012 
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strength of IP protection per se. 1291   There is a lack of predictable, stable and 
transparent environments for financial transactions, contracting, licensing, and dispute 
settlement in many developing countries, even in emerging countries. This is a problem 
for domestic as much as foreign firms. Both would benefit from taking some of these 
issues off the table. In the general investment environment, many countries have signed 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) that subject disputes related to the treaty to 
international arbitration and commit themselves to recognizing and enforcing such 
judgments.  In BITs, it is investor state dispute settlement that has raised much of the 
concerns but it is a common practice in international business transactions between 
private sector actors and something that would already be a familiar business practice, 
but now embedded in the model licenses at the UNFCCC.  Such an approach will be 
necessary to address some of the risk premium that would attach to participation in 
such licensing, and an arbitration clause, subject to a particular kind of body with 
expertise in settling technology and IP-related contractual disputes would be necessary. 
 
Of course some limiting principle in terms of scope of technology might be 
needed but not so limited as to be ineffective.  It remains important to maintain the 
flexibility of developing countries to determine their own need, individually and in the 
aggregate but the concerns of developed countries of sheer technology grabbing will 
need to be addressed.  I would propose focusing directly on technologies identified as 
needs in NAMAs, technology needs assessments and NAPAs, as discussed in Chapter 2.  
This universe of technologies, while still broad, requires states to have provided well 
thought out, justified climate reasons for including the technologies in their needs.  For 
each country or license or production, the production would be limited to its expressed 
technology needs. 
Developed countries can use the proposed mechanism as a lever to enable and 
encourage technological development in developing and least developed countries.  
They could specifically and unilaterally open their markets, by lowering their tariffs on 
environmentally sound technologies produced by developing countries, especially by 
low and middle income countries.1292  While this could be done unilaterally, the aim 
would be to leverage the funding capacity of the UNFCCC to encourage and model the 
behaviour.  The proposal is to have a COP decision or set of decisions that would 
mandate the Technology Executive Committee to do the following and embed in the 
rules of the Green Climate Fund, the following:  
1. Create a standard model license to be used by firms and institutions in 
developing country UNFCCC parties to produce technologies primarily for 
                                                        
 
1291 p22, Maskus, K E “Encouraging International Technology Transfer” ICTSD Issue Paper No. 7, May 
2004. 
1292 See p16, Hoekman, B, K E Maskus, and K Saggi, "Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries: 
Unilateral and Multilateral Policy Options" World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3332. June 1, 
2004. 
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their domestic markets and for export to LDC (or other countries with 
insufficient technological and manufacturing capacity) markets.  The license 
would explicitly exclude the export of patented products or products produced 
by a patented process into other non-LDC or non-developing country 
markets.  Recipients of funds from any UNFCCC financial mechanism who 
used such a license would be prioritized for receipt of funds and would be 
guaranteed 100% support of licensing costs, even at full commercial rates.   
o Funds for licensing of technologies covered by such a license would 
have to meet following criteria: 
 The technology/ies were identified in the TNAs or NAMAs 
of the recipient LDC markets; 
o Disputes under such a license would be subject to binding arbitration 
under a UNFCCC mechanism either established or designated by the 
TEC.1293  
 
2. Create a standard model license to allow enterprises from any UNFCCC 
party to export technological goods produced in any LDC (or other 
country with insufficient technological and manufacturing capacity) into any 
other UNFCCC party (including other developing countries) where the 
products or process producing such products is IP protected; provided that: 
o The technology/ies were identified in the TNAs or NAMAs of the 
host LDC markets; 
o Production of the technology and/or application of the process for 
production is carried out in facilities located within the territory of an 
LDC and is committed to do so for at least 10 years; 
o At least 30% of personnel involved each year in production are local 
citizens;  
o Production involves capacity building, education, information 
transfer, training of local personnel, and use of local content.   
o At least one sub-license is granted (at grant or concessional rates) for 
use of the technology for production and/or adaptation primarily for 
the domestic market of the LDC (or other country with insufficient 
technological and manufacturing capacity); 
o Recipients of any UNFCCC Financial mechanism who used such a 
license would be prioritized for receipt of funds and would be 
guaranteed 100% support of licensing costs, even at full commercial 
rates.   
o Disputes under such a license would be subject to binding arbitration 
under a UNFCCC mechanism either established or designated by the 
TEC.  
                                                        
 
1293 For more detail on the binding arbitration mechanism see Section B.3 
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o The same conditions shall be required to be used for any technologies 
further developed and patented under such a license. 
 
3. For those LDCs (or other country with insufficient technological and 
manufacturing capacity) where a specific technology product or process is not 
IP protected, UNFCCC parties should commit to allow import into other 
UNFCCC countries of that technological product (or products produced 
by that process) made in LDCs (or other countries with insufficient 
technological and manufacturing capacity), provided that: 
o The technology/ies were identified in the TNAs or NAMAs of the 
recipient LDC markets; 
o Production of the technology and/or application of the process for 
production is carried out in facilities located within the territory of an 
LDC (or other country with insufficient technological and 
manufacturing capacity),  and is committed to do so for at least 5 
years; 
o At least 30% of personnel involved each year in production are local 
citizens;  
o Production involves capacity building, education, information 
transfer, training of local personnel,  
o Local content (by value added) provided by domestic firms makes up 
4% in the first year, 8% in the second, 12, in the third, 16% in the 
fourth and 20% in the final year. 
o Recipients of any UNFCCC Financial mechanism (including 
multilateral and bilateral funds) who carried out such production 
would be prioritized for receipt of funds.  
o Determination of compliance with these conditions would be subject 
to binding arbitration (between the complaining importing state and 
the firm concerned) under a UNFCCC mechanism either established 
or designated by the TEC.  
 
It is important when considering investment issues that the CDM is essentially 
an investment regime, with very specific structures for rewarding FDI that successfully 
meets certain performance standards. It embodies the very concept of performance 
requirements that has largely been anathema in the broader international investment 
framework.  As noted in chapter 4, bilateral investment treaties have generally 
prohibited performance, technology transfer and local content requirements.  In 
addition, as discussed in chapter 4, the CDM has not been a very successful vehicle at 
meeting even its main performance requirement i.e. truly additional GHG emissions 
reductions, and has not been successful at meeting the implied sustainable development 
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and technology transfer requirements.  Most of the proposals around reforming the 
CDM and its relationship to technology transfer relate to both the issue of embedding 
technology transfer more tightly into the assessment of the DNA and the certification 
process.1294  In part this has been to avoid stepping on the freedom that developing 
countries have insisted upon in defining for themselves what they would consider the 
sustainable development criteria that they would use for approving CDM projects 
through their designated national authority.  I would argue that if they are seriously 
concerned about technology transfer, developing countries should be willing to have at 
least a technology transfer requirement in the registration and validation of CDM 
projects.  This would address the ways in which countries have historically used FDI to 
encourage spillovers within the context of a system that also created a strong incentive 
for firms from developed countries to participate by rewarding them with emissions 
reduction credits.  This would of course be premised on there being a strong incentive 
under the CDM or other future market mechanism for developed country firms to 
participate due to a high price for credits in developed country markets. 
With respect to the CDM or reformed CDM, this would be a specialized 
investment regime governing how performance requirements for technology transfer 
and local content would apply within the framework of sustainable development and 
technology transfer.  It may have to be explicitly excepted from the restrictions of the 
Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Investment Measures (TRIMS Agreement)1295 
which prohibits, under Article 2 on national treatment, the following: 
- Requirements for local purchase or content of goods; 
- Discriminatory export performance or requirements. 
Even without such an agreement excepting such measures, such actions may 
nevertheless be justified under GATT Article XX exceptions (see Article 3 TRIMS), and 
for developing countries under GATT Article XVIII (see Article 4 TRIMS).  GATT 
Article XVIII governs in particular the process for withdrawal of concessions for the 
purposes of ensuring the development of domestic industries as well as addressing 
balance of payment issues, which is particularly well-suited as a justification for 
investment-related measures such as these in the specific arena of technology transfer 
for climate change. 
                                                        
 
1294 Teng,  F et al., “Possible  development  of  a technology clean development mechanism in a post-2012 
regime” Discussion paper  08-24,  Harvard  Projection  International  Climate  Agreements,  Cambridge, 
MA, November 2008. 
1295 Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Investment measures (“TRIMS Agreement”) Annex 1A to  the 
Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement), Marrakesh, 15 April 
1994, in force 1 January 1995, 1867 United Nations Treaty Series (1995) 4. 
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To the extent that many countries have signed bilateral investment treaties, it 
may be appropriate to consider suspending or withdrawing from obligations on 
performance, local content, technology transfer and other requirements. In order for the 
CDM to enable the best technology transfer and spillovers while not being overly 
prescriptive, a Kyoto protocol MOP decision should state that in the context of 
emissions trading and the CDM, CDM project host countries are free to establish 
the performance and other requirements, as a condition for approving CDM 
projects. In a sense the requirements of additionality for CDM project approval already 
constitute such a requirement. This would ensure that the DNA can refuse to provide 
domestic certification unless certain minimum requirements have been met such as, for 
example; 
- Local participation of domestic firms in supply chains; 
- Joint venture or local equity in the investment itself; 
- Technology transfer relating to products, skills and know-how, data and 
information, including licenses, 
- R&D requirements. 
In addition to using the CDM to truly impose performance requirements on 
technology related investments, thus encouraging spillovers into the host market, a 
further incentive could be provided through a system that would issue some kind of 
emissions reduction credit bonus for projects that carried out high quality technology 
transfer. Thus basic hardware technology transfer would be built into the basic issuance 
of credits but on top of that, some percentage would be received for training in 
operation and maintenance, even more in exchange for transfer that resulted in the 
ability or capacity to adapt the technology; and the most for training and providing 
capacity to replicate the technology. That last could be embodied in a production license 
that also provided know-how. Such proposals seek to create an added incentive to 
transfer technology by providing emission credits for certain technology transfer 
outcomes such as enabling localization, adaptation and replication.  There remain details 
to be worked out especially those that present some accounting difficulties in terms of 
not over-producing certified emissions reduction credits.1296 
                                                        
 
1296 See p16, de Sepibus, J “Reforming the Clean Development Mechanism to accelerate Technology 
Transfer” Working Paper No 2009/42, NCCR Trade Regulation, Swiss National Centre of Competence in 
Research, November 2009. 
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 Ghana proposed such a technology crediting mechanism within the CDM in a 
2009 submission to the AWGLCA.1297  It put forward a mechanism whereby a separate 
system of Environmentally Sound Technology Rewards (ESTRs) would be created, 
which would be tradable and which could be used for off-setting, and for meeting MRV 
and emissions obligations. The extent of the rewards would be linked to how much the 
project contributed to meeting technology needs, expressed in a country’s Technology 
Needs Assessment.  My proposal keeps the crediting within the CDM acknowledging 
that technology transfer normally takes place within a broader business project rather 
than a separate technology transaction. 
Thus I would propose: 
1. Regarding the CDM and its successor mechanism, the TEC should 
recommend technology requirements in the CDM or future market 
mechanism specifically transfer of know-how, skills, information and licenses, 
for: 
 Validation/Verification of projects for the CDM or whatever future 
CDM-like market mechanism exists in the post-Kyoto framework; 
 Registration/Issuance of credits under the CDM or whatever future 
CDM-like market mechanism exists in the post-Kyoto framework, 
requiring best available technologies.  
In this scenario, an operational definition of technology transfer would be used 
that required more than delivery of hardware but at a minimum training in operation 
and maintenance of the technology. A capped but fixed percentage of credits issued per 
project could be benchmarked to the extent that the following criteria were addressed:   
 Transfer of Physical Capital and Goods ((outside of the firm or wholly 
owned subsidiary) including, but not limited to: specialized equipment; goods 
embodying or incorporating the relevant technology or idea.  This largely 
entails financing for purchase of such goods.  
 Transfer of Skills and Know How (outside of the firm or wholly owned 
subsidiary) including, but not limited to: licensing or assistance with the 
purchase of proprietary knowledge, provision of technical and manual skills 
training; scientific and academic training; training and technical advice and 
assistance, necessary to maintain, operate, adapt and reproduce a viable system 
or technology. This would include scientific and educational exchanges, 
workshops, field education, funding, training and capacity building all along the 
                                                        
 
1297 See p97, UNFCCC “Ideas and proposals on the elements contained in paragraph 1 of the Bali Action 
Plan: Submissions from Parties-Part 1” Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under 
the Convention, Sixth session , Bonn, 12 June 2009. 
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research chain: - research, development, demonstration, deployment, and 
commercialization. This is largely aimed at ensuring learning – acquisition and 
application of know how leading to an understanding of the principles of why 
the technology works and building the capacity to adapt and replicate it. 
 Transfer of Information and Data ((outside of the firm or wholly owned 
subsidiary), including but not limited to: manuals; designs; blueprints; 
operating instructions; scientific and technical publications and reports.  This 
would include greater access to scientific and technical information, patent 
office publications and data.  This is embodied in the formal documents and 
detail of patent information, licenses, as well as information to learn how to 
operate, adapt and replicate the technology. This is meant to provide a durable 
basis for building on and being able to adapt the technology. 
 Transfer of ability to adapt and improve the technology including, but not 
limited to: no limitations on production and export under licenses for domestic 
use or export to other developing countries; no restrictions on improvement 
and ownership of improvement of the technology; establishment of R&D 
facilities in the country in which the project is placed; creation of joint R&D 
project or projects.   
 
In terms of dispute settlement, the creation of a mechanism for binding arbitration will 
be necessary and possibly made applicable for all transactions relating to IP and 
contracting using funds from the UNFCCC and for issuance of credits. 
 
1. The TEC should authorize, designate or create an Arbitration Mechanism to 
address contractual or intellectual property licensing problems that arise in the 
context of any legal dispute related to projects or programmes funded by any 
UNFCCC Financial Mechanism.  Receipt of funds from any UNFCCC 
financial mechanism and use of such in any contract using, accepting or in any 
way transferring intellectual property, should be contingent on acceptance of a 
mandatory, binding arbitration clause in the funding contract and in the 
contract between the funding recipient and the technology provider (subject to 
the participants’ choice of law in each contract and the designated countries’ 
systems for recognition of mandatory arbitration terms).  All UNFCCC 
countries would agree to implement such decisions, subject only to the 
constitutional requirements of domestic law. Decisions of the Arbitration 
mechanism would be appealable to the Advisory Board of the Technology 
Mechanism, which would review and only reverse such decisions by a two 
thirds majority of the voting members. 
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 It may be appropriate to designate existing mechanisms with 
sufficient expertise such as the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation 
Center1298, provided that specific criteria are met such as: 
o Exclusion of arbitrators with conflicts of interest; 
o Inclusion of arbitrators with specific experience in 
environmental technologies; 
o Procedural transparency, acceptance of interventions by 
third party stakeholders and publication of arbitration 
decisions in all cases involving public bodies, 
governments, and quasi-public bodies such as state-
owned enterprises, research institutes, and sovereign 
wealth funds; 
o A flat fee rate for any UNFCCC-related cases. 
 
III.2. Reducing barriers to transactions 
A significant part of the problem for technology transfer for climate change 
relates to the nature and scale of transactions for both products and knowledge. In 
Chapter 3, several of the studies pointed out that rates of diffusion were too slow for 
the technology sectors studied.  One of the contributions that the UNFCCC can make 
is to provide standardized, centralized and trustworthy mechanisms for negotiating and 
carrying out such transactions.   A crucial part of this will be providing transparency, 
certainty, predictability, and conflict resolution. The basic aim is to deal with the issue of 
lack of information that limits the ability of commercial actors to properly evaluate 
available technologies, available partners and available projects. While the CDM 
provides a venue for some of this, the structure does not lend itself to encouraging a 
volume of arms-length transactions related to technologies.  Enabling such a resource 
and platform is crucial to scaling up market based activity related to technology 
transactions.1299  What also needs to be taken into account however is the need for 
addressing the deficit related to directly operating in developing country markets relating 
to: 
- Enforcement of intellectual property 
- Enforcement of contracts 
- Reliability as to financial and managerial capacity of partners 
- Information as to each countries rules on technology export and import 
- Advisory services for such transactions related to contract structure 
- Contracting and dispute settlement 
                                                        
 
1298 See http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/ 
1299 See p10, Egenhofer, C et al. “Low-Carbon Technologies in the Post-Bali Period: Accelerating their 
Development and Deployment” European Climate Platform, report No. 4, December 2007 
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This is particularly crucial for the SMEs who are the vast majority of individual 
economic actors that have to be reached in developing countries and in whom a 
significant portion of technology is held in developed countries. 1300  The aim is to 
provide a way to speed up transactions and provide a one-stop shop that works to 
address several concerns at once and create a market that may not be subject to the 
vagaries of domestic variations in contracting and legal protection while providing 
standard licensing terms.  This means creating platforms for conducting business that 
provide services beyond basic matchmaking and provide methodologies for assessing 
trustworthiness, reputation,  and capacity.  In particular, such a platform could be a 
useful advisory service for identifying and advising on import-export rules on products 
and sales for different countries.  
Cannady is sceptical of what she calls “grand” plans although she 
acknowledges the usefulness of coordinating and facilitating transactions in some 
fashion. 1301  She notes precedents for providing access to packages of technology 
involving patents, know-how and training, such as the Public Intellectual Property 
Resource for Agriculture (PIPRA). This approach is also reflected in suggestion for 
standard licensing of Green Technology Packages 1302  and suggestions that the 
administration and handling of these could be carried out through the CTC&N.1303 
More generally, as many such licensing platforms and online licensing aggregation 
mechanisms have folded in the past decade, there are clearly limitations to what such 
platforms can and cannot do.  Cannady suggests that more than standard terms and 
contracts what is needed are advisory services to help developing country firms 
negotiate licensing contracts or training and capacity building in carrying out such 
negotiations.1304  Given the mandate of the CTC&N, such advisory services may be well 
within its capacity and mission even in the first few years of operation.  Cannady focuses 
on mechanisms for increasing the bargaining power of developing countries and 
developing country firms in licensing negotiations and technology transactions as key to 
succeeding in technology transfer.1305 Again, there seems to be no reason that these 
tasks could not be embedded in a platform. 
Such exchanges make the process of identifying licensees, technologies on 
offer and carrying out negotiations and pricing much easier and simpler, including 
                                                        
 
1300 See p2932, Schneider, M et al. “Understanding the CDM’s contribution to technology transfer” 36 
Energy Policy 2930 (2008). 
1301 See p12, Cannady, C “Access to Climate Change Technology by Developing Countries: A Practical 
Strategy, ICTSD’s Programme on IPRs and Sustainable Development, Issue Paper No. 25, International 
Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Geneva, Switzerland (2009). 
1302 See p13, Id. 
1303 See p14, Consilvio, M “The Role of Patents  in the International Framework of  Clean Technology 
Transfer: A  Discussion  of Barriers and Solutions”  3 Intell. Prop. Brief 10 (2011). 
1304 See p13, Cannady, C “Access to Climate Change Technology by Developing Countries”  
1305 See p23, Id. 
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standard licensing.  They are particularly useful for those institutions and firms that are 
primarily engaged in manufacturing and for whom licensing is not a central activity. The 
opportunity costs related to negotiating, and licensing out are much reduced in such an 
exchange for such actors who may not be willing to put significant resources into 
licensing activity.  The exchanges may also be very useful for weakly resourced 
institutions and actors, such as university technology transfer offices.  
 
  A pilot version of such an exchange for environmentally sound technologies 
was Green Xchange, established in 2009 as a collaboration of Creative commons and 
several firms. (http://www.greenxchange.cc/), which implemented a patent commons 
approach first pioneered by Creative commons in the copyright arena and extended now 
to the field of patents. Green Xchange offered four kinds of standard licenses: Intellectual 
capital which provided free and open access to all for any purposes; Research Non-exempt, 
which is limited to free access for non-profits for non-commercial research purposes 
only1306; Standard which provided a royalty free license for exploitation for commercial 
purposes; and Standard PLUS which required some payments and could contain other 
restrictions.  Assessment of the project suggests that it never expanded much beyond 
the primary provider of the initial patents, Nike, and that the business model was never 
able to overcome issues related to existing IP management practices in firms who 
primarily viewed IP as a strategic blocking tool.1307  The Xchange was never able to 
build up a critical mass of patents and also found that users were primarily interested 
not just in the patent but in the associated know-how requiring further building up of 
relationships and value-added service that the exchange was not in a position to 
provide.1308  In addition, while the focus on open innovation was laudable, it made it 
difficult to make a business case to firms that they should place their patents into the 
Xchange. This may have made the Xchange more of a CSR exercise for many 
companies rather than a new business opportunity. In this case of this proposal, the 
presence of the CTC&N, in combination with the exchange, as well as access to 
financing and a critical mass due to the worldwide scale of the exchange would go a long 
way to addressing some of the challenges encountered by the Green Xchange approach.   
 
The importance of putting together technology packages and having sufficient 
internal financial support and funding to hire people with sufficient expertise to do so is 
crucial.  Patent holders would also have to be willing to have their patents included in 
such packages rather than licensed separately.  Such an approach requires an active 
technology transfer manager both in the providing institution and in the platform, who 
would actively identify market opportunities, work with rightholders to create 
agreements to pool their technologies and to make them available as packages on the 
                                                        
 
1306 Patenting for non-commercial purposes is also allowed. 
1307 See p5, Ghafele, R and R D O’Brien “Open innovation for Sustainability: Lessons from  the 
GreenXchange Experience” Policy Brief No. 13, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable 
Development, Geneva, Switzerland, June 2012. 
1308 Id. 
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platform.  This is why, to a significant extent, there is overlap between this proposal and 
proposals for pooling of patents. In the case of the platform, such pooling would have 
to take place voluntarily, potentially increasing the transaction costs for the platform 
itself, but perhaps increasing the likelihood of remuneration for licenses by provider 
firms.  
The way to address the creation of technology packages may be the 
establishment of global voluntary patent pools although these have generally been 
proposed as a tool for providing cheaper, easier or free access to technologies for 
developing country firms.1309   Global voluntary patent pools consist of rightholders 
placing technologies in exchange pools where rightholders are able to access each 
other’s technologies, the know-how, and the capacity building to make the most 
effective use these other technologies.   There are several weaknesses to traditional 
global patent pools and I am more sceptical of these than authors such as Maskus.1310  
Pools are only as effective as their memberships, their content, and the licensing 
structure that they create.1311  The first concern would be to ensure that the pool was 
open to all relevant actors and did not unduly exclude firms from developing countries.   
Where the establishment of these is voluntary, it may be possible to rely on market 
forces to best identify the stakeholders. Where these are government structured or 
mandated, the difficulty lies in designing a system that would be seen as fair by both 
insiders and outsiders.  In both cases, significant concerns arise about anti-competitive 
effects.  A patent pool is most efficient where it brings together sets of different, 
complementary technologies that in the aggregate provide a package which allows the 
manufacture of a product.  One example could be the smartphone market.1312 Many 
patents from many different partners on different aspects of the technology are 
necessary for the product to be created and it is more efficient to allow all participants 
to pool their patents, allowing easy or cheap access for all participants to the package. 
However, where the pool charges higher prices to outsiders for accessing the technology 
than to its own members, this creates a barrier to entry in the product market. Thus 
incumbents may be unduly protected. Where the pool consists not just of 
                                                        
 
1309 See p59, Lee, B et al. “Who owns our Low Carbon Future: Intellectual Property and Energy 
Technologies” Chatham House, September 2009. See also Abbott, F M “Innovation and Technology 
Transfer to Address Climate Change: Lessons  from  the  Global  Debate  on  Intellectual  Property  and  
Public  Health”,  ICTSD’s  Programme  on  IPRs and Sustainable Development, Issue Paper No. 24, 
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Geneva, Switzerland, 2009. 
1310 See p27, Maskus, K “Differentiated Intellectual Property Regimes for Environmental and Climate 
Technologies”, OECD Environment Working Papers, No. 17, OECD Publishing 2010. As is Cannady, C 
“Access to Climate Change Technology by Developing Countries: A Practical Strategy, ICTSD’s Programme 
on IPRs and Sustainable Development, Issue Paper No. 25, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable 
Development, Geneva, Switzerland (2009). 
1311 Cannady, C “Access to Climate Change Technology by Developing Countries: A Practical Strategy, 
ICTSD’s Programme on IPRs and Sustainable Development, Issue Paper No. 25, International Centre for 
Trade and Sustainable Development, Geneva, Switzerland (2009). 
1312 See e.g. the Sisvel LTE Patent Pool, available at: http://www.sisvel.com/index.php/lte. (last visited 15 
August 2014).  
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complementary technologies which may be linked in some network, but of companies 
with similar technologies and patents, the anti-competitive concerns are that much 
larger as this allows the firms to not just prevent market entry into the product market 
but allows them to collude to charge a joint higher price in the licensing market. Thus 
where these licensors might have competed on price and terms they can now present 
the same, likely higher costs and terms to non-pool members.   
What is problematic is that much of what people envision pools achieving in 
the realm of climate technology is the pooling of similar technologies allowing firms to 
more efficiently research and improve each other’s technologies.1313  Such patent pools 
seem to be viewed as tools for accessing technologies for firms in developing countries 
but where these firms are not able to provide sufficiently valuable patents to the pool, 
there will be no market incentive to include them in the pool. 1314   In either case, 
voluntary pools outside of an exchange pose too much of a danger in competitive terms 
in that they are likely to exclude developing country firms, and they are unlikely to allow 
competitors to share technologies. Where the package of patents offered by the pool 
contains non-essential patents but the pool uses the leverage to require purchase of 
these as part of the package, this also creates significant problems for the market. 
One iteration of the pool idea is the Marshall Plan-type, country level pool 
proposed by Ajemian and Reid. 1315  Based on the successful support to Japan and 
Europe in the post-World War II period, they argue that climate change presents just as 
large a security issue and that such a pool would be an appropriate model of 
organization between four main countries: the US, Japan, China and the European 
Union.  All the countries would pool and not compete on climate technology. The pool 
would pay or insure against losses, the IP owned by their private sectors for the material 
that they placed in the pool and these would be licensed at similar low costs or freely, 
among the members of the pool. Primarily as a China directed mechanism, this 
approach asks the involved countries to reframe their competitive relationship around 
clean technology and cooperate on a scale unprecedented since the Marshall Plan.  The 
basis is that even where China may not be an equal partner, it still would have IP to 
contribute to the pool, something which may become increasingly true but may not be 
entirely the case at the moment.  It is not clear whether standard licenses are envisaged, 
whether some kind of market segmentation is considered or what would be done about 
subsequent innovations based on technology licensed from the pool.  It is also not clear 
                                                        
 
1313 See e.g. p59, Lee, B et al. “Who owns our Low Carbon Future: Intellectual Property and Energy 
Technologies” Chatham House, September 2009. 
1314 See p10, Cannady, C “Access to Climate Change Technology by Developing Countries: A Practical 
Strategy, ICTSD’s Programme on IPRs and Sustainable Development, Issue Paper No. 25, International 
Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Geneva, Switzerland (2009). 
1315 Ajemian, C and D Reid “Preventing Global Warming: The United States, China, and Intellectual 
Property” 115 Business and Society Review 417 (2010)  
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how they would envision outside countries’ role in accessing or using the technology in 
the pool, or whether they contemplate some mechanism for participation.   
 It is important to consider the kind of problems that pools are meant to solve.  
If the issue is one where production of a technological good is blocked because of 
patent thickets and high transaction costs, voluntary or even publicly backed pools can 
be useful tools. They can provide a one stop shop for all participants in the product 
market.   If the issue is to try to solve the issue of such things as refusals to license, or 
reluctance to share technology and knowledge, voluntary pools are not likely to change 
the behaviour of those firms who see the patent primarily as a tool for creating room to 
operate and prevent market entry, unless they can use the pool to exclude new market 
entrants.  As noted, given the gaps in ownership in patenting between firms in 
developed and developing countries, cross-licensing within a pool creates little incentive 
for the inclusion of firms in developing countries without valuable IP.  They would 
most likely end up as outsiders to the pool.  In designing around this, what is actually 
being created is the concept of a repository, from which stakeholders can pick and 
choose which technologies they wish to license, at a flat rate. Given the variation in the 
utility and value of different patents, such a repository is unlikely to be able to provide a 
flat rate and each patent will have to be priced differently.  This effectively then 
becomes a publicly run IP licensing platform rather than a pool per se.  The idea of 
aggregation is correct but the label of a “patent pool” and the understanding of the 
limits of what it can accomplish are sometimes missing from recommendations to pool 
patents, enable cross-licensing and provide low cost access.  Thus an IP Platform or 
exchange would have to build in an incentive for participants to first place their patents 
on the exchange and then allow them to be placed in packages. Pricing is also a serious 
challenge and firms that placed their technologies would have to indicate a priori what 
prices they would like to charge (either in absolute numbers or as percentages of gross 
income) when licensed individually or as part of a package. In order to be licensed 
within a package rightholder may have to lower their price in order to ensure that the 
package does not become prohibitively expensive. A significant amount of control may 
have to be relinquished to the platform manager in such cases, which may also present a 
problem.   
Approaches such as these are aimed at providing a way to speed up 
transactions and provide a one-stop shop that works to address several concerns at once 
and create a market that may not be subject to the vagaries of domestic variations in 
contracting and legal protection while providing standard licensing terms.  As such it 
may be better for any proposal to focus purely on facilitation, including allowing a space 
for rightholders to self-select if they want to combine and create packages.  What would 
then be required is transparency about all the technologies, the firms, the goods, the 
prices all in a trusted venue.  The main task of the platform would be a venue for 
enabling transactions rather than managing transactions.  It would ensure processes for 
registration for firms that would entail background checks and creditworthiness checks 
among other things. 
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As such I propose that: 
1. The TEC should authorize/designate/create an intellectual property 
exchange/licensing platform specifically for climate change mitigation and 
adaptation technologies. Such an exchange/platform would enable secure, 
efficient and transparent arms-length transactions for intellectual property 
licensing at a one-stop shop, with the weight and authority of the UNFCCC 
behind it.  It may be appropriate for the TEC and/or CTC&N to select one or 
more existing exchanges in an open and competitive process provided that the 
exchange that is finally selected meets basic criteria such as: 
 Providing a low flat nominal fee for those posting assets or seeking to 
access licenses; 
 Providing security and reliability for financial transactions; 
 Providing secure, speedy and predictable dispute settlement; 
 Enabling special licensing arrangements for LDCs. 
 
2. In parallel, The TEC should authorize/designate/ create a B2B platform for 
commercial transactions related to climate change mitigation and 
adaptation goods and services specifically targeted at projects and 
programmes funded by UNFCCC financial mechanisms that leverages the 
information and categorization achieved by TT:CLEAR and its affiliated 
databases to allow easy access to publicly available technologies in particular. 
Such a platform would enable global, transparent offers for sale and offers for 
purchasing of technological goods and services on a web-based platform and 
enable secure, efficient arms-length transactions without long protracted 
negotiation processes.  Registration requirements and placing of financial 
bonds for participation could reduce transaction risks for sellers and buyers, as 
would processes for reputational ranking.  Such a platform should: 
 Enable optimal searching; input window self-selection and reliable 
and secure financial transactions, especially suited to government 
procurement departments in developing countries; 
 Enable standard simple contracting terms, billing, purchase orders, 
sales and delivery tracking, and expedited dispute resolution through 
a mandatory arbitration process provided by the platform. 
It may be appropriate for the TEC to select, through an open tender process 
for the development, implementation and running of such a platform that 
would be funded by a basic fee for participation charged to private 
stakeholders. The CTC&N may be an appropriate host for the B2B platform. 
 
III.3 Enabling Joint Research & Development, Demonstration and Deployment 
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Collaborative research and development (R&D) is seen by many as a way to 
circumvent IP-related issues by engaging in joint research in structures that provide for 
sharing of IP.1316 Thus joint cross-border R&D will ensure that all involved parties have 
ownership.  Studies have shown that investment in R&D has a significant impact on 
technology productivity and capacity building and can be a powerful tool in enabling not 
just deployment but capacity to adopt and adapt technologies to local needs.1317   
One of the key advantages of these forms of collaborative R&D structures is 
that they address two key market failures that have the potential to bedevil climate 
technologies. The first is the difficulty in getting private sector investment into 
innovation where the benefits of such innovation are imperfectly captured by the 
innovator.1318  In fact, such imperfect capture is a desirable outcome in the climate arena, 
given the need for rapid dissemination. This makes resource pooling measures, 
supported by public financing much more likely to be effective in moving private sector 
actors to carry out research that they otherwise would not. The second is the costs of 
adopting technology for first movers, especially where such technologies have network 
externalities1319 as in power generation, water, transport, agriculture and buildings.  
In looking for models, several scholars have looked at the CGIAR model of 
sector-specific directed research groups. Milford made a proposal for a Consultative 
Group on Climate Innovation in 2007 based on the CGIAR model.1320 This model 
allows pooling of resources by governments rather than creating competing research 
programs. Joint R&D and Demonstration platforms have been suggested by others as a 
way to address especially problems related to the commercialization, and uptake of 
climate technologies. 1321   Correa presents the most thorough analysis of the 
opportunities and limits of the CGIAR. The argument from supporters is that the 
model presents a collaborative R&D model for generating and disseminating public 
goods.1322 The CGIAR was the successful driver behind the Green Revolution that saw 
                                                        
 
1316 See p59, Lee, B et al. “Who owns our Low Carbon Future: Intellectual Property and Energy 
Technologies” Chatham House, September 2009. See also p110, Ockwell, D  et al. “UK-India Collaboration 
to Identify the Barriers to the Transfer of Low Carbon Technology-Final report” (London: the Department 
of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, U.K., 2007). 
1317 See p8, Hoekman, B, K E Maskus, and K Saggi, "Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries: 
Unilateral and Multilateral Policy Options" World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3332. June 1, 
2004. 
1318 See p338, De Coninck et al. “International technology-oriented agreements to address climate 
change” 36 Energy Policy 335 (2008). 
1319 Id. 
1320 Milford, L “Consultative Group on Climate Innovation: A Proposed Complementary Technology Track 
for the Post-2012 Period” Clean Energy Group, paper presented at Road to Copenhagen 2009-
Conference on Leadership, Sustainable Development and Climate Change, 23 November 2007, Brussels, 
Belgium. 
1321 See p61, Lee, B et al. “Who owns our Low Carbon Future: Intellectual Property and Energy 
Technologies” Chatham House, September 2009. 
1322 See Correa, C “Fostering the Development and Diffusion of Technologies for Climate Change: Lessons 
from the CGIAR Model” Policy Brief 6, ICTSD Programme on IPRs and Sustainable Development, 
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introduction of high yield varieties in South East Asia and Africa. The CGIAR is an 
association of thematically or sectorally specific research centers, that cooperate, share 
information, cooperate on joint projects and each one presents a research platform for 
coordinating research on a specific set of issues (maize, rice, wheat).  The centres 
purposefully did not assert intellectual property rights to products so as to ensure the 
greatest dissemination and uptake of products.  In addition, given that the funding for 
the research was public, the need for addressing the risk premium associated with 
frontier research was non-existent. In addition, the end-use community of farmers could 
access the products directly for the most part without an additional intermediary to turn 
the research into products. 
The structure of the model remains appealing but it remains to be seen 
whether the type of research and relationship to end user communities is replicated in 
other technology areas related to climate. Within the UNFCCC structure, the CGIAR 
may play a role as the platform for agricultural research and development, 
demonstration and deployment of mitigation and adaptation technologies. As Correa 
points out, the farther away from basic scientific research, the more difficulties in 
establishing sustainable collaboration structures, especially if private sector actors wish 
to have a significant ownership role of research products for commercialization.1323 A 
key lesson that Correa points to is the diffusion oriented structure of the CGIAR 
platform, including the use of social science research to ensure acceptability and 
affordability of its research products, and using that to guide the kind of products they 
researched.1324 
The structure and success of R&D approaches to dealing with the technology 
transfer and IP issue of course depends on the kind of R&D required.  Again, where 
this concerns new technologies and related basic research, IP issues tend to be much 
more easily managed, and in any case, tend to have a more public character. However, 
where difficulties arise is in the demonstration and deployment phase, the so-called 
                                                                                                                                   
 
December 2009 and p66, Correa, C “Mechanisms for International Cooperation in Research and 
Development in the  Area of Climate Change”  in Soni, P et al. Technological Cooperation and Climate 
Change Issues and Perspectives Working papers presented at the Ministry of Environment and  Forests, 
Government of India - UNDP Consultation on  Technology Cooperation for Addressing Climate Change, 
23-24 September, 2011;  New Delhi, India. 
1323 See p66, Correa, C “Mechanisms for International Cooperation in Research and Development in the   
Area of Climate Change”  in Soni, P. et al. Technological Cooperation and Climate Change Issues and 
Perspectives Working papers presented at the Ministry of Environment and  Forests, Government of 
India - UNDP Consultation on  Technology Cooperation for Addressing Climate Change, 23-24 September, 
2011;  New Delhi, India. 
1324 Correa, C “Fostering the Development and Diffusion of Technologies for Climate Change: Lessons 
from the CGIAR Model” Policy Brief 6, ICTSD Programme on IPRs and Sustainable Development, 
December 2009. 
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“valley of death” prevalent even in developed countries.1325 Most of the technologies 
needed in developing countries relate to commercial or near commercial technologies. 
This requires cooperation in learning and adapting technologies to local needs.  As such, 
adaptation of technologies may form an ideal platform for collaboration1326 provided 
that the resultant solution is available to all participants equally and does not provide an 
unfair competitive advantage to any particular participant.  It may even present a real 
opportunity for cross-border sectoral cooperation between developing countries. The 
key issue is what structure could there be for carrying out such cooperation that did not 
rely on establishing new multilateral or bilateral mechanisms.  Looking sectorally and 
using existing institutions may be the right approach, but at least within the UNFCCC, 
this is a role that the CTC&N seems to have within its mandate, with the potential to 
provide funding for those smaller countries that cannot afford to participate. There 
would also be a way to re-direct existing research funds to those areas of more interest 
to developing countries e.g. adaptation, mitigation in agriculture and energy efficiency in 
industry and buildings.   
Providing equal access to R&D subsidies and fund to firms from developing 
countries is a crucial way to encourage technology transfer. Since the expiration of the 
provisions in the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM 
Agreement)1327  on non-actionable subsidies on 31 December 19991328 , research and 
development subsidies fall within the category of ‘actionable’ subsidies, as do 
environmental subsidies more generally.  Thus, discriminatory R&D subsidy regimes by 
developed countries may be subject to WTO dispute settlement if they do not meet the 
standards in Articles, 1, 2 and 5 of the SCM Agreement. However, it may be better to 
address such issues with prior commitments to provide access negotiated at the 
UNFCCC. This could include specific access to such subsidies for developing countries 
as part of meeting obligations under TRIPS Article 66.2 and more generally TRIPS 
Article 7.  The use of tax benefits for R&D could be extended to R&D carried out in 
developing countries, especially for LDCs. 
The IEA Technology Implementing Agreements (TIAs) may be an appropriate 
way in which to address the need for increasing international R&D collaboration in 
energy related mitigation.  These TIAs serve as vehicles for directed collaboration, with 
defined roadmaps and research and development goals in which countries participate 
                                                        
 
1325 CAP “Breaking Through on Technology: Overcoming the barriers to the development and wide 
deployment of low-carbon technology” Center for American Progress and Global Climate Network, July 
2009. 
1326 See p52 Correa, C “Mechanisms for International Cooperation in Research and Development in the   
Area of Climate Change” 
1327 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) Annex 1A to  the Marrakesh Agreement 
establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement), Marrakesh, 15 April 1994, in force 1 
January 1995, 1867 United Nations Treaty Series (1995) 4. 
1328 See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/scm_e/subs_e.htm 
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voluntarily, and which may include both IEA member and non-member countries as 
well as associated parties from industry and academia.1329   
A key component of many of these TIAs is that they envision either a cost-
sharing framework, with a contribution from each participating party or a task sharing 
framework, in which each party takes on a task and pays the costs of that itself within its 
own national framework.1330 It is not clear whether this is the main cause for the limited 
participation of developing country parties or private sector actors from developing 
countries in these TIAs, but a survey of the membership of all forty current TIAs shows 
a very low participation of developing countries.  In addition, the issue of intellectual 
property is structured in such as fashion as to assure rightholders that any IP that they 
make available as part of the project will not be disclosed or transferred to others.1331  
What is done with the information and possibly patentable improvements that may 
occur as a result of the collaborations is also unclear.  A major problem is that the TIAs 
focus almost exclusively on information sharing arrangements such as workshops and 
platforms or collecting and describing best practices but rarely involve carrying out 
proof of concept or demonstration projects. 1332  They also do not seem to involve 
additional funding for their activities as they rely largely on existing national budgets.1333 
 If the IEA aims to become a useful venue for enhancing R&D collaboration it will need 
to: 
- Find a financing structure that appeals to participation of developing countries, 
by perhaps applying for GCF funds to enable participation; 
- Have clarity on the IP sharing of technologies brought in and those developed 
under the TIAs; 
- Focus on tangible cooperation regarding proof of concept, demonstration and 
adaptation of technologies to specific conditions and markets. 
If we take to heart the argument that the primary need in developing countries 
is for technologies that are either new to the domestic industry or new to the domestic 
                                                        
 
1329 p3, IEA, “IEA Implementing Agreements: Background and Framework as of 2003” IEA Paris, 2003.  
1330 p5, p11, Id. 
1331 p6, IEA, Id. 
1332 See p113, Ockwell, D et al. “UK-India Collaboration to Identify the Barriers to the Transfer of Low 
Carbon Technology-Final report” (London: the Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, U.K., 
2007). 
1333 See p343, De Coninck et al. “International technology-oriented agreements to address climate 
change” 36 Energy Policy 335 (2008). 
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firm, but not necessarily inventive1334, then the focus should be on dissemination of 
existing technologies in the near term.  Collaborative frontier R&D will be useful for 
avoiding IP problems once developing countries have built up sufficient domestic 
capacity to compete on the global market in these sectors and this may already be true in 
some sectors such as wind and solar PV. Thus joint R&D per se is best suited for the 
post-2030 technological landscape and not a panacea for the short term problems of 
access to advanced technological but already commercialized products and processes.  
As discussed in Chapter 3, what is needed is demonstration and adaptation of 
commercialized or near commercialization technologies to market and environmental 
factors in developing countries.  The TIAs may be better suited to creating the 
breakthrough technologies of the future post-2030, but less well-suited to enabling work 
directed at near-term demonstration and deployment of already commercialized or near 
commercialized technologies.  
There is also a need in both developed and developing countries for a clear 
policy focus on ensuring that publicly funded technologies are made available at grant or 
concessional rates on a non-exclusive basis to firms and institutions in developing 
countries.  As discussed in chapter 3, the choice to engage in large scale transfer of IP to 
the private sector may lead to increased patenting of climate technologies, as R&D 
funding increases. In the absence of concerted action and policy to retain and work 
collaboratively with developing countries this has the potential to increase the 
technology gap rather than close it.  Developed countries do have the legislative and 
policy capacity to retain rights in such publicly funded technologies precisely for the 
purposes envisioned for technology transfer, as can be seen for example, in the US 
licenses provided National Institutes of Health.1335 Such a policy change would require 
that funding agencies maintain ownership or retain non-exclusive licenses, with the 
option of sub-licensing on a non-exclusive basis and geographically limited to 
developing countries, on a grant or concessional basis.  
Looking at the experience of the Montreal Protocol’s Multilateral Fund with 
public technologies, Andersen et al. also point out that a significant number of 
technologies had been cooperatively developed and delivered to the public without 
restriction.1336  This suggest that collaborative R&D can be effective in disseminating 
technology where the result are made freely available rather than turned into proprietary 
information. As long as there is sufficient demand for mitigation and climate solutions 
there will be competition to turn the research into products and processes in the market. 
                                                        
 
1334 See p16, Ockwell, D et al. “Enhancing Developing Country Access to Eco-Innovation: The Case of 
Technology Transfer and Climate Change in a Post-2012 Policy Framework”, OECD Environment Working 
Papers, No. 12, OECD Publishing 2010 
1335 See NIH “Model Non-profit License Agreement for NTDs, HIV, TB and Malaria Technologies” Available 
at: http://www.ott.nih.gov/non-profit-license-agreement-summary (last visited 15 August 2014) 
1336 See p66-67, Andersen, S et al. Technology Transfer for the Ozone Layer: Lessons for Climate Change 
(London: Earthscan 2007) 
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  One weakness of the Multilateral Fund was the decision to refuse to fund 
what was considered experimental research and development of indigenous technology. 
To the extent that it created a disincentive for countries to engage in research and 
development to enable domestic production in the face of refusals to license, this caused 
a serious barrier for some countries (India and Korea).1337 The UNFCCC will need to 
adopt a different policy as the need to create domestic producers of these technologies 
is crucial to the success of the technology transfer to address climate change.  
Understanding that this will not always be the case, joint R&D will nevertheless need to 
focus on developing countries engaging in R&D of already commercialized or near 
commercialization technologies.  However, the calculus is different for the major 
emerging economies who may have both the capacity and the interest to engage in 
frontier R&D.  
As discussed in chapter 3, the R&D capacity for the majority of developing 
countries remains very low.  Joint R&D collaborations cannot just focus on research 
outcomes but also on providing deliberate and structured training, education and 
capacity building.  The UNFCCC also needs to leverage its institutional and financial 
power to retain some power of how and what it licenses and focus its work on 
demonstration and deployment, allowing the bulk of breakthrough research to take 
place in the IEA and other fora.  
With these issues in mind, I propose that: 
1. The TEC should require that all R&D projects funded by any UNFCCC 
financial mechanism (or that wishes to be credited under MRV rules) 
establishes joint intellectual property rights for the UNFCCC, through 
the TEC and/or CTC&N as its authorized representative, and that the TEC 
and/or CTC&N shall not require permission from other joint rightholders to 
sub-license the technology (at grant or concessional rates and terms, with 
proceeds shared jointly with other rightholders) to enterprises and institutions 
located in LDCs (or other countries with insufficient technological and 
manufacturing capacity) provided that: 
o the enterprise or institution is located within the territory of an LDC 
(or other country with insufficient technological and manufacturing 
capacity), and is committed to carry out activities related to 
adaptation, demonstration and deployment of commercialized, or 
near commercialization technologies in the country for at least 5 
years; 
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o the enterprise or institution carries out capacity building, education, 
information transfer, training of local personnel relating to the 
licensed technology. 
2. As a condition of receiving funds, all R&D, demonstration and deployment 
projects with a funding component from any UNFCCC Financial Mechanism, 
must involve at least one public research institution from an LDC and, at the 
very least, intellectual property rights in technologies and knowledge developed 
under the research project or programme so funded must be vested jointly in 
that public institution. 
3. Developed country parties should commit to giving preference for any publicly 
funded research collaborations on climate technology to those that include 
participation by public and/or academic institutions from developing 
countries.  This would, for example, require that the EU Horizon 2020 
research funding framework program give preference to projects in the climate 
mitigation and adaptation sector, to those that include public institutions from 
developing countries.   
4. UNFCCC developed country parties should commit to retaining the IP right 
or full non-exclusive licensing rights to publicly funded technologies and 
commit to license or sub-license technologies developed using public funds to 
firms and institutions in developing countries (or to the CTC&N and related 
joint R&D platforms) on non-exclusive grant or concessional terms. It may be 
appropriate to limit these licenses to domestic use and for export of products 
(or products produced by protected processes) only to other developing 
countries.  
 
III.4. Increasing the effectiveness of existing UNFCCC mechanisms 
There are some key existing issues that the UNFCCC can clarify that can go a 
long way to providing further certainty for member states and firms in those states.  
Most important is the issue of funding and the measuring, reporting and verifying of 
support for technology transfer. To the extent that it is unclear what kinds of activities 
the UNFCCC would fund, this creates significant uncertainty, as in the case of whether 
or not the Green Climate Fund will fund purchases of licenses and acquisition of 
patents.   
I argue that the following should be priorities in the near term. 
1. The TEC should make clear in its rules and regulations, including for those 
that establish the relationship between the TEC and the CTC&N, and the 
TEC and the Green Climate Fund, that the effect of the provisions of Article 
 385 
 
4.1c, 4.3, 4.5, and 4.7 requires the UNFCCC to provide support for, and 
include within the definition of ‘incremental costs’,: 
 Purchases of products embodying the best available technologies in 
the context of projects and programmes funded by all recognized 
financial mechanisms of the UNFCCC; 
 Purchases of licenses (at full cost, or concessional rates) for best 
available technologies in the context of projects and programmes 
funded by all recognized financial mechanisms of the UNFCCC, 
especially in the context of activities undertaken by the CTC&N. 
This recommendation would need to be implemented in the finalization of the 
rules for operationalization of the CTC&N and the Green Climate Fund, and included 
as an implementation mandate for the GEF, in its role as a financial mechanism of the 
Convention.  
2. In terms of addressing the information gap regarding the status of technologies 
identified in TNAs and NAMAs, the TEC needs to revisit the guidelines for 
conducting TNAs and constructing NAMAs and ensure that countries doing 
so engage in the following, and are provided funding, for that purpose: 
a. A domestic patent landscaping of the technologies identified as 
priority needs in their technology needs assessment or NAMAs – 
including identification of the rightholders, or assignees; 
b. A survey of domestic firms of licensing practices (costs and terms) 
related to the technologies identified in the TNAs and NAMAs. 
In order to also address a key missing element of MRV, which, as discussed in 
chapter 4, has been a major bone of contention between UNFCCC parties, it is 
important for developed countries to provide accurate and comparable information of 
the delivery of their obligations under the UNFCCC. 
The TEC should set standards for measuring, reporting and verification 
(MRV) of technology transfer by Annex 1 and emerging economies.1338 These should be 
used to elaborate the reporting requirements for technology support in the tabular 
template format of Table 8 in the National Communications of Annex 1 parties.1339  
                                                        
 
1338 For example the performance indicators developed for use in UNFCCC “Report on the review and 
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III.5 Increasing the effectiveness of existing flexibilities available under TRIPS 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the main remaining tool of significant effectiveness 
available to developing countries is the application of competition law to address market 
structure problems related to distribution of climate technological products and know-
how. However, as I also noted in Chapter 5, there is a significant lack of capacity in 
developing countries on competition law.  There is however an opening for multilateral 
cooperation that can be used as both a capacity building platform as well as a platform 
for cooperating to address anti-competitive behaviour related to patents.  Especially in 
the major developing economies, the capacity for using competition law is much greater 
but would be made much more effective by cooperating with developed country 
competition authorities to carry out surveillance and monitoring and to assess remedies 
that may have cross-border effects.  To that end I would propose that: 
1. The TEC should establish a Competition and Standards Multi-Stakeholder 
Platform which will operate as a TRIPS Article 40.3 consultative mechanism 
on information sharing and enforcement of anti-competitive practices and 
standard setting. This platform will work to bring relevant stakeholders 
(primarily member state competition and standards authorities) together to 
voluntarily work out, agree and implement market-based and sector-wide 
solutions to competition problems identified under TRIPS Article 40 and 
propose solutions, especially related to standard-setting in climate technologies.   
The competition authorities of developed countries should commit under this 
framework to investigate anti-competitive behaviour of their companies in developing 
countries with little or no capacity to pursue competition policy, including adequate 
remedies.1340  As discussed in Chapter 8, the importance of a clear and consciously 
chosen strategy for interacting with other regimes cannot be overstated with respect to 
the climate change regime.  Given the broad range of areas affected by climate change, 
conflicts regarding both objectives and methodologies are inevitable. 
The new UNFCCC Agreement, or the COP decisions relating to any such 
Agreement(s), will need to elaborate general interaction and savings clauses that account 
for the broad shared objectives and the specific shared provisions among the UNFCCC 
and other regimes.  These “interaction clauses” will enable the agreement to more 
comprehensively address the relationship to other regimes, and put forward a pro-active 
                                                                                                                                   
 
Doha from 26 November to  8 December 2012 - Addendum Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of 
the Parties  at its eighteenth session” FCCC /CP/2012/8/Add.3, 28 February 2013. 
1340 As suggested at p36, Maskus, K E “Encouraging International Technology Transfer” ICTSD Issue Paper 
No. 7, May 2004. 
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mode of cooperation rather than one of avoidance. 1341   In the specific case of 
technology transfer, an option may be the use of an International Declaration on 
Climate Change and Intellectual Property Rights (DCCIPR).  First mooted in the 
UNFCCC context by the Brazilian Trade Minister Celso Amorin at the Bali COP1342, 
this has been revisited several times by member states and civil society organizations, 
although the details of what it would contain remain unclear, in the climate context.  As 
with the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, it would be a soft law, 
interpretive statement regarding flexibilities and the way the use of such flexibilities 
should be treated by the interpretive organs of the WTO and other bodies. There are 
differing opinions on the usefulness of such an approach, although Khor sees it as 
providing a useful signalling function to developing and developed countries as to the 
exact boundaries of available action and flexibility.1343  Abbott expresses concerns that it 
may involve significant trade-offs for not much substantive gain for developing 
countries.1344  He does note that if such a measure is pursued it should address all 
multilateral regimes concerned, not just the WTO. 
The South Centre, in 2009, provided some suggestions for what such a 
declaration might contain:1345  
- It should be a ministerial Declaration at the WTO; 
- It should address the scope of TRIPS Article 8.2 to address anti-competitive 
behaviour, in particular interpreting the ‘consistency’ element; 
- It should ensure a differential standard for ESTs including exceptions to the 
term of patentability; 
- It should require a broader interpretation of article 30 to allow for export to 
other developing countries; 
- Interpret TRIPS article 39, to ensure that know-how necessary for public 
interest uses is allowed to be exposed; 
- Clarify the freedom to set standards to revoke patents;  
- Refrain from bringing dispute settlement for actions understood to be in 
pursuit of UNFCCC aims. 
                                                        
 
1341 See p431 Van Asselt, H et al, “Global Climate Change and the Fragmentation of International Law” 30 
Law and Policy 423 (2008). 
1342 Celso Amorin “Trade Ministers' Informal Dialogue on Climate Change - Intervention by Minister Celso 
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1343 See Khor, M “Climate Change, Technology and Intellectual Property Rights: Context and Recent 
Negotiations” Research Paper 45, South Centre, April 2012. 
1344 See Abbott, F M “Innovation and Technology Transfer to Address Climate Change: Lessons  from  the  
Global  Debate  on  Intellectual  Property  and  Public  Health”,  ICTSD’s  Programme  on  IPRs and 
Sustainable Development, Issue Paper No. 24, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable 
Development, Geneva, Switzerland, 2009. 
1345 See p25, South Centre “Accelerating Climate-Relevant Technology Innovation and Transfer to 
Developing Countries: Using Trips Flexibilities under The UNFCCC” Analytical Note, SC/IAKP/AN/ENV/1, 
SC/GGDP/AN/ENV/8, August 2009. 
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While a useful outline I believe that at least one of the provisions goes beyond 
the existing standards and actually alters the substantive content of a TRIPS standard, 
by changing the potential term.  There is no precedent for understanding that the rules 
on exceptions could be applied to the term of the patent. This also applies to the 
proposal to set absolute freedom to revoke patents. The TRIPS Agreement is not 
actually silent on this; it establishes a right to a patent except under specific 
circumstances outlined in the TRIPS Agreement and the Paris Convention. 
Generally, there is a clear need for a statement that existing international 
flexibilities on patents, plant varieties, and copyright especially relating to competition 
law, compulsory licensing, exceptions and limitations must be interpreted in ways 
conducive to enabling rapid and efficient uptake of technologies to address mitigation 
and adaptation.  
There are some lessons that can be learned from the experience of the Doha 
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health. One key lesson is that a discussion on the 
proposed declaration should not and is not, required to take place in the context of the 
WTO.  Abbott has argued that the economic and political power imbalance may be less 
pronounced against developing countries in the UNFCCC than in the WTO.1346  It may 
be more appropriate to seek such a declaration in the context of the broader mandate of 
the UNFCCC rather than the relatively narrow focus of the WTO’s TRIPS 
Agreement.1347 There is of course the problem that negotiating such a declaration may 
absorb a significant amount of energy without achieving a significant amount beyond an 
interpretive statement.  However, where the Doha Declaration focused on the freedom 
to operate of developing countries, the DCCIPR that I propose commits developed 
countries to refraining from taking certain kinds of actions, to committing to specific 
interpretations and applying to a much broader set of international treaties. 
The proposed DCCIPR would outline the urgency of climate change, the 
urgency of the human rights challenge, the key obligations of states to fulfil and protect 
those human rights, and the necessity for technology transfer to achieve those rights.  A 
discussed in Chapter 7, this may pose a slight problem for states that are not a party to 
the ICESCR, but language that is not explicitly based on the ICESCR may also be found.  
The proposed declaration could provide interpretive force, but only if adopted through 
a COP decision and directed to be shared with the Human Rights Council, the WIPO 
General Assembly, and the WTO General Council as well as UPOV.  Unlike Abbott, I 
do not believe that a joint sitting of the decision-making bodies of all the relevant bodies 
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1347 Id. 
 389 
 
would be appropriate, or manageable1348, but I do recognize his point that an explicit 
relationship must be established between the DCCIPR and other venues.  As a matter 
of international law, this would require first negotiating multiple mandates in each 
forum.  It may be more appropriate to first discuss and negotiate and then propose the 
declaration or similar language be adopted within each organization according to its own 
rules and competences. 
The Declaration on Climate Change and Intellectual Property should, at a 
minimum, state that: 
 Given a peaking date of 2015-2025, All UNFCCC parties recognize that 
climate change is recognized as global public emergency condition to 
which all countries must respond, and must be treated as such in the 
context of the interpretation of all obligations in international law, 
including, but not limited to the TRIPS Agreement (Articles 7, 8, 30 and 
31). The parties agree that measures to address adaptation shall be 
especially treated as emergencies.   
 All possible policy avenues to accelerate research, development, 
demonstration and diffusion of climate-friendly technology, should be 
explored, including the use of all flexibilities, exceptions and limitations in 
international and national patent and related intellectual property rules, as 
well as innovative uses of intellectual property mechanisms, licensing 
practices, and alternative modes of innovation and diffusion. 
 UNFCCC parties agree that the TRIPS Agreement, the International 
Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, the 
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Agriculture, and the 
WIPO Copyright Treaty (“the international IP treaties’) do not and should 
not prevent UNFCCC parties from taking measures to address climate 
change mitigation and adaptation. Accordingly, while reiterating their 
commitment to the international IP treaties, they should affirm that these 
agreements can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner 
supportive of UNFCCC members obligations to adopt measures 
necessary to address climate change mitigation under Article 4 of the 
Convention, to enable their citizens to adapt to the effects of climate 
change and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to 
their socio-economic and technological development.  They should 
reaffirm the right of UNFCCC parties to use, to the full, the provisions in 
these international treaties, which provide flexibility for this purpose. 
 In disputes relating to the application and interpretation of measures 
under this declaration, parties agree that they shall submit to prior binding 
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arbitration under the TEC (under rules to be negotiated by the TEC and 
Advisory Board) for a determination of whether the measure in dispute 
was carried out in pursuit of meeting the obligation of the defending party 
under the UNFCCC, its protocols and COP decisions. Parties agree to be 
bound by such a determination in any dispute settlement complaints that 
they bring before any other body. This is meant to address the balancing 
requirement for necessity required by the panel approaches to GATT and 
TRIPS exceptions, and the ‘necessity’ requirement. 
 Parties also agree that they shall refrain from unilateral measures to 
address disputes related to actions taken under this declaration, specifically 
threats or unilateral measures such as withdrawal of trade preferential 
treatment or market access. 
 
IV. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
 
The proposals that conclude this chapter draw from the findings in the earlier 
chapters.  They are extensions in many cases of existing practices in the UNFCCC or 
from other regimes. They address directly identified gaps in the UNFCCC mechanisms 
themselves, based directly on the scale of the problem in terms of timing, scope and 
geography.  Crucially, they are not norm-setting proposals and cannot be characterized 
as such. Nothing about them requires a change in the existing norms and standards for 
intellectual property protection.  The contingent question that this thesis asked has been 
answered in the affirmative: TRIPS does bar or limit the effectiveness of interventions 
that countries can take to address behaviour by an intellectual property rightholder that 
limits the adoption, adaptation and replication of climate technologies.  However, when 
it comes to norm setting, the hurdle for necessity may not have been reached. What 
makes it difficult to answer whether norm-setting is really required is the paucity of real 
data regarding the existence and use of patent in the relevant technology sectors in the 
relevant national situations.  We need more information, but as discussed in the early 
part of this chapter, waiting is not costless and waiting for certainty may result in higher 
costs and necessitate more extreme action in the future.  What is clear is that any norm 
setting proposal cannot just tinker around the edges of the existing system if it is to 
address the full scale of the climate challenge.  It seems appropriate to close this chapter 
with a reminder of what is at stake: 
 
First, the timing issue – it is difficult to avoid the evidence that peaking will 
have to take place between 2015 and 2018. The data and scenarios tend to agree that 
peaking somewhere between 2015 and 2018 will be required if we are to stand a 
reasonable chance of reducing emissions by 80% by 2050 (relative to 2007 levels) and to 
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stabilize at an increase of only 1.5-2 degrees Celsius.1349  There is significant evidence 
and consensus that peaking can be achieved with existing or near commercialization 
technologies.1350   
Second, there is also the issue of scope of technologies. Peaking can only be 
achieved with rapid uptake of existing technology at a rate unprecedented in human 
history.  The need for rapid distribution of technological products is clearly paramount 
and economies of scale have to be achieved in a very short period of time.  The 
immediate availability of more efficient and low emission processes in all fields is crucial 
to shifting industries away from GHG-reliant paths and to preventing lock-in. In 
Chapter 2, and Chapter 3, the evidence on existing rates of market diffusion, even 
between developed country partners suggests that existing rates of licensing and 
transactions related to deployment and diffusion of climate technology are likely to be 
insufficient. 1351  The process of licensing negotiations or other bilateral exchanges 
between rightholders and users of their technologies are too slow.  While the facilitative 
mechanisms outlined above present serious attempts to reduce the costs of transactions, 
what is needed is an almost frictionless system.  However, we may also need to address 
the issue of uncertainty by not making unduly permanent changes in the innovation 
system, especially if we wish to maintain the dynamic efficiencies and production of new 
technologies in the post-2025 period after peaking.  As noted in Chapter 3, adaptive 
capacity must also be built up as quickly as possible in the near term to ensure increased 
resilience and survivability in the post-peak period, when changes of at least 1 degree 
Celsius appear to be already locked-in.1352   
It is also important in a world in which complex technologies consist of 
multiple patents that the focus is on increasing the capacity to access, use and adapt 
products rather than specific patented components. The solutions proposed must 
operate at the level of the product, not just at the one or more technological inventions 
contained within a product.  With respect to processes, the need is to address products 
produced by such processes and to the specific technologies that enable process change 
or efficiency, which are more likely embedded in the single patent or technology. What 
this means is that actions aimed at these technologies are not likely to have 100% 
congruence with specific patent classifications. The scope and effect of action will 
therefore be limited only to those situations wherein a patent (product or process) is 
being used for a particular designated climate technological purpose. A norm-setting 
solution would also have to address not just patents but the full panoply of intellectual 
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property rights including: plant breeders’ rights, copyright and trade secrets rights 
embedded, contained in, or consisting of technological products and processes for 
climate change mitigation and adaptation.   
The elements above outline one simple proposition: that norm-setting 
measures to address intellectual property to address climate change cannot consist of 
half-measures. TRIPS has become the primary regulatory tool for managing the global 
generation and diffusion of technologies.  A response to the challenge of climate change 
will have to operate at that global level.  It may be too early as it stands to specify exactly 
what the response should be. Further research may indicate further structural problems 
in global technology markets related to intellectual property and the trend lines continue 
in the direction in which they appear to be heading. Without data on licensing and the 
kinds of costs and terms being imposed, any concrete proposal will be flying somewhat 
blind in terms of hitting its target. 
Climate change presents a radical challenge to existing structures of production 
and consumption, and in particular to our existing modes of decision-making and legal 
implementation.  The uncertainty does not just lie in the extent to which we must act to 
mitigate and adapt to climate change but also in whether or not existing regulations pose 
a barrier or create too much friction to enable action to address climate change.  In 
implementing solutions, there is always the fear of doing more damage and creating new 
problems while trying to solve another problem.  There is also, however, the sense that 
delayed action may make effective action at a later date extremely costly or not possible 
at all. These uncertainties are complicated by deep divisions between developed and 
developing countries on burden sharing, on the scale and sources of financing, on the 
scale and sources of technology transfer.  Pragmatism requires that any workable 
solution must balance between all of the competing demands and uncertainties.  The 
scale of the climate change problem however, may require radical solutions that have 
broad impact.  There is clearly much more work to be done to provide better 
information on which to base solutions, especially in the arena of empirical evidence 
relating to the scale and scope of technology transfer and the role of intellectual 
property.  However, I believe that this book has provided at least one key to the puzzle: 
an assessment of the existing limits of the international IP system and the ways in which 
it is insufficient as things stand to enable technology transfer at the scale and scope 
necessary.  What I have tried to show is that the response to this need not be to rip the 
system up root and branch, but to target very specific mechanisms which can be 
adjusted and made to work for rather than against technology transfer through facilitation 
of transactions, and elaboration of existing obligations. Most importantly, this book has 
demonstrated not only that the UNFCCC can act to address these issues as a matter of 
international law and its own competence and mandate, and, hopefully, it has shown 
that it should act. 
 
 393 
 
Chapter 10  
Summary  
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis faced the challenge of answering a question that may have seemed 
to many to already have been asked and answered.  However, it was that very 
assumption that this thesis proposed to challenge and doing so required looking at the 
manner in which the question was framed and the context in which it was asked.  The 
question had been asked in order to address the question of whether it was necessary for 
the UNFCCC or any other international body to address intellectual property regarding 
climate change.  The way in which it was answered, was to ask empirical questions about 
the existence and distribution of patents, and whether this was a barrier to technology 
transfer.  The error in focusing on the empirical issues was two-fold: it did not address 
the actual problem which was not the existence of patents, but the uses to which they 
were put, especially licensing; and it did not address the actual issue of regulatory 
freedom to address intellectual problems if they were to arise.   
Understandably wishing to avoid having to revisit the entire intellectual 
property system, empirical studies aimed to design around the issue by showing that 
there are no empirical concerns regarding intellectual property protection in developing 
countries. If there are few patents in the industries studied, if there are few patents in 
the countries studied, if the patents that exist are not in the hands of concentrated 
ownership, then the necessity for developing countries to take unilateral actions beyond 
the existing intellectual property framework does not exist, and there is no need to 
renegotiate international intellectual property norms.  The Copenhagen Economics/IPR 
Company Study,1353  the Chatham House Study1354, the EPO/UNEP/ICTSD Study1355, 
the Dechezleprêtre et. al. Study1356 and the John Barton ICTSD study1357 all work within 
this framework. They all seek to answer the question of whether intellectual property 
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poses a barrier to action empirically.  However, I argued that the barrier question has 
always been a contingent one rather than one that is susceptible solely through empirical 
determination.  Thus, in this thesis, I divided the broader question into two elements: 
the necessity to act; and where there is necessity to act, is there capacity to act?  The first 
is an empirical question but the second is a legal question. The issue of whether the 
UNFCCC, or any other international regime, should act to address intellectual property 
lies, primarily in the answer to the second question rather than the first.  This is because 
necessity to act (of the country, not the UNFCCC) is actually an issue that is primarily 
legal rather empirical.  The room and the ability to act is determined by how necessity is 
framed in the international rules as much by the conditions in the national market, the 
behaviour of rightholders in that market, framed within the policy goal of addressing 
climate change. To the extent that global assessments of the distribution of patents, 
ownership of patents, can tell us where problems are likely to arise, if at all, they provide 
useful information.  To the extent that such global assessments tell us something about 
the nature and scope of licensing and other uses of intellectual property protected 
technologies, they provide useful information as to the kinds of interventions that may 
be needed.  However, given the variety of different countries, with different markets, 
with varying technology needs, and varying distributions of patent protection use, a priori 
determinations that a country or set of countries they will not need to take particular 
kinds of action to address intellectual property issues can never truly be made.   
However, I do not aim to dismiss such global empirical approaches. I believe 
they can provide crucial information to policymakers regarding potential opportunities 
and blockages in international technology markets.  It is on this basis that I have made 
several proposals in Chapter 9 for the ways in which the UNFCCC should address 
technology transfer and especially investment, market access and licensing related to 
intellectual property protected technologies.  After all, based on the existing studies 
examine in Chapter 4, it was possible to tentatively conclude that: 
- existing data in the very limited set of sectors studied show concentrated 
ownership of patents in developed countries, largely OECD.  Of patents that 
exist in developing countries, the vast majority are in China.  In terms of 
ownership by developing countries, China may have the largest ownership but 
this is still relatively small in comparison to OECD rightholders; 
- The majority of technologies in the very limited set are likely not patented in 
least developed countries.  They are almost certain to be patented in China, 
and in the main emerging economies of Brazil, India and China; 
- with respect to licensing in some of the sectors (especially wind and solar), 
there appears to be some evidence of licensing to major developing countries, 
but with some suggestion of geographical and other restrictions;   
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- What licensing there is appears to be from national or smaller companies, not 
necessarily in possession of best available technologies, and not from 
transnational enterprises with significant production capacity of their own.   
The lesson from these studies lies in the insight they provide regarding the 
dearth of technology transactions, and the pace of diffusion of intellectual property 
protected technologies.  What data we have from Chapter 3 also points to trends in 
patenting; increasing overall patenting in climate technologies, and a significant jump in 
R&D accompanied by significant transfers of IP into private sector hands. 
I also argue that, for the most part, the studies on the distribution of patenting 
fail by their own measures. The studies tell us very little about how patents in the sectors 
studied are exercised.  In addition, there are basic methodological differences regarding 
the use of patent data that limit the scope of conclusions that they can make.  This 
critical analysis of the relatively small pool of studies so far has not really been carried 
out before, especially within the framework that has been used here by looking at the 
scope of technologies, the timing of distribution of technologies, and the geographic 
focus. This critique provides a way of properly assessing the claims made as to nature 
and scale of the intellectual property problem for technology transfer; and this thesis 
concludes that while a useful start they do not provide sufficient purchase for a policy 
decision based purely on their findings.   
The problem of course is that the default of taking no action is entirely 
congruent with the untenable recommendations 1358  that no action is necessary to 
address intellectual property at this time. The mistake is to conflate taking action 
regarding intellectual property with taking action to address intellectual property norm-
setting.  It seems entirely appropriate to conclude from their findings that some action 
regarding intellectual property needs to take place, especially regarding licensing and 
transaction, without necessarily concluding that norms on intellectual property need to 
be changed.  
 The primary sin is one of scope: the landscapes and studies cover only a small 
sector of relevant technologies, mostly focused on mitigation, and within that power 
generation.  The discussion in chapter 2 constructed a set of technologies of particular 
relevance to developing countries based on TNAs, NAMAs, National Communications 
and several scenarios based on mitigation potentials.  That extensive discussion was 
necessary to drive the point home that the scope of technologies is necessarily wide and 
that studies and recommendations for action must be commensurate with that.   
                                                        
 
1358 See e.g. Copenhagen Economics and the IPR Company “Are IPRs a Barrier to the Transfer of Climate 
Change Technology?” Study Commissioned by European Commission DG Trade, January 2009. 
 396 
 
The importance of timing is also crucial. Almost all studies looking at 
intellectual property and climate change ignore the issue of timing and the role of timing 
in influencing the assessment of how a barrier operates.  Intellectual property creates a 
friction in the number and scope of technology transactions that take place.  We have to 
be concerned not just about the static volume of patenting but also the effect of 
patenting on the rate of diffusion. That means that we must ask about the extent to 
which patenting may delay adoption and diffusion of technologies by relevant peaking 
dates, in the case of mitigation, 2015-2018, in terms of adaptation, 2025-2030. Where 
the existence and exercise of patent rights creates frictions that delay the adoption 
adaptation and replication of climate technologies in developing countries, we have to 
consider that this may indeed pose a barrier, even if it is not an absolute bar.  This thesis 
concludes that while there is insufficient data to address this in the existing studies, there 
is some small indication (e.g. the Chatham House study) that diffusion is not happening 
fast enough due to the limited number of transactions into developing countries. 
 Finally, the studies generally have committed the sin of not taking geography 
and the potential of major emerging economies seriously enough.  While all focus on the 
nature and scale of patenting into major developing countries, especially in relation to 
developed countries, there is rarely enough in depth study of the intellectual property 
structure of relevant technology sectors at the national level and the role of exports of 
technology and goods to other developing countries. Some of the best data could have 
been obtained by focusing on the key developing country markets of Brazil, China, 
India and South Africa, and, in those jurisdictions and asking: 
- Based on the technology needs identified for that country, what is the portion 
of patenting in those technologies and technology sectors; 
- Based on the patented sectors, what is the nature  (cost and terms) and scale of 
licensing of those technologies to domestic firms; 
- Looking at technological capacity; what is the trend in the capacity of domestic 
firms to adopt, adapt and replicate the technologies in the sectors identified in 
the technology needs. 
This kind of research program will still allow some comparative sectoral based 
work, but will be rooted in the actual technology needs of developing countries and 
provide sufficient depth to provide useful information about the necessity to act on 
norm-setting at the international level if the data show that developing countries are 
unable to take action to address key issues that arise in multiple jurisdictions at a 
significant scale.  Only such findings may provide sufficient impetus for a multilateral 
solution of sufficient scale in intellectual property norm-setting.  Without such 
information, this thesis finds it difficult to recommend with confidence a course of 
action at the UNFCCC or any other international body aimed at norm-setting, despite 
the finding that where the behaviour by an intellectual property right holder bars or 
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limits or TRIPS does indeed bar or limit the capacity of developing countries to make 
interventions to address: 
a. Affordability - ensuring that prices of products are not set 
so high that it is too expensive for all the relevant economic 
actors to afford.  
b. Adoptability - ensuring that prices of products and or 
know-how are not set so high that they make it 
commercially unviable for all relevant actors to adopt 
‘climate-friendly’ technologies. 
c. Adaptability – ensuring sufficient distribution of knowledge 
(information, skills, know-how) to enable a critical number 
of existing producers/service providers in the market to 
adopt, adapt and replicate climate technologies and ensure 
their participation in the market. 
 
The findings in Chapter 6 depended on identifying the kinds of interventions 
that developing countries would ostensibly use and examining them in the light of 
existing WTO and TRIPS jurisprudence.  This framework brings something new to the 
literature which has traditionally looked simply at the agreement itself and the 
flexibilities it contains. This thesis adds to the literature by first identifying a  universe of 
interventions that have historically been used to encourage technology transfer and that 
are relevant to technology transfer for climate change; examining whether or not TRIPS 
addresses them; and finally, discussing the scope of activity available under TRIPS as a 
legal matter. The novel approach that this thesis takes is to situate the legal analysis 
directly within the framework of the policy goal that such interventions are meant to 
achieve. Thus, availability was defined not just in legal terms but in terms of whether it 
enabled action at the right speed, at the right scope, and in the right countries.  Where a 
purely legal analysis might indeed have found that the TRIPS Agreement does not pose 
a significant limitation on the universe of potential actions, this allows me to examine 
the scope and nature of the actions that are legally available and note the ways in which 
the TRIPS Agreement limits their potential impact, and to conclude that their ability to 
make changes to market structures and behaviour is severely curtailed.  The IP-related 
interventions that would be most effective as levers have been marginalized and reduced 
in scope and effectiveness by the TRIPS Agreement.  The use of working requirements, 
one of the more powerful historical incentives for encouraging licensing and FDI has 
been curtailed.  The use of patent exclusions in key sectors of public interest such as 
pharmaceuticals and agriculture is no longer available.  Most importantly, few of the 
remaining flexibilities allow for the emerging economies to play the role as 
intermediaries and export products and know-how as they need to do if technologies are 
to be transferred to other developing countries at the scale and speed required. 
The most useful tools that are left legally and practically available by the TRIPS 
Agreement are the application of competition law and the use of performance and 
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technology transfer requirements, as well as requirements to have FDI take place in the 
form of JVs. The rest are smaller, marginal adjustments to domestic intellectual property 
systems.   
This is not to say that there do not remain significant interventions available to 
developing countries.  The list of activities in Chapter 6 that the TRIPS Agreement does 
not address or limit remains quite extensive.  Further research should examine the 
extent to which these options are actually being exercised by developing countries, 
looking at their effectiveness in timing, scale and scope.  It may be that developing 
countries have indeed not taken up and used to the fullest the available measures to 
encourage technology transfer.  It may be that some have even signed on to other 
international regimes, such as bilateral investment treaties, that place additional limits on 
the measures that TRIPS does not address. In addition, many may have signed on to 
bilateral and regional free trade agreements that further restrict their ability to use 
measures identified as legally available in this thesis.  It will be important to assess for 
each country the extent to which this has occurred and the extent to which they are free 
to take action to remove such restrictions. 
Finally, developing countries find themselves placed in a peculiar position in 
the relationship between TRIPS and the climate change regime.  In the event that a 
country finds that there are actions that it wishes to undertake in order to benefit from 
rights or implement obligations from one treaty that are prevented by their obligations 
under another treaty, they can appeal to conflict resolution mechanisms in international 
law that provide a framework for interpreters to either give priority to one set of 
obligations or to find a way to make the obligations mutually supportive and 
implementable.1359  This thesis concludes that the UNFCCC does not present such an 
obligation to developing countries because their obligations under the treaty to reduce 
emissions are conditional. Article 4.7 of the UNFCCC makes the implementation of 
their obligations under the UNFCCC dependent on being provided sufficient 
technology and financial support. Chapter 7 shows that they cannot use their obligations 
under the UNFCCC as a justification for taking actions that are not compliant with the 
TRIPS Agreement.  This limitation is also exacerbated by the fact that WTO law 
remains hostile to the intrusion of non-WTO law in its dispute settlement process 
providing very little purchase for entry of UNFCCC treaty language in any case, even if 
it applied.  As long as the approach in the WTO panel case EC – Approval and Marketing 
of Biotech Products1360 remains applicable, then, absent any other statement from within the 
institutions of the WTO, the UNFCCC cannot be used as applicable law between the 
                                                        
 
1359 Pauwelyn, J Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other Rules of 
International Law. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.). In line with Condon, B “Climate 
Change and Unresolved Issues in WTO Law” 12 J. Int'l Econ. L. 895 (2009). 
1360 See para. 7.70 – 7.71, Panel Reports, European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and 
Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/DS291/R / WT/DS292/R / WT/DS293/R, Add.1 to Add.9, and Corr.1, 
adopted 21 November 2006, DSR 2006:III-VIII, 847 (EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products) 
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parties to a dispute at the WTO that challenges a unilateral measure that has an effect on 
a TRIPS-related right or obligation. 
 I also conclude, in Chapter 7, that the hope that framing technology transfer 
as a human rights matter and thus part of the general international law that the WTO 
must consider remains an untested assertion at best.  There is no indication that the 
rights most relevant in this framework of economic, social and cultural rights are of 
such universality and integral nature as to trigger the obligation of other regimes to 
integrate them as applicable law.  In addition, intellectual property law has a special place 
in human rights law where intellectual property-like rights are part of the human rights 
framework rather than external to it. Thus one cannot reach to the human rights 
framework to try and use it to impose other considerations when the human rights 
framework itself contains an obligation of a sort to protect rights in intangible creative 
property.  In the end, in Chapter 8, I suggest that recourse to broader structures of 
international law may be the only option, with developing countries working in the 
UNFCCC and other international fora to take a far more active role in integrating the 
values of regimes such as the UNFCCC into the WTO by using ‘interaction’ clauses that 
explicitly state the intention to construct a particular relationship to the other regime.  
The limits of this are clearly political: to the extent that countries are unable to negotiate 
relaxations of norms in the WTO itself, they may not be able to agree to do so in the 
UNFCCC or other fora. I provide some framing that developing countries can use to 
make an effective case for the jurisdiction and competence of one venue over another 
on issues such as sustainable development and technology transfer, and to take 
advantage of the differing constitutional frameworks of the UNFCCC regime compared 
to that of the WTO.   
The scale of the climate challenge can be daunting. The combination of the 
language of catastrophe, with the long time frame for action, and the initially slow 
growth of climate impacts creates an environment where caution and incrementalism 
prevail.  Nobody wants to spend all their time staring into the sun. And yet, in the case 
of climate change, it seems the incrementalists may not be the true realists. In addressing 
climate change true realism may require that we all become radicals, an uncomfortable 
thought, especially for traditional intellectual property scholars and lawyers. It is a habit 
of thought to which environmental lawyers and scholars have had more time to become 
accustomed.  It is my hope that this thesis, by working to bridge the frameworks of both 
areas of law goes some way to providing a proper basis for a fruitful conversation 
between the intellectual property and climate change regimes. 
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